


ICPR TRANSLATION OF  
Indian  
Philosophical  
Classics

General Editor: Sibajiban Bhattacharyya

# The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali

SURENDRANATH  
DASGUPTA





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PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS

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THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA OF PATAṄJALI

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS

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THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA  
OF PATAÑJALI  
WITH ANNOTATIONS  
(ĀHNIKAS I - IV)

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

Edited by  
SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA



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## EDITOR'S PREFACE

Dr (Mrs) Surama Dasgupta donated a collection of unpublished works of the late Dr Surendranath Dasgupta to the library of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Lucknow. The present work belongs to that collection.

The work as published here is incomplete in two ways. Firstly, it covers only the first four Āhnikas of Prathamādhyāya of the Mahābhāṣya. Secondly, even of the four Āhnikas, the second and fourth Āhnikas are incomplete. There were two possible courses open here. First, to get the incomplete Āhnikas completed and to append them to the main work. This way was not followed because of the following reason. The value of the present work lies not so much in the translation of the text but in the very thorough discussions on all topics in the annotations. It was felt that a comparable treatment of the portions left out by Dr Dasgupta could be given only by someone having the width and depth of knowledge of the subject which Dr Dasgupta had. As such a scholar was not readily available, on the advice of Mrs Dasgupta the work is published in the same form in which Dr Dasgupta left it. As Dr. Dasgupta dictated different parts of the manuscript to different scholars apparently of unequal competence, the manuscript contained many errors of different sorts. I thank the editorial reader, Pandit Satkari Mukhopadhyaya of Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, for carefully going through the manuscript, correcting mistakes which remained after my editing, and for preparing the index. We have, however, corrected only obvious mistakes in spelling and in grammar.

It is hoped that this great work, incomplete though it is, will attract attention not merely of scholars of Sanskrit grammar, but also of philosophers of language because of the important philosophical discussions on various topics in the annotations.

April, 1991

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA



# FIRST ĀHNIKA

## (*Paspasā*)

*Pāṇini.*

**atha śabdānuśāsanam**

*Bhāṣya.*

athety ayam śabdo' dhikārārtih prayujyate.  
śabdānuśāsanam nāma śāstram adhikṛtam  
veditavyam.

The object of grammar is directly specified here by the elaborator of grammar, Patañjali – ‘atha’ etc. Now (follows) the instruction of words. The word ‘atha’ is used to indicate the commencement of the topic. Though the topic of the instruction of words is a long process, the word ‘atha’ indicates the commencement of such a topic. The action of instruction has for its object, ‘the words’. The word ‘adhikāra’ means *prastāva* or the commencement of a topic.<sup>1</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*

keṣāṁ śabdānām? laukikānām vaidikānām  
ca. tatra laukikās tāvad — gaur aśvah puruṣo  
hasti śakunirmṛgo brāhmaṇa iti. vaidikāḥ  
khalvapi — śām no devīr abhiṣṭaye; iṣe  
tvorje tvā; agnim īle purohitam; agna āyāhi  
vītaya iti.

Of what words ? Of the popular and the Vedic. There the popular are: the cow, the horse, the man, the elephant, the bird, the beast, the brahmin and so forth. Also there are the Vedic (propositions as illustrated in the Atharvan, Yajus, Ṛc and Sāman)— *śanno devīr abhiṣṭaye* — may the

1. Dīkṣita in the *Śabda-kaustubha* asserts that the word ‘atha’ which has the grammatical status of a *nipāta* has only an indicatory function (*dyotakatva*) like the *upasarga* and not an explicatory function (*vācakatva*). The word ‘atha’ indicates that now is the commencement of the topic of instruction of words. The word ‘anuśāsanam’ means that the function of the instruction consists in distinguishing correct from incorrect words (*vivicya bodhakatvam* – *vivicya asādhubhyo vibhajya bodhyante yena iti karane lyuṭ*). The word ‘instruction’ again has no reference to the instructor and for this reason the sixth case ending in *śabdasya anuśāsanam* is by the rule *kartṛ-karmaṇoh kṛti* and not by the rule *ubhaya-prāptau karmaṇi* and hence there is no legitimate objection against compounding *śabdasya* with *anuśāsanam*.

shining good be for the sacrifices (A. V. 1.1.6); *iṣe tvorje tvā*— I (cut thee) for libation and strength (Y. V. 1.1.1); *agnim īle purohitam* — I adore Agni, the leader (R. V. 1.1.1); *Agna āyāhi vītaye* — Oh Agni, may thou come for drinking (the clarified butter) (S. V. 1.1.1).<sup>2</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      *atha gaur ity atra kah śabdah?*

Now the question is —what is the word in cow (*gauḥ*).<sup>3</sup>

2. The words about which the instruction is proposed consist of such words as are used among the people, popular words and sounds. The word ‘*anuśāsana*’ means ‘to make known’. It also means ‘explaining with discrimination’. The word ‘*laukika*’ means known among the people (*loke vidiṭā iti laukikāḥ*) or that, that which has originated among the people (*loke bhavā iti laukikāḥ*). Though the *Vaidika* words are known among the people, yet they are separately mentioned for their importance. The *Pradipa* suggests that *laukika* is separately mentioned on account of the fact that it is spoken. In giving example of the *laukika* words, words are separately mentioned at random. But in giving the example of the *Vaidika* words, the definite order in which they occur cannot be overridden; and it is for that reason that the illustrations of *Vaidika* words are given in the form of sentences in which they occur. The *Uddyota* comments that the *Vaidika* illustrations are given in the form of sentences in order to show their accents.

3. Now when one says that the cow is white, no distinction is made between the word and the object among the people in general. One has therefore to distinguish the place in and status of the word in the awareness of the object. The awareness consists of the words, the universal and the individual. As a quality and a substance often appear as unified, so the word appears as unified with object. When the word ‘cow’ is pronounced, the universal and the particular may both appear in consciousness. The quality (*guṇa*) and the action (*kriyā*) being indistinguishable from those that possess them, also appear in consciousness along with them. There is a view that a substance is nothing but a conglomeration of qualities, and in such a view, the parts may be regarded as qualities of which the whole is a conglomeration. In the awareness of a cow its qualities are apparent in a generic manner in the cow as a whole. When we see mango, we have a general knowledge of its juiciness but still we may enquire about the specific nature of the juice. This problem that the enquiry about specific particulars is preceded by generic awareness has been more fully discussed in the *Mañjūṣā*.

When the word ‘cow’ (*gauḥ*) is pronounced, its etymological aspect does not come immediately before awareness. The word ‘cow’ (*gauḥ*) immediately stands before awareness as a significant something referring to its signifie. Just as the cow expresses its generic character which is inseparably inherent in it, so is it associated with the quality of signification. It has been said by Bharṭṛhari that all objects are penetrated through and through with words. All knowledge is inter-penetrated with words. An object seen by our eyes can at the same time remind us of the word which denotes it. Just as a ray of light works in a double manner in contributing to vision as

well as to the illumination of the object, so the word also signifies the object and itself is signified by the object. (*Vākyapadiya*, 1.124 and 1.55). When by looking into an object one is reminded of a word, that word must have been brought to the mind by that object; so the object also may have a reverse function by virtue of which the sight of the object reminds one of the word. So, just as the genus cow is identical with the particular cow, so the word also, by virtue of its association, is identical with the object; and so also are the qualities of the cow. Under such a theory a natural question is— how to distinguish the word? Is the word then identical with the substance of the object and its qualities etc. ? How can the word be at once identical with the cow and different from it? The reply of Patañjali is that negation and position become contradictory when they refer to the same specified unit. But otherwise they are not so. Thus qualities which are identical with being may be affirmed of it with impunity. So we may affirm pleasure and pain, heaven and hell, of being and no contradiction is felt. So the identity is affirmed of words with objects by virtue of their association and hence no contradiction can be anticipated.

A point may arise that if grammar consists in imparting instruction on words why should it try to analyse them in constitutive parts, such as the stem, the suffix, the prefix and the like. The answer is that the words are so vast that to exhaust them by simple enumeration would be an impossibility. The analytical method serves to classify the stems, the suffixes and the prefixes and impose a number of relation for associating them together and thereby can bring the description and words within reasonable limit. This method of analysis is merely a means by which the young learners may be introduced to the infinite realm of words. Being loyal to the method of analysis, different grammarians may use different schemes. There are some thinkers who think that when we listen to a word we are reminded of its fictitious constituent parts and these are indicative of particular meanings. This view is wrong. The introduction of fictitious parts as describing the constitution of an actually used word has no locus standi and are in themselves false, though they may, in the end, lead to the comprehension of the word and its meaning just as mere lines forming a script, though in themselves meaningless and in that way false, may indicate real objects. In reality, the signification of words is due to traditional usage. A suffix can only have an import so long as it is used with words. It does not matter, if in different grammars the suffixes have different forms. A suffix, however, can only be significant, when it is used in relation to words. A verbal form is supposed to be capable of indicating its meaning not by the memory of the conventionally artificial form of its primal root (as *du pacas*), but in the form in which it is practically used (e.g. *pacati*). In such usages as *pacati Devadattah* (*Devadatta* cooks) and *pacantam Devadattam paśya*, the suffixes *tip* and *śatṛ* if regarded as reminding one of the *laṭ* as signifying in one case (i.e. as in *pacati Devadattah*) the dynamicity of the verb as being qualitatively associated in the nominative *Devadatta* as its locus and in the other case (*pacantam devadattam paśya*) when it has to be supposed that the nominative is adjectival to the dynamicity of the verbal part we have a contradiction of principles as held by the Naiyāyikas. The Mīmāṃsakas also fall into the same difficulty when they deny the verbal action on the part of the nominative in one *adhikarana*, and in another *adhikarana* attributes meaning of *śatṛ* and *śāṇac* as modifying the nominative. Their

*Bhāṣya.*      kim̄ yat tat sāsnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-  
viṣāṇy-artaḥ-rūpam̄ sa śabdaḥ ?

To the previous question 'what is the *śabdaḥ* in *gauḥ*?', a further question is raised. Does *śabda* denote the object which is a combination of the dewlap, the tail, the hump, the hoof and the horn?

In reply in denying the supposition that the *śabda* of the word denotes that, Patañjali says:

*Bhāṣya.*      netyāha; dravyam̄ nāma tat.

"No," he says, "that is called *dravya* or substance". The enquirer again is supposed to ask:

*Bhāṣya.*      yat tarhi tad iṅgitam ceṣṭitam nimiṣitamiti saḥ  
śabdaḥ?

Does *śabdaḥ* then mean the gesturing, the moving or the winking? The final reply is that

*Bhāṣya.*      netyāha; kriyā nāma sā.

"No", he says, "that is called action." A further question is again asked:

assertion that the part denoted by the suffix *śānac* refers the action to the nominative cannot stand a deeper scrutiny. The principle that ought to guide the problem as to which ought to play the substantive part depends upon what may be the natural complement for the completion of the sense. In the case of *Devadattāḥ pacati* the nominative 'Devadatta' is the verbal complement for the completion of the verbal action and for this reason, it may be possible to regard the verb-suffix denoted part as having adjectival to the nominative 'Devadatta'. In that case, the meaning would be the verbal action as qualified by the nominative as modified by the suffix-denoted part. But the Naiyāyikas deny it; they think that the verb as a whole—the effort included in the action is adjectival to the nominative 'Devadatta'. But in the case of *śatṛ* and *śānac* these suffixes standing for the original verb-suffix cannot but be regarded as adjectival to the nominative which, in its turn, is adjectival to the action denoted by the verb. Thus the Naiyāyikas have to take to two different contradictory theories in explaining the relation between the subject and the action.

Following the view of the *Nirukta*, the grammar school holds that the verbs are dominated by the idea of action and names are dominated by the sense of being. The suffixes only denote the specific relations. But it is obvious that such analytic consideration of denotation is an over-adumbrage for Patañjali is a believer in the *Sphoṭa* doctrine which regards all analytic considerations as being meaningless. The word or words have a complete sense and that sense cannot be so analysed that we may be able to point out parts of each meaning as being denoted by certain analysed parts of the words. The *Śabda-kaustubha* goes on in this connection into special

*Bhāṣya.*      *yat tarhi tacchuklo nīlah kapilah kapota iti sa  
śabdah?*

Is it then the white, the blue, the brown, or the gray that is to be called the *śabda* or word? The reply given is:

*Bhāṣya.*      *netyāha; guṇo nāma sah.*

“No”, he says, “this is *guṇa*.”

Again, if the *guṇas* or rather those which have different colours are not to be regarded as words, then what are the words?

The *Bhāṣya* again proposes another reply:

*Bhāṣya.*      *yat tarhi tad bhinneṣ abhinnam chinneṣ  
acchinnam sāmānyabhūtam sah śabdah?*

Should that which being broken remains unbroken, being torn remains un torn, the being, the highest genus of all things, be called *śabda*?<sup>4</sup>

The conclusive affirmation rebutting the previous alternatives is given by Patañjali as:

*Bhāṣya.*      *netyāha; ākṛtir nāma sā.*

“No”, he says, “it is called *ākṛti*. ”<sup>5</sup>

The next question is:

*Bhāṣya.*      *kastarhi śabdah?*

What is then the word or *śabda*?

The answer, as given by Patañjali, is:

elaboration of the *Sphoṭa* theory which seems to us to be quite irrelevant for our present purposes.

4. The phrase ‘*bhinneṣ abhinnam*’ signifies that the genus or the class-notion is one. The phrase ‘*chinneṣ acchinnam*’ means that the class-notion is eternal. The word ‘*sāmānya-bhūtam*’ means like the class-notion *sāmānyam iva sāmānya-bhūtam*. The word *bhūta* is used in the sense of comparison. But Nāgeśa offers a different interpretation to the word ‘*sāmānya-bhūta*’. Nāgeśa says that the word *sāmānya* here need not mean the highest genus or class-notion; for in that case, it would not be possible to denote the class-notion of a smaller genus, the cow. The word ‘*sāmānya*’ simply means that which has an aspect of generic character. According to Nāgeśa there is no idea of comparison here. The word ‘*sāmānya-bhūta*’ means that entity which has a generic aspect.

5. *Ākṛti* means *jāti* or class concept and also the build of the body (*samsthāna*). The *ākṛti* on the one hand displays a definite structure and build and at the same time reminds one of the class-notion.

*Bhāṣya.*      yenoccāritena sāsnā-lāngūla-kakuda-khura-  
viṣāṇināṁ sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdah.

That which being pronounced leads to the comprehension of the animal possessing dewlap, tail, hump, hoof and horn is called 'śabda' or word.<sup>6</sup>

6. The word 'uccāritena' has been interpreted by Kaiyaṭa not as 'pronounced' but as 'expressed' (*prakāśitena*). According to the grammarians, the denoting entity is something different from the alphabets constituting a word (*pada*) or a sentence (*vākyā*). They argue that if the letter-sounds individually denote the object then the pronunciation of the first letter-sound would be enough and the pronunciation of the other letter-sounds constituting the word would be unnecessary. If each letter-sound has a meaning then they jointly cannot produce the unified meaning—the cow. If it is held that the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of the meaning takes place in succession, then as the letter-sounds vanish each moment that they are produced, it has to be admitted that the combination of the different letter-sounds contributing to the final manifestation takes place on the basis of memory; on such an alternative the word 'sara' will have the same manifestation of meaning as 'rasa' for the constituent letter-sounds as held in memory are the same. It is for this reason that the grammarians admit the existence of a separate transcendent whole called the *sphoṭa*. Here on this view the *pada* is a transcendent whole different from the *varṇas*. We have already shown why the letter-sounds or the *varṇas* can neither separately nor jointly manifest a meaning. The argument that the memory of the letter-sounds may integrate the letter-sounds in the same temporal order in which they were pronounced is objected to by the grammarians who hold that the sameness of order cannot be guaranteed in the case of memory. Nāgeśa in explaining the situation takes to the analogy of a painting. On a canvas something may be painted by various colours in a particular order, but the finished painting produces a sense of wholeness which cannot be deduced from the manner and order in which the strokes of the brush were applied.

Bhaṭṭoḍi Dikṣita in his *Śabda-kaustubha* speaks of eight kinds of *sphoṭa* such as *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa*, *vākyā-sphoṭa*, *akhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa*, and so on. In another type of classification, he speaks of five kinds of *vyakti-sphoṭa* and three kinds of *jāti-sphoṭa*. When the same consonance in different combinations yields different kinds of meanings, we have the case of *varṇa-sphoṭa*. Thus, *kar*, *kār*, *kur* make different meanings. In such cases as *Rāma*, *Rāmeṇa*, *Rāmāya*, it is impossible to determine what part of it denotes the substantive character of *Rāma* and what part of it denotes the case characters. This is called *pada-sphoṭa*. Again, in *dadhīḍam*, *Hare'va*, there being the same difficulty as to which of the parts denotes what, it has to be admitted that the sentences as such have crystallised meanings. This is called *vākyā-sphoṭa*. As a piece of pictorial art manifests its wholeness through all its constituent parts, so a *pada* or a *vākyā* also manifests its character as a whole, though the manifestation is suggested or imparted by the individual constituent sounds. This appearance of wholeness is not conditioned by the parts, for in the expression of a picture also, one might regard the parts as playing the role of conditions (*upādhī*). A

difference must here be noted between *vyañjanā* and *upādhi*. In the case of *vyañjanā*, something is projected which was not present in the projecting constituents. Thus *rasa* or an aesthetic emotion is projected by a piece of literary art and so a picture may be projected through the diverse placings of colours and lines. But an *upādhi* is that which modifies in some manner or other, the object or objects which is perceived in and through the *upādhi*. The modification may be special, temporal or the attribution of new characters. Bhaṭṭoji maintains that the projection of the type of *sphoṭa* is a case of *vyañjanā* and not of *upādhi*. The next question is, under what category, can we include *sphoṭa*. The reply is, that though it may not be included within the well-known categories of the philosophies like that of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, it is a category of reality (*bhāva*). No objection can be raised against it, on the ground that it is not included within the well-known categories, for since its existence is logically proved, it does not matter under what category it may be included. No philosopher who evolved any set of categories of existence ever put a limit to the number of individual existence. In the case of *upādhis*, it is always possible to set a limit to the conditional modifications. Or one may divide the categories as existent or non-existent, eternal or non-eternal. In the case of the categories of existence, it is fruitless to make any enumeration of appearances due to the operations of *upādhi*. In both these alternatives, the *varṇas* are unnecessary. The manifesting set of sounds of a unique nature conditions the *sphoṭa* which is manifested as 'ka' or 'kha'. This leads to the monistic theory of *sphoṭa*, such that, the one *sphoṭa* may manifest itself as diverse *sphoṭas* of *varṇas*, *padas*, etc. through the diverse conglomeration of sounds co-operating together as conditions or *upādhis* for the manifestation of particular *sphoṭas* as 'ka' or 'kha'. In support of his view Bhaṭṭoji quotes from the *Tattva-bindu* which is supposed to hold that the *sphoṭa* of 'ka' is not different from the *sphoṭa* of 'ga'. In counting on Bopadeva's support, he says that as letter-sounds may be pronounced in shrill or a tender voice, so does one *sphoṭa* manifest itself in the form of diverse letter-sounds. Bhartṛhari also in his *Vākyapadiya* (1.73) says that just as the parts do not exist in the *varṇas*, so the *varṇas* do not exist in the *padas* and the *vākyas* also differ absolutely from the *padas*. For this reason, one has to admit the theory of *akhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍa-vākyā-sphoṭa*. These together with the *varṇa-sphoṭa* and *vākyā-sphoṭa* as described before give us the fivefold *sphoṭas*. There are others, however, who hold the theory of *jāti-sphoṭa*. According to this school of thinkers, the letter-sounds denote the *jāti* or the class-notion and these class-notions through a gradual widening of its limits ultimately refers to Brahman. Thus according to this view, Brahman is the ultimate significance of words but different meanings appear on account of the conditioning apparatus (*upādhi*) of the different letter-sounds. There is, however, another view as to which different meanings or significance are projected by words due to the diverse manifestations of the functions of *avidyā* (*avidyā-vṛtti-brahmatattvameva tattadupahitam vācyam vācakaṇīca avidyā avidyā-ka-dharma-viśeṣo vā jātir iti pakṣe tu saiva vācikā astu ityāhuḥ*).

Bhaṭṭoji holds that as already said that there are eight types of *sphoṭa*. Both Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa admit the *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākyā-sphoṭa* views. But true eternity according to them belongs only to the *jāti-sphoṭa*. Every word ultimately expresses the ultimate reality, the Brahman or rather it is the reality of the

*Bhāṣya.*      kāni punah ūabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni?

What are the needs of the instruction regarding words?<sup>7</sup>

Brahman that appears as words (*anupadam eva brahmatavvam eva hi ūabda-rūpatayā pratibhāti*). The other view of course is that *avidyā* is the *jāti* and from that point of view in the phenomenal aspect *jāti* is also eternal. The analysis of grammar is all unreal just as the scripts and writings of all descriptions are all unreal. The real aspect, however, is the concrete expression of the whole as expressed in concrete wholes through words or propositions. Bhaṭṭoji holds that this view has been maintained by Patañjali and Kaiyāṭa.

Bhartṛhari also believes that the *jāti* or the class concept is ultimately the Brahman. Thus he says it is only the Being (*sattva*) that appears diverse as the cow or the cat in diverse relations and this is the highest universal or *jāti* and all words are ultimately grounded in them. All nouns and verbs signify this reality. This is the eternal Great Self. This is signified by all suffixes like *tva* and *tal* that signify abstractness.

Though a reference has been made to eight kinds of *sphoṭas*, both Patañjali and Kaiyāṭa believe in the doctrine of *vākyā-sphoṭa*, ultimately leading to *jāti-sphoṭa*. The position may briefly be stated thus: a proposition or a combination of propositions forming a *vākyā* or sentence signifies a unified whole and this through a hierarchy ultimately leads to the concept of the pure Being which involves within it all specific forms of Being as being impositions on it. It is only by a reverse process and for illustrative purposes that we adopt the process of grammatical analysis. Philosophers who adhere to other systems of thought start at the wrong end and believe that we must begin with the analysis of words and the relations to suffixes, prefixes and the like and then proceed upwards on the analogy of atomic and molecular construction to bigger wholes as forming the propositions. There are, however, situations in which such a view seems to have a better footing. Bhartṛhari also has said that what one school regards as primary is regarded as secondary by other schools. He further says that in the synthetic word the 'brāhmaṇa-kambala' (the blanket of the Brahmin) there is no separate meaning of the word 'brāhmaṇa'; so in a proposition or a combination of propositions the individual words have in themselves no individual meaning (*Vākyapadiya*, 2.14). Thus the function of 'nipāṭas' as suggestiveness and all the *vikarāṇas* as being without meaning and the like are analytical discussions for the comprehension of the structure of words while in a state of formation. Thus Bhartṛhari says that the distinction of the *upasarga* and the *dhātu* has been made for the sake of advising as to the place that is to be taken by certain prefixes like *at* and the like. In reality, however, the *dhātu* and the *upasarga* together constitute the *dhātu* (*Vākyapadiya*, 2.182). Thus also the name and its meaning are identical. The supposition of the special importance of the suffixes has only value as illustrative of the constructive process of the word. These discussions regarding the various functions of prefixes, suffixes and the like, though ultimately unreal still have a significance analogous to the science of scripts such as letters and the like to the understanding of the composition.

7. Kaiyāṭa points out that the question is whether the study of grammar is to be regarded as an obligatory duty or an optative work. Nāgeśa, however, puts it

*Bhāṣya.* rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam.

The needs (of studying grammar) are preservation, modification, injunction, brevity and certainty.<sup>8</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* rakṣārtham vedānām adhyeyam vyākaraṇam. lopāgama-varṇa-vikārajño hi samyag vedān paripālayiṣyati.

The grammar is to be studied for the preservation of the Vedas. Only the person who knows about elisions, introductions and the change of sounds can properly follow the Vedas.<sup>9</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* ūhaḥ khalvapi—na sarvair lingair na ca sarvābhīrvibhaktibhir vede mantrā nigaditāḥ. te cāvaśyam yajña-gatena puruṣena yathā-yathāḥ vipariṇamayitavyāḥ. tānnāvaiyā-karaṇāḥ śaknoti yathāyathāḥ vipariṇamayitum. tasmād adhyeyam vyākaraṇam.

Certainly also modification; in the Vedas the *mantras* are not always uttered in all genders and with all kinds of suffixes. The person engaged in sacrifice must properly modify them. No one who is not a grammarian

otherwise and thinks the word *prayojana* means *prayojaka*, i.e. the question is whether any real purpose is served by the study of grammar. Bhaṭṭoji, however, says that it falls within the obligatory duties of a Brahmin to study the Vedas and as grammar is an accessory literature (*aṅga*) of the Vedas, its study is also obligatory. So the study of grammar has the same obligatoriness as the performance of the daily *sandhyā* prayers.

8. *Rakṣā* or preservation means the preservation of the Vedas. There exist such forms in the Vedas as are not found in spoken Sanskrit and unless people read grammar, ignorant people might, following the usage of ordinary Sanskrit speech, consider the Vedic forms to be erroneous. The Vedic language differs from spoken language in various ways. There may be elisions, introductions, elision and introduction both, change of sounds and the like.

9. Thus certain suffixes are elided only in the Vedas. Thus in *lai* of the verb *dūha*, the *ta* of the suffix at the third person plural number is elided and we have the form *devā aduhra* which is different from the current Sanskrit expression *aduhata*. Again sometimes sounds are changed; instead of *udgrāha* and *nigrāha* we have the Vedic forms *udgrābha* and *nigrābha*.

can make the proper modification. For that reason one should study grammar.<sup>10</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* āgamah khalvapi—‘brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ ṣadāṅgo vedo’dheyo jñeyaśca’ iti. pradhānam ṣadāṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam. pradhāne ca kṛto yatnah phalavān bhavati.

There is also the Vedic injunction—‘a Brahmin should, without any objective, study and know the dharma as the Veda with its six *aṅgas*. Grammar is the prominent of the six *aṅgas*. Effort made in the prominent *aṅga* produces fruit.’<sup>11</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* laghvartham cādhyeyam vyākaraṇam. ‘brāhmaṇenāvaśyam śabdā jñeyāḥ’ iti. na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇam laghunopāyena śabdāḥ śakyā jñātum.

10. There are two kinds of sacrifices called *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. *Prakṛti* is that kind of sacrifice in which all accessories are mentioned fully, such as *darśa-pūrṇamāsa*. *Vikṛti* is that kind of sacrifice in which the details are not mentioned, but the details of the *mantra* is to be imagined by the analogy of the *prakṛti* sacrifice. Thus when in the *prakṛti* sacrifice the *mantra* is given; ‘agnaye tvā juṣṭam nirvapāmi’; in the *vikṛti* sacrifice there is a *caru-yāga* and the *vidhi* is *sauryam carum nirvapet brahmavarcasakāmaḥ*, i.e. he who desires the brahminic spirit should offer the *caru* to Sūrya, but the exact *mantra* of the offering of *caru* is not given; here the *mantra* is to be formulated after the analogy of the *mantra* of offering made to Agni as specified in the *prakṛti*. It has been noted above that the *mantra* of offering obtains to ‘agnaye tvā juṣṭam nirvapāmi’. Now the *mantra* offering oblations to Sūrya must be formulated in analogy to this *mantra* by changing *agnaye tvā* to *sūryāya tvā*. Such a change cannot be made if the sacrificer has no knowledge of grammar.

11. The word *kāraṇa* in *niṣkāraṇa* means ‘end’ or ‘object’ (*phala*). It is suggested by Nāgeśa that a study of grammar is obligatory for a Brahmin and optative for others. The fruitfulness of the study of grammar consists in this alone that only by a study of grammar one can understand the meanings of the Vedas and the other *aṅgas* which consist of speech. Nāgeśa in commenting on the word ‘dharma’ says: ‘dharmaṭvāca vedasya puruṣa-yatna-sādhyatayā dharmatvenābhimatādhyayana-jñāna-karmatvena-upacārikam’, i.e. though *dharma* cannot really be the object of study or of knowledge, yet since the Vedas are the source of *dharma*, a study of the Vedas and its knowledge are regarded as *dharma* in a secondary sense.

Grammar is to be studied for the sake of brevity. 'A Brahmin must know words.' There is no other simple method of knowing words than grammar.<sup>12</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*

asandehārtham cādhyeyam vyākaraṇam.  
yājñikāḥ paṭhanti—'sthūla-prṣatīm āgni-  
vāruṇīm anaḍvāhīm ālabheta' iti. tasyām  
sandehāḥ—sthūlā cāsau prṣatī ca sthūla-  
prṣatī, sthūlāni vā prṣanti yasyāḥ seyam  
sthūlaprṣatī? tām nāvaiyākaraṇāḥ svarato'-  
dhyavasyati. yadi pūrva-pada-prakṛti-  
svaratvam tato bahuvrīhiḥ, atha  
samāsāntodāttatvam tatas tatpuruṣa iti.

Grammar should be studied also for attaining certainty. The sacrificers read as follows: *sthūla*, etc. Now there is a doubt whether the word '*sthūla-prṣatī*' is a *tatpuruṣa* or *bahuvrīhi* compound. In the first case it would mean that which is fat and has spots on it or in the other case it would mean that has large spots on it. No one but a grammarian would distinguish the difference between the two (in the first case meaning a cow which is fat and has spots on its back and in the second case meaning having large spots on its back)—describing the cow which is to be sacrificed in honour of the gods, Agni and Varuṇa (*sthūla-prṣatīm agni-  
vāruṇīm anaḍvāhīm ālabheta*) leading to the accent of the first *pada* in the case of *bahuvrīhi* or leading to an *udātta* accent at the end of the compound word in the case of the *tatpuruṣa*.<sup>13</sup>

12. A brahmin earns his living by teaching and no teaching is possible without words. Again, words being limitless they can only be studied through grammar which systematizes them under general principles and exceptions and it is this method that makes grammar the simplest method of learning a language.

13. The word '*asandeha*' involves a negation of the *prāgabhbā* type, i.e. the grammarian has no doubt in his mind which is later on destroyed. In his case no doubt arises. In the case in question the *saṃasa* to be accepted is *bahuvrīhi* and the accent is to be given on the first member of the compound (*pūrva-pada-prakṛti-svara*). From the manner of the accent of such Vedic passages, which the sacrificer learnt from the teacher, he knows that the cow he has to sacrifice is such that would have large spots on it and this he could not know unless he was a grammarian. A grammarian knows that a word which has accent on the first member is a *bahuvrīhi* compound. So by the manner of his own reading he can clearly comprehend the meaning of the compound as being *bahuvrīhi* which is of practical importance for him for selecting the sort of the cow he requires.

*Bhāṣya.*

imāni ca bhūyah śabdānuśāsanasya  
prayojanāni—‘te’surāḥ’, ‘duṣṭāḥ śabdāḥ’;  
‘yad adhitam’; ‘yastu prayuṇkте’; ‘avi-  
dvāṁṣaḥ’; ‘vibhaktiṁ kurvanti’; ‘yo vā  
imām’; ‘catvāri’; ‘uta tvāḥ’; ‘saktumiva’;  
‘sārasvatīm’; ‘daśamyām putrasya’;  
‘sudevo’si varuṇa’ iti.

There are further the following objects for the instruction of words: ‘Those *asuras*’; ‘wrongly pronounced word’; ‘whatever is studied’; ‘whoever uses’; ‘the ignorant’; ‘they make the suffixes’; ‘he who (reads) these’; ‘the four’; ‘and what one does’; ‘like the powdered pulse’; ‘belonging to *Sarasvati*’; ‘of the son, on the tenth lunar day’; ‘o *Varuṇa*, you are highly shining’.<sup>14</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*

te’surāḥ—‘te’surā helayo helaya iti kurvan-  
taḥ parābabhūvus tasmād brāhmaṇena na  
mlecchitavai nāpabhāṣitavai. mleccho ha vā  
eṣa yadapaśabdāḥ’. mlecchā mā bhūma’ity  
adhyeyāṁ vyākaraṇam.—te’surāḥ.

Te’surāḥ (those *asuras*):— those *asuras* were defeated because they pronounced ‘*helayah*’, ‘*helayah*’ (i.e. instead of pronouncing the word ‘*arayah*’ the enemy, as preceded by the vocative term ‘*he*’ with a long *pluta* accent, the *asuras* on account of their defective speech pronounced it as ‘*helaya*’; therefore the brahmin should not pronounce as a *mleccha* does and should not use vulgar words: it is the vulgar word that is called a *mleccha* word. Grammar ought to be studied in order that we may not be *mlecchas*.<sup>15</sup>

14. These cryptic phrases which have been interpreted by Patañjali in the immediately succeeding passages carry no meaning to us in themselves and it is not at all intelligible why Patañjali should enumerate them as well-known cryptic phrases unless in his time these have already attained popular celebrity. The commentators are practically all silent about the significance of the enumeration of these cryptic phrases. These objections are regarded as being accessory (*ānusāṅgika*) to the items of usefulness of studying grammar which has just been enumerated.

15. Kaiyāṭa points out a different reading in as the use of “*haihayo*” instead of ‘*haihe*’ by two *asuras*. The mistake in this case consists in dropping the use of the vocative *pluta* accent. In the reading accepted above, the mistake consists in

Bhāṣya.

duṣṭah śabdah—

duṣṭah śabdah svarato varṇato vā,  
 mithyā-prayukto na tamartham āha /  
 sa vāg-vajro yajamānaṁ hinasti,  
 yathendraśatruḥ svarato' parādhāt //  
 iti duṣṭāñchabdān mā prayuṅkṣmahīty-  
 adhyeyam vyākaraṇam.— duṣṭah śabdah.

A word wrongly accented or sounded, is a confounded use and cannot convey the desired meaning. That speech is like a thunder that injures the sacrificer just as the (word) 'Indra-śatru' (did) on account of its wrong accent. We ought to read grammar so that we may not pronounce words wrongly. Just as the *homa* performed by *adhvaryu* produces virtue for the sacrificer, so the mispronunciation of the *adhvaryu* injures the sacrificer (*yajamāna*). The story of the mispronunciation of the word 'Indra-śatru'.

When Viśvarūpa, the son of Tvaṣṭṛ was killed by Indra, Tvaṣṭṛ began a sacrifice for producing a son who would be able to kill Indra. In doing this sacrifice he uttered the mantra 'Indra-śatru (slayer of Indra) *vardhasva* (grow)'. Here the object of sacrifice is to make that one grow who would be the slayer of Indra, and therefore according to grammar the *udātta* accent should be on the last member, but the priest had by mistake put the *udātta* accent on the first member thus completely changing the meaning of the compound and producing a son who would be killed by Indra (*indrah śatruḥ ghātako yasya*).

pronouncing 'la' instead of 'ra' and in conjoining two *padas* in the *vākyā* 'helayah' instead of pronouncing two *padas* 'he' and 'arayah' separately. This prohibitory injunction is of the nature of *arthavāda*. The *arthavāda* consists generally in the narrative of a story in strengthening of the emphasis of an obligatory or a prohibitory injunction. It is supposed that there is a prohibition in the *śruti* against the vulgarization of words in pronouncing as leading to defect and the present story of the *asuras* is an *arthavāda* for strengthening the force of the prohibition. It is suggested that this prohibitory *arthavāda* may be treated as having the force of a prohibitory injunction. The word *apabhāṣa* is used to refer to such words which through error or confusion slightly differ from the usage sanctioned in grammar (*apaśabdatvam vyākaraṇānugataśabdasyeṣad bhraṇṭsana eva prasiddham*—Nāgeśa). The 'mleccha' here does not mean either particular races of people or country. It only means speech not sanctioned by grammar and thus only means 'unacceptable' (*nindya*). Bhaṭṭoji says that in the *Śatapathabrahmāṇa* (*Mādhyandina*) the reading is 'helavo helavah' instead of *helayo helayah* as given here. The present reading does not seem to be traceable.

*Bhāṣya.* yad adhītam—  
*yadhitamavijñātaṁ nigadenaiva śabdyate /*  
*anagnāviva śuṣkaidho na tajjvalati karhicit //*  
*tasmād anarthakām mādhigīṣmahītya-*  
*dhyeyaṁ vyākaranam. —yadadhitam.*

That which is only studied and merely pronounced but not properly understood does not ever burn like dry wood (in a hearth) without fire. So grammar should be studied so that our reading may not be fruitless.<sup>16</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* yastu prayuṇkte—  
*yas tu prayuṇkte kuśalo viśeṣe*  
*śabdān yathāvad vyavahāra-kāle /*  
*so nantam āpnoti jayam paratra*  
*vāgyogavid duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ //*

Kah? vāgyogavid eva. kuta etat? yo hi  
 śabdān jānāty apaśabdān apyasaū jānāti.  
 yathaiva hi śabda-jñāne dharmah, evam  
 apaśabda-jñāne' pyadharmah. atha vā  
 bhūyān adharmah prāpnoti. bhūyāṁso' pa-  
 śabdāḥ, alpiyāṁsaḥ śabdā iti. ekaikasya hi  
 śabdasya bahavo' pabhramśāḥ. tad yathā  
 gaur ity asya śabdasya gāvī goṇī gotā  
 gopotaliketyādayo bahavo' pabhramśāḥ.  
 atha yo'vāgyogavid ajñānam tasya śaraṇam.

Who uses—an adept in special peculiarities (i.e. which word is correct in which sense and the like) who uses words properly at the time of usage attains victory in the other world.

(The person) who knows the proper conjunction of words is corrupted by vulgar words. (Is corrupted by vulgar words)—

16. The above verse is found in the *Nirukta* (only there is the reading *grhītam* instead of *adhītam*). This is preceded by the following passage:

sthānurayaṁ bhāraharaḥ kilābhūd  
 adhītya vedam na vijñātī yo'rtham /  
 yo'rthajñā it sakalaṁ bhadramaśnute  
 nākameti jñāna-vidhūta-pāpmā //

Who? Only he who knows the conjunction of words. Why so? He who knows the correct words also knows the incorrect or vulgar words. As there is merit in knowing correct words there is demerit in knowing vulgar words.

Or, rather there is chance of there being more demerit. There are more vulgar words and less correct words. For each correct word there are many vulgar usages. Thus the correct word 'gauḥ' (cow) has many vulgar usages—'gāvī', 'goṇī', 'gotā', 'gopotalikā', and many other vulgar forms. He who does not know the proper conjunction of words is only to thank (his) ignorance.<sup>17</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* viṣama upanyāsaḥ—nātyantāyājñānam  
śaraṇām bhavitumarhati. yo hyajānan vai  
brāhmaṇām hanyāt surām vā pibet so'pi  
manyē patitah syāt.

The thesis is contradictory. Ignorance cannot be ultimate (lit. endless) support. One who unknowingly kills a brahmin or drinks liquor may well be supposed to have fallen low.<sup>18</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* evam tarhi—  
'so'nantam āpnoti jayam paratra /  
vāgyogavid—duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ //  
kah? avāgyogavid eva. atha yo vāgyogavid  
vijñānam tasya śaraṇam.

17. The above represents the opponents' point of view. The opponent is supposed to object to the accruing of merit through the study of grammar. He is supposed to hold that the grammarian in knowing the correct words naturally knows also the limitless incorrect words. Therefore if he happens to attain any merit by the knowledge of correct words, he attains a much greater measure of demerit through the knowledge of incorrect words. In such a situation, it is the grammarian who is in a grave situation for through his knowledge of incorrect words he is being corrupted in a limitless manner (vāg-yogavid eva duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ). The non-grammarians, however, the objector is supposed to think, is obviously in a better position, for since he does not know the correct word, he cannot know such a variety of incorrect words as a grammarian would do. He would probably know one of the incorrect forms and be quite ignorant of the variety of other forms. His ignorance therefore saves him from much mischief which would come to the learned man through his knowledge of many incorrect forms naturally associated with the knowledge of correct forms.

18. The word *atyantāya* is an obscure *avyaya* word having the same meaning as *atyantam*. The purport here is that there is a difference between men and beasts. The beasts are absolutely shrouded in ignorance and are therefore below good and evil,

So then he attains endless victory in the other world; he who knows the conjunction of words is corrupted by (his knowledge of) vulgar words.

Who? Only he who is not conversant with the conjunction of words. But he who has knowledge of the conjunction of words has knowledge for his support.<sup>19</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      kva punar idam pañhitam? bhrājā nāma ślokāḥ.

Where has it been read? These are verses known as *bhrājā ślokas* (i.e. verses composed by Kātyāyana as Nāgeśa points out).

*Bhāṣya.*      kiñca bhoḥ ślokā api pramāṇam?

Oh! Are verses also to be regarded authoritative?

*Bhāṣya.*      kiñcātah?

Why such a question?

*Bhāṣya.*      yadi ślokā api pramāṇam ayam api ślokah  
pramāṇam bhavitum arhati—

“yadudumbara-varṇānām  
ghaṭinām maṇḍalam mahat /  
pītām na gamayet svargām  
kim tat kratugatām nayet //” iti.

pramatta-gīta eṣa tatra-bhavataḥ. yas-  
tvapramatta-gītastat pramāṇam.—yastu  
prayuṇkte.

If verses are to be regarded as authoritative, then the following verse is also authoritative (says the objector):

“If (the contents) of a collection of copper-coloured jugs (i.e. liquor) do not, when drunk, lead (one) to heaven, will that be attained through sacrifice?”

but man who has intelligence and who has the right to know good and evil is expected to make an effort towards a knowledge of them. He cannot offer ignorance as a plea.

19. The idea is that mere knowledge of vulgar words does not cause any demerit. It is the use of vulgar words that causes demerit. He who knows the science of words knows both the correct and incorrect words, but he uses only the correct words.

This is a mad man's song that you have quoted. That which is not a mad song may be authoritative.<sup>20</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      avidvāṁsaḥ —

“avidvāṁsaḥ pratyabhivāde  
 nāmno ye na plutim̄ viduḥ /  
 kāmaṁ teṣu tu viproṣya  
 strīśvivāyamahāṁ vadet //”  
 abhivāde strīvan mā bhūmety adhyeyam̄  
 vyākaranam. —avidvāṁsaḥ.

The ignorant—"Those ignorant persons who at the time of returning a greeting do not know that the *pluta* is to the name (of the person first greeting) may be addressed at pleasure after returning from a distant place merely as 'I am here' as one might do with regard to women."

Grammar should be studied so that at the time of greeting we may not be like women.<sup>21</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* vibhaktim kurvanti—

yājñikāḥ pañthanti—‘prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ kāryāḥ’ iti. na cāntareṇa vyākaranam prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ śakyāḥ kartum. —vibhaktim kurvanti.

20. The idea is that the śloka of Kātyāyana quoted above is authoritative because it has been written by a wise person and Kaiyāṭa observes that this has a support of the Vedas also; cf. *ekaḥ śabdah sujñātah suśtu prayuktah, svarge loke kāmadhuk bhavati*, i.e. even a single word when properly known and properly used may produce all the fruits of a man's desire in the world of heaven.

21. It is the rule that a superior person when returning a greeting made by an inferior person should call the latter by his name with the *pluta* vowel. It is also the rule that when an inferior person addresses a superior person he does it as follows — 'I greet you, I am Devadatta' — but in the case of offering a greeting to women one should not mention one's name but say merely (in the form) 'I great you' (*ayam aham abhivādaye*). But as already said, in the other case one should say *abhivādaye Devadatto' ham*. But with reference to the person who does not know that at the time of returning the greeting of an inferior person he should return the greeting by accosting him by his name with the *pluta* at the end, may behave as he might do to a woman, i.e the inferior person may greet such a superior person without mentioning his own name as he would do in the case of greeting a woman.

The sacrificial priests read thus—"The *prayāja mantras* should be (suitably) associated with suffixes", but it is not possible to do so without studying grammar.<sup>22</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      yo vā imāṁ —

"yo vā imāṁ padaśah svaraśo' kṣaraśāś ca  
vācam vidadhāti sa ārtvijīno bhavati."  
ārtvijināḥ syāmetyadheyam vyākaraṇam.  
—yo vā imāṁ.

And who this—"And who properly articulates this speech according to accent and according to consonant and vowel sounds becomes a priest." Grammar ought to be studied so that we may be priests.

*Bhāṣya.*      catvāri—

"catvāri śrīṇgā trayo asya pādāḥ  
dve śīrṣe sapta hastāśo asya /  
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti  
maho devo martyā āviveśa //"

'catvāri śrīṇgāṇī'—catvāri padajātāni  
nāmākhyātopasarganipātāś ca. 'trayo asya  
pādāḥ'—trayaḥ kālā bhūtabhavīṣyad-  
vartamānāḥ. 'dve śīrṣe'—dvau śabdātmānau  
nityāḥ kāryāś ca. 'sapta hastāśo asya'—  
sapta vibhaktayah. 'tridhā baddhāḥ'—triṣu  
sthāneṣu baddha urasi kāṇṭhe śirasīti.  
'vṛṣabho' varṣaṇāt. roravīti—śabdāṇi karoti.  
kuta etat? rautiḥ śabda-karmā. 'maho devo  
martyā āvivešeti'—mahān devaḥ śabdah.  
martyā maraṇadharmaṇo manusyāś tān  
āviveśa. mahatā devena nah sāmyam yathā  
syād ityadhyeyam vyākaraṇam.

22. The *prayāja* sacrifice *mantras* are generally directed with proper suffixes, but if after the commencement of the sacrifice the priest has a stomach-ache or is otherwise ill, then a separate compensatory sacrifice is to be performed. In that connection it has been directed that the *prayājas* should be associated with proper

Four—"It has four horns, three legs, two heads, seven hands, bound in three-wise, the bull bellows, the great deity has entered the dying ones." (R.V. 4.58.3).

Four horns are the four kinds of *padas* or nouns, verbs, prefixes and the particles. It has three feet (which means) three times—past, present, and future. The two heads (are the) two types of words as eternal and as produced. Its seven hands—the seven declensions. 'Bound in three ways'—bound in three places, the heart, the throat and the head. 'The bull'—because it showers. 'Bellows'—because it makes sounds. Why so? The root *ru* indicates a verb having its object, sound, i.e the making of sound.

The great deity entered the dying ones—the great deity is the word. The dying ones—men who are mortal; (it) entered them. Grammar ought to be read so that we may have similarity with the great deity.<sup>23</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      *apara āha—*

"catvāri vāk-parimitā padāni  
 tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye maniṣināḥ /  
 guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti  
 turīyam vāco manuṣyā vadanti //"  
 'catvāri vākparimitā padāni'—catvāri  
 pada-jātāni nāmākhyātopasarga-nipātāśca.  
 'tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye maniṣināḥ'—  
 manaso īṣiṇo maniṣināḥ. 'guhā trīṇi nihitā  
 neṅgayanti'—guhāyām trīṇi nihitāni  
 neṅgayanti—na ceṣṭante, na nimiṣantīty-  
 arthāḥ. 'turīyam vāco manuṣyā vadanti'  
 —turīyam vā etad vāco yan manuṣyeṣu  
 vartate caturtham ity arthāḥ.—catvāri.

Another says, "The word is measured by four *padas*. Only the scholarly Brahmins know them. Three parts of it hidden in the cavern do not blow themselves; only the fourth part is spoken by men." (R.V. 1.164.45).

suffixes. In this *prayāja* sacrifice the deity is Agni. So the suffixes are to be associated also with Agni. Such association of proper suffixes necessarily involves knowledge of grammar.

23. The word is here symbolised as a bull. The showering which is the etymological sense of *vṛṣabha* from the word *vṛṣ*, to shower, indicates that just as the cloud showers water, so on account of the qualities that the word possesses it satisfies all

Words are only fourfold. The four kinds of *padas* are nouns, verbs, prefixes and particles. These are known only by scholarly Brahmins. He who collects (within him) the mind is called wise (*maniṣin*). The three hidden in the cavern do not twinkle or move. It is only the fourth part of the speech that belongs to men. *Turiya* means the fourth.<sup>24</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      *uta tvah*—

“*uta tvah paśyan na dadarśa vācam*  
*uta tvah śṛṇvan na śṛṇotyenaṁ /*  
*uto tvasmai tanvam vi sasre*  
*jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ //*”

‘*uta tvah*’ — *api khalvekaḥ paśyannapi na paśyati vācam. api khalvekaḥ śṛṇvannapi na śṛṇotyenaṁ iti. avidvāṁsam āhārdham ‘uto tvasmai tanvam visasre’ tanum vivṛṇute.*  
 ‘*jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ*’—*tad yathā jāyā patye kāmayamānā suvāsāḥ svam ātmānam vivṛṇute, evam vāg vāgvide svātmānam vivṛṇute. vāñno vivṛṇuyād ātmānam ityadhyeyam vyākaraṇam.*—*uta tvah.*

“There are others who though perceiving cannot see speech; others again though listening cannot hear it(i.e. speech). There are others again to whom she reveals herself as a well-dressed wife desiring her husband would do.”(R. V. 10.71.4)

our desires if it can be properly used. It is said that the word entered into the mortals. This means that it revealed itself as identical with it. It is the object of the science of grammar to reveal the great deity, the word as Brahman. It may therefore be supposed that he who knows grammar becomes inspired with it.

The aspirate *ha* is supposed to have its origin in the heart and some *varṇas* such *r̥*, the *ta* group, *ra* and *ṣa* are supposed to have sprung from the head. The eternal form of *Sabda* represents the overlord, the omnipotent, the Great who is symbolised as the word ‘bull’ and the man who knows grammar by using words with full knowledge can free himself from all sins and can ultimately demolish his egoism.

24. The above verse is of similar import as the one referred to before, which is quoted by Patañjali in support of the previous one. The phrase ‘*Parimitā padāni*’ is irregular, being a Vedic form. In the ordinary form it should be *parimitāni* as adjective to *padāni*, which means measured or limited. Nāgeśa says that the word ‘*maniṣin*’

‘And others’. There is again some one who though perceiving cannot see speech and there is again some one who though auditive cannot hear her. This half-rk-verse speaks about the ignorant.

‘Again to him reveal herself’. Reveals the body. ‘Like a wife well-dressed desiring the husband’, i.e. just as the wife well-dressed and desiring the husband reveals her own body, so to one who knows speech (she, i.e. speech) reveals her own self. Grammar should be studied so that the speech may reveal herself to us.<sup>25</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* saktumiva—

“saktum iva titāūnā punanto  
yatra dhīrā manasā vācamakrata /  
atrā sakhyāḥ sakhyāni jānate  
bhadraiśāṁ lakṣmīr nihitādhivāci//”

‘saktuḥ’—sacater dурdhāvo bhavati, kasater  
vā viparītād vikasito bhavati. ‘titāu’— pari-

denotes a person who has risen high by being able to control their mind through gradual purification. All the four kinds of words such as nouns, verbs, etc. have four stages—the *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*. Of these the *parā* represents the Brahman stage of words. The *paśyantī* is that stage of words in which it is in the form of incipient ideation, and therefore has not the capacity of being used as language. The *madhyamā* is the stage wherein the effort for constructive word-formation is being noticed in the heart and *vaikhari* is that while it attains the audible stage. Of the four classes of words, each one has these four stages. Of these the first three remain in the darkness of ignorance for the ordinary men. The grammarians, however, by virtue of their wisdom of the *śāstras* can break open the darkness of ignorance and know the word in all its stages. The ordinary man merely speaks. He does not know the mystery of speech or its origin. Grammar is therefore to be studied for attaining such wisdom as has been specified above. The *parā* stage of speech has been declared by Bhartṛhari as being like internal eternal light and by its true intuition a man attains salvation. [Bhartṛhari is usually understood as not having any *parā* stage of speech. Ed].

25. The word *uta* means *api* or also, and the word *tvaḥ* means others (*tva-śabdaḥ anyavāci*). There are many students who though they are alike in body and intelligent cannot understand the proper meaning of speech and such persons cannot comprehend the import of speech though they may listen to it. The first half of the verse explains the condition of the ignorant. But to some grammarians the speech reveals her import and to such a person does speech reveal herself like a wife who desiring her husband takes off the garment through love. The comparison is supposed to point out that the speech reveals her import by revealing the significance of all suffix, prefix, etc. which are compared with the garments of the wife.

pāvanaṁ bhavati, tatavad vā tunnavad vā.  
 ‘dhīrā’—dhyānavantah. ‘manasā’—  
 prajñānena. ‘vācam akrata’—vācam akṛṣata.  
 ‘atrā sakhāyah sakhyāni jānate’— atra  
 sakhāyah santah sakhyāni jānate.  
 kva? ya eṣa durgo mārga ekagamyo  
 vāgviṣayah. ke punaste? vaiyākaraṇāḥ. kuta  
 etat? ‘bhadraiṣāṁ lakṣmīr nihitādhibhāci’—  
 eṣāṁ vāci bhadrā lakṣmīr nihitā bhavati.  
 lakṣmīr lakṣaṇād bhāsanāt parivṛḍhā  
 bhavati.—saktaumiva.

“Like the powdered pulse — just as one cleanses the powdered pulse with sieve so the meditative persons by their wisdom purify the speech. It is here that men of equal knowledge know each other. In their speech the auspicious beauty is inherent.” (R.V. 10.71.2)

The word *sakta* (powdered pulse) is from the root ‘*sacati*’ (to sprinkle) and it is not easily purifiable; or the word may have been formed from the root ‘*kasati*’ (which means movement and control) and by a transposition of consonants it becomes *sakta* in the sense of flowering. The word ‘*titaü*’ means to purify (i.e. by removing the husk and other impurities). The word *tataü* either means spread out or interspersed with holes (i.e. a sieve). ‘*Dhīrāḥ*’ means meditative persons. The word ‘*manasā*’ means through superior knowledge. The word ‘*vācam akrata*’ means ‘purified the speech’. Here the friends attain friendship. Where? In this what is the impassable path attainable only by words. Again who are they? The grammarians. Why so? In their speech the noble *Lakṣmī* is well hidden. The word ‘*lakṣmī*’ comes from ‘*lakṣaṇa*’, i.e. revelation, by virtue of which the speech becomes all-encompassing, i.e. can express all things, even the finest shades of thought.<sup>26</sup>

26. The word ‘*sakhāyah*’ has been explained by Kaiyatā as *samānakhyātayah* as having the knowledge of equality, i.e. those with whom the knowledge of plurality has vanished and the wisdom of oneness has appeared, that is those who have knowledge of Brahman as one and who regard all things as one. The word ‘*sakhyāni*’ has been explained by Kaiyatā as *sāyujyāni* or absorption into the divine essence; and ‘*jānate*’ means ‘attain’. It should be noted that we have translated the words *sakha* and *sakhyā* in the ordinary sense of ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’. We think that Kaiyatā’s interpretation of *sakhāyah* as *samānakhyātayah* (in the sense of those who have attained unity) and *sakhyā* as *sāyujya* or absorption is rather far-fetched. In our

*Bhāṣya.*

sārasvatīm—

yājñikāḥ paṭhanti—“āhitāgnir apaśabdaṁ prayujya prāyaścittīyāṁ sārasvatīm iṣṭīṁ nirvaped” iti. prāyaścittīyā mā bhūmety adhyeyāṁ vyākaraṇam.—sārasvatīm.

The sacrificial priests read: “Those who lay sacrificial fire in the house should have to perform the *sārasvatī* sacrifice by way of expiation if they use vulgar words.” We ought to read grammar so that we may not be laid under the obligation of performing an expiation.

*Bhāṣya.*

daśamyāṁ putrasya—

yājñikāḥ paṭhanti—“daśamyuttarakālāṁ putrasya jātasya nāma vidadhyād, ghoṣavad-ādyantarantahśtham avṛddhaṁ tripuruṣānūkam anaripratiṣṭhitam. tad dhi pratiṣṭhitatamāṁ bhavati, dvyaṣṭaram caturakṣaram vā nāma kṛtaṁ kuryān na taddhitam” iti. na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇam kṛtas taddhitā vā śakyā vijñātum.—daśamyāṁ putrasya.

Of the son of the tenth lunar day— The sacrificial priests read: “One should, after the tenth day, initiate the born baby with names and such

interpretation the meaning is that those who speak the same type of correct speech easily become friends. Friendship can naturally grow among people of the same level of high culture of speech. So also our interpretation of the last line ‘*bhadraiṣām*’ etc. is different from that of Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa. It is too far-fetched to think that by the knowledge of grammar or of speech one can attain Brahmanhood. In our interpretation the sentence simply means that in the speech of the cultured people there lies deeply hidden unique grace and beauty. It is pity that most of the interpreters of the *Bhāṣya* of Patañjali belong to the monistic Vedānta faith. We have still to discover whether Patañjali had anticipated the interpretation of the Upaniṣads as given by Śaṅkara. The word ‘*adhinihita*’ means deeply laid. Referring to our interpretation of the line ‘*bhadraiṣām*’ etc., we must say that the meaning of the word ‘*parivṛḍha*’ as *ajñānavivartaka* or ‘the dispeller of ignorance’ as given by Nāgeśa seems to be doubtful. The word means ‘all-encompassing’, and it does not seem that it had any special Vedic sense. The unique grace of one well-versed in language consists in its all encompassing character as being able to express all shades of thought. We cannot agree with Nāgeśa that the passage has any reference to the four stages of words ultimately leading to Brahman and thereby leading also to pure consciousness as the only reality and the vapourisation of all plurality of the world before us.

names shall begin with the type of alphabet sounds called *ghoṣavat* or hoarse-sounding such as *ha*, *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* and the medial aspirate and the nasals of each of the five groups; and such names should have in between the alphabet sounds *ya*, *ra*, *la*, *va*, and should refer to the three generations of the name of the father and these names should not be associated to one's enemy. It is only then that such names become well-established. It should consist of two or four syllables ending in a *kṛt* suffix and not have a *taddhita*. Now without grammar no one can distinguish the *kṛt* from the *taddhita*.

*Bhāṣya.*

suđevo asi—

“suđevo asi varuṇa

yasya te sapta sindhavaḥ /

anukṣaranti kākudam

sūrmyam suśirām iva //”

‘suđevo asi varuṇa’— satya-devo’si. ‘yasya te sapta sindhavaḥ’ — sapta vibhaktayah.

‘anukṣaranti kākudam’— kādudam tālu, kākur jihvā sā’sminnudyata iti kākudam.

‘sūrmyam suśirām iva’. tad yathā—

śobhanām ūrmim suśirām agnir antah

praviṣya dahati, evam te sapta sindhavaḥ sapta vibhaktayas tālvanukṣaranti. tenāsi

satyadevah. satyadevah syāmetyadhyeyam vyākaraṇam.—suđevo’si

“O Varuṇa, you are a true deity. Your palate showers the seven rivers just as an image interspersed with holes” (R.V. 8.69.12). O Varuṇa, you are a good shining one, i.e. you are a true deity. Of you there are the seven rivers—the seven declensions of forms. Your *kākuda* or the palate—‘*kāku*’ means tongue, that in which it is struck upwards is called *kākuda*. Like an iron image full of holes, the word ‘*sūrmi*’ means beautiful image. Just as fire burnt inside a beautiful image full of holes so the seven rivers like the seven declensions of forms are being showered by the palate. For that reason you are the truly shining one. We ought to study grammar so that we may be the truly shining one.<sup>27</sup>

27. Varuṇa is here spoken of as the truly shining deity. From this Varuṇa flow the seven rivers which are but the seven declensional forms from the palate. The word

*Bhāṣya.*

kim punar idam vyākaraṇam eva  
adhijigāṁsamānebhyah prayojanam  
anvākhyāyate, na punar anyad api kiñcit?  
om ity uktvā vṛttāntaśah ‘śam’ityevamādīn  
śabdān paṭhanti?

So far the reason why grammar ought to be read has been described; is there nothing else to say? O yes, saying this they would begin with the Vedas as *śanno devīr abhiṣṭaye* etc.<sup>28</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*

purākalpa etad āsīt—saṁskārottara-kālam  
brāhmaṇā vyākaraṇam smādhīyate. tebhyaḥ<sup>29</sup>  
tattat-sthāna-karaṇa-nādānupradāna-jñebhyo  
vaidikāḥ śabdā upadiṣyante. tad adyatve na  
tathā. vedam adhītya tvaritā vaktāro  
bhavanti—‘vedānno vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ siddhāḥ  
lokācca laukikāḥ, anarthakām vyākaraṇam’  
iti. tebhya evam vipratipanna-  
buddhibhyo’dhyetṛbhyah suhṛd bhūtvā  
ācārya idam śāstram anvācaṣṭe—‘imāni  
prajoyanāni, adhyeyam vyākaraṇam’ iti.  
uktah śabdah. svarūpam apy uktam.  
prajoyanānyapuyuktāni.

In ancient times it so happened that the Brahmins after receiving their initiations used to study grammar. To such boys who knew the proper

*kākuda* is formed thus : *kākur jihvā, udayate utkṣipyate asmin iti kākudāṇ tālu*. The word ‘*udayate*’ is from the root *vad* to throw upwards (rather a peculiar meaning of the root)—*kāku + vad + ghaṇ = kāku + uda*. There is a shortening of the vowel as it is supposed to come under the *śakandhvādī* list. The word ‘*sūrmya*’ is a Vedic form of ‘*sūrmi*’. Just as fire entering an iron image full of holes burns all the impurities so showering the seven declensions of forms are supposed to purify us.

28. Kaiyaṭa notes as follows: In ancient times people used to study grammar first and due to their tender age (*bālyāt*) they were unable to ask anything. So for them it was not necessary to state the reasons for the study of grammar. But in these days when life is short people first study the Vedas and are therefore quite grown up when they read grammar and hence able to ask the reason for studying grammar and for that purpose it is now necessary to state the reasons for studying grammar.

places of pronunciation, the inner efforts and the outer efforts, instructions were given about Vedic words. But in our days it is not so. By studying the Vedas, they soon become loquacious, (they think) that from the Vedas we know the Vedic words and from popular usage we know the spoken language; grammar is thus useless. To such deluded students a teacher (Patañjali), as a friend, instructs the *śāstra*—that these are the objects for studying grammar. So far words have been described, their nature has also been told as also the necessity of studying grammar.

*Bhāṣya.* śabdānuśāsanam idānīṁ kartavyam. tat katham kartavyam? kiṁ śabdopadeśah kartavyah, āhosvid apaśabdopadeśah, āhosvid ubhayopadeśa iti ?

anyataropadeśena kṛtam syāt. tad yathā bhakṣya-niyamena abhakṣya-pratiṣedho gamyate—“pañca pañca-nakhā bhakṣyāḥ” ityukte gamyata etad ‘ato’nye abhakṣyāḥ’ iti. abhakṣya-pratiṣedhena vā bhakṣya-niyamāḥ. tad yathā—“abhakṣyo grāmyakukkutāḥ,” “abhakṣyo grāmya-sūkaraḥ” ityukte gamyata etad ‘āraṇyo bhakṣyāḥ’ iti. evam ihaṇi. yadi tāvac chabdopadeśah kriyate, gaurity etasminnupadiṣṭe gamyata etad ‘gāvyaḍayo’paśabdāḥ’ iti. athāpy apaśabdopadeśah kriyate, gāvyaḍiṣu upadiṣṭeṣu gamyata etad ‘gaur ityeṣa śabdāḥ’ - iti.

Now instructions have to be made regarding (correct) words. How is that to be done? Have we to make instructions about correct words or about incorrect words or about both? (An onesided opponent is supposed to answer as follows): Any one of these may do. Thus, by restricting the edibles, the prohibition of the non-edibles is implied, when it is said that the five five-nailed animals are edible it is implied that others are non-edibles. Or, rather by prohibiting the non-edibles we may find the rule about the edibles. Thus when it is said that the village fowl is non-edible, the village pig is non-edible it is implied that the forest ones are edible. So

here also when instruction is given about words that 'gauḥ' is the proper word instructed, it is implied that words like 'gāvī' etc. are vulgar words. But on the other hand, instruction can be given about vulgar words; when words like 'gāvī' etc. are instructed it is implied that the word *gauḥ* is the proper word.

*Bhāṣya.*      *kim punar atra jyāyah?*

laghutvāc chabdopadeśah. laghiyān  
 chabdopadeśo gariyān apaśabdopadeśah.  
 ekaikasya śabdasya bahavo' pabhramṣāḥ.  
 tad yathā—gaur ity asya śabdasya gāvī-gonī-  
 gotā-gopotalikety evam ādayo' apabhramṣāḥ.  
 iṣṭānvākhyanam khalvapi bhavati.

Which is again better here? It is because of simplicity that the instruction of correct words is better. The instruction of correct words is simpler and the instruction of vulgar words is cumbersome. For each correct word there are many vulgar equivalents. Thus for the word 'gauḥ' there are many vulgar equivalents such as *gāvī*, *gonī*, *gotā*, *gopotalikā*, etc. (Moreover by instructing the correct words) one attains what is desirable. Kaiyāṭa notes that by the instruction of correct words one may attain merit or there is a direct comprehension.<sup>29</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      *athaitasmiñ śabdopadeśe sati kim śabdānām  
 pratipattau pratipada-pāṭhaḥ kartavyah? gaur  
 aśvah puruṣo hastī śakunir mṛgo brāhmaṇa ity*

29. Bhaṭṭoji in the *Śabda-kaustubha* makes a long discussion as to what may be the criterion of correct words. The discussion is long and it is not of much use to give here an account of the whole of it in detail. The substance of the discussion is that only those words about which no traditional origin or commencement can be pointed out should be called *sādhu* or correct words, as such it is indispensable that some one should instruct what words have such characteristic and can be called correct. Deviation of pronunciation through indolence, inattention and the like leading to the use of words which differ from standard words are called incorrect. It thus appears that there should be some teacher who should advise about correct words. The first advice so far as we now have is that given by Pāṇini. Patañjali supplements the instructions of Pāṇini and hence he says that his duty is to make an *anuśāsana* of correct words. *Śiṣṭasya punah sāśanam anuśāsanam*. *Anuśāsana* means the supplementary instruction on that on which instruction has already been given.

evamādayah śabdāḥ paṭhitavyāḥ?

nety āha. anabhyupāya eṣa śabdānām pratipattau pratipada-pāthah. evam hi śrūyate—‘bṛhaspatir indrāya divyam varṣa-sahasram pratipaduktānām śabdānām śabda-pārāyaṇām provāca, nāntām jagāma. bṛhaspatiśca pravaktā, indraścādhyetā, divyam varṣa-sahasram adhyayana-kālo, na cāntām jagāma. kiṁ punar adyatve? yaḥ sarvathā ciram jīvati varṣa-śatām jīvati. caturbhiśca prakārair vidyopajuktā bhavati—āgama-kālena, svādhyāya-kālena, pravacana-kālena, vyāvahāra-kāleneti. tatra cāsyāgama-kālenaiwa āyuh kṛtsnam paryupayuktaṁ syāt; tasmād anabhyupāyah śabdānām pratipattau pratipada-pāthah.

Now in the matter of instruction of correct words, should one enumerate off the correct words for their proper comprehension? Should the separate words such as 'the cow', 'the horse', 'the man', 'the elephant', 'the bird', 'the beast', 'the Brahmin' etc. be instructed.

No. This (process) of separate enumeration of words is not the proper means for their comprehension. So this we hear: Br̥haspati, for one thousand heavenly years, instructed Indra the separate words for reaching the other shore of words but could not exhaust it. Br̥haspati the teacher and Indra the pupil, the time of study is one thousand heavenly years, yet he could not exhaust it. What about these days? He who lives long, lives a hundred years. In four ways is learning acquired—the time of instruction, the time of preparation, the time of teaching, and the time of its use (in sacrifices etc.). So by the time, the teaching is finished, the life would be wholly spent up. Therefore, this method of severally enumerating the words is not the means for their comprehension.

Bhāṣya.

katham tarhi ime śabdāḥ pratipattavyāḥ?  
kiñcit sāmānya-viśeṣavallakṣaṇam  
pravartyam yenālpena yatnena mahato ma-  
hataḥ śabdaughāḥ pratipadyeran. kim punas

tat? utsargāpavādau. kaścid utsargah kar-tavyah, kaścid apavādah. kathamjātiya-kaḥ punar utsargah kartavyah,

kathamjātiyako'pavādah? sāmānyena utsargah kartavyah. tad yathā “*karmaṇyaṇ*” (Pā. 3.2.1), tasya višeṣenāpavādah; tad yathā “*ato'upasarge kaḥ*” (Pā. 3.2.3).

How are these words to be comprehended? Some rule has to be introduced involving the use of universal and special principles so that with little labour, the great collection of words may be comprehended. What is that? General rule and exceptions. In the *sūtras* there should be some universal laws and some exceptions. There should be some times general principles and their exceptions. Of what class should again be the general principles be made and what class the exceptions? The general principles should be made in universal lines such as “*karmaṇyaṇ*” (the suffix *aṇ* is enjoined when a verb carries an accusative case as its pre-word). A limitation of that is an exception (*apavāda*). “*ato'upasarge kaḥ*” (the *ka* should be suffixed to verbs ending in *ā* and without a pre-particle—*anupasarga*).

*Bhāṣya.*

kim punar ākṛtiḥ padārthah, āhosvid dra-vyam? ‘ubhayam’ ity āha. katham jñāyate? ubhayathā hy ācaryeṇa sūtrāṇi paṭhitāni, ākṛtiṁ padārtham matvā —“jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām (Pā. 1.2.58)” ity ucyate. dravyam padārtham matvā “*sarūpāṇām*” (Pā. 1.2.64) — ity ekaśeṣa ārabhyate.

A new topic now comes in, regarding the nature of that which is signified by a word.

Does the word signify the class-notion (*ākṛti*) of the individual or the individual substance? Both— he says. How is it known? The teacher (Pāṇini) has read the *sūtra* both the ways taking the class notion for the meaning of the *pada*, he has formed the *sūtra* — “*jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*”. In the sense of *jāti* or a class notion a word may optionally be used in the plural. Thinking individual substance as the

significance of words, he has formulated the *sūtra*—“*sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*”—when the words having the same form and having the same declensional suffix, one may be left (other may be dropped).<sup>30</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      kim punar nityaḥ śabdah, āhosvit kāryah?  
                          samgraha etat prādhānyena parikṣitam—  
                          nityo vā syāt kāryo veti. tatraktā doṣāḥ,  
                          prayojanāny apy uktāni, tatra tveṣa nirṇayāḥ  
                          — ‘yadyeva nityo’thāpi kāryah, ubhayathā’—  
                          pi lakṣaṇam pravartyam’ iti.

30. Kaiyaṭa reminds that the interpretation of grammar as a whole cannot be made either on the assumption that the signification of words is limited to class-notion or to individual things. He refers to two *paribhāṣās* — “*sakṛt gatau vipratiṣedhe yad bādhitaṇi tad bādhitam eva*” and “*punah prasaṅga-vijñānāt siddham*” (see *Paribhāṣendu-śekhara*, *paribhāṣās* 39 and 40) referred to in the *Bhāṣya* on the rule, “*vipratiṣedhe param kāryam*” and interprets the *Bhāṣya* there as holding that in the opinion of the *Bhāṣya* in some cases the significance of *pada* is to be referred to a *jāti* and in other cases it is to be referred to *vyakti* but Nāgeśa in his *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* rejects the interpretation of Kaiyaṭa and holds that every case may be interpreted either on the supposition that the significance of words refers to class-notions or to particulars. Kaiyaṭa, in summarising the views of those who hold that the significance of words has reference only to class-notions, says that all words whether substantive or qualitative are permeated through and through with class-notions. Thus in denoting substantive qualities, actions and artificial names always refer to some kind of class-notions. There are others, however, who hold that words only denote particulars and the objection that such a reference would involve the necessity of extending the denoting power of words to limitless objects for otherwise if such a denoting power was limited to some particular, others would not fall within its scope, is invalid for as in fixing the denoting power of words to class-notions denotation applies to particulars; so in giving the denoting power to particulars, the class-notion may be included within it by a similar kind of implication and as such the objections made would be invalid. The solution here is that when the denotation applies to particulars such an application necessarily applies to certain characteristic features by virtue of which a particular is a particular as distinguished from other particulars of other classes; a denotation of particulars has thus a natural reference to such characteristics as contribute to the formation of class notions; for this reason, a denotation of particulars also involves a denotation of class-characters. Thus even though a word denotes a particular it carries with such a denotation also a notion of class-characteristics involved in it as a constituent. Thus in both the views, in the passage from the class-notion to the particulars and vice versa an implication of some sort involving in extension of meaning or a restriction of it has to be admitted.

(A doubt naturally arises) are words eternal (i.e. uncreated) or are they produced? In the *Saṅgraha* (possibly of Vyādi) this (problem) has been chiefly examined—"Are they eternal or are they created?" There the defects as well as the necessity have been described. There, however, the conclusion arrived at is, whether it be eternal or produced, in each case, the definite regulations have to be made.<sup>31</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      kathaṁ punar idam bhagavataḥ Pāṇiner  
                      ācāryasya lakṣaṇam pravṛttam?

*Vārttika.*      siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe.

*Bhāṣya.*      siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ceti.  
                      atha siddha-śabdasya kah padārthah?  
                      nitya-paryāya-vācī siddha-śabdah. kathaṇ  
                      jñāyate? yat kūṭastheśvavicāliṣu bhāvēṣu  
                      vartate; tad yathā—siddhā dyauḥ, siddhā  
                      pr̥thivī, siddham ākāśam.

31. Some hold that the alphabet form of speech is eternal and is only manifested by articulated sound. Others, however, think that the articulated sounds corresponding to the alphabetic forms manifest the words (*padas*) as wholes. Others, however, hold the view of *vākyā-sphoṭa*. Those who hold that the words are nothing but sound, naturally adhere to the view that the words are non-eternal and produced. The Mimānsakas think that the alphabet forms are eternal and are manifested by articulated sounds. According to this view, of course, both the *pada* and the *vākyā* are of the nature of alphabet forms which are eternal in that form and manifested only by the articulated sounds. The *sphoṭa* view is held by the grammarians. The more advanced thinkers of the grammar school think that in reality the whole proposition is a combination of propositions forming the *vākyā* appear as one whole. The appearance of *padas* as wholes is unreal and has only a pragmatic value for demonstrating an analytic purpose. The supposition that the *padas* or words have separate meanings is only illusory or imaginary. The Vaiśeṣika school, however, thinks that the word is nothing but the articulated sound. The articulated sounds, however, may be both of the alphabetic order or of other orders, such as noise etc.

Patañjali refers to the *Saṅgraha*. But we have no knowledge as to the nature of the book or as to its author. Nāgeśa says that according to tradition, Vyādi wrote the *Saṅgraha*, a work containing a hundred thousand words.

Patañjali says that so far as the writer of grammar is concerned, it is immaterial whether the words are eternal or non-eternal, for in either case the instruction of the grammatical science is necessary for the instruction of correct words. Bhaṭṭoji, however, holds that in grammar the denotation of words may well be regarded as

How does his holiness Pāṇini, the teacher apply his definitive instructions (at this point comes the *Vārttika*, the relation between the words and their meanings being already there to which Patañjali says as follows): The words being already there and so the object and the signifying relation being also there (a question comes—what is the meaning of the word—‘being there’, ‘*siddha*’)? The word *siddha* means eternal. The question is how is it known? The reply is: that (is eternal) which refers to unchanging and immovable ideas or entities, such as, the heaven is there, the earth is there (*siddha*).<sup>32</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      nanu ca bhoḥ kāryeṣvapi vartate. tad yathā—  
 siddha odanah, siddhah sūpah, siddhā  
 yavāgūr iti. yāvatā kāryeṣvapi vartate, tatra  
 kuta etan nitya-paryāya-vācino grahaṇam, na  
 punah kārye yah siddha-śabda iti?

saṅgrahe tāvat kārya-prati-dvandvi-  
 bhāvān-manyāmahe ‘nitya-paryāya-vācino  
 grahaṇam’ iti. ihāpi tad eva.

athavā santy eka padāny apy  
 avadhāraṇāni. tad yathā —‘abbhakṣo’,  
 ‘vāyu-bhakṣah’ iti. apa eva bhakṣayati,  
 vāyum eva bhakṣyatīti gamyate. evam ihāpi  
 siddha eva, na sāddhya iti.

applying to universals and particulars. The denotation is to be determined in accordance with contextual usage of the problematic term.

32. The import of Patañjali’s question, as to how Pāṇini wrote his work, is according to Kaiyaṭa whether Pāṇini was the creator of the relation of words with objects or he merely was the compiler of the relations that existed before. Patañjali here mentions the name of Pāṇini as he is presently introducing a *Vārttika* line for interpretation and previous to this, he was interpreting the intention of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana together and so far that portion was wholly his own contribution. Nāgeśa says here the purport of the question is—whether Pāṇini himself coined the words or he only explained the relations that already existed between the existing words and their objects. Kaiyaṭa further states that in both the views of *jāti-sphoṭa* and *vyakti-sphoṭa* words are eternal. Even in the Vaiśeṣika view where words are regarded as produced, they are regarded as eternal as being traditionally current from beginningless time. The objects themselves also are eternal in their aspect as class-notions; even if they be regarded as only particular things, there is eternity, there is their aspect

But the word 'siddha' is also used with reference to products (of actions), such as the rice is prepared, the soup is prepared, the ricegruel is prepared. But if that word is used in the sense of products, why it is held as synonymous with *nitya* or eternity and why is the other meaning in the sense of product is discarded. (The reply is) in the *Saṅgraha*, however, it is taken in the sense opposite to that of the product and therefore in the sense of eternity, here also therefore that is the meaning or rather there are words which though single and used with a determining sense such as the words 'abbhakṣa', 'vāyu-bhakṣa' meaning that who eats only water, that who eats only air. (Here though the word only or *eva* is not used yet a single word *ap* or water has the sense of only water). So the word 'siddha' means only *siddha*, i.e. eternal and not *sādhyā* or *kāryā*, i.e. product.<sup>33</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* athavā pūrvapada-lopo'tra draṣṭavyaḥ—  
atyanta-siddhaḥ siddha iti. tad yathā—  
devadatto dattah, satya bhāmā bhāmeti.  
athavā—“vyākhyānato viṣeṣa-pratipattir na hi  
sandehād alakṣṇam” iti nitya-paryāya-vācino  
grahaṇam iti vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.  
kim punar anena varṇyena? kim na ma-  
hatā kaṇṭhena nityaśabda evopātto yasminn  
upādiyamāne'sandehaḥ syāt?

Or it should be understood that there is an elision of the previous word. (The word 'siddha') is supposed to be formed of the two words *atyanta* and

of Brahman which is the underlying in them. The word 'siddha' means *nitya* or eternal. The words are regarded as eternal because they refer to eternal objects.

33. Patañjali is here discussing the meaning of the phrase "siddhe śabdārthaśaṁbandhe" of Kātyāyana, the Vārttikakāra. His interpretation is that 'siddha' here means eternal, i.e. the words, their objects and their relations are all eternal. He at first draws this meaning by reference to the conclusive decision on the subject arrived at in the *Saṅgraha* (possibly by Vyādi). His next interpretation is based on the suggestion that *siddha* means *siddha eva*, i.e. *śabdārthaśaṁbandhaḥ siddha eva*. He refers to other words, *abbhakṣa*, *vāyu-bhakṣa* which though single words are pregnant in the idea of *eva*, *sarva eva apaḥ bhakṣayati iti ab-bhakṣaḥ*. The sentence 'apa eva bhakṣayati' is the explanation of the word *ab-bhakṣa* which contains within it the sense of *eva* in a pregnant manner. There is only one opposite to the word *siddha* meaning eternal and that is *kārya*. *Siddha eva* means only *siddha* which negates *kārya*, there being only two alternatives.

*siddha* and the word *atyanta* is elided. The word *siddha* or accomplished is used in the sense extremely accomplished, such as the word *Datta* is used for *Devadatta* and *Bhāmā* for *Satyabhāmā*.

Or the particular meaning is to be comprehended in accordance with interpretation and from doubt (it should not be thought) that there is no definite meaning. We shall interpret the *siddha* as being taken as an equivalent to 'nitya' or eternal. But (what is the good) again of such long explanation? Why not loudly in a loud voice the word 'nitya' had been uttered, which being done there would be no doubt?

*Bhāṣya.*

maṅgalārtham.

māṅgalika ācāryo mahataḥ sāstraughasya  
maṅgalārtham siddha-śabdam ādītaḥ  
prayuṇkte—maṅgalādīni hi sāstrāṇi prathante  
vīra-puruṣāṇi ca bhavanty āyuṣmat-puruṣāṇi  
cādhyetāraś ca siddhārthā yathā syur iti.

The auspicious teacher desiring auspiciousness for the extensive *śāstra* at first uses the word *siddha*. (There is a maxim) the *śāstras* that begin with auspicious words are traditionally continued and invest (their readers) with heroism and are associated with long life, and so that those who read (such *śāstras*) attain their fruit.<sup>34</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*

ayam khalu nitya-śabdo nāvaśyam  
kūṭastheśvavicāliṣu bhāveṣu vartate. kim  
tarhi? ābhikṣṇye'pi vartate. tad yathā—ni-  
tya-prahasito nitya-prajalpita iti. yāvatā—  
bhikṣṇye'pi vartate tatrāpy anenaivārthaḥ  
syāt—“vyākhyānato viśeṣa-pratipattir na hi  
sandehād alakṣṇam” iti. paśyati tvācāryo  
‘maṅgalārthaścaiva siddha-śabda ādītaḥ  
prayukto bhaviṣyati, śakṣyāmi cainam nitya-  
paryāya-vācinam varṇayitum’ iti. atah  
siddha-śabda evopātto na nitya-śabdah.

34. Though Kātyāyana might have used the word 'nitya' instead of the word 'siddha' he chose the latter word as an auspicious one in consonance with the maxim that only those *śāstras* which begin with auspicious words are traditionally continued through time and those who study them cannot be defeated by others.

This word ‘*nitya*’ again is not always to be used to denote those entities which are unmoved like an anvil. What then? It is also used in the sense of repetition. Thus ‘*nitya-prahasita*’ means often laughing and ‘*nitya-prajalpita*’ means always talking. It may be objected since the word can also be used in the sense of repetition why not take that sense. (The reply will be) that here also since there is a doubt between (two meanings) the proper meaning to be accepted (is that which is) according as it is explained (and as to the cause of this doubt one should not think that there is) no definite explanation. The teacher (Kātyāyana) thinks that the word ‘*siddha*’ in the auspicious sense should be used at the commencement. It is possible for us to describe it as being equivalent to *nitya* or eternal. For this reason the word ‘*siddha*’ has been used and not *nitya*.

*Bhāṣya.*      *atha kam punah padārthaṁ matvā eṣa  
vigrahaḥ kriyate— ‘siddhe śabde’rthe sam-  
bandhe ca’ iti?*

‘ākṛtīm’ ityāha. kuta etat? ākṛtir hi nityā,  
dravyam anityam. atha dravye padārthe  
katham vigrahaḥ kartavyah?

‘siddhe śabde artha-saṁbandhe ca’ iti. nityo  
hy arthavatām arthair abhi-saṁbandhaḥ.  
athavā dravya eva padārthe eṣa vighraho  
nyāyyaḥ: siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe ce-  
ti. dravyam hi nityam ākṛtir anityā.

To what does the signification of words refer? In the compound *śabdārtha-sambandhe*, where the compound means the words, their objects and the relations being eternal, the reply is—(the reference is to the class-notion). Why so? (Because) the class-notion is eternal and the particulars are non-eternal.

Now if the signification refers to particulars, how should the compound be made? (The reply is) the words being eternal, and their relations to objects being eternal, the relation of significant words with objects is eternal. Or, rather, if signification of words refers to particulars it would be as follows, the words, their objects and the relations being eternal. The particulars are eternal and the class-notion is non-eternal.<sup>35</sup>

35. In the view in which particulars are regarded as non-eternal the relation of objects with words are regarded as eternal. But if objects are non-eternal, how can relations with them be eternal? The reply is that even though objects may be non-

*Bhāṣya.*

katham jñāyate?

evaṁ hi dr̄ṣyate loke mṛt̄ kayācid ākṛtyā  
yuktā piṇḍo bhavati, piṇḍākṛtim upamṛḍya  
ghaṭikāḥ kriyante, ghaṭikākṛtim upmṛḍya  
kuṇḍikāḥ kriyante. tathā suvarṇam kayācid  
ākṛtyā yuktam piṇḍo bhavati, piṇḍākṛtim  
upamṛḍya rucakāḥ kriyante, rucakākṛtim  
upamṛḍya kaṭakāḥ kriyante, kaṭakākṛtim  
upamṛḍya svastikāḥ kriyante. punaravṛttah  
suvarṇa-piṇḍah punar aparayā" kṛtyā yuktah  
khadirāṅgāra-savarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ.  
ākṛtir anyā cānyā ca bhavati, dravyam punas  
tad eva. ākṛty upamardena dravyam evāvaśi-  
ṣyate.

How is it known? So it is seen among people that from certain points of view earth may be regarded as lump. By demolishing the lump-form it is made into jugs. By demolishing the jug-forms, pitchers are made. So also when gold is associated with certain forms, it becomes a lump. By demolishing these lump-forms, certain neck-rings can be made and these again may be changed into bracelets. These again can be changed into a *svastikā*. These again may be reformed into a lump of gold and may be made into other forms. The substance is the same but the form may be this or that. With the demolition of the form the substance remains the same.

*Bhāṣya.*

ākṛtāvapi padārtha eṣa vighraho nyāyyah—  
'siddhe sabde' rthe sambandhe ca' iti'.  
nanu coktamākṛtir anityeti?

eternal yet the relation of signification may be eternal. There is a further relation between words and objects that certain words permanently denote certain objects.

In the view in which particulars are regarded as eternal the eternity refers to the underlying Brahman. (This is of course the interpretation of Kaiyāṭa). In such a view the class-notion is non-eternal for when there is a realisation of the Brahman everything becomes illusory. This constant reference to Brahman in discussions of grammar by Kaiyāṭa seems to have no basis in the *Bhāṣya* itself. The *Bhāṣya* seems to refer to different perspectives and tries to explain the status of signification with the varying perspectives, wherein the aspect of universals or of particulars may alternately be emphasised.

naitad asti. nityā"kr̥tiḥ.

katham? na kvacid uparateti kr̥tvā sarva-troparataḥ bhavati. dravyāntarasthā tūpalabhyate. athavā nedam eva nitya-lakṣṇam—‘dhruvam kūṭastham avicālyanapāyopajana-vikāry-anutpatty-avṛddhy-avyaya-yogi yat tan nityam’ iti. tad api nityam yasmiṁstattvam na vihanyate.

kim punas tattvam? tasya bhāvas tattvam ākr̥tāvapi tattvam na vihanyate.

athavā kim na etena—‘idam nityam idam anityam’ iti? yannityam tam padārtham matvaiśa vigrahaḥ kriyate —‘siddhe śabde’-rthe sambandhe ca’ iti.

The compound may be so formed that the signification may refer to the form (the class-notion), the word, the object and the relation being eternal. But it has been said that the class-notion is non-eternal. But this is not so, (says Patañjali). The class-notion is eternal. It cannot be said that because it is not exhausted anywhere, it is exhausted everywhere. It can be perceived in other objects.

Or, rather, this not the only definition of eternity. Eternal is that which is unchanging, stays like an anvil, immovable, devoid of decay, growth or change, is not produced, does not grow and has not loss. That also is eternal in which the reality is not destroyed. What is reality? The reality is its essence. In the case of class-concepts also the essence is not destroyed. Or, rather, what is the use of entering into this question—this is eternal and this is non-eternal? The compound has been so formed as to refer to the idea of eternity whatever it may mean—the word, the object and its relation being eternal.

*Bhāṣya.*      katham punar jñāyate—‘siddhaḥ śabdo’rthaḥ sambandhaś ca’ iti?

*Vārttikka.*      lokataḥ.

*Bhāṣya.*      yalloke’rtham artham upādāya śabdān prayuñjate, naisām nirvṛttau yatnam kurvanti.

ye punaḥ kāryā bhāvā nirvṛttau tāvat teṣām  
 yatnaḥ kriyate. tad yathā—ghaṭena kāryam  
 kariṣyan kumbha-kāra-kulam gatvā”ha—  
 ‘kuru ghaṭam kāryam anena kariṣyāmi’ itī.  
 na tadvac chabdān prayuyukṣamāṇo vaiyāk-  
 arāṇakulam gatvā”ha ‘kuru śabdān  
 prayokṣye’ iti. tāvaty evārtham upādāya  
 śabdān prayuñjate.  
 yadi tarhi loka eṣu pramāṇam kim śāstreṇa  
 kriyate?

*Vārttika.* lokato’rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge  
 śāstreṇa dharma-niyamah.

*Bhāṣya.* lokato’rthaprayukte śabda-prayoge śāstreṇa  
 dharma-niyamah kriyate. kim idam dharma-  
 niyama iti? dharmāya niyamo dharma-  
 niyamah, dharmārtho vā niyamo dharma-  
 niyamah, dharma-prayojano vā niyamo  
 dharma-niyamah.

How is it known? The word, the object and the relation are eternal. Here the *Vārttika* intervenes and says *lokataḥ*, i.e. from the behaviour of the people. In the world, the people take objects one after another and use words to signify them. But they make no effort in producing them. Those entities which are produced require effort to be made for their production. If one has to do with a jug, he goes to the potter's house, and says: 'Make a jug that I have something to do with it.' But wishing to use words, he does not go to the grammarian and says: 'Make words. I wish to use it.' But he takes whatever objects he likes and uses words. If people's behaviour is to be regarded as valid, what is effected by the *śāstras*?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes and says) words are used to denote objects and the *śāstra* makes restrictions for the accruing of merit. To this (the *Bhāṣya* says) when people drawn by objects use words, restriction is made by the *śāstra* (grammar) for the sake of merit. (A questioner asks) what is the meaning of 'dharma-niyama' (restriction for the sake of merit). The *Bhāṣya* remarks that it may be compounded in different ways—

restriction for the sake of merit or restriction for the need of merit or restriction which has for its object merit.<sup>36</sup>

Vārttikka. yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu.

Bhāṣya. priya-taddhitā dākṣinātyāḥ—yathā loke vede ceti prayuktavye ‘yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu’ iti prayuñjate. athavā yukta evâtra tad-dhitārthaḥ—‘yathā laukikeṣu vaidikeṣu ca kṛtānteṣu’.

loke tāvat—‘abhaṅkṣyo grāmya-kukkuṭaḥ’, ‘abhaṅkṣyo grāmya-sūkaraḥ’ ity ucyate. bhakṣyam ca nāma kṣutpratighātārtham upādīyate. śakyam cānena śvamāṁśādibhir api kṣut-pratihantum. tatra niyamah kri-yate—‘idam bhakṣyam idam abhaṅkṣyam’ iti. tathā—khedāt striṣu pravṛttir bhavati. samānaś ca kheda-vigamo gamyāyām cā-gamyāyām ca. tatra niyamah kriyate—iyam gamyeyam agamye ti.

Such as it is found among the people and in the Vedas, the southerners are fond of (applying) *taddhita* suffixes. Instead of saying ‘*loke*’ and ‘*vede*’ they use ‘*laukika-vaidikeṣu*’. Or, rather, the uses of *taddhita* is justifiable as in the passage ‘*laukikeṣu vaidikeṣu ca kṛtānteṣu*.’ (Here *laukikeṣu* means drawn from popular usage and *vaidikeṣu* means drawn from the Vedas and from other decisions). Among the people it is said that the village fowl should not be eaten, the village pig should not be eaten. But all that is taken for removing hunger should be regarded as eatable and on this principle one might remove his hunger even with the meat of dogs.

36. The phrase ‘drawn by objects’ in the translation has been used in the sense impelled by the necessity of knowing objects. When people want that others should understand a particular meaning they use words; when these words are articulated, people know things. For the use of words, the science of grammar directs the nature of the stem, the suffixes and the like; when with such consciousness people use words they attain merit. Nāgeśa points out that Prabhākara thinks that by the use of the imperative or the subjunctive when certain actions are dictated to be performed, a person is impelled to do an action and this is called *niyoga* and this is *dharma*.

Therefore, a restriction is made—this ought to be eaten and this ought not to be eaten. So through sexual urge one turns to women. This urge can well be satisfied by going to women to whom one may legitimately go and to others to whom one may not legitimately go. There a restriction is made—this woman is legitimately worthy of cohabitation and this woman is legitimately not so.<sup>37</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      *vede khalvapi*—“*payo-vrato brāhmaṇo yavāgū-vrato rājanya āmikṣā-vrato vaiśyah*”  
 ity ucyate. *vrataṁ ca nāmābhyavahārārtham upādīyate. śakyam cānena sālimāṁsādīny api vratayitum tatra niyamah kriyate.*  
 tathā—“*bailvah khādiro vā yūpah syād*”  
 ity ucyate. *yūpaś ca nāma paśu-bandhārtham upādīyate. śakyam cānena yatkiñcid eva kāṣṭham ucchṛityānucchṛitya vā paśur anubandhum. tatra niyamah kriyate.*  
 tathāgnau *kapālāny adhiśrityābhiman-trayate*—“*bhṛgūṇāṁ aṅgirasāṁ dharmasya tapasā tapyadhvam*” iti. *antareñāpi mantram agnir dahana-karmā kapālāni santāpayati. tatra ca niyamah kriyate*—‘*evam kriyāṁnam abhyudayakāri bhavati*’ iti. evam

37. The sentence in the *Bhāṣya*—“*athāvā yukta evātra taddhitārthaḥ*” etc. wherein the use of the *taddhita* suffix in the words *laukika* and *vaidika* has been justified, has another annotation by Kaiyāṭa on the words *laukika* and *vaidika*. Kaiyāṭa says that *laukika* here means as embodied in the *smṛti-śāstra* and *vaidika* means as embodied in the *Vedas*. This is to be distinguished from the use of the word ‘*laukika-vaidikeṣu*’ in the previous sentence where the words *laukika* and *vaidika* have been used in the sense of the ‘the people as a whole’ and ‘the *Vedas* as a whole’. The usage of *taddhita* in that passage is therefore only optional. Instead of saying ‘among the people’, the speaker says, ‘among the people as a whole’. Herein the speaker only shows his vagary in his fondness for using the *taddhita* suffix whereas in the latter case the use of the *taddhita* suffix in the word *laukika* is justifiable on the ground that here the word ‘*loka*’ means *smṛti-śāstra* and the *taddhita* suffix means ‘codification’. These two examples are introduced for showing that there are some usages where certain suffixes are not exactly justifiable but not incorrect while in other cases they are quite justifiable.

ihāpi—samānāyām arthāvagatau śabdena  
cāpaśabdena ca dharma-niyamah kriyate—  
‘śabdenaivārtho’bhidheyo nāpaśabdena’ iti.  
‘evam kriyamāṇam abhyudaya-kāri bhavati’  
iti.

In the Vedas also it is enjoined that a Brahmin should restrict his diet to milk, a Kṣatriya to rice-gruel and a Vaiśya to curd mixed with water. A restriction is made among all things that a man may be desirous of eating. One may eat good rice and meat and restriction is made there. So also there is the injunction—a sacrificial post should be made of the *bilva* or the *khadira* wood. A sacrificial stake (*yūpa*) is the post at which the animals are tied. One can take any kind of wood and make it smooth or rough and tie the animal at it. Here the restriction is made:

So also putting on the fire the halves of a jug one utters the *mantra*—“Grow heated with the ascetic fervour of the heat of Bhṛgus and Aṅgirasas.” But one might as well put the jug-shells on the burning fire without uttering such *mantras*. A restriction is here made and if it is so done it becomes auspicious. So here also when meaning can be understood equally from correct and incorrect words a restriction for merit is made—object should be indicated by correct words and not by incorrect words. If it is so done it becomes meritorious.

Varttika. astyaprayuktah.

Bhāṣya. santi vai śabdā aprayuktāḥ. tad yathā—  
‘ūṣa’, ‘terā’, ‘cakra’, ‘peca’ iti.

kim ato yat santi aprayuktāḥ? prayogād hi  
bhavāñ chabdānām sādhutvām adhyavasyati.  
ya idānīm aprayuktā nāmī sādhavaḥ syuḥ.

idam tāvad vīpratiśiddham yad ucyate—  
‘santi vai śabdā aprayuktāḥ’ iti. yadi santi  
nāprayuktāḥ, athāprayuktā na santi, ‘santi

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This discussion is introduced on the word *dharma-niyama* referred to in the previous section of the *Bhāṣya*. Words may diversely be used and in all these usages they may be significant. But it is only in certain restricted usages as enjoined by grammar that they may contribute to merit. Any food may appease hunger but only some food is prescribed as contributing to merit and others are prohibited. So some forms of speech as enjoined by grammar contribute to merit and others do not.

cāprayuktāś ca'iti vipratiṣiddham.  
 prayuñjāna eva khalu bhavān āha—'santi  
 śabdā aprayuktāḥ' iti. kaś cedānīm anyo  
 bhavaj-jātiyakah puruṣah śabdānām prayoge  
 sādhuḥ syāt?

naitad vipratiṣiddham. 'santi'ti tāvad  
 brūmo yad etañ śāstra-vidaḥ śāstreṇa  
 anuvidadhate. 'aprayuktāḥ' iti brūmāḥ.  
 yat loke 'prayuktāḥ' iti. yad apyucyate —  
 'kaścedānīm anyo bhavaj-jātiyakah puruṣah  
 śabdānām prayoge sādhuḥ syād' iti. na  
 brūmo'smābhīr aprayuktā iti. kiṃ tarhi? loke  
 'prayuktā' iti. nanu ca bhavān apy ābhyan-  
 taro loke? ābhyan taro'ham loke, na tvaham  
 lokah.

A *Vārttika sūtra* (raising an objection) intervenes that there are words which are not in usage such as *ūṣa*, *terā*, *cakra*, *peca*. What does it matter if there are words which are not in usage? (This is said) that because it is only through usage that you can determine the correctness of words. The words that are not now used cannot be regarded as correct. (To this) a further objection is raised—this is all contradictory to say that there are words which are not in usage (for if the words exist it cannot be that they are not in usage, and if they are not in usage they cannot be said to exist). It is contradictory to say that they exist and are not in usage. It is by using the words that we say that these words are not in use). Who is the other better man than like you by whose use the words would be correct? (This is a joke—we are using the words and yet saying that the word is not in use). Your very use of the word is an instance of using it and that contradicts you. It is when men use a word that the word is said to be in usage. What special type of a man we should imagine by whose use of the word, should we speak of the word as being in usage and how can we exempt you from belonging to that category?

The supposed reply is—this is not contradictory. (When we say that) the words that the words exist, we mean those words that the grammarians enjoined by rules. (By referring to words) that are not used we mean that they are not used by people. To your question—who is there the other kind

of person etc. we do not say that we have not used it. What then? (We mean that they are not used by people. Further reply to this position is)—are you not included in ‘the people’? (The reply is) yes—I am included within the people but I am not the people.

*Vārttika.* asty aprayukta iti cennârthe śabda-prayogāt.

*Bhāṣya.* asty aprayukta iti cet? tanna. kim kāraṇam?  
‘arthe śabda-prayogāt’— arthe śabdāḥ prayujyante. santi caiśām śabdānām arthā yeśvartheṣu prayujyante.

*Vārttika.* aprayogaḥ prayogānyatvāt.

*Bhāṣya.* aprayogaḥ khalvapy eṣām śabdānām nyāyyaḥ. kutah? ‘prayogānyatvāt’. yad eṣām śabdānām arthe’nyāñchabdān prayuñjate. tad yathā—‘ūṣa’ ityasya śabdasyārthe—‘kva yūyam uṣitāḥ’, ‘terā’ ity asyārthe ‘kva yūyam tīrṇāḥ’, ‘cakra’ ity asyārthe—‘kva yūyam kṛtavantah’, ‘peca’ ity asyārthe—‘kva yūyam pakvavantah’ iti.

Here again a *Vārttika* intervenes—it is wrong to suggest that there are words which are not in use, for the words are used to denote objects.

It is suggested that there are words which are not used. (The reply is) it is not so. What reason is there? Words are used to denote objects. These words refer to objects to signify which they are used.

Here another *Vārttika* intervenes criticising the previous *Vārttika*—the word ‘aprayoga’, i.e. not in use (means) that they are other than the words which properly denote the objects.

(The *Bhāṣya* commenting on the above says) it is proper that these words should not be used; for they are other than the words which really denote the objects (i.e. words that are used other than those that would denote the objects). Thus in the place of the word ‘ūṣa’ there is the phrase—where did you stay (*kva yūyam uṣitāḥ*)? In the sense of the word ‘terā’—where did you cross (*kva yūyam tīrṇāḥ*)? In the sense of the word ‘cakra’—where did you do? In the sense of ‘peca’—where did you cook?

*Vārttika.* aprayukte dīrgha-satravat.

*Bhāṣya.* yady apy aprayuktāḥ, avaśyam dīrgha-satraval lakṣaṇenānuvidheyāḥ. tad yathā — dīrgha-satrāṇī vārṣaśatikāni vārṣasaha-srikāṇi ca. na cādyatve kaścid apy āharati. kevalam ṛṣi-sampradāyo dharma iti kṛtvā yājñikāḥ śāstrenānuvidadhate.

*Vārttika.* sarve deśāntare.

*Bhāṣya.* sarve khalvapy ete śabdā deśāntareṣu prayujyante.  
na caiva upalabhyante.

(In the matter of the consideration of) words not in usage the maxim of long sacrifice applies. (To this the *Bhāṣya* comments)—there are indeed words which are not in usage (but in this matter) the maxim of long sacrifice must be followed. Thus there are indeed long sacrifices extending over hundred or thousand years but no one in these days takes to them. The sacrificial priests give instructions about them only because there is merit in the study of the *Vedas*.

(Another *Vārttika* again intervenes)—they all exist in other countries. (The *Bhāṣya* comments)—all these words exist in other countries. (But how is it) that they are not to be found?

*Bhāṣya.* upalabdhaḥ yatnah kriyatām. mahān śabdasya prayogaviṣyāḥ. sapta-dvīpā vasumatī trayo lokās catvāro vedāḥ sāṅgāḥ sarahasyā bahudhā bhinnā ekaśatam adhvaryuśākhāḥ sahasra-vartmā sāma-vedāḥ ekavimśatidhā bāhvṛcyam, navadhā”— tharvaṇo vedāḥ vākovākyam itihāsaḥ purāṇam vaidyakam ity etāvān śabdasya prayoga-viṣayāḥ. etāvantam śabdasya prayoga-viṣayam ananuniśamya ‘santy aprayuktāḥ’ iti vacanam kevalaṁ sāhasamātram eva. etasmimś cātimahati śabdasya

prayoga-viṣaye te te śabdās tatra tatra  
 niyata-viṣayā dr̥ṣyante. tad yathā—śavatir  
 gati-karmā kambojeṣveva bhāṣito bhavati,  
 vikāra enam āryā bhāṣante ‘śava’ iti. ham-  
 matiḥ surāstresu. rāmhatiḥ prācyā-ma-  
 dhyeṣu. gamim eva tvāryāḥ prayuñjate. dātir  
 lavanārthe prācyeṣu, dātrām udīcyeṣu.

ye cāpy ete bhavato’ prayuktā abhimatāḥ  
 śabdā eteṣām api prayogo dr̥ṣyate. kva?  
 vede. tad yathā—“saptāṣye revatī  
 revadūṣa” (R. V. 4.51.4), “yadvo revatī reva-  
 tyāṁ tamūṣa”, “yanme naraḥ śrutyāṁ  
 brahma cakra” (R. V. 1.165.11), “yatrā  
 naścakrā jarasaṁ tanūnām” (R. V. 1.89.9) iti.

Make efforts in discovering them. The field for the use of words is very large. There are the seven islands of the earth, three worlds, the four Vedas with their accessories and esoteric doctrines diversely varied. There are the hundred branches of the *Adhvaryuveda* and thousand ways of *Sāmaveda*, twenty-one-fold *Bāhvṛcya*, ninefold *Ātharvaṇaveda*, the dialogue literature, legends and *purāṇas*, medical science, so much is the field of the use of words. Without examining such a large field of the application of words, to say that there are words which are not used, is merely boldness.

In this large field of the use of words, specific words are used in special senses. Thus the root ‘śava’ is used in the sense of movement in the Kamboja country. But the Aryans use it in the sense of decomposition; and the word ‘hammati’ is used in Surāstra, ‘rāmhati’ in the Middle East, but the Aryans use the word ‘gama’. The root ‘dāti’ is used in the sense of tearing in the East, and in the same sense the word ‘datra’ is used in the North. Even those words, that you regard as being out of usage, are found to be used. Where? In the Vedas. Thus the word ‘ūṣa’ is found in the Vedic passage—‘saptāṣye revatī revadūṣa’, ‘yadvo revatī revatyāṁ tamūṣa’ (The) word ‘cakra’ is used in the passage ‘yan me naraḥ śrutyāṁ brahma cakra’, and in the passage, ‘yatrā naś cakrā jarasaṁ tanūnām’

*Bhāṣya.*      kim punah śabdasya jñāne dharmah, āhosvit  
 prayoge? kaś cātra viṣeṣah?

Vārttika. jñāne dharma iti cet tathādharmah.

Bhāṣya. 'jñāne dharmaḥ' iti cet tathā adharmo'pi  
prāpnoti. yo hi śabdāñ jānāty apaśabdāñ apy  
asau jānāti. yathaiva śabda-jñāne dharma  
evam apaśabda-jñāne'py adharmah. athavā  
bhūyāñ adharmah prāpnoti. bhūyāṁso hy  
apaśabdāḥ, alpiyāṁsaḥ śabdāḥ. ekaikasya  
śabdasya bahavo'pabhrāṁśāḥ. tad yathā—  
'gaur' ity asya gāvī- goṇī-gotā-gopotalikety  
evamādayo'pabhrāṁśāḥ.

(Now comes the question of the production of merit by the knowledge of words). Is merit produced by the knowledge of words, or by their use? What is the difference? (Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)— if there is merit in knowledge, there is also demerit. (The *Bhāṣya* comments)— if there is merit in knowledge, then there is also demerit. He who knows correct words, also knows incorrect words. As there is merit in the knowledge of correct words, there is also demerit in the knowledge of incorrect words. Or rather there will be more demerit. There are more vulgar words and fewer correct words. For each correct word, there are many corrupt forms. Thus the word 'Gauḥ' has many corrupt forms such as, *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā*, *gopotalikā*, etc.

Vārttika. ācāre niyamah.

Bhāṣya. ācāre punar ṛṣir niyamam vedayate, "te'surā  
helayo helaya iti kurvantah parābabhūvuh"  
iti. astu tarhi prayoge.

Vārttika. prayoge sarvalokasya.

Bhāṣya. yadi prayoge dharmah, sarvo loko'bhyuda-  
yena yujyeta.  
kaś cedānīm bhavato matsaro, yadi sarvo  
loko'bhyudayena yujyeta?

na khalu kaścin matsarah. prayatnānartha-  
kyam tu bhavati. phalavatā ca nāma prayat-  
nena bhavitavyam. na ca prayatnah phalād

vyātirecyah. nanu ca ye kṛta-prayatnāś te  
sādhiyah śabdān prayokṣyante, ta eva  
sādhiyo'bhyudayena yokṣyante.

vyatireko'pi vai lakṣyate. dṛṣyante hi kṛta-  
prayatnāś cāpravīṇāḥ, akṛta-prayatnāś ca  
pravīṇāḥ. tatra phala-vyatireko'pi syāt. evam  
tarhi nāpi jñāna eva dharmo nāpi prayoga  
eva.

kim tarhi?

*Vārttika.* śāstra-pūrvake prayoge'bhyūdayas tat  
tulyam̄ veda-śabdena.

*Bhāṣya.* śāstra-pūrvakam̄ yaḥ śabdān prayuṇkte  
so'bhyudayena yuṣyate. tat tulyam̄ veda-  
śabdena. veda-śabdā apy evam  
abhivadanti— “yo'gni-ṣṭomena yajate ya u  
cainam evam veda,” , “yo'gnim nāciketam̄  
cinute ya u cainam evam veda”.

apara āha—‘tat tulyam̄ veda-śabdeneti.  
yathā veda-śabdā niyama-pūrvam̄ adhītāḥ  
phalavanto bhavanty evam̄ yaḥ śāstra-  
pūrvakam̄ śabdān prayuṇkte so'bhyudayena  
yuṣyate’ iti.

The restriction is about usage. (The *Bhāṣya* comments)— in the matter of usage again the Vedas instruct us the restriction,—the *asuras* were defeated, as they pronounced ‘*helayah*’, ‘*helayah*’. Let it be then in usage. (Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)— in that case it would be so for all people.

(The *Bhāṣya* comments)— if there is merit, in the use of words, then all people should attain so. Well, why should you be jealous, if all people attain merit? No one is becoming jealous. Only there would be no meaning in efforts. Efforts ought to be fruitful. Efforts cannot be dissociated from fruits. Well, then, those who have made proper efforts, will use correct words and they will excel and be associated with merit, but the reverse is often seen (i.e. sometimes there are some who make efforts, but do not attain fruit). We often find that there are some who make efforts, and yet

are not well-versed, and there are some, who do not make efforts, but yet they are well-versed. There must be difference in fruit as well. Well, then, there is not merit merely in knowledge or in use. What, then? (Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—it is only in the use of words with proper scientific knowledge (that merit is attained) as it is said in the *Vedas*. (Here the *Bhāṣya* comments)—he alone is associated with merit who uses words in accordance with grammatical science. This is equal to the Vedic passage. The Vedic passage also says, “he, who sacrifices by the *agniṣṭoma*, and he, who knows it to be such”, “he, who collects the *nāciketa* fire and knows it to be such.”

The above *Vārttika* passage 'tat tulyam' etc., is also differently interpreted thus: The other interpreter, (says the *Bhāṣya*), says in explaining the *Vārttika* phrase, 'tat tulyam vedaśabdena', says, just as the Vedic words produce fruit when they are studied according to proper rules, so he, who uses words according to the grammatical science, is also associated with merit.

*Bhaṣya.* athavā punar astu, ‘jñāna eva dharmaḥ’ iti. nanu coktam, ‘jñāne dharma iti cet tatha’—dharmaḥ’ iti.

naiṣa doṣaḥ; śabda-pramāṇakā vayam, yac  
chabda āha tad asmākam pramāṇam.  
Śabdaśca śabda-jñāne dharmam āha,  
nāpaśabda-jñāne'dharmam. yac ca punar  
aśiṣṭāpratiṣiddham, naiva tad doṣāya  
bhavati, nābhyudayāya. tad yathā hikkita-  
hasita-kaṇḍūyitāni naiva doṣāya bhavanti,  
nābhyudayāya.

Vārttika. abhyupāyo vā'paśabda-jñānam śabda-jñāne.

*Bhaṣya.* atha vā’bhyupāya evāpaśabda-jñānam  
śabdajñāne. yo hy apaśabdāñ jānāti śabdān  
apya asau jānāti. tad evam ‘jñāne dharmah’ iti  
bruvato’rthād āpannam bhavati, ‘apaśabda-  
jñāna-pūrvake śabda-jñāne dharmah’ iti.

Vārttika. kūpa-khānakavad vā.

Bhāṣya. atha vā kūpa-khānakavad etad bhaviṣyati.  
 tad yathā kūpa-khānakah kūpam khanan  
 yady api mṛdā pāṁsubhis cāvakīrṇo bhavati.  
 so'psu samjātāsu tata eva tam guṇam  
 āśādayati. yena ca sa doṣo nirhanyate;  
 bhūyasā cābhuyudayena yogo bhavati. evam  
 ihāpi yady apaśabda-jñāne adharmas tathāpi  
 yas tvasau śabda-jñāne dharmas tena ca sa  
 doṣo nirghāniyate bhūyasā cābhuyudayena  
 yogo bhaviṣyati.

Or, rather merit may accrue from knowledge. Well, it has been said that if there is merit in knowledge, there is also demerit. (To this an objection is raised which will be settled by the next Vārttika). This is no fault. We follow the authority of the Vedas. Whatever the Vedas say is valid for us. The Vedas say that there is merit in the knowledge of correct words and there is demerit in the knowledge of vulgar words. Those words which are not current among the cultured, nor prohibited, would produce neither merit, nor demerit, just as hiccuping, laughing, or itching is neither of merit nor of demerit. (Here the Vārttika intervenes)—or, rather, the knowledge of vulgar words would be the means for knowing the correct words. (Here the Bhāṣya comments)—or, rather, the knowledge of vulgar words is the means of the knowledge of correct words. He who knows the vulgar words also knows the correct words. So when it is said that merit accrues from knowledge, it may imply that when one knows the correct words after knowing the vulgar words, merit accrues to him.

(Here another Vārttika intervenes) — or, it may be like the digger of a well. (The Bhāṣya comments)— or, rather, it should be like the digger of a well, i.e. just as the digger of a well in digging a well becomes besmeared with mud and dust. But when the water is produced, it derives from that such quality by which that impurity is removed and he gets much good out of it. So here also though there may be demerit in knowing the vulgar words yet the merit, that accrues by the knowledge of correct words, would remove that demerit and he would attain much good.

Vārttika. ācāre niyama iti ced yājñe karmani sa  
 niyamo'nyatrāniyamah.

*Bhāṣya.*

yadap yucyate — ‘ācāre niyamah’ iti. yājñē karmaṇi sa niyamo’nyatrāniyamah. evaṁ hi śrūyate — ‘yarvāṇas tarvāṇo nāma ṛṣayo babhūvuh pratyakṣa-dharmāṇah parā-parajñā vidita-veditavyā adhigatayāthātathyāḥ.’ te tatrabhavanto ‘yad vā nas tad vā nah’ iti prayoktavye ‘yarvāṇas tarvāṇah’ iti prayuñjate, yājñē punah karmaṇi nāpabhāṣante. taiḥ punar asurair yājñē karmaṇy apabhāṣitam tatas te parābhūtah.

(Here another *Vārttika* intervenes) — if it is suggested that the rule (regarding the correct use of words) applies only in Vedic duties, then the rule applies only in sacrificial work, and not elsewhere. (Here the *Bhāṣya* comments) with reference to what is said that the restriction applies only to Vedic duties, that the rule applies only to sacrificial work and not elsewhere. It is also said in the Vedas that there were sages, Yarvāṇa and Tarvāṇa who directly realised merit and knew all the mundane and extramundane things, and all that was worth knowing, and had realized the truth. They, the masters, instead of pronouncing the words, ‘yad vā nas tad vā nah’ used to pronounce it as ‘yarvāṇas tarvāṇah’ (and hence probably were nicknamed as yarvāṇas-tarvāṇas), but in the sacrificial work, however, never used a vulgar word. The Asuras, however, used vulgar words in the sacrificial work and hence were defeated.

*Bhāṣya.*

atha ‘vyākaraṇam’ ity asya śabdasya kah padārthaḥ? sūtram.

*Vārttika.*

sūtre vyākaraṇe ṣaṣṭhy artho’nupapannaḥ.

*Bhāṣya.*

sūtre vyākaraṇe ṣaṣṭhyartho nopapadyate — ‘vyākaraṇasya sūtram’ iti. kiṁ hi tad anyat sūtrād vyākaraṇam yasyādah sūtram syāt?

*Vārttika.*

śabdāpratipattiḥ.

*Bhāṣya.*

śabdānām cāpratipattiḥ prāpnoti, ‘vyākaraṇāc chabdān pratipadyāmahe’ iti. nahi

sūtrata eva śabdān pratipadyante. kīm tarhi?  
vyākhyānataś ca.

nanu ca tad eva sūtram vigṛhitam  
vyākhyānam bhavati.  
na kevalāni carcā-padāni vyākhyānam—  
'vṛddhiḥ, āt, aij' iti.

kīm tarhi? udāharaṇam, pratyudāharaṇam,  
vākyādhyāhāra ityetat samuditam vyā-  
khyānam bhavati.

Vārttika. śabde lyuḍ-arthaḥ.

Bhāṣya. yadi śabdo vyākaraṇam, lyuḍ-artha nopa-  
padyate—'vyākriyante śabdā anena' iti  
vyākaraṇam. nahi śabdena kīmcid vyā-  
kriyate.  
kena tarhi? sūtreṇa.

Vārttika. bhave ca taddhitah

Bhāṣya. bhave ca taddhito nopapadyate, 'vyākaraṇe  
bhavo yogo vaiyākaraṇah' iti. nahi śabde  
bhavo yogah. kva tarhi? sūtre.

Vārttika. proktādayaś ca taddhitah.

Bhāṣya. proktādayaś ca taddhitā nopapadyante,  
Pāṇinīnā proktam pāṇinīyam, āpiśalam,  
kāśakṛtsnam iti. nahi Pāṇinīnā śabdāḥ  
proktah. kīm tarhi? sūtram.

kimartham idam ubhayam ucyate—  
“bhave ca taddhitah”, “proktādayaś ca  
taddhitah” iti. na ‘proktādayaś ca taddhitah’  
ity eva bhave’pi taddhitaś coditah syāt?

purastād idam ācāryeṇa dṛṣṭam— “bhave  
ca taddhitah” iti, tat paṭhitam. tata uttara-

kālam idam dṛṣṭam, “*proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*” iti, tad api pañhitam. na cedānīm ācāryāḥ sūtrāṇi kṛtvā nivartayanti.

Now what is the meaning of the word ‘*vyākarana*’? (The answer is) the *sūtras*. (Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—in the ‘*sūtra*’ and in the ‘*vyākarana*’ the application of the meaning of the sixth-case is not justifiable.

(The *Bhāṣya* comments) in the expression—the *sūtra* of *vyākarana* (grammar), the meaning of the sixth-case is not applicable. What is that in grammar which are not the *sūtras*, that it can be said that of that is the *sūtra* (a grammar being wholly made up of *sūtras*, there cannot be any separate existence of grammar to which the *sūtras* belong. The *sūtras* themselves are the grammar, and, therefore, there cannot be any sixth-case).

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—(Well in that case) there cannot be any comprehension of words.

(Herein the *Bhāṣya* comments)—in such a case one cannot understand the correct words (and they say)—we know words from grammar, but words cannot be known merely from the *sūtras*. What then?—(Well) from interpretations as well. But then the *sūtras* themselves when properly analysed, give the interpretation. (To this the *Bhāṣya* objects and says) merely by analysing the words, such *vṛddhi*, *āt*, *aic* (in the *sūtra*, *vṛddhir-ād-aic*), can we get the interpretation of the *sūtra*? What then? Examples, counter-examples supplying of elisions—all these make interpretation. (Another objection is raised for introducing the next *Vārttika*.) Well then, the words (may be called) grammar.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—in words (there cannot be) any significance of the suffix ‘*iyuṭ*’. (The *Bhāṣya* comments on it and says)—if it is supposed that *vyākarana* is nothing but words, then the meaning or the suffix ‘*iyuṭ*’ (in the word *vyākarana*) becomes unjustifiable. The word ‘*vyākarana*’ is derived thus, the words are analysed by it. The words do not analyse anything. By what are they analysed then? By the *sūtras*.

(Another *Vārttika* introduces another objection)—A *taddhita* suffix in the sense of ‘produced out of it’ (becomes inapplicable). (The *Bhāṣya* comments)—the *taddhita* suffix in the sense of ‘being produced’ becomes inapplicable. (As one says), the *vaiyākarana* is he whose wisdom is produced from grammar. No wisdom is produced from the words. What is then? In the *sūtras*?

(Another objection is introduced by a *Vārttika*)— the *taddhita* suffix takes place in such senses as ‘have been spoken’.

(The *Bhāṣya* comments)— the *taddhita* suffixes in the sense of ‘have been spoken etc.’ become inapplicable. (In the sense) ‘spoken by Pāṇini’, we have ‘*pāṇiniyam*’, so we have ‘*āpiśalam*’, ‘*kāśakṛtsnam*’. Pāṇini did not speak words. What then? The *sūtras*. What is the good of referring to two *sūtras*: ‘*bhave ca taddhitah*’, ‘*proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*’? Would not a reference to ‘*proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*’ involve within it a reference to ‘*bhave ca taddhitah*’? (The reply to such an objection is then suggested in the *Bhāṣya*). At first the *sūtra*, ‘*bhave ca taddhitah*’ struck the teacher and he read it. Later on the rule ‘*proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*’ also struck him, and he read that also. The teachers do not stop after making the *sutras* (i.e. just as Pāṇini uses the method of definition and elaboration, so by way of the latter, Kātyāyana also gave two instances of the *taddhita* suffix.

*Bhāṣya.*

ayam tāvad adoṣo, yad ucyate— ‘śabde lyuḍarthah’ iti. nāvāśyam karaṇādhikaranayor eva lyuḍ vidhīyate.

kim tarhi? anyeṣvapi kārakeṣu, “kṛtya-lyuṭo bahulam” (Pā. 3.3.113) iti. tad yathā— praskandanam, prapatanam iti.

atha vā śabdair api śabdā vyākriyante. tad yathā— ‘gaur’ ityukte sarve saṃdehā nivartante ‘nāśvo na gardabhaḥ’ iti.

ayam tarhi doṣaḥ, ‘*bhave (ca taddhitah)*’, ‘*proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*’ iti.

This is no criterion that (the word *vyākaraṇa* has two meanings of the *lyuṭ* suffix and there can be no such) meaning of the *lyuṭ* suffix in words (or rather if the word *śabda* be regarded as standing for the science of grammar). There is no such obligation that the *lyuṭ* suffix should be used only in the instrumental (*karaṇa*) and in the locative (*adhikaraṇa*). The *lyuṭ* suffix is used in the sense of other *kārakas* as well, such as ‘*praskandana*’ or ‘*prapatana*’ (where the suffix is used in the sense of the ablative).

Or, rather, words may also explain words. When one pronounces the word ‘cow’, all doubts are dispelled—that this is neither a horse nor an ass. (The idea is that as when a word is pronounced, it signifies only one object, and no one would have other objects indicated by it, so when the example is given, all words of that type are indicated).

This is a defect—(the reference to two types of *taddhita* suffix)—*taddhita* in the sense of *bhava* and in the sense of *prokta*, as referred to.

evam tarhi—

*Vārttika.* lakṣya-lakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam.

*Bhāṣya.* lakṣyaṁ ca lakṣaṇaṁ caitatsamuditam  
vyākaraṇam bhavatīti. kiṁ punar lakṣyaṁ,  
kiṁ vā lakṣaṇam? śabdo lakṣyah, sūtram  
lakṣaṇam.

evam apy ayam doṣah—samudāye  
vyākaraṇa-śabdaḥ pravṛtto'vayave nopa-  
padyate. sūtrāṇī cāpyadhīyāna iṣyate—  
'vaiyākaraṇa' iti.

naiṣa doṣah. samudāyeṣu hi śabdāḥ  
pravṛttā avayaveṣvapi vartante. tad yathā—  
'pūrve pañcālāḥ', 'uttare pañcālāḥ', 'tailaṁ  
bhuktam', 'ghṛtaṁ bhuktam', 'śuklah',  
'nilah', 'kapilah', 'krṣṇah' iti. evam ayam  
samudāye vyākaraṇa-śabdaḥ pravṛtto—  
vayaveṣvapi vartate.

atha vā punarastu sūtram. nanu coktam—  
“sūtre vyākaraṇe ṣaṣṭhyartho 'nupapannah”  
iti.

naiṣa doṣah. vyapadeśivadbhāvena bha-  
viṣyati.

Grammar (involves within it) the object of definition and the definition itself—(on two above *Vārttika*, the *Bhāṣya* comments as follows). The object of definition (i.e. words) and as well as the definitions (i.e. the *sūtras*) together belong to grammar. What is the object to be defined and what is definition? The words are objects of definition and the *sūtras* are the definitions. This also is a fault (says the supposed objector) that the word 'vyākaraṇa' being used for the whole is also used for its parts. Even he, who reads the *sūtras*, is called a 'vaiyākaraṇa' or a grammarian. (In refutation of the supposed objection it is said). This is not a fault. The

words, that are used to denote the whole, may also denote the parts. Thus (they say) the Eastern Pañcālas, the Northern Pañcālas, eaten oil, eaten clarified butter, white, blue, brown, black. So also the word, that indicates the whole, the word *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), may also be used to denote the parts. The eastern or the northern parts of the Pañcāla country are only parts of the Pañcāla country and to signify these parts the word 'Pañcāla' which denotes the whole of the Pañcāla, is used. So the medicated oil and clarified butter which contains other elements than the oil or the clarified butter, go by the name 'taila' and 'ghṛta' signifying oil and clarified butter which are only partial elements of those medicated mixtures. Even if an object has parts which are not white or not blue, brown or black may be called white, blue, brown or black only if they are largely so. So the word 'vyākaraṇa' (grammar), though it is applicable to the whole connection of *sūtras*, may be used to denote its constitutive parts—the *sūtras*.

Or, rather, the *sūtras* may also be called 'vyākaraṇa' (grammar). But it has been suggested that the meaning of the sixth-case is not applicable to the word 'vyākaraṇa' (i.e. it cannot be said that the *sūtras* belong to grammar on the contention that *sūtras* are the grammar). (To this supposed objection the *Bhāṣya* replies)—this not a fault. A word may be used both in the sense of a name and in the sense disclosing the meaning involved in that name.<sup>38</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* yadapyucyate—“śabdāpratipattir” iti.  
 nahi sūtrata eva śabdān pratipadyante. kim  
 tarhi? “vyākhyānataś ca” iti. pariḥṛtam  
 etat—‘tad eva sūtram vigṛhitam  
 vyākhyānam bhavatī’ iti

38. Thus we use the words 'rāhoḥ śirah' (the head of Rāhu) — the Rāhu is nothing else but a head. So in the same object an imaginary reference may be introduced as indicating a name and its meaning. The word 'vyākaraṇa' may be used technically in the sense of grammar and also in its etymological sense— 'that by which anything is explained'; and the word 'sūtra' may be used in the sense of the whole grammar (as a collection of *sūtras*), as also to denote its parts, the individual *sūtras*. In one aspect then, viz. that of explaining the words, the *sūtras* may be identical with grammar, and in another sense it may mean the individual *sūtras* forming a part of the whole collection of *sūtras* called grammar or *vyākaraṇa*.

nanu coktam—“na kevalāni carcā-padāni vyākhyānam—‘vṛddhiḥ āt aij’ ” iti; kiṁ tarhi? “udāharāṇam pratyudāharāṇam vākyādhyāhāra ity etat samuditāṇam vyākhyānam bhavati” iti.

avijānata etad evam bhavati. sūtrata eva hi śabdāḥ pratipadyante. ātaś ca sūtrata eva. yo hyutsūtram kathayennādo grhyeta.

It has been objected that (in such an interpretation of the word ‘vyākaraṇa’ as meaning the *sūtras*) one may not understand the nature of words; for one does not understand the nature of words only from the *sūtras*; what then? From interpretations as well. This (objection) has already been refuted. Those *sūtras* themselves when analysed become interpretations. Now it has been stated that by merely analysing the *sūtras* we do not get any interpretation, but only with examples, counter-examples, supplying of elision, etc. that the explanation as a whole is possible.

(In replying to this objection the *Bhāṣya* says such an objection can be raised only by the ignorant. They understand words only from the *sūtras*. For this reason from the *sūtras* alone (the words are explained). He who says anything besides the *sūtras*, only makes a sound.

*Bhāṣya* .      atha kimartho varṇānām upadeśah?

*Vārttika*.      vṛtti-samavāyārtha upadeśah.

*Bhāṣya*.      vṛtti-samavāyārtha varṇānām upadeśah.

kim idam. vṛtti-samavāyārtha iti? vṛttaye samavāyo vṛtti-samavāyah. vṛttyartho vā samavāyo vṛtti-samavāyah. vṛtti-prayojano vā samavāyo vṛtti-samavāyah.

kā punar vṛttih? śāstra-pravṛttih.

atha kah samavāyah? varṇānām ānupūrvyeṇa sanniveśah.

atha ka upadeśah? uccāraṇam.

kuta etat? diśir uccāraṇa-kriyah. uccārya hi varṇān āha— upadiṣṭā ime varṇā iti.

Vārttika. anubandhakaraṇārthaś ca.

Bhāṣya. anubandha-karaṇārthaś ca varṇānām upadeśah— ‘anubandhān āsaṅkhyāmi’ iti. nahy anupadiṣyavarnān anubandhāḥ śakyā āsaṅktum. sa eṣa varṇānām upadeśo vṛtti-samavāyārthaś cānubandha-karaṇārthaś ca. vṛtti-samavāyaś cānubandhakaraṇam ca pratyāhārārtham. pratyāhāro vṛttyarthah.

Vārttika. iṣṭa-buddhyarthaś ca.

Bhāṣya. iṣṭabuddhyarthaś ca varṇānām upadeśah— ‘iṣṭān varṇān bhotsyāmahe’ iti na hy anupadiṣya varṇān iṣṭā varṇāḥ śakyā vijñātum.

Vārttika. iṣṭa-buddhyarthaś ceti ced udāttānudāttā-svaritānunāsika-dīrgha-plutānām upadeśah.

Bhāṣya. iṣṭa-buddhyarthaś ceti ced udāttānudāttā-svaritānunāsika-dīrgha-plutānām apy-upadeśah kartavyah. evamguṇā api hi varṇā iṣyante.

Vārttika. ākṛtyupadeśāt siddham.

Bhāṣya. avarṇākṛtir upadiṣṭā sarvam avarṇa-kulam grahiṣyati. tathēvarṇākṛtih. tathōvarṇākṛtih.

Vārttika. ākṛtyupadeśāt siddham iti cet samvṛtādīnām pratiṣedhah.

Bhāṣya. ‘ākṛtyupadeśāt siddham’ iti cet? samvṛtādīnām pratiṣedho vaktavyah. ke punah samvṛtādayah? samvṛtah kalo dhamāta enīkṛto’mbūkṛto’rdhako grasto

nirastaḥ pragīta upagītaḥ kṣviṇo romaśa iti.  
 apara āha—  
 “grastaṁ nirastamavalambitaṁ nirhatam  
 ambūkṛtaṁ dhmātamatho vikampitam /  
 sandaṣṭameṇīkṛtamardhakam̄ drutaṁ  
 vikīrṇametāḥ svara-doṣa-bhāvanāḥ //” iti  
 ato’ anye vyañjana-doṣāḥ.  
 naiṣa doṣāḥ.

<i>Vārttika.</i>	gargādi-bidādi-pāṭhāt samvṛtādīnāṁ nivṛttiḥ.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	gargādi-bidādi-pāṭhāt samvṛtādīnāṁ nivṛttir bhaviṣyati.
<i>Vārttika.</i>	samudāya-sādhutvārthaṁ tu gargādi- bidādi-pāṭhāḥ.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	asty anyad gargādi-bidādi-pāṭhe prayojanam. kim? samudāyānāṁ sādhutvām yathā syād iti.
<i>Vārttika.</i>	pratyāpatti-vacanam.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	evam tarhy aṣṭādaśadhā bhinnām nivṛttā- kalādikām avarṇasya pratyāpattim vaksyāmi. sā tarhi vaktavyā.
<i>Vārttika.</i>	liṅgārthā tu pratyāpattiḥ.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	liṅgārthā sā tarhi bhavati. tat tarhi vaktavyam. yady apy etad ucyate, athavaitarhi anekam anubandha-śatam noccāryam it-samjñā ca na vaktavyā, lopāś ca na vaktavyāḥ. yad-anu- bandhaiḥ kriyate tat kalādibhiḥ kariṣyate. siddhyat evam. apāñinīyam tu bhavati.

(In introducing another topic brought forward by the Vārttikakāra the Bhāṣya says) —Well then, why there are instructions also about syllables? (The correctness or incorrectness of words cannot be explained by instructions about syllables, so what is the good in instructing them?)

(Here the Vārttika intervenes) — This instruction as the utterance of syllables is for the sake of the introduction to the grammatical science.

(The Bhāṣya comments) — it is for introducing the Śāstras the syllables are instructed in order (*vṛtti-samavāyārthaṁ varṇānām upadeśah*). What is the meaning of the word ‘*vṛtti-samavāyārtha*’? Their utterance in order is for the sake of the introduction of the grammatical science. What is again the meaning of ‘*vṛtti*’? Introduction of the Śāstra. What is the meaning of ‘*samavāya*’? The utterance of syllables in order. What is the meaning of ‘*upadeśa*’? Articulation. The root ‘*diśi*’ means ‘to utter’. It is by uttering the syllables that one says that these syllables have been instructed. (*upadīṣṭā ime varṇāḥ*).

(Here the Vārttika intervenes) — Also for making the attachments.

(The Bhāṣya comments) — The syllables are instructed for the sake of interpreting the attachments (*anubandha*); so that we may connect the attachments. It is not possible to connect the attachments without instructing the syllables. The instruction or utterance in order of the syllables is then both for the cohesion of the introduction of the Śāstras and for the sake of the knowledge of the attachments. The commencement of the Śāstras as involving the utterance of syllables in order is for the sake of the attachments and for forming the *pratyāhāras*. The *pratyāhāras* are for the sake of introducing the Śāstras in a simple manner.

*Pratyāhāra* means the comprehension of a series of letters or affixes into one syllable effected by combining the first member of the series, without its indicating letter or letters, with the indicatory final consonant of the last member. Thus the *pratyāhāra* ‘ac’ is the technical term for all the vowels and ‘hal’ for all the consonants.

(Here the Vārttika intervenes) — (The syllables are instructed) also for the sake of indicating the desired articulation of the syllables.

(The Bhāṣya says) — The syllables are instructed so that we may indicate the desired articulation of the syllables. It is not possible to indicate the nature of the desired articulation, of the syllables without instructing properly about the syllables.

(Here the Vārttika intervenes with a supposed objection) — If the above view is accepted, then the instruction ought to indicate the *udātta*, the *anudātta* and the *svarita* accents as well as the nasal, the long and vocative prolongation in each case.

(The *Bhāṣya* repeats the *Vārttika* sentence and says) that the syllables of all these qualities since each syllable has varied forms according to their accent, length and the like; the instruction should then specify and indicate all the characters.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes with a conclusive answer)—By the instruction (of the syllables) in their universal aspect, this is effected. When the universal class of 'a' is instructed, all 'a'-s may be comprehended. So the universals of *i* and *u* syllables.

(Here another *Vārttika* intervenes)—If the purpose is served by the instruction of the syllables as universals then there should be no instruction about the closed or open utterances.

(The *Bhāṣya* repeats the *Vārttika* sentence and raises the question)—What are these closed and open utterances?

(The reply is)—These are the closed distorted (when a syllable is uttered from an improper place of articulation, there is a distortion of it resembling the sounds of birds), the aspirate (by too much aspiration even a short sound appears as long), indistinct when a syllable is not properly pronounced it cannot be distinguished from another syllable. Inarticulate (this means a sort of articulation in which though a syllable is pronounced, it appears as if it was in the throat of the speaker), half-pronounced (a long sound appears as a short one), the struck (syllables are so pronounced that they are arrested at the root of the tongue), harsh, singing tone associated with the singing articulation of the neighbouring syllables, shaky, too voluminous, too swift, hoarse, extended (melting to other syllables). These are the defects of articulation.<sup>39</sup>

Apart from these, there are other defects of proper expression. In introducing the next *Vārttika*, the *Bhāṣya* says that the faults of too closed utterances and the like (the defects just pointed out above) are removed by the utterance of the list of words coming under the *gargādi* or the *bidādi* list. To this another objection is raised by the *Vārttika*—the utterance of the *gargādi* and the *bidādi* is for demonstrating the correctness or articulation of the separate words falling under that list (i.e. the utterance of the words of those lists serve to indicate the proper articulation of number of words, but not as syllables of a class).

39. Kaiyatā remarks that the defects of articulation are limitless as may be due to the inability of proper articulation and error. This is again repeated in the *Bhāṣya* as a verse which is not translated for fear of reduplication.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—Another purpose is served by the utterance of the *gargādi* and *bidādi* list. That is done. (Those lists have been uttered for demonstrating the correctness of the whole words).

(Another *Vārttika* intervenes)—It is for this reason that the proper nature of the articulation of syllables has been indicated. In this way we shall describe the eighteen different kinds of the pronunciation of 'a' as free from the defects of indistinct pronunciation and the like as describing the proper nature.

(The *Bhāṣya* raises another objection)—This then requires a separate enumeration. If after once describing the nature of the syllables we have again to describe it, that is reduplication. A provisional answer to such an objection is introduced by the *Vārttika*. This description of the nature of syllables may be for indicating the various characteristics as there may be defects of articulation in the *anubandha* syllables. So there may be similar defects in the articulation of the syllables in the notes etc. The instruction of the nature of the syllables is not merely for indicating the defects of the syllables in their universal aspect, but also in the aspects in which they appear in various combinations and therefore such a redescription of their nature is not a duplication.

(The *Bhāṣya* repeats the *Vārttika* line and says that), then that ought to be described. (The *Bhāṣya* here suggests a supposed objection). It has been suggested that one should rather not introduce hundreds of attachments (*anubandha*) or direct it or evasion and other elisions. What may be done by the *anubandhas* may as well be done by the different forms of articulations, indistinct, nasal, etc.<sup>40</sup>

40. It is suggested here, just as there are *adhikāra-sūtras* in Pāṇini in which certain roots are marked out as belonging to a class for the sake of different operations, so all operations in grammar might have been based upon a system of different kinds of defects in articulation which might mark out particular class of roots or words for particular operations.

Thus, instead of forming such a rule as "anudātta-ñīta", i.e. roots which are articulated in the *anudātta* accent, or has an attachment of ñ, should take ātmanepada, one might have formed a rule "kalādātmanepadam", i.e. roots pronounced in a particular indistinct manner, should take ātmanepada. The suggestion here made is that instead of introducing the system of *anubandhas* and *it-s* it was possible to make the same sort of classification by means of different kinds of tones. Probably grammars were made under such a system and Pāṇini introduced a reform in introducing the *anubandha* system where articulate syllables replaced the tones and thus attained celebrity. But it cannot be denied that the remnants of the old system existed even in Pāṇini's system, as he also used accents and nasal tones for the classification of roots in certain operations.

(The reply is)— It will, no doubt, serve the purpose, but it would not be in accordance with the system of Pāṇini. Then let it be as it is.

*Bhāṣya.*      nanu coktam—“ākṛtyupadeśāt siddham iti  
cet samvṛtādīnām pratiṣedhaḥ” iti.

parihṛtam etat—“gargādi-bidādi-pāṭhāt  
samvṛtādīnām nivṛttir bhaviṣyati’ iti.

nanu cānyad gargādi-bidādi-pāṭhe  
prayojanam uktam. kim? samudāyānām  
sādhutvam yathā-syād iti.

evaṁ tarhy ubhayam anena kriyate—  
pāṭhaś caiva viśesyate, kalādayaś ca nivart-  
yante.

kathām punar ekena yatnenobhayam  
labhyam? labhyam ityāha. katham? dvigatā  
api hetavo bhavanti. tad yathā—āmrāś ca  
siktāḥ pitaraś ca prīṇītā iti. tathā vākyāny api  
dviṣṭhāni bhavanti—‘śveto dhāvati’,  
‘alambusānām yātā’ iti.

atha vā idam tāvad ayam praṣṭavyaḥ—  
kveme samvṛtādayaḥ śrūyerann iti?  
āgameṣu. āgamāḥ śuddhāḥ paṭhyante.  
vikāreṣu tarhi? vikārā api śuddhāḥ  
paṭhyante. pratyayeṣu tarhi? pratyayāḥ api  
śuddhāḥ paṭhyante. dhātuṣu tarhi?  
dhātavo’pi śuddhāḥ paṭhyante. prātipadikeṣu  
tarhi? prātipadi-kāny api śuddhāni  
paṭhyante.


yāni tarhy agrahaṇāni prātipadikāni?  
eteṣām api svara-varṇānupūrvī-jñānārtham  
upadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ. ‘śāsah’ ‘ṣaṣah’ iti mā  
bhūt, ‘palāśah’ ‘palāṣah’ iti mā bhūt.  
‘mañcako’ ‘mañjakah’ iti mā bhūt.

“āgamāś ca vikārāś ca pratyayāḥ saha  
 dhātubhiḥ /  
 uccāryante tatasteṣu neme prāptāḥ  
 kalādayah”//

iti śrimad-bhagavat-patañjali-viracite vyākaraṇa-  
 mahābhāṣye prathamādhyāṣya prathame pāde pra-  
 thamam āhnikam.

It has been suggested that if the instruction of syllables is in their universal aspect, then the closed or open utterances need not be instructed. But this criticism has already been refuted by the utterance of the *gargādi* or *bidādi* list, the prohibition of the defects of closed or open utterances can be removed. But to this also it has been pointed out that there are other purposes to be fulfilled by the utterance of the *gargādi* list. What was that purpose so that whole words may be correctly pronounced? Now it is being suggested that both the purpose may be served by the utterance of such a list. Thus, by the utterance of such lists the nature of the articulation of the whole words is shown, and their mispronouncing tones such as indistinct and the like are also prohibited. (But the question arises) how can both the purposes be served by the same means? The answer is that there are causes which go two ways. The mango-trees have been sprinkled and the forefathers have been satisfied. So there are propositions which may be interpreted in two ways. Thus, the sentence ‘śveto dhāvati’ may be interpreted both ways — (The dog is running away from here—śvā ito dhāvati; or the white one runs). Read the sentence—alambusānām yātā, it may be interpreted in both ways— (He has gone to the Alambusa country; or busānām yātā alam— this one which has attained the colour of straw, is now fit).

(But there may be a further question)— Where shall we hear of these closed or open utterances? (The answer is) — in the Vedas. The Vedas are uttered correctly. The modifications are uttered correctly. The *pratyayas* also are correctly uttered. The *dhātus* are also correctly uttered. The *prātipadikas* (names) are correctly uttered. But there are many *prātipadikas* (names) which are underived and formed according to tradition. For these also, for their proper intonation and the proper arrangement of the syllables. The word ‘śāśa’ is not to be pronounced as ‘ṣaṣa’; ‘palāśa’, and not ‘palāṣa’; ‘mañcaka’, and not ‘mañjaka’. The āgamas, the vikāras, the *pratyayas* and the *dhātus* are all properly uttered and for that reason the defects of tone cannot apply to them.



## SECOND ĀHNIKA

Pāṇini.

**a i u ḥ. 1.**

Vārttika.

akārasya vivṛtopadeśa ākāra-  
grahaṇārthaḥ.

(The Vārttika here says that) this 'a' sound be pronounced widely as 'ā'.

Bhāṣya.

akārasya vivṛtopadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ. kim  
prayojanam? ākāra-grahaṇārthaḥ. akāraḥ  
savarna-grahaṇena ākāram api yathā gr̥hṇīyāt.  
kim ca kāraṇam na gr̥hṇīyāt? vivāra-bhedāt.

kim ucyate—vivāra-bhedād iti, na punaḥ  
kāla-bhedād api. yathaiva hy ayam vivāra-  
bhinna evam kāla-bhinno'pi? satyam eva tat.  
vakṣyati—“tulyāsyā-prayatnam savarnaṁ”  
(Pā. 1.1.9) ity atrāsyā-grahaṇasya  
prayojanam—āsyē yeṣāṁ tulyo deśaḥ  
prayatnaś ca te savarna-samjñā bhavantīti.  
bāhyāś ca punar āsyāt kālaḥ. tena syād eva  
kāla-bhinnasya grahaṇam, na punar vivāra-  
bhinnasya.

kim punar idam vivṛtasyopadiśyamānasya  
prayojanam anvākhyāyate, āhosvit  
samvṛtasyopadiśyamānasya vivṛtopadeśaś  
codyate? vivṛtasyopadiśyamānasya  
prayojanam anvākhyāyate.

kathaṁ jñāyate? yad ayam “a a” (Pā. 8.4.68)  
ityakārasya vivṛtasya samvṛtatāpratyāpattim  
śāsti.

The 'a' sound should be instructed. For what reason? For including the  
ā sound, so that the a sound may include within it also the ā sound, as its

homogeneous. Why, is it general that it should not include it? Because it differs from it in its wide pronunciation. Why is it said 'on account of there being a difference in the widened articulation?' Is not there also a difference in longer time (of articulation)? (The ā differs from a) not only in the widening of articulation, but also in longer time. This is true. Pāṇini will later on define *savarna* as "those are homogeneous (*savarna*) which agree as regards their origin in the mouth as well as effort (*prayatna*)."<sup>41</sup> The word 'in the mouth' in the *sūtra* is for this reason —those which have the same place of origin in the mouth and also the same effort, are called homogenous. The time is different from the (place of origin) in the mouth; so the difference of effort is to be understood and not the widening.

Did the writer of the *sūtra* instruct the widening, and the writer of the *Vṛtti* only explained its reason, or the writer of the *sūtra* did not advise the 'widening' only the writer of the *Vṛtti* suggested it, i.e. or did Pāṇini advise a closed (*samvr̥ta*) utterance and only the *Vārttika* suggested a 'widening'? (The reply is)—Pāṇini advised a widening and the *Vṛtti* only explains the necessity of doing so. How do you know it—(because in the last *sūtra* Pāṇini suggests that) the wide ā should be regarded as closed a.<sup>41</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      naitad asti jñāpakam. asti hy anyad etasya  
vacane prayojanam. kim? 'atikhaṭvah',

41. "a, i uṇ" is a technical rule and should be read along with "ādirantyena sahetā" (*Pā*. 1.1.71) which means that in the case of a *pratyāhāra* (*an*, *in*, *ac*, etc.) the first syllable together with the attachment (as *an*) would signify the initial and intervening syllables. The point raised is that why the syllables should not have suffixes and why should not the *a i* or *u* combine in euphonic combination. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in commenting on the "a i uṇ" *sūtra* says that this is a *samjñā sūtra* as it is to be interpreted along with the rule "ādirantyena sahetā" which means that in the *sūtra* "a i uṇ" the 'a' with the attachment *n* will indicate the initial, the ending and the middle vowel. Some say that whether we take *a* here as the original syllable or its imitative sound, since it has no meaning it has no suffix or declension, or as others have said the suffix *sup* has been dropped, as the *sūtras* are to be treated as Vedic forms. But be that as it may, why should not there be a *sandhi* (euphonic combination between *a i* and *u*). On this point Bhaṭṭoji repudiates the tentative suggestion that the rules of *sandhi* cannot be operative while the instruction on the syllables are being given. His own reply is that the euphonic combination is only possible when there is contiguity. The rule is that contiguity between vowels and consonants has to be assumed in the same *pada*, between the *dhātu* and the *upasarga* and in the case of the compounds. But in the case of a *vākyā* or a sentence, the contiguity is optional. Since "a i uṇ" forms with "ādirantyena sahetā" one *vākyā*, the contiguity is optional and hence there is no *sandhi*. The condition of contiguity has been admitted in grammar to provide for such cases.

‘atimāla’ ity atrāntaryato vivṛtasya vivṛtaḥ  
prāpnoti, samvṛtaḥ syād ity evamarthā  
pratyāpattiḥ. naitad asti. naiva loke na ca  
vede’kārō vivṛto’sti. kas tarhi? samvṛtaḥ,  
yo’sti sa bhaviṣyati, tad etat pratyāpatti-va-  
canam jñāpakam eva bhaviṣyati ‘vivṛtasyo-  
padiṣyamānasya prayojanam anvākhyāyate’  
iti.

kaḥ punar atra viśeṣaḥ ‘vivṛtasyopadiṣyamānasya prayojanam anvākhyāyeta,  
samvṛtasyopadiṣyamānasya vā vivṛtopadeśaś codyeteti?

na khalu kaścid viśeṣaḥ. āhopuru-  
śikāmātram tu bhavān āha — ‘samvṛta-  
syopadiṣyamānasya vivṛtopadeśaś codyate’  
iti. vayaṁ tu brūmo—‘vivṛtasyopadiṣya-  
mānasya prayojanam anvākhyāyate’ iti.

(This instruction that an a, though naturally contracted in usage, should be regarded as open in articulation) is not an indication of any particular maxim (i.e. it does not imply the maxim that a *vivṛta* or open *a-kāra* in usage, should be regarded as contracted. It cannot be suggested that if it is not enjoined that a here should be taken as open, then it could not be taken as a *savarṇa* or homogeneous with a sound and in such a case the shortening of ā in *atikhaṭvā* as *atikhaṭva* and *atimālā* as *atimāla* would be inadmissible, — for if a is not made homologous with ā there will be no vowel like a ; but this criticism is invalid as this is effectuated by the indicatory suggestion contained in the rule “*udīcāmātah...*” (Pā. 7.3.46). There is some other purpose served in it. What is that? (The reason is that) on account of proximity the ā sound as open can only be a substitute for ā sound, but the last rule at the end of Pāṇini’s work again instructs that what has been instructed as ā should be regarded as relapsing back to a.

Kaiyatā notes that the distinction between *vivṛta* and *saṁvṛta* (open and contracted) with the length of time required in pronouncing a *vivṛta* and *saṁvṛta* sound, is that the latter characteristic (the length of time required) is external and that the former, since its efforts begin in the mouth, is internal.

But this is not true, for neither in popular usage nor in the Vedas a is pronounced widely, i.e. as open. How is it then pronounced? As closed or contracted? Then that form ought to be articulated which is in usage but the last rule of Pāṇini, a relapse of a into a suggests that throughout the work the a has to be taken as open, as ā (for otherwise there is no meaning in suggesting a relapse from a into a). This is a reason why a has been instructed here as having a wide and open articulation. What is the difference here between the two expression, 'the reason for the instruction of wide articulation being stated here', and the expression that that which is instructed as contracted is being instructed has been wide? (The reply is) there is no difference. It is only vanity. You suggest that which is instructed as contracted, is here instructed as wide. We, however, say the reason for instruction of a as wide is being stated here.

*Vārttika.* tasya vivṛtopadeśād anyatrāpi vivṛtopadeśāḥ savarṇa-grahaṇārthaḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* tasyaitasyākṣara-samāmnāyikasya vivṛtopadeśād anyatrāpi vivṛtopadeśāḥ kartavyaḥ. kvānyatra? dhātu-prātipadika-pratyaya-nipātasthasya.

kim prayojanam? savarṇa-grahaṇārthaḥ. ākṣara-samāmnāyikenāsyā grahaṇam yathā syāt.

kim ca kāraṇam na syāt? vivāra-bhēdād eva.

ācārya-pravṛttir jñāpayati—bhavaty-ākṣara-samāmnāyikena dhātvādisthasya grahaṇam iti, yad ayam “*akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*” (Pā. 6.1.101) iti pratyāhāre’ko grahaṇam karoti.

kathaṁ kṛtvā jñāpakam? nahi dvayor-ākṣara-samāmnāyikayor Yugapat samavasthānam asti.

naitad asti jñāpakām. asti hy anyad etasya vacane prayojanam. kim? yasyākṣara-

samāmnāyikena grahaṇam asti tadartham  
 etat syāt— ‘khatvādhakam’, ‘mālādhakam’  
 iti. sati prayojane na jñāpakaṁ bhavati. tasmād  
 vivṛtopadeśah kartavyah.

ka esa yatnaś codyate—vivṛtopadeśo  
 nāma. vivṛto vopadiṣyeta samvṛto vā. ko-  
 nvatra viśeṣah ?

sa esa sarva evamartho yatnah kriyate.  
 yāny etāni prātipadikāny agraḥāṇāni teṣām  
 etenābhypāyenopadeśāś codyate, tad guru  
 bhavati tasmād vaktavyam— ‘dhātvādīsthaś  
 ca vivṛtaḥ’ iti.

The instruction of wide articulation of the syllables should be extended to other sphere for including the homogenous syllables (*Vārttika*).

(In the interpretation of this, the *Bhāṣya* says) the instruction of wide articulation of *a* as advised regarding the *a* occurring in the syllabic order should be extended elsewhere. Where is the elsewhere? (The answer is) in the *akāra* of *dhātus*, *prātipadikas*, *pratyayas* and *nipātas*. What is the reason? For including the homologous syllables so that it may be affiliated with those articulated in the syllabic order. Why should it not be so?<sup>42</sup> Because the open articulation is different from the closed one. The usage of Pāṇini indicates that the syllables articulated in the syllabic order should include the vowel in the beginning of a root. Thus in the rule “*akāḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*”, i.e., the syllables included under *ak*, i.e. *a i u ṛ* would be lengthened when followed by homologous vowels. In this *pratyāhāra* *ak* has been taken.<sup>43</sup> (A question is raised by Patañjali)— how can this indicate that? The *a* of the syllabic order cannot at the same time take two

42. The open *a-kāra* is advised in the *pratyāhāra* involving a different effort from the closed *a-kāra*, this closed *a-kāra* would not be a *savarṇa* of the open variety and consequently the rules for their conjunction and other functions would not be operative. So for effecting the homologousness of all *a-kāras* they are all to be regarded as open.

43. The idea is that when by the combination *ak* Pāṇini includes the *a* of the *pratyāhāra*, *a i u*; this *a* is not only a *vivṛta* or open sound as *ā*, but also the closed sound as *a*, otherwise the *sūtra* would have been “*ikāḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*”. Moreover, if *a* as closed sound is not at all included then there will be no provision for making the euphonic combination as *dāṇḍa* + *agram* = *dāṇḍāgram*. Thus by advising the

forms, the *a* and *ā*. Therefore the objection may be raised that this has no indicatory value. There was some other necessity for it. What is that? The *a* that is read in the syllabic order should be read as *ā* in order to provide for the euphonic combination *khaṭṭvā* + *ādhakam*, *mālā* + *ādhakam*. If there is a necessity for instructing the open sound, it cannot be said to have any indicatory value. Therefore the *a* of the *pratyāhāra* should be instructed as having an open sound. But what is the special use in making much ado about this? (Since *a* is advised in the *pratyāhāra*, this *a* may be articulated as an open sound or a closed sound. There is no difference in that). What does it matter if the open or the closed *a* be instructed. What is the difference? (In reply to this one-sided objector, Patañjali says)—this instructive effort is made for this purpose. (If this effort would not have been made, it would have been more cumbrous for otherwise)—it should have to be advised that all the *a-kāras* and the *prātipadikas* have to be instructed as having an open sound in the method prescribed. This would be more cumbrous. For this reason it has to be separately announced that the initial *a* of the *dhātus* should also be regarded as having a *vivṛta* or open sound.<sup>44</sup>

*a-kāra* as open, it is indicated (*jñāpaka*) by Pāṇini that the closed one is also to be included in it.

44. On the above discussion, Bhaṭṭoji remarks as follows:  
*a* is closed, but the other vowels are open. *E* and *ai* are still more open, and *ai* and *au* are further more open than *e* or *ai*, and *ā* is the openest of all. The words *vivṛta* and *samvṛta*, open and closed, refer to the similar effort of the mouth, and also to the vowels which are so articulated, i.e. on the one hand, open would mean the sort of opening of the lips by which a particular sound is articulated, and it may be also used adjectively to the vowel sounds articulated with such an open *prayatna* (effort). But though *a* has a closed sound yet in order to make it homologous with the long and the long-drawn (*pluta*) sound, it has been regarded as open for the formative operations of grammar. In order that in actual usage one may not use it as an open sound, Pāṇini makes his final advice in the last *sūtra* “*a a*”, i.e. the *a* advised as having an open sound, should be regarded as a closed one. It is this last *sūtra* “*a a*” that suggests or indicates that throughout the whole of grammar *a* is to be treated as an open sound. But *a* as open sound cannot be regarded as homologous with *ā* which requires a muh more open effort. For this reason the *Vārtika* “*akārasya vivṛtopadeśa ākāragrahaṇārthah*.” The idea suggested is that the *a* sound should be taken not only as open but as wide open as in *ā-kāra*. According to the rule “*tulyāsyā-prayatnam savarṇam*”, i.e. those only are homologous vowels what are articulated from the same place of the mouth with the same effort; and syllables pronounced with different degrees of effort cannot be regarded as homologous and this without this instruction the closed *a* could not be regarded as homologous with the widely open *ā*, and there would be no euphonic combination between them.

Vārttika. dīrgha-pluta-vacane ca samvṛta-nivṛttyarthah.

Bhāṣya. dīrgha-pluta-vacane ca samvṛta-nivṛttyartho vivṛtopadeśah kartavyah. dīrgha-plutau samvṛtau mā bhūtām iti. 'vrksābhym', 'devadattā' 3 iti.  
 naiva loke na ca vede dīrgha-plutau samvṛtau stah. kau tarhi? vivṛtau. yau stas tau bhaviṣyatah.  
 "sthānī prakalpayed etāvanusvāro yathā  
 samvṛtah sthānī, samvṛtau dīrghaplatau  
 prakalpayet //"  
 anusvāro yathā yanam. tad yathā —  
 sañyantā sañvatsarah yañlokaṁ, tañlokaṁ  
 iti— anusvārah sthānī yanam anunāsikam  
 prakalpayati.  
 viṣama upanyāsaḥ. yuktam̄ yat satas tatra praklptir bhavati, santi hi yanah sānunāsikā niranunāsikās ca. dīrgha-plutau punar naiva loke naiva ca vede samvṛtau stah. kau tarhi? vivṛtau. yau stah tau bhaviṣyatah. evam api kuta etat — tulya-sthānau prayatna-bhinnau bhaviṣyatah, na punas tulya-prayatnau sthānabhinnau syātām īkāra ūkāro veti?  
 vakṣyati "sthāne 'ntrara-tamah"  
 (Pā. 1.1.50) ityatra sthāna ity anuvartamāne punah sthāne-grahaṇasya prayojanam,

For this reason Bhaṭṭoji remarks: "tasmād atratya-bhāṣya-vārttikayor vivṛtaśabdo vivṛtatarām lakṣyayati iti vā tattvam." But this is further repudiated by Bhaṭṭoji in the same discourse. He holds that Pāṇini's instruction here seems to be that a should be regarded as open and should be declared as homologous as to the wide open ā. The former view is attributed to the Nyāsakāra Haradatta.

“yatrānekavidham āntaryām tatra sthānata  
āntaryām baliyo bhavati” iti.

The instruction that *a* should be open, is for providing for the open articulation involved in *dirgha* and *pluta*, so that *dirgha* and *pluta* may not be articulated as closed, as in the examples ‘vṛkṣābhyaṁ’, ‘Devadattā’ 3. But this is not a defect (that needs to be provided for). Neither in popular usage nor in the Vedas there are instances of the long and long-drawn as being closed. How are they articulated? As open. They are then to be as they are.

(Another one-sided objector is supposed to say that) the nature of the place of articulation should determine the nature of *dirgha* and *pluta*, as the nasal affects the *ya va ra la* (i.e. if it is supposed that as there is no closed articulation of the long and the long-drawn in the Vedas and in the popular usage, so there is no nasal *ya va ra la* in the Vedas or in the popular usage. Yet being pronounced in association with a nasal, *ya va ra la*, also become nasal. So it would be here also).

The closed nature of the articulation of one vowel would naturally impose the same character on the long and long-drawn sound of the same vowel, just as the *anusvāra* nasal impose its character on the *ya va ra la* articulated in association with it as in the use of the following examples: *sañyantā*; *sañvatsarāḥ*; *yañlokam*; *tañlokam*; the nasal *anusvāra* being the place of utterance, it imposes its nasal character on the *ya, va, ra, la*.

(To this objection, the *Bhāṣyakāra* replies as follows:) The illustration is beyond the mark; it is indeed proper that what exists should be imposed upon. *Ya, va, ra la* exist in two varieties, as nasal and non-nasal (and so a nasal *ya, va, ra la* may occur in association with a nasal). The long and the long-drawn do not exist in the closed form either in the Vedic or in the popular usage. How are they then articulated? – as open. Then they must be as they are.

(But another objection comes)— That *a* and the *ā* originate from the same place, but are articulated with different efforts closed and open. Then on the same analogy those that are produced by the same effort, but originate in the different place of the mouth, should also be regarded as homologous. Thus the *Bhāṣya* says, even so why this—that the two originating in the same place, but differing in effort, shall be *savarṇa* or homologous, but not those that have the same effort but originate in different places, shall not be *savarṇas* (homologous) as the *ī, ū* sounds.

(The reply of the *Bhāṣya* is) (Pāṇini) will read later on the *sūtra* “*sthāne’ntaratamah*”, i.e. the place being the same that is advised which is most closely written. Here the word *sthāne*, though available in the

context has again been uttered in the *sūtra* with this purpose where the proximity is of various kinds, the proximity of the place of utterance will be stronger.

Vārttika. *tatrānuvṛtti-nirdeśe savarnā-grahaṇamanantvāt.*

Bhāṣya. *tatrānuvṛtti-nirdeśe savarnānām grahaṇam na prāpnoti—“asya cvau”(Pā. 7.4.32), “yasyeti ca” (Pā. 6.4.148) kiṃ kāraṇam? anaṇtvāt. na hy ete’ṇo ye’-nuvṛttau. ke tarhi? ye’kṣara-samāmnāye upadiṣyante.*

Vārttika. *ekatvād akārasya siddham.*

Bhāṣya. *eko’yam akāro, yaścākṣara-samāmnāye, yaś cānuvṛttau, yaś’ca dhātvādisthah.*

Vārttika. *anubandha-saṅkarastu.*

Bhāṣya. *anubandha-saṅkarastu prāpnoti. “karmaṇyaṇ” (Pā. 3.2.1), “āto’ nupasarge kah”(Pā. 3.3.3) iti ke’pi ḡitkṛtaṇ prāpnoti.*

Vārttika. *ekājanekāj-grahaṇeṣu cānupapattiḥ.*

Bhāṣya. *ekājanekāj-grahaṇeṣu cānupapattir bhavati. tatra ko doṣah? ‘kiriṇā’, ‘giriṇā’, ityekājlakṣaṇam antodāttatvam prāpnoti. iha ca ‘ghaṭena tarati ghaṭikah’ iti dvyaj-lakṣaṇah ḡhan na prāpnoti.*

Vārttika. *dravyavaccopacārāḥ.*

Bhāṣya. *dravyavaccopacārāḥ prāpnuvanti. tad yathā—dravyeṣu naikena ghaṭenāneko yugapat kāryam karoti. evam imam akāraṇ nāneko yugapad uccārayet.*

Vārttika. *viṣayeṇa tu nānāliṅga-karaṇāt siddham.*

*Bhāṣya.*

yad ayam viṣaye viṣaye nānā-liṅgam akāraṇ  
karoti—“*karmaṇy aṇ*”, “*āto ’nupasarge kah*”  
iti. tena jñāyate—nānubandha-saṅkaro’stī. yadi hi syāt nānā-liṅga-karaṇam anarthakam  
syād, ekamevāyam sarva-guṇam uccārayet.

naitad asti jñāpakam. it-samjñā-prakṛptyartham etat syāt. na hy ayam anubandhaiḥ śālyakavac chakya upacetum. it-samjñāyām hi doṣaḥ syāt. āyamya hi dvayor it-samjñā syāt. kayoḥ? ādyantayoḥ.

evam tarhi—“*viṣayeṇa punar liṅgakaraṇāt siddham.*” yad ayam viṣaye viṣaye punar liṅgam akāraṇ karoti—“*prāg dīvyato’ṇ*” (*Pā. 4.1.83*), “*śivādibhyo’ṇ*” (*Pā. 4.1.112*) iti, tena jñāyate—nānubandhasaṅkaro’stī. yadi hi syāt punar liṅga-karaṇam anarthakam syāt.

athavā punar astu—“*viṣayeṇa tu nānā-liṅga-karaṇāt siddham*” ityeva.

nanu coktam—‘it-samjñā-prakṛptyartham etat syād’ iti.

naiṣa doṣaḥ, lokata etat siddham. tad yathā—loke kaścid evam devadattam āha—‘iha muṇḍo bhava’, ‘iha jaṭilo bhava’, ‘iha śikhi bhava’ iti, yallīṅgo yatrocye tallīṅgas tatropatiṣṭhate. evam ayam akāro yallīṅgo yatrocye tallīṅgas tatropasthāsyate.

(The *Vārttika* says—In the *sūtras* that follow like “*akah savarṇe dīrghah*”, if the vowels mentioned) therein, be of an imitative character then they cannot include their homologous or as they are not included within the vowels included in the *pratyāhāra aṇ*.

(The *Bhāṣya* in commenting upon it says)—(in the *sūtra* “*akah savarṇe dīrghah*”, the vowels referred to in *ak* being of the nature of an imitation of the vowels as mentioned in the *pratyāhāras, a i uṇ*, etc) they would not

include their homologous ones. There if reference be to the imitative ones, it would not entitle (us) to comprehend the homologous. (Such as mentioned) in the rules—"asya cvau" (a becomes ī when cvi follows) and "yasyeti ca". Why so? What reason? (because this a in the rule "asya cvau" is not the same as the vowel a included in the *pratyāhāra* rule *añ*). Not being included within *añ*. Those, which are included in the *pratyāhāra* *añ*, are the same as those that are articulated after the same imitation. Who are they? Those (vowels) which have been instructed in the syllabic order.<sup>45</sup>

(Here an one-sided objection is made in the *Vārttika*)—the a being the same, the difficulty is obviated. (Here the *Bhāṣya* says)—the a is one whether it be in the syllabic order or in its imitative articulation or in the beginning of a root.

(A further objection is made against it in the *Vārttika*)—then there is an invalid intermingling of the attachments. (This is explained by *Bhāṣya* as follows)—An indistinguishability of character between the vowels associated with various attachments, is the effect. Thus there is the rule "karmanyāñ" (in association with an accusative a root takes an *añ* suffix). There is also the rule "āto 'nupasarge kah" (a root ending in ā and not preceded by a prefix, takes the *ka*-suffix). (The *ka* is reduced to *a* with the detachment of the attachment *ka* and *añ* is reduced to *a* with the detachment of the attachment *ṇ* at the time of oration). Then the effects that are to take place in association with the attachment *ṇ* are to take place in the *a* associated with the attachment *ka*. (For the supposition has been that all *a* are the same, and in that case the *a* as marked off with a *ka* attachment, and the *a* as marked off with a *ṇ* would be the same and there ought to be the same grammatical operation).

(A second objection is raised by the *Vārttika*)—there will be difficulty with regard to monosyllables and multi-syllables. (The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows)—There would be difficulty with regard to the distinction between monosyllabic and multi-syllabic words. What is the difficulty

45. The word 'anuvṛtti' in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika* is used in the peculiar sense of *anukūla-vṛtti* for an imitative articulation. The vowels mentioned in the syllabic order are that had been instructed in the *śāstra*. But the *a i u ṛ ḷ* involved in the epigrammatic phrase *ak* are similar to the vowel sounds mentioned in the *pratyāhāra a i u ṛ*. The objection raised is that in such a supposition, since the vowels mentioned in the epigrammatic phrases such as *ak* etc. not being the same (but only being similar) they would not include the homologous vowels. The *pratyāhāra* *śāstra* was applied to *a*, but in the *śāstra* it is not the same *a*, but only similar *a*. Therefore the reference in the *pratyāhāra* would not apply to the vowels referred to in the directive *sūtras* like *akah savarṇe dirghah*.

there? The words 'kiriṇā' and 'giriṇā' (formed out of the words 'kiri' and 'giri') would have a terminal high accent, they being monosyllabic. Here again is the case of the word 'ghaṭa' in the formation 'ghatena tarati ghaṭikāḥ' (ghatika is one who swims with a pitcher) the *than* suffix which is applied to disyllabic words, would not be applicable.<sup>46</sup>

(Another objection is raised by the *Vārttika*)—the usage also ought to be like things. (The *Bhāṣya* says)—the usage ought to be like things just as among things many persons cannot do their work with one jug at the same time, so not many persons can pronounce the same a at the same time.

(Now follows the refutation of the first objection made by the *Vārttika*). (The difference of the same vowel sounds) is accompanied in different contexts owing to their being marked differently (by their attachments). (The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows)— that in the different contexts the same a appears with different marks as in the rules "karmanyā", "ato'nupasarge kah" it is known thereby that there is no confusion of attachments (if the same a is meant then it would be useless to mark it differently with different attachments) or the a may be the same which is pronounced with all kinds of attachments (leading thereby to different grammatical operations).<sup>47</sup>

(A further objection is raised in the *Bhāṣya*)—this (attachment) has no such indicative value. It is so (that is the application of the attachment is) for the sake of making the technical name *it*.

It cannot be supposed that the a is covered all over with the attachment like a porcupine, and the formation of the technical term *it* would be adversely affected. The technical term *it* refers to the two. Which two? The first and the last.<sup>48</sup>

(A reply to this objection is now introduced in the *Bhāṣya*)—The indicative nature can be known through the application of different marks

46. The words 'kiri' and 'giri' are obviously disyllabic; but if the supposition is that there is only one *i* sound, then the two *is* of 'kiri' and 'giri' become one and therefore the words become monosyllabic and not disyllabic, and so also *ghaṭa* become mono-syllabic, because the *as* in *gha* and *ṭa* are one.

47. The word 'guṇa' in the *Bhāṣya* literally meaning quality, refers to the *anubandhas* or attachments; that is the same a is pronounced with different attachments for different operations.

48. The purport of the objection is this : it cannot be said that the attachments are intended for distinctive operations of the same vowel, for in the epigrammatic word *aṇ* the *ṇ* attachment does not direct any special operation for the vowels included in it or of the a. The attachment is applied only in justification of the formation of the technical term *it*.

or attachments in different contexts. It is seen that in different contexts the *a* is differently marked, as the rule “*prāgdivyato'ñ*” (the *añ* suffix should be added to all roots occurring up to the rule (*divyato'* etc.)), or “*śivādibhyo'ñ*” (*añ* suffix should be applied to roots falling under the *śivādi* list). This is indicative of the fact that there should not be any confusion of operation due to the ignoring of the value of the attachments (*anubandha*); for had it been so, there will be no meaning in marking the vowels again with the *anubandhas*.<sup>49</sup>

Or rather the explanation would be that the difficulty is solved by marking the vowels differently in different contexts.

(A further objection is raised)—It has been suggested that the attachments are added for the formation of the epigrammatic name of it. (To this a further reply is made)—This is no criticism. It follows from popular usage. So among the people, one would speak to Devadatta as follows: here, shave away your hair, or here get your locks tangled, or here have only one tuft of hair at the middle of the head. So whatever mark is suggested the person appears there with that mark. So with whatever the *a* may be advised in any particular context in whatever mark it appears there.<sup>50</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* yadapy ucyate—“*ekājanekāj-grahaṇeṣu cā-nupapattih*” iti.

*Vārttika.* *ekājanekāj-grahaṇeṣu cāvṛttisañ-khyānāt.*

*Bhāṣya.* *ekājanekāj-grahaṇeṣu cāvṛtteḥ saṅkhyānād anekāctvam bhaviṣyati. tad yathā—“sapta-daśa sāmidhenyo bhavanti”* iti, “*trīḥ*

49. If there is any chance of confusion of operations owing to the attachments, then instead of prescribing “*Śivādibhyo'ñ*”, the prescription might have been “*Śivādibhyah a*”. It is suggested that the attachment of *ñ* signifies that the operations should be of *ñ*-attachment and not of *a*-attachment. It must be said in reply that it is a case of *vidhi* or prescription and not of *niyama* or selection.

50. This is an answer to the previous supposition that *a* should be uttered with all the attachments. It is here suggested that *a* should be pronounced with that particular characteristic that may be advised in any particular context. An *a* with a particular characteristic attachment may be advised in any particular context, the object be in that different kinds of grammatical operations are indicated by those attachment marks.

*prathamām anvāha triruttamām*” ityāvṛttitah  
sapta-daśatvam bhavati. evam iha pṛṣṭhitito-  
nekāctvam bhaviṣyati.

bhaved āvṛttitah kāryam parihr̥tam. iha tu  
khalu ‘kiriṇā’, ‘giriṇā’ ity ekāj-lakṣaṇam  
antodāttatvam pṛāpnony eva.

etad api siddham. katham? lokataḥ. tad  
yathā—ṛṣi-sahasram ekām kapilām ekai-  
kaśah sahasrakṛtvō dattvā tayā sarve te  
sahasra-dakṣiṇāḥ sampannāḥ. evam iha  
anekāctvam bhaviṣyati.

yad apy ucyate—‘dravyavaccopacārāḥ  
pṛāpnuvanti’ iti. bhaved yad asambhavi  
kāryam, tan nāneko yugapat kuryāt. yat tu  
khalu sambhavi kāryam aneko’pi tad  
yugapat karoti. tad yathā—ghaṭasya  
darśanam sparśanam vā. saṁbhavi cedaṁ  
kāryam akārasyoccāraṇam nāma. aneko’pi  
tad yugapat kariṣyati.

*Vārttika.*

ānyabhāvyam tu kāla-śabda-vyavāyāt.

*Bhāṣya.*

ānyabhāvyam tvakārasya. kutaḥ? kāla-  
śabda-vyavāyāt. kāla-vyavāyāc chabda-  
vyavāyāc ca. kāla-vyavāyād ‘daṇḍa-agram’.  
śabda-vyavāyāt ‘daṇḍah’. na caikasyātmano  
vyavāyena bhavitavyam. bhavati ced  
bhavatyānyabhāvyam akārasya.

*Vārttika.*

yugapac ca deśa-pṛthaktva-darśanāt.

*Bhāṣya.*

yugapac ca deśa-pṛthaktva-darśanān  
manyāmahe—‘ānyabhāvyam akārasya’ iti.  
yad ayam yugapad deśa-pṛthaktveśūpa-  
labhyate—āśvah, arkah, artha iti. na hy eko

devadatto yugapat srugghne ca bhavati  
mathurāyām ca.

It has been suggested that there is a difficulty in settling the problem as to whether a word is monosyllabic or multi-syllabic. (The *Vārttika* intervenes and repudiates the objection and says that) the problem of deciding as to monosyllabic or multi-syllabic character is to be settled by counting the number of times that the sound is repeated.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows)—the matter of deciding the question as to the monosyllabic or multi-syllabic character, the multi-syllabic character is to be decided by counting the number of times that the sound is pronounced. So here also a word is multi-syllabic even if the same syllabic is pronounced more than once.

(A further objection is raised in the *Bhāṣya* as it says that) by the number of types that a vowel may be produced, the main purpose may indeed be served; but in the examples 'kiriṇā' and 'giriṇā', the high accentuation of the last syllable characteristic of monosyllabic words, would certainly be applicable.<sup>51</sup> This can be decided. How? According to the popular usage. Just as one thousand *r̥sis* by giving away the same cow thousand times (by purchasing each time the cow that is given away) succeeded in donating thousand cows, so here also the same vowel when taken many times by way of articulation could render the word multi-syllabic. (As regards the third objection the *Bhāṣya* says that) the treatment should be in accordance with the manner of ordinary articles (wherein a single article cannot be used by many persons at the same time), the answer is that it would be so if the action was impossible in which case many persons could not simultaneously do it, but there are actions which though one may be performed by many at the same time. Thus many people can see the jug or touch it at the same time. This action, namely, that of articulating the *a* sound, can be done by many persons at the same time and therefore many may do it simultaneously.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes with the viewpoint of the objector that the *a* is not one but many. The *Vārttika* thus says)—it may be supposed that each *a* may be different from the other, because each is separate from the other by time and by syllables.<sup>52</sup>

51. The idea is that since the word involving the pronunciation of *i* which is all one is indeed monosyllabic, the mere repetition of the same vowel cannot render it disyllabic in nature.

52. Thus, in the case of *a i uṇ* there is a pause between *a*, *i* and *uṇ* by virtue of which they retain their individual characteristic and do not enter into euphonic combination.

(The *Bhāṣya* in interpreting the *Vārttika* says)— the *a* should be regarded as different. Why so? Because of the intervention of time and other syllables. The first case is exemplified in ‘*dāṇḍa*’ ‘*agram*’ (here there is a pause or lapse of time between the *a* of ‘*dāṇḍa*’ and the *a* of ‘*agram*’). The intervention of syllables as in ‘*dāṇḍah*’ (here the *a* of *da* is distinct from *a* of *ṇḍa*, because the syllables *ṇḍa* separate them. An entity cannot remain the same when there is an intervention in the midst. So if there is an intervention, one *a* becomes different from the other.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes and emphasises the view that *a* is not one but many. Thus the *Vārttika* says)—that *a* is many, because it is simultaneously different in different places.

(The *Bhāṣya* in explaining it says that) we consider one *a* as different from another, because it can be pronounced at the same time in different places (i.e. words). Thus one *a* can be articulated at the same time in different words or places such as *aśvah* (horse), *arkah* (sun), *arthah* (the object). Now the same *Devadatta* cannot be at the same time at the cities of *Srughna* and *Mathurā*.

<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	yadi punar ime varṇāḥ—
<i>Vārttika.</i>	śakunivat syuḥ.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	tad yathā—śakunaya āśu-gāmitvāt purastād utpatitāḥ paścād dṛṣyante. evam ayam akāro ‘da’ ity atra dṛṣṭo ‘ṇḍa’ ity atra dṛṣyate. naivam śakyam.anityatvam evam syāt. nityāś ca śabdāḥ. nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapāyopajana-vikāribhīḥ. yadi cāyam ‘da’ ity atra dṛṣṭo ‘ṇḍa’ ity atra dṛṣyeta, nāyam kūṭasthāḥ syāt.
	yadi punar ime varṇāḥ—
<i>Vārttika.</i>	ādityavat syuḥ.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	tad yathā eka ādityo’nekādhikaranastho yugapad deśa-prthaktveśūpalabhyate.

Again in the word *dṛ̥ti* the *ṛ̥* is made distant from *i* by the intervention of the sound *ta* between *r̥* and *i*. See the *Bhāṣya* on “*anuditsavarṇasya*” (Pā. 1.1.69) in this connection.

viṣama upanyāsaḥ—naiko draṣṭā ādityam  
anekādhikaraṇastham yugapad deṣa-pr̥tha-  
ktveṣu upalabhatē. akāram punar upalabhatē.

akāram api nopalabhatē. kim kāraṇam?  
śrotropalabdhīr buddhinirgrāhyah prayogena  
abhijvalita ākāṣa-deṣaḥ śabdah. ekam ca  
punar ākāṣam.

ākāṣadeṣā api bahavah. yāvatā bahavah,  
tasmād ānyabhāvyam akārasya.

ākṛtigrahaṇāt siddham.

Bhāṣya. avarṇākṛtir upadiṣṭā sarvam avarṇakulam  
grahiṣyati. tathevarṇākṛtiḥ, tathovarṇākṛtiḥ.

Vārttika. tadvacca tapara-karaṇam.

Bhāṣya. evam ca kṛtvā taparāḥ kriyante—ākṛti-  
grahaṇenā tiprasaktam iti.

nanu ca savarṇa-grahaṇenātiprasaktam iti  
kṛtvā taparāḥ kriyeraṇ. pratyākhyāyate tat  
“savarṇe ‘aṇ-grahaṇam aparibhāṣyam  
ākṛtigrahaṇād ananyatvāc ca” iti.

Vārttika. hal-grahaṇeṣu ca.

Bhāṣya. (hal-grahaṇeṣu ca). kim? “ākṛti-grahaṇāt  
siddham” ityeva. “jhalo jhalī”(Pā. 8.2.26)—  
avāttām, avāttam, avātta. yatraitan nāsti—  
aṇ savarṇān gṛhṇāti iti.

Vārttika. rūpa-sāmānyād vā.

Bhāṣya. rūpa-sāmānyād vā siddham etat. tad yathā—  
‘tān eva śāṭakān ācchādayāmo ye mathurā-  
yām’, ‘tān eva śālin bhuñjmahe ye maga-  
dheṣu’, ‘tad evedam bhavataḥ kārṣāpaṇam  
yan mathurāyām gṛhitam.’ anyasmīmś

cānyasmin rūpa-sāmānyāt 'tadevedam' iti  
bhavati. evam ihaipi rūpa-sāmānyāt siddham  
(aiuṇ).

(The *Bhāṣya* anticipates the view of those who hold that the syllables are one and says by way of introducing a *Vārttika*)— (If these syllables again) were like the birds, that is, the birds who for quickness of flight when they are flying, appear as going backwards, so the one a sound appearing in *da* also appears at the end of the conjunction *ṇ* and *ḍ* as *ṇda*.

This cannot be explained in this way, for then the *varṇas* would be transitory and yet the words are known to be eternal. If the words are eternal, then the syllables must also be devoid of production and destruction and immovable like an anvil. If the same *a* is seen in *da* and *ṇda* then it cannot be unchangeable.

(Now the *Bhāṣya* introduces the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, and in that way introduces a *Vārttika* with the words—if again these syllables) be like sun (*Vārttika*).

Just as the sun being reflected from various places may appear at the same time at different places, (so the *varṇas* may also be the same and yet may appear as different in different contexts and conjunctions).

(A further objection is raised in the *Bhāṣya*)—the analogy does not fit in. It is not possible that one perceiver should perceive the sun as reflected from different places, and thus simultaneously perceive it in different places, but one cannot perceive *a* in that manner.

(To this a further criticism is considered, in the *Bhāṣya*)—it is not possible to perceive *a* in that manner. Why so? The ear is the place where sound is grasped and then it is comprehended by intelligence; the sound is roused by making in the ākāśa and ākāśa is one. But the ākāśa has also many positions (and it is again objected) that in accordance with the diversity of the positions of the ākāśa. One as may be different from one another.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes by refuting the criticisms against those that regard *a-kāra* as particularistic). (Thus the *Vārttika* says)— the problem is solved by taking *a* in the sense of ākṛti or class-notion.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—instruction is regarding *a* as universal *a* which would include all *a*-s. So also there is the universal of the *i*-syllable and *u*-syllable.

(Here the other Vārttika comes and holds that)—the *ta*-attachment is introduced in the same manner.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—having done in this way, the syllables are appended with *ta*. (The appendage of *ta-kāra* is indicative of the fact that a was taken as universal and was all-pervasive. This is hinted by the line of the *Bhāṣya* as follows)—the syllables are appended with *ta*, because by taking the syllables in their universal aspect that universal aspect was applicable everywhere (i.e. no means was left for indicating any particular aspect of the syllable).

(But it may be objected that) the application of a was limitless, because it included all the homologous sounds, and it is for that reason that particular aspects have to be denoted by the appendage of *ta*. (To this the *Bhāṣya* replies that) this view has been refuted in the rule “*anudit-savarṇasya*” in connection of which (the *Bhāṣya* says that) in comprehending the homologous sounds *aŋ* should not be regarded as sufficient, for each vowel is referred to in its universal aspect and as one.

(There is however another argument in favour of the universalistic aspect of the syllables. The Vārttika says that the universalistic aspect of the syllables is further understood when) take the scope of comprehension of the epigrammatic term *hal*.

(The *Bhāṣya* in explaining it says)—what is this? The problem is settled by taking the syllables in universalistic sense. When the syllables included within *jhal* follow similar syllables, then those syllables, that is, the latter are elided. Thus we have the forms—*avāttām*, *avāttam*, *avātta*. (The *luṇ* form of the root *vas*). Here there is no such rule that *aŋ* includes the homologous syllables).<sup>53</sup>

(Here the Vārttika intervenes and explains the situation by accepting the particularistic view and says) or it may be because of the similarity of form (Vārttika).

(The *Bhāṣya* in interpreting it says)—or rather the problem is solved on account of the similarity of forms. Thus people say, ‘We cover those clothes which are in Mathurā, we eat those rice which are in Magadha, it is the same *kārṣāpana* that was taken in Mathurā’. Even if the things are

53. In the particularistic view the *ta-kāra* in *kha pha cha tha tha ca ta tav*, is only an imitative variety of one *ta-kāra*, and the two *ta-kāras* (the *sic* between which is elided on the supposition that *sic* is *jhal* which comes after a *jhal* and is followed by a *jhal*) and the two *ta-karas* are not both included within the epigrammatic term *jhal* and if it is not so, *sic* would not be elided. (Thus if we hold the particularistic view the forms of *avāttam*, *avātta*, etc. cannot be explained).

different, they are regarded as one on account of their similarity of form. Here also it would be on account of the similarity of forms.<sup>54</sup>

54. Now after much discussion it was admitted that the *a* articulated in the syllabic order, is open, but the *a* of the syllabic order is not the same as the *a* in the *dhātus*, *prātipadikas* and the *nipātas*. The latter is of the closed type and as such there should not only be no homologousness between the two types, but latter, that is, the *a* of the *dhātus*, *prātipadikas*, etc. cannot be counted under *ac*, the *a* in *ac* being of an entirely different type; and this would lead to much confusion in the operation of Pāṇini's *sūtra*. Some instances of such confusion have been exemplified by Bhāṭṭoji which I cannot discuss here for want of space. It is further pointed out there that since the *a* referred to in "asya cvau" is a *samvṛta* variety, it is not the *a-kāra* which is included in *aŋ* and thus since the *a* referred to in "asya cvau" is a *samvṛta* variety such as the *a* in *aiuŋ*, the direction that *a* becomes *i* before *cvi*, can refer only to the *samvṛta* variety of *a* as *śuklibhavati*, but not to the *vivṛta* variety as exemplified in the exemplification *mālibhavati*. It cannot also be suggested that by virtue of the fact that the *a* of the syllabic order has been declared as open, the *a*-s that are similar to it in the *prātipadikas* and the *dhātus* will have the *a* of the syllabic order as open, is well-satisfied in rendering an euphonic combination of words where *a* as initial follows *a* as the ending vowel, e.g., *khaṭṭvāḍhakam*. The force of the declension of the syllabic *a* as *vivṛta* having been exhausted here, it may well be held that it cannot have any further indicative value by which we can extend its scope to the *a* sounds similar to it and to other *a-kāras* found in *dhātus* and *prātipadikas*. It has been further declared that the *a* in *aiuŋ* has been taken to mean the open *a*-sound in order to effectuate its homologousness with the long and the long-drawn sounds, by which alone (that is *savarṇata*) the euphonic combinations can be made as in *khaṭṭvāḍhaka*.

But it is suggested that it is directed that not only the *a* in the *pratyāhāra* should be articulated as open, but whenever *a* occurs in the grammar should be regarded as *a* (*īha* *śāstre yāvān akāraḥ sa sarvo'pi prakriyāyām vivṛto boddhavyaḥ*). But even then, since with every articulation we have different syllable (that is each articulated 'a' is different from every other articulated *a* pronounced a second later by the same person or by other persons). These 'a'-s not being included within the *pratyāhāra aŋ* (*aiuŋ*), these 'a'-s would not be homologous with each other; in the rule, 'akāḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ' the 'a' is an imitative variety of the *pratyāhāra a*, and therefore the homologousness should be limited to the *pratyāhāras* only and not elsewhere. Here it is suggested that there is only one *a* and the same *a* that we find in the *pratyāhāra* is found elsewhere also, and it is futile to think that the 'a'-s occurring in other places are different from the 'a' in the *pratyāhāra aŋ*. This does not involve any difficulty, for we can quite conceive that the same 'a' may be pronounced with an *udātta* accent, and that this accentual character will be manifested by the articulated sound. The provision of attachments can also be explained after the analogy of popular usage. Thus the same man may be asked to keep a tangled hair at a certain place under certain circumstances or to shave it at other place and under other circumstances. So the same 'a' may induce different grammatical operations under different circumstances and these are distinguished by the difference in attachments or *anubandhas* which do not

make the 'a' different, but only indicate the nature of grammatical operations that would be induced by the same 'a' under different circumstances. But it is again objected that if 'a' is the same, then in the word 'ghaṭa' we should not take into consideration the two articulated *a-kāras* associated with *gha* and *ta*, and regard them as identical and therefore consider the word as monosyllabic, but such a supposition would prevent us from applying the '*than*' which can only be done through disyllabic words. The reply is that since 'a' is articulated twice in the same word 'ghaṭa', the word 'ghaṭa' should be regarded as disyllabic. So from these considerations 'a' should be regarded as one but to this particularistic object. They say that the same 'a' cannot have different accentual characteristics. They further say that the *varṇas* are the characters of sound, but if that is so then *ka*, *ga*, *a*, *i*, *o* may all be regarded as characteristic of sound and may, therefore, be regarded as one, and we hear also a *pada* is a whole or a *vākyā* is a whole. Moreover, in such a view, the *varṇas* are manifested through the sounds and may not be regarded to have any real existence. We may serve our purpose by sticking to the manifesting power of sounds. Thus Bhatṛhari has said—the universal that is manifested by many particulars, is its *sphoṭa*. Others, however, regard the sounds as manifesting the particulars. So if we can explain only the manifesting power of sound, we have the view of *jāti-sphoṭa*, otherwise the various *varṇas* are all to be regarded as different even in their different accentuations. So leaving aside the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, we may accept that the *varṇas* are infinite, and we may take them as standing for the universal 'a', a universal 'i' and so forth. Though this view has its justification, yet it does not appear that this view was sponsored by Pāṇini who denied the universal character of *a* and regarded that it has 18 varieties. Thus there is difficulty both in regarding *a* as universal or as particular. As a matter of fact there are three views contending with each other. One view is that the syllables are one as manifested by sound (*dhvani*). The other view is that though they are many their significance is in their class-notion and the third view is that each syllable is as many as there are ways of articulation in each articulated *a-kāra*. Bhaṭṭoji holds that Pāṇini's rule can be explained on any of these suppositions. Thus the *a-kāra* though articulated with different accents or by different persons or in different contexts, may be recognised as one, and this will serve to explain why the *a-kāra* in "Ato'nupasarge *ka*" and "karmany *an*" should induce different operations; and in order to extend the operation of the rule "asya cvau" to *a* and *a* for providing for the cases of *śuklibhavati* and *mālibhavati*, the short *a* has been declared to be open. The objection is invalid that the *a* in "asya cvau" is not the same as *a* in *aŋ*, for the *a* in *aŋ* includes both the closed and the open variety. These two characters do not belong to *a* alternately as *muṇḍo bhava* and *jaṭilo bhava*, but simultaneously as *śyāmo dīrghaś caturvāhuh*. The difference in accentuation or in the nasal and non-nasal character, is not a real difference as has been explained in the *sūtra* "vṛddhir ādaic" (Pa. 1.1.1).

Again in the view where *a* is regarded as infinite and in the view where *a* is regarded as having 18 varieties, it is no doubt admitted that the universal character of *a* both as implying *hrasva*, *dīrgha*, *pluta* jointly and severally as *hrasva*, *dīrgha* and *pluta*. According to this view the open character has been ascribed to one universal *a* implying *hrasva*, *dīrgha* and *pluta* in the *aiuṇ pratyāhāra*. Therefore both the short and the long variety are included within it and there will be no difficulty in the scope

*Pāṇini.*

## ṛ ḥ k. 2

*Bhāṣya.*

atha ḥ-kāropadeśah kimarthah?

kim višeṣeṇa ḥ-kāropadeśāś codyate, na punar anyeṣām api varṇānām upadeśāś codyate? yadi kiṃcid anyeṣām api varṇānām upadeśe prayojanam asti ḥ-kāropadeśasyāpi tad bhavitum arhati. ko vā višeṣah?

ayam asti višeṣah—asya hi ḥ-kārasya alpiyāṁś caiva prayoga-viṣayah. yaścāpi prayoga-viṣayah so'pi klpisthasyaiva. kṛ-peśca latvam asiddham. tasyāsiddhatvād ḥ-kārasyaiva ac-kāryāṇi bhaviṣyanti nārtha ḥ-kāropadeṣena.

ata uttaram paṭhati—

*Vārttika.*

ḥ-kāropadeśo yadṛcchā-śakti-jānukaraṇa-plutyādyarthah.

*Bhāṣya.*

ḥ-kāropadeśah kriyate yadṛcchā-śabdārtho'-śaktijānukaraṇārthah, plutyādyarthaś ca.

yadṛcchāśabdārthas tāvat —yadṛcchayā kaścid ḥtako nāma. tasminn ackāryāṇi yathā syuh—dadhy-ḥ-ḥtakāya dehi, madhy-v-ḥtakāya dehi, udaññḥtako'gamat, pratyāññḥtako'gamat. catusṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ—jāti-śabdāḥ, guṇa-śabdāḥ, kriyā-śabdāḥ, yadṛcchā-śabdāś caturthāḥ.

āśaktijānukaraṇārthah—āśaktyā kayācid brāhmaṇyā 'ṛtaka' iti prayuktavye 'ṛtaka' iti prayuktam, tasyānukaraṇam 'brāhmaṇy-ṛtaka

of the application of the rule, "asya cvau". The same explanation applies to the formation of the words—avāttām, avāttam, avātta involving the elision of the *s* of *sic*. Otherwise if the two *ta-kāras* were not regarded as being included in *jhal* form would have been *avātstām*.

ityāha, 'kumār-y-łtaka- ityāheti.

plutādyarthaś ca īkāropadeśah kartavyah.

ke punah plutyādayah? pluti-dvirvacana-svaritāh. klpta3-śikha, klpptah, prakłptaḥ.  
plutyādiṣu kāryeṣu kṛper latvam siddham.  
tasya siddhatvād ac-kāryāṇi na siddhyanti.  
tasmād ī-kāropadeśah kriyate.

naitāni santi prayojanāni.

Vārttika. nyāyyabhāvāt kalpanam samjñādiṣu.

Bhāṣya. nyāyyasya ṛtaka-śabdasya bhāvāt kalpanam samjñādiṣu, sādhu manyante—‘ṛtaka evāsau, na ḥtakah’ iti. apara āha—‘nyāyya ṛtaka-śabdah śāstrānvito’sti. sa kalpayitavyah sādhuḥ samjñādiṣu—ṛtaka evāsau na ḥtakah.

ayam tarhi yadṛcchā-śabdo’parihāryah—  
łphiḍah łphiḍḍaśceti.

eso’pi ṛphiḍah, ṛphiḍḍaś ca. katham? arti-pravṛttiś caiva loke lakṣyate, phida-phiddāv auṇādikau pratyayau. trayī ca śabdānām pravṛttih—jāti-śabdāh, guṇa-śabdāh, kriyā-śabdā iti. na santi yadṛcchā-śabdāh.

anyathā kṛtvā prayojanam uktam, anyathā kṛtvā parihārah.

‘santi yadṛcchā-śabdāh’ iti kṛtvā prayojanam uktam, ‘na santi’ iti parihārah. samāne cārthe śāstrānvito’śāstrānvitasya nivartako bhavati. tad yathā devadatta-śabdo devadiṇa-śabdām nivartayati. na gāvyādīn.

naiṣa dosah. paksāntarair api parihārā bhavanti.

Vārttika. anukaraṇam śiṣṭāśiṣṭāpratiṣiddheṣu  
yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu.

*Bhāṣya.*

anukaraṇaṁ hi śiṣṭasya vā sādhu bhavati, aśiṣṭāpratiṣiddhasya vā, naiva tad doṣāya bhavati, nābhuyudayāya. yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu. yathā laukikeṣu vaidikeṣu ca kṛtānteṣu. loke tāvad ya evam asau dadāti ya evam asau yajate, ya evam asau adhīte iti. tasyānukurvan dadyāc ca yajeta cādhīyīta ca so'py abhyudayena yajyate. vede'pi—"ya evam viśva-srjaḥ satrāṇy adhyāsate" iti, teṣām anukurvān tadvat satrāṇy adhyāsīta. so'py abhyudayena yujyate. aśiṣṭāpratiṣiddhaṁ yathā—ya evam asau hikkati, ya evam asau hasati, ya evam asau kaṇḍūyatī. tasyānukurvan hikkec ca hasec ca kaṇḍūyec ca, naiva tad doṣāya syān nābhuyudayāya. yas tu khalv evam asau brāhmaṇaṁ hanti evam asau surāṁ pibatīti tasyānukurvan brāhmaṇaṁ hanyāt surāṁ vā pibet so'pi manye patitāḥ syāt.

viṣama upanyāsaḥ. yaś caivam hanti, yaś cānuhanti, ubhau tau hataḥ. yaś cāpi pibati, yaś cānupibati, ubhau tau pibataḥ. yas tu khalv evam asau brāhmaṇaṁ hanti, evam asau surāṁ vā pibatīti tasyānukurvan snātānulipto mālyaguṇa-kaṇṭhaḥ kadalīstambhaṁ chindyāt payo vā pibet, na sa manye patitāḥ syāt.

evam iḥāpi ya evam asau apaśabdaṁ prayuṇkte iti tasyānukurvān apaśabdaṁ prayuṇjīta, so'py apaśabdabhāk syāt.

ayam tvanyo'paśabda-padārthakah śabdo, yadartha upadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ. na cāpaśabda-padārthakah śabdo'paśabdo bhavati.

avaśyam caitad evam vijñeyam—yo hi man-  
yate ‘apaśabda-padārthakah śabdo’paśabdo  
bhavati’ iti, ‘apaśabda’ ity eva tasyāpaśabdaḥ  
syāt. na caiṣo’paśabdaḥ.

ayam khalv api bhūyo’nukaraṇa-śabdo’-  
parihāryah, yadartha upadeśah kartavyah—  
‘sādhv ḥkāram adhīte’, ‘madhv ḥkāram  
adhīte’ iti.

kvasthasya punar etad anukaraṇam?  
kḷipisthasya. yadi kḷipisthasya kḷpeś ca latvam  
asiddham tasyāsiddhatvād ḥ-kāra evāckār-  
yāṇi bhaviṣyanti.

bhavet tadarthena nārthaḥ syāt. ayam  
tvanyah kḷipistha-padārthakah śabdaḥ,  
yadartha upadeśah kartavyah.

na kartavyah. idam avaśyam kartavyam—  
“prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati” iti. kiṁ  
prayojanam? ‘dviḥ pacantv ityāha’,  
“tiṁnatiñā” (Pā. 8.1.28) iti nighāto yathā  
syāt. ‘agni ityāha’. ‘īd-ūd-ed-dvivacanam  
pragṛhyam”(Pā. 1.1.11) iti pragṛhya-samjñā  
yathā syāt.

yadi ‘prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati’ ity  
ucyate, apaśabda evāsau bhavati—  
‘kumāryltaka ity āha’, ‘brāhmaṇyltaka ity  
āha’. apaśabdo hy asya prakṛtiḥ.

‘na cāpaśabdah prakṛtiḥ. nahy apaśabdā  
upadiṣyante, na cānupadiṣṭā prakṛtir asti.

Vārttika. ekadeśa-vikṛtasyānanyatvāt  
plutvādayah.

Bhāṣya. ‘ekadeśa-vikṛtam ananyavad bhavati’ iti  
plutvādayo’pi bhaviṣyanti.

yadi 'ekadeśavikṛtam ananyavad bhavati' ity ucyeta, "rājñah ka ca" (Pā. 4.2.140) rājakīyam, "allopo'nah" (Pā. 6.4.134) iti lopah prāpnoti.

ekadeśa-vikṛtam ananyavat ṣaṣṭhī-nirdiṣṭasya.

yadi 'ṣaṣṭhī-nirdiṣṭasya' ity ucyate, 'kl̄ṣpta-śikha' iti pluto na prāpnoti. na hy atra ḫkārah ṣaṣṭhīnirdiṣṭah. kas tarhi? rephah. ḫ-kāro'py atra ᷣaṣṭhī-nirdiṣṭah. katham? avibhaktiko nirdeśah —kr̄pa uḥ rah laḥ— "kr̄po ro laḥ" iti.

athavā punar astv avišeṣeṇa.

nanu coktaṃ—"rājñah ka ca" rājakīyam "allopo'nah" iti prāpnotīti.

naiṣa doṣah. vakṣyat� etat— "śvādinām samprasāraṇe nakārānta-grahaṇam ana-kārānta- pratiṣedhārtham" iti. tat prakṛtam uttaratrānuvartītyate—"allopo'nah" nakārāntasyeti.

iha tarhi—'kl̄ṣptaśikha' "anṛta" iti pratiṣedhah prāpnoti.

Vārttika. ravat pratiṣedhāc ca.

Bhāṣya. ravat-pratiṣedhāc caitat siddhyati. "guror aravataḥ" iti vakṣyāmi.

yadi 'aravataḥ' ity ucyate, hotṛ+ḥkārah 'hotṛṣkārah' atra na prāpnoti.

"gurorararavato hrasvasya" iti vakṣyāmi. sa esa sūtra-bhedenā ḫkāropodeśah plutyādyarthah san pratyākhyāyate. saiṣā mahato vamśa-stamballaṭṭvānukṛṣyate. (rlk)

(The Bhāṣya in introducing the above Vārttika says)—why has ḫkāra been (separately instructed)? What is the special significance of the

instruction of *l-kāra*? But, well, there ought not to be any further instruction of any of the other syllables; whatever necessity there may be in the instruction of the other syllables the same necessity applies with regard to the instruction of *l-kāra*. What is the difference?

There is this difference. There is very little scope for the use of *l-kāra*. Whatever use there is, applies to the root *kṛpi*. The *l* sound of *kṛpi* is invalid, and the vowel changes that are to be affected should refer to the *r-kāra* in the *kṛpi* and, therefore, there is no use in advising *l-kāra*. So the reply is given (in the following *Vārttika*).

The instruction of *l-kāra* is for underived words and ineffective imitations and for the long-drawn sound of *pluta* (*Vārttika*).

(The *Bhāṣya* says) the instruction of underived words and for ineffective imitations and for the long-drawn *pluta* sound by the word 'yadṛcchā' (translated here as underived words but which really means words or names formed at will). Thus according to one's wish we may have a name *Itaka*. The advice regarding *l* is given in order that vowel-change may be affected with regard to such names as in the examples 'dadhyūtakāya dehi', 'madhvūtakāya dehi', 'udaññūtako'gamat', 'pratyāññūtako'gamat'. Words are used in four ways: words signifying universals, signifying qualities, signifying activities and signifying just whatever one might wish to have.<sup>55</sup>

(The *l-kāra* has been advised also for ineffective imitation.) Thus some Brahmin woman or wife being unable to pronounce the word *Itaka* where *ṛtaka* should have been used and this may further be imitated, and one may say—brāhmaṇyūtaka ity āha (the Brāhmaṇi said *Itaka*) or kumāryūtaka ity āha iti (the maiden pronounced it as *Itaka*). The instruction of *l-kāra* is also for the long-drawn *pluta* and the other intonations. What are these *pluta* and other intonations? The *pluta* consists in the doubling tone, such as *kṛṣpta-śikha*, *kṛptah*, *prakṛptah*. In the *pluta* and other intonations, the *r* of *kṛp* becomes *l*, and unless *l* is advised, no vowel-changes can be effected. For this reason *l-kāra* has to be advised.

(The *Bhāṣya* in raising the objection says) there are none of these purposes (to be served).

(This introduces the *Vārttika*)—since there are correct words, these only should be used as names.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—since there is the correct word 'ṛtaka', they are to be used in forming names as correct; and that is 'ṛtaka', and not 'Itaka'.

55. When words are used according to the wish of the speaker without any reference to meaning, they are called *yadṛcchā* *śabdas*, such as 'dīttha', etc.

(This *Vārttika* has been differently explained). This another interprets it thus—the word 'ṛtaka' is justifiable and is found in the *śāstras* and this only should be used as correct in forming names, and that word is 'ṛtaka' and not 'Itaka'.

But there is a self-willed word (*yadrcchā śabda*) which cannot be avoided, such as *Iphida*, *Iphidḍa*, but this is also pronounced as 'ṛphida' and 'ṛphidḍa'. How 'phiḍa' and 'phidḍa' are *aupādika* suffixes, and they may be applied to root *r* by the people. The words may be used in a three-fold manner: as universals, qualities and actions. There are no self-willed ones.

(To this the *Bhāṣya* replies)—the need of the *l-kāras* is explained in one manner, and it is avoided in another manner. The need was shown on the supposition that there existed self-willed words. It is avoided on the supposition that there are no such self-willed words. When the meaning is the same, the word that is sanctioned by the *śāstras*, rules out the word that is not sanctioned by the *śāstras*. Thus the word 'Devadatta' rules out the word 'devadīṇa', but not such words as *gavī*, etc.

(Those that favour the non-instruction of *l-kāra* are supposed to say as follows)—this is no fault. One may avoid an objection by taking other alternatives.

(The *Vārttika* intervenes and says)—an imitation of the cultured is correct, but an imitation of the uncultured, and that which is not prohibited, is neither bad nor good as among the people and Vedic usage.

(Now the *Bhāṣya* explains it)—the imitation of the cultured may be correct, but an imitation of the uncultured or that which is not prohibited would be neither good nor bad as among ordinary people and Vedic people. Among the people there is an usage—'he who gives like that', 'he who sacrifices like that', 'he who studies like this', he who imitates him, would make donations, perform sacrifices and study, and will attain good. In the *Vedas* also, it is said he who performs in this way the *viśva* sacrifices, when one imitates such persons, he also sacrifices; he thus attains good. In the case of the uncultured and unprohibited, one may say—'he who hiccoughs like this', 'he who laughs like this', 'he who itches like this', when one imitates that, he would hiccough, laugh and itch, and that would be neither good nor evil. He who kills a Brahmin like this, he who drinks liquor like this, here by such an imitation if one kills a Brahmin or drinks liquor, would certainly be fallen.

(To this the *Bhāṣya* further says)—the analogy is contrarily put. He who kills and he who follows him in killing, both are performing the operation of killing. When one drinks and the other follows him, both of

them drink. So when he drinks wine, imitating such a person, one will merely perform a consequent action like 'one first bathed and then besmeared his body with sandal paste and put garlands on his neck'? One may cut down the trunk of a banana tree or drink milk, he will not be fallen thereby.<sup>56</sup>

So here also when one uses the vulgar word and another imitates him and utters a vulgar word, he becomes guilty of uttering a vulgar word.

But this is quite another point that there are words of the same meaning as the vulgar words, for which reason the instruction is made. The word does not become an *apaśabda* (vulgar), because it has the meaning of an *apaśabda*. It must be so understood. He who thinks that a word becomes *apaśabda* when signifying the meaning of an *apaśabda* (is wrong). A vulgar word or *apaśabda* becomes vulgar, because it is a vulgar word (that is, not because it denotes the meaning of a vulgar word). But this word is not vulgar.

Again here also imitation is unavoidable for which imitation is necessary. '*sādhvIkāram adhīta*', '*madhvIkāram adhīta*' (one is studying *!-kāra* well, one is studying *!-kāra* sweetly).

(The next question comes)—of where is it an imitation? In the word '*kłpi*'.

If it is in '*kłpi*', then the *!-kāra* in '*kłpi*' will be incorrect. The vowel-changes should be made in *r-kāra*.

(The necessity of advising the *!-kāra* is adduced by the *Bhāṣya*). May be, no purpose is served in that way, but this is another word having the same meaning as that of the word '*kłpi*' for which instruction is necessary.

Such an instruction is unnecessary. This must be said that an imitation is after the original pattern. What is the necessity of imitation? "He said twice the word '*pacantu*'", so that the accent may be lowered by the rule '*timatiñah*'. Again, 'he said *agnī*', so that *agnī* may become *pragrhya* under the rule '*i-kāra, ū-kāra, e-kāra*' in the dual number, are called *pragrhya*.' (If a syllable is *pragrhya*, it does not enter into an euphonic combination).

56. It is not by the fault of that which is imitated that the imitation becomes faulty and in the imitation of wrong deeds there is demerit, and in the performance of good deed there is merit, when one imitated another in doing good or bad deeds, one does not attain merit and demerit for imitating, but because he performed the enjoined action or committed the prohibited one. So it is not by imitating *ṛtaka* as *ṛtaka* that any fault accrues to anyone.

That is, it may be an imitation or *anukarāṇa* word for which instruction is necessary, though it may not be the actual root '*kłpi*'. The *Bhāṣya* further urges.

(Again a further objection is raised)—If an imitation follows the original, then we must say that when the maiden said ‘*Itaka*’ or the Brahmin’s wife said ‘*Itaka*’, that was a vulgar word. (It cannot be an imitation of the word ‘*ṛtaka*’, as the maxim is that an imitation should follow the original. So the form ‘*Itaka*’ must be an imitation of the vulgar word ‘*Itaka*’.)

(The reply given is)—a vulgar word cannot be the original. The vulgar words are not instructed in the *śāstras* and there are no originals which are not instructed in the *śāstras*.<sup>57</sup>

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—slight partial changes seem to keep the thing unaffected and so it may provide for the *pluta* intonation.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows)—Since change in part leaves the thing as if it were the same, the accents *pluta* etc. may take place.<sup>58</sup>

(To this an objection is raised in the *Bhāṣya* which says that)—the partial modification of anything leaves it the same. Then in the rule “*rājñah ka ca*” (there will be *ka*-suffix to the word ‘*rājan*’) forming the word ‘*rājakiya*’, we should expect the application of the rule “*allopo’nah*” (the *a* of a word ending in *an* should be elided).

(To this a further reply is suggested)—The maxim that partial modification leaves the word undisturbed, applies to a word ending in the sixth-case.<sup>59</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* further says)—again if the condition that it should be enjoined by the sixth-case, be insisted on them, there would be no *pluta* in the word ‘*kṛṣṇa-śikha*’, for in the rule “*kṛpo ro laḥ*” the *r*-*kara* has not been mentioned in the sixth-case and so it cannot be the same as *!*.

(To this the *Bhāṣya* further replies)—that the *r* here is also in the sixth-case for the form of the *sūtra* “*kṛpo ro laḥ*” is to be analysed as *kṛpa*, *u*, *ra*, *la*. Only the declension suffixes have not been shown in the *sūtra*.

(The *Bhāṣya* again says)—or rather, let there be no restriction (with reference to the maxim that a partial change is no change; that it should be enjoined in the sixth-case). But it has been said that in the formation of

57. The purport of the argument introduced in the *Bhāṣya* is that *r*-*kāra* has been introduced in order to provide for the inefficient imitation of the word ‘*ṛtaka*’.

58. When the *r*-*kāra* in the *pluta* accent becomes changed to *ṛ*-*kāra*, this partial change may be supposed to leave the word undisturbed.

59. The idea is that in the case of a universal application of the maxim the slight change is no change; we may treat the word *rājan* and *rājñah* as if they were the same and in the formation of the word *rājakiya* we may have the word ‘*rājña-kiya*’, which is impossible.

the word 'rājakīyam' by the rule "rājñāḥ ka ca", there is an application of the rule "allopō'nah" (i.e. the a of an *an-bhāgānta* word should be elided).

(The *Bhāṣya* returns to reply to this objection and says)—this is no criticism. It will be said later on that in the expansion of the words like 'śvan' etc., the injunction that it should end in *n*, is only to rule out all words that do not end in *n*. This context is drawn on to the later *sūtra* "allopō'nah", i.e. of the words ending in *na*.<sup>60</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* further raises the point of view of the objector and says)—What is to be done here in 'kl3pta-śikha'. Since there is a prohibition by the rule "anṛta", i.e. *r-kāra* should not have the *pluta* as *l-kāra*.

(Here a further objection comes in by the mouth of the *Vārttika*)—Also because the prohibition applies to those that have *r*. (The *Bhāṣya* in explaining it says that) this will be effected by the prohibition that applies to words ending in *r*.<sup>61</sup>

We shall say later on "guroraravataḥ". If it is suggested that the word should be 'aravataḥ', i.e., those that do not contain *ra*, then there would be prohibition in the lengthening of the *r-kāra* in the euphonic combination *hotṛ+r-kāra* = *hotṛ2kāra*.

(The *Bhāṣya* comes to the final solution and says)—The prohibition of *pluta* or the long drawn applies to the short sound and not to the long. So the introduction of a special *sūtra* for the instruction of *l-kāra* for the *pluta* intonation is unnecessary. It is like scaling over a big bamboo for drawing the insignificant fruit called *latvā*.<sup>62</sup>

60. The point in question here is that when the *ka*-suffix is enjoined, the word 'rājan' may also be regarded as slightly changed and as ending in *n-kāra* in accordance with the maxim that slight change does not distract the identity. The reply is that by the word *ekadeśa* or part referring to the partial change, it is held that it is only a whole word that is regarded as the same, when there is a slight change in the part which appears in the whole. But a part that is changed partly, is not regarded as identical in spite of the change. Thus a dog with its tail partly cut may be regarded as the identical dog, but the cut-tail is not identical with the uncut-tail. This is all according to popular usage. Thus the slight difference in the word 'rājan' may leave the word undisturbed, but to say that ending in *an* is the same as ending in *n* cannot be tolerated.

61. That which always has *r*, is called *ravat*. Therefore the *r-kāra* is *ravat*.

62. The idea is that so much ado about the instruction of *l-kāra* is quite unnecessary. There is no significant ground for giving this special instruction about *l-kāra*.

Pañini.

e on. 3.

ai auc. 4.

Bhāṣya.

idaṁ vicāryate — imāni sandhy-akṣarāṇi ta-parāṇi vopadiśyeran, ‘et ot n̄’, ‘ait aut c’ iti, ataparāṇi vā yathānyāsam, iti.  
kaś cātra viśeṣah ?

Vārttika.

sandhyakṣareṣu ta-paropadeśāś cet ta-paroccāraṇam.

Bhāṣya.

sandhyakṣareṣu ta-paropadeśāś cet ta-paroccāraṇam kartavyam.

Vārttika.

plutyādiṣv aj-vidhiḥ.

Bhāṣya.

plutyādiṣv aj-āśrayo vidhir na sidhyati.  
‘go3trāta’, ‘nau4trāta’ ity atra “anaci ca” (Pā. 8.4.47) ity aca uttarasya yaro dve bhavata iti dvirvacanam na prāpnoti, iha ca ‘pratyāñnai4tikāyana’, ‘udaññau4pagava’ iti “aci” (Pā. 8.8.32) iti ḥamuḍāgamo na prāpnoti.

Vārttika.

pluta-samjñā ca.

Bhāṣya.

pluta-samjñā ca na sidhyati. ‘ai3tikāyana’, ‘au3pagava. “ūkāloj-hrasva-dīrgha-plutah” (Pā. 8.3.32) iti pluta-samjñā ca na prāpnoti. santu tarhy ataparāṇi.

Vārttika.

atapara eva igghrasvādeśe.

Bhāṣya.

yady ataparāṇi “eca igghrasvādeśe” (Pā.1.1.48) iti vaktavyam. kiṁ prayojanam? eco hrasvādeśa-śāsaneṣv ardha ekāro’rdha okāro vā mā bhūd iti.

nanu ca yasyâpi ta-parâñi, tenâpy etad vaktavyam. imâv aicau samâhâra-varñau—mâtrâ'varñasya, mâtrevarevarñovarñayos taylor hrasvâdeśa—śâsanešu kadâcid avarñah syât, kadâcid ivarñovarñau, mâ kadâcid avarño bhûd iti.

pratyâkhyâyata etat “aicoś cottarabhûy-astvâl” iti.

yadi pratyâkhyâna-paksah, idam api pratyâkhyâyate—“siddhameñah sasthâna-tvâl” iti.

nanu caiñah sasthânatarâvardha ekâro'-rdha okârah.

na tau staḥ. yadi hi tau syâtâm tâveva ayam upadiśet.

nanu ca bhoś chandogânâm sâtyamu—grirâñayañiyâ ardham ekâram ardham okâram câdhîyate — “sujâte eśvasûnîrte”, “adhvaryo odribhiḥ sutam”, “śukram te en-yad”, “yajataṁ te enyâl” iti.

pârişadakrtir eṣâ tatra-bhavatâm. naiva hi loke nânyasmin vede ardha ekâro'rdha okâro vâ'sti.

ekâdeśe dîrgha-grahaṇam.

ekâdeśe dîrgha-grahaṇam kartavyam—“ādguṇo dîrghah”, “vṛddhir eci dîrghah” iti. kim prayojanam ? āntaryatas trimâtraca-turmâtrâñâm sthâninâm trimâtra-caturmâtrâ ādeśâ mâ bhûvann iti. khaṭvâ indrah khaṭvendrah, khaṭvâ udakam khaṭvodakam, khaṭvâ iṣâ khaṭveṣâ, khaṭvâ ūḍhâ khaṭvodhâ, khaṭvâ elakâ, khaṭvailakâ, khaṭvâ odanah

Vârttika.

Bhâṣya.

khaṭvaudanah, khaṭvā aitikāyanah  
khaṭvaitikāyanah, khaṭvā aupagavaḥ  
khaṭvaupagava iti.

tat tarhi dīrghagrahaṇam kartavyam?  
na kartavyam. upariṣṭād yoga-vibhagah  
kariṣyate— “akaḥ savarṇe” eko bhavati. tato  
“dīrghah” dīrghaś ca sa bhavati yaḥ sa “ekaḥ  
pūrvaparayoḥ” (Pā. 6.1.84) ity evam nirdiṣṭa  
iti.

ihāpi tarhi prāpnoti— paśum, viddham,  
pacantīti.

naiṣa doṣah. iha tāvat paśum iti. “amyekah”  
iti iyatā siddham. so’ yam evam siddhe sati  
yat pūrva-grahaṇam karoti tasyaitat prayo-  
janam— yathājātiyakah pūrvas tathājātiyaka  
ubhayor yathā syād iti. ‘viddham’ iti.  
‘pūrva’ ity evānuvartate. athavā ācāryapra-  
vittir jñāpayati — ‘nānena samprasāraṇasya  
dīrgho bhavati’ iti. yad ayam hala uttarasya  
samprasāraṇasya dīrghatvam śāsti. ‘pacanti’  
iti. “ato guṇe parah” (Pā. 6.1.97) iti iyatā  
siddham. so’- yam evam siddhe sati  
yadrūpagrahaṇam karoti tasyaitat prayo-  
janam — ‘yathājātiya-kam parasya rūpam  
tathājātiyakam ubhayor yathā syād’ iti.

iha tarhi ‘khaṭvārśyo, mālarśyah’ iti  
dīrgha-vacanād akāro na, anāntaryād  
ekāraukārau na. tatra ko doṣah? vigṛhītasya  
śravaṇam prasajyeta.

na brūmo — yatra kriyamāṇe doṣas tatra  
kartavyam iti. kim tarhi? yatra kriyamāṇe na  
doṣas tatra kartavyam iti.

kva ca kriyamāṇe na doṣah ?

saṁjñā-vidhau. “vṛddhir ād aij dīrghah”,  
“adeñ guṇo dīrghah” iti.

tat tarhi dīrgha-grahaṇam kartavyam ? na  
kartavyam.

kasmād evāntaryatas trimātra-catur-  
mātrāṇām sthāninām trimātra-caturmātrā  
ādeśā na bhavanti ? tapare guṇa-vṛddhī.

nanu ca tāḥ paro yasmāt so'yaṁ taparah.  
'na' ityāha; tād api paras tapara iti.

yadi tād api paras taparah, “ṛdor ap”  
(Pā.3.3.47) iti ihaiva syāt— yavah, stavah;  
lavaḥ, pava ity atra na syāt.

naiṣa takārah. kastarhi? dakārah.

kim dakāre prayojanam?

atha kim takāre? yady asandehārthas  
takārah, dakāro'pi. atha mukha-sukhārthas  
takārah, dakāro'pi iti.

This is being discussed: should these conjunctive syllables (sandhyakṣarāṇi) be instructed with a 'ta' at the end, as "et ot n", 'ait ut c', or should they be instructed by any such 'ta' as has been done. What is the difference ?

(Here the Vārttika intervenes) — if the conjunctive syllables should be intended as ending in a 'ta', they should be so uttered.

(The Bhāṣya here says that) — if the conjunctive syllables are to be instructed as ending in 'ta', then they should be uttered as ending in 'ta'.

(Here again a Vārttika intervenes criticising the suggestion that 'e' and 'o' should end in 'ta'. The objection is that) there should in that case be no vowel conjunction in the case of the longdrawn accent.

(The Bhāṣya interprets it as follows:) (if 'e' and 'o' should end in ta, there would be no operations relating to vowels in the case of longdrawn and similar accents, e.g. go3trātah; nau3trātah; here, there should be no doubling of the syllables comprehended within the pratyāhāra 'yar' according to the rule "anaci ca". So also in 'pratyāñ nai3tikāyana', 'udaññau3pagava' there can be no augment nāmuñ according to the rule "nāmo hrasvādaci nāmuñityam" (Pā.8.3.32).<sup>63</sup>

63. The word 'gotrātah' is the vocative case of the word 'gotrātri'. So also the other word is 'nau3trār' is the vocative case. The *pluta* accent is due here by the rule

(Here the *Vārttika* intervening says) — Even the name *pluta* could not be ascribable.

(The *Bhāṣya* here says) — The name *pluta* becomes invalid, as in ‘*aitikāyana*’ or ‘*aupagava*’. The technical name *pluta* as per Pāṇini’s rule “*ūkālojhrasva-dīrgha-plutah*” (1.2.27) would not be valid.<sup>64</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* in introducing the next *Vārttika* raises the other side of the issue) — Let the ‘*en*’ and ‘*on*’ be without the ‘*ta*’ (and then the *Vārttika* intervenes and says) — if ‘*en*’ and ‘*on*’ be without a ‘*ta*’, then when it is

“*guror-an̄to nantyasyāpyekaikasya prācām*” (8.2.86) which means that in the case of calling from distance, a long vowel which is neither *r-kāra*, nor is at the end, may take *pluta* accent optionally. It should be noted that while a short vowel is regarded as having one unit of time, the long is supposed to have two units and the longdrawn or the *pluta* is supposed to have three units of time. Sometimes the *pluta* have four units of time. In the *Vārttika* rule above and in the *Bhāṣya*, we have the word ‘*plutyādi*’, i.e., *pluti* etc. Here the word ‘*ādi*’ or etc. includes the *pluti* accents with four units of time or *mātrās*. The number of *mātrās* in a *pluta* accent may therefore be indicated by a mathematical number. Thus according to this rule you may have *pluta* accent after ‘*go*’ and ‘*nau*’ in ‘*go-trātah*’ or ‘*nau-trātah*’. Now, the objection raised is that if ‘*et*’ and ‘*ot*’ be taken as ending in ‘*ta*’, they cannot indicate their *pluta* variety. So in *gotrātah* and *pluta* ‘*o*’ in ‘*go*’ cannot be regarded as a vowel and, therefore, the rule that says that when a consonant follows, then after the preceding vowel the syllables included in the *pratyāhāra* ‘*yar*’, could be duplicated, would not apply. Now, the *pratyāhāra* ‘*yar*’ includes in it all consonants excepting ‘*ha*’, and in accordance with the rule “*anaci ca*” we expect a doubling of the consonant ‘*ta*’ followed by consonant ‘*ra*’ and preceded by the vowel ‘*o*’ in ‘*gotrātah*’, of which the optional form should be ‘*gotrātah*’. Now if *pluta* accent in ‘*go*’ is not included in ‘*en*’, when instead of ‘*en*’, we have ‘*et*’ (i.e. ending in ‘*ta*’), then the *pluta* in ‘*go*’ cannot technically become a vowel and that there can be no duplication of ‘*ta*’ in ‘*trātah*’. Again we have the rule “*nimo hrasvād aci nāmuṇ nityam*” (8.3.32) which means that when a *pada* ends in a nasal preceded by a short vowel and followed by a vowel, then a corresponding nasal will arise before the latter. Thus, we have *pratyān-ātmā* = *pratyānātātmā*. Now, according to the above rule when we have a *pluta* accent in the word ‘*ai*’ as forming a part of the word *pratyān-ātikāyana*, then this ‘*ai-kāra*’ in ‘*ātikāyana*’ being a *pluta* accent could not technically be a vowel and there would not therefore be the addition of ‘*n*’ according to the above rule (8.3.32) which could be operative only if ‘*ai*’ was a vowel.

64. The idea is that if ‘*et*’ was substituted for ‘*en*’, then we should take the long variety by the rule “*taparas tat-kālasya*”, i.e. when a vowel is followed by ‘*ta*’, it indicates that the vowel indicates only one variety such as the short or the long. ‘*Et*’ would thus have only the long variety and no *pluta* accent would be admissible to it. The rule “*ūkālo*” etc. shows a sort of pronunciation by the gradual increase of the units of time that would form the short, the long and the *pluta* accent as involving one unit, two units or three units of time.

enjoined that they would be short, it ought to be specified that they should be 'ik'.

(The *Bhāṣya* says) — If without the 'ta' then a separate instruction has to be made that when 'ec' is to become short, it would be 'ik'. What is the necessity?

(The reply is) — that when 'ac' is to become short, it might not become half 'e' or half 'o'.<sup>65</sup>

Now the *Bhāṣya* comes in with the objection that may be raised against those that prefer to associate 'ec' with 'ta'. (The *Bhāṣya* thus says) — But even those that associate with 'ta' must enjoin as follows: there two that are included in the 'ec' are compound vowels, involving the unit of time of 'a' and 'i' and 'u'. Now, when it is enjoined that they should be short, sometimes they may be 'a' and sometimes they may be 'i' and 'u', but they should never become 'a'.<sup>66</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* however says) — This objection will be refuted because in 'aic' there is a greater portion of the later part (i.e., 'i' or 'u').<sup>67</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* now gives a solution of those that do not like the associate 'en' with a 't'). If the refutation side is to be followed then it may be refuted on the ground that 'i' and 'u' have the same place of origin as 'en'. (There are no half e-kāra or half o-kāra. The e-kāra is palatal, the o-kāra is labial,

65. If 'e' or 'o' be made to end with a *takāra* it would only include the long variety involving two units of time. But it cannot become *i-kāra* or *u-kāra* which would involve only one unit of time and as such cannot be the substitute of *e-kāra* or *o-kāra* which being associated with 'ta' can only be of the long variety with two units of time. If there was no *ta-kāra*, then there would be no limitation to units of time and even half *e-kāra* and half *i-kāra* could melt together and be regarded as a vowel. Therefore when it is associated with the *ta-kāra*, a separate rule has to be made.

66. The idea is that 'ai' and 'au' being compound vowels, are composed partly of 'a', 'i' and 'u'. If 'ai' and 'au' be associated with 'ta' they only comprehend the long variety and may be regarded as having 'a', 'i' and 'u', as their elements; as such, if it is enjoined anywhere that 'ai' or 'au' should be *hrasva* or short, either 'a' or 'i' or 'u' might take place. But in the pronunciation of 'ai' or 'au' no 'a' is realised and the half of *ai-kāra* or of *au-kāra* would not be vowels, for through the association 'ta', 'ai', and 'au' can be vowels. Moreover, owing to the fact that 'ai' and 'au' are both palatals, no 'a' which is a guttural can be substituted in its place. So even if 'ai' and 'au' be associated with 'ta', Pāṇini has to make the rule 'eca ig-hrasvādeśe' in order to provide for the coming of 'ik', i.e. 'i' or 'u' when 'ec' is prescribed to be *hrasva*.

67. There will be only half unit of 'a' which will be overflowed by the half unit of 'i' or 'u' and consequently 'i' or 'u' will have greater claim for their appearance at the time of prescription of *hrasva* than 'a'.

and in their place the palatal *i-kāra* and the *u-kāra* which is labial come in. (The word *sasthāna* in the *Bhāṣya* means *samāna sthāna*).

(The *Bhāṣya* further raises an objection and says) — But the half *e-kāra* and the half *o-kāra* have a closer proximity to 'eñ'.

(To this objection the reply is) — But they do not exist, if they had existence, they would have been enjoined.

(The *Bhāṣya* again raises a further objection that half *e-kāra* and half *o-kāra* also exist. Thus the *Bhāṣya* says) — But the Satyāmugrirāṇāyaniya branch of the *Sāmaveda* read a half *e-kāra* and a half *o-kāra* in the passages: 'sujāte eśvasūnṛte', 'adhvaryo odribhiḥ sutam', 'śukram te enyat', 'yajatam te enyat'. Here in pronouncing *e aśva* as *eśva* or *o adribhiḥ* as *odribhiḥ* and *e anyat* as *enyat*, the *e-kāra* and *o-kāra* following *e-kāra* and *o-kāra* are pronounced with half sound.

(To this the reply is) — This pronunciation of those holy sages is due to their singing in tune. Neither among the people nor among the other *Vedas*, there is any sound as half *e-kāra* and half *o-kāra*.<sup>68</sup>

(Now the *Vārttika* intervenes and says that) — When one sound is enjoined as the substitute for two sounds in conjunction, that is, an *ekādeśa*, a long sound is to be taken.<sup>69</sup>

(In the case of *ekādeśa* the *Bhāṣya* in interpreting it says) — In the case where one syllable is substituted in the place of two, i.e. an *ekādeśa*, it should be specially instructed that the syllable, so substituted, is long. Thus in the case of "ād gunah" one ought to say "ād guno dīrghah" or "vṛddhir aci dīrghah." What is the reason? Because according to the rule of proximity a vowel having three or four units of time, there may not be a substitution of vowels of three or four units of time. Thus *khaṭvā indrah* *khaṭvendraḥ*, *khaṭvā udakam* = *khaṭvodakam*, *khaṭvā iṣā* = *khatvesā*, *khaṭvā ūḍhā* = *khaṭvodhā*, *khaṭvā elakā* = *khaṭvailakā*, *khaṭvā odanah* = *khaṭvaudanah*, *khaṭvā aitikāyanah* = *khaṭvaitikāyanah*, *khaṭvā aupagavah* = *khaṭvaupagavah* etc.<sup>70</sup>

68. The word 'pāriṣadakṛti' in the *Bhāṣya* is explained by Kaiyatā as *gīti-vaśāt tathoccāraṇam*. We, however, think that the word 'pāriṣadakṛti' actually means — 'done by the members of an assembly'. Sāma songs were sung by a number of priests who may be regarded as forming a sacrificial assembly. The hymns were sung in a chorus. *Pāriṣadakṛti* thus means the 'e' or 'o' is pronounced with half sound, because it was effected by the chorus of the assembly of the Sāma songsters.

69. The idea is that in the case of technical terms of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* there is association with 't' and therefore we have to take the long variety as in "ād gunah" "vṛddhir ād aic".

70. Bhaṭṭoḍi Dīkṣita here remarks as follows:

Though among the Sāma singers of particular Śākhās the half *e-kāra* or half *o-kāra*

Then the injunction that there should be the long vowel (when a single substitute in place of the preceding and the succeeding is advised in *ekādeśa*).

(An one-sided objector's view is anticipated in the *Bhāṣya* as follows)—No, it should not be done. Later on, they would divide the rule into two parts, such as “*akah savarṇe*” (when a homologous vowel follows ‘a’, ‘i’, ‘u’, ‘ṛ’, ‘l’), they become one. Then comes the word ‘*dīrghah*’ (long);

are actually pronounced, yet this sound is not universal. If as in the case of *a-kāra*, we may have 18 varieties, so in the case of ‘e’, ‘ai’, ‘o’, ‘au’ or ‘ec’, also we could have a short variety involving one unit of time or one *mātrā*, then ‘ec’ should have been advised as being of one *mātrā*. It may be contended that the rule, “*eca igghrasvādeśe*” was formulated for preventing the coming in of the half *e-kāra* and half *o-kāra*. But the reply is in the negative. The enunciation of the rule has been necessary for preventing the coming in of ‘*a-kāra*’ which is a constituent of *e-kāra*. The first part of ‘*e-kāra*’ is like ‘a’ and the second part is like ‘i’. So as ‘*e-kāra*’ has a similarity with them both, there is a chance of *a-kāra* coming in; so in order to provide for the coming in of *i-kāra* and *u-kāra* and ruling out *a-kāra* the rule was enunciated. But this rule is actually regarded as unnecessary by the *Vārttika* which holds that *e-kāra* and *o-kāra* being palatal and labial, may well be replaced by palatal *i-kāra* and the labial *u-kāra*. Again, in the view that *e-kāra* contains the half-*mātrā* of *a-kāra* and one and a half *mātrās* of *i-kāra*, *i-kāra* has more justification of coming in than *a-kāra*. There is, of course, a view that *e-kāra* contains half *ā-kāra* and half *i-kāra*.

Another point is that if ‘e’ and ‘o’ were associated with ‘*ta*’, then the *e-kāra* and the *o-kāra* could not have a short variety and it might be regarded as impertinent to prescribe a short variety. But the reply is that in such a case the *pluta* is also to be described. The various rules that effect the euphonic changes in such words as ‘*gotrātaḥ*’ and ‘*pratyānīnaitikāyana*’ would not take place. There are other objections also which have been detailed above in the translation of the *Bhāṣya*.

Again if the ‘*ei*’ is not regarded as being associated with ‘*ta*’ then in such euphonic combinations as ‘*gaingodaka*’ or ‘*rameśa*’ wherein *gaingā* + *udaka* we have ‘ā’ and ‘u’ making three *mātrās* or three units of time, and in ‘*rameśa*’, we have ‘*ramā* + *iśa*, i.e. ‘ā’ and ‘i’ making four *mātrās* or four units of time and therefore the euphonic substitutes in their places the ‘o’ and ‘e’ should have three and four *mātrās*. The reply that in the rule “*akah savarṇe dīrghah*”, the injunction is sufficient to restrict the ‘*e-kāra*’ and ‘*o-kāra*’ (which is enjoined as *dīrgha*) to two *mātrās*, for then in the case of *paśu* + *am* = *paśum*, the *u-kāra*, which is a substitute for ‘u’ and ‘a’ (being *ekādeśa*, like ‘e’ in *rameśa*) ought to be *dīrgha* and of two *mātrās*. The justification of the letter, however, is to be found in the maxim that as is the preceding vowel so should be the later one.

This maxim is drawn from the fact that in Pāṇini (6.1.84) we have the rule “*ekah pūrva-parayoḥ*” (there should be one substitute for that which precedes and follows). This is an *adhikāra sūtra* and is extended up to Pāṇini 6.1.102 “*prathamayoh pūrva-savarṇah*”. (In a vowel, in the first and the second case the rule “*akah savarṇe dīrghah*”

that one substitute which comes in place of the preceding and the succeeding, becomes long—this is how it has been instructed (as an interpretation of the rule “*akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*”).<sup>71</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* runs on as follows raising an objection and refuting it). Then here also there is the likelihood of a long substitute — *paśu + am-paśum viddham, pacanti*.

This is no criticism. The word ‘*paśum*’ (i.e. *paśu + am*) is solved by the rule ‘*amyekāḥ*’ — (The actual rule is “*pūrvah*”— Pāṇini 6.1.107, which means that when ‘*am*’ follows the ‘*a*’ of ‘*am*’ together with the preceding vowel is replaced by the preceding vowel). When by the preceding rule “*ekaḥ pūrva-parayoh*” (6.1.84) the injunction that there should be one ‘*ādeśa*’ in place of the preceding and the succeeding, the fact that the word ‘preceding’ (*pūrva*) which was running contextually from the former to the latter *sūtra*, was yet again uttered in the present *sūtra* as ‘*pūrva*’ in the ‘*ami pūrvah*’, is explained as leading to the suggestion that the vowel that is enjoined to come in place of the preceding and the succeeding, must be of the type of the preceding. Then again in the case of the word ‘*viddham*’ we have the contextual reference to ‘*pūrva*’ in the rule “*samprasāraṇāc ca*” (6.1.108) on *pūrva* which is separately taken again, or rather Pāṇini seems to instruct us that though ‘*pūrva*’ is coming only contextually here and not taken again separately, yet there will be no lengthening of the vowel obtained by *samprasāraṇa* (when in place of *ya, va, ra, la, 'i', 'u', 'ṛ', 'ṝ* is enjoined, such injunction is called *samprasāraṇa*). The case of the word ‘*pacanti*’ is solved by the rule “*ato guṇe*” (6.1.97).<sup>72</sup>

would apply). The repetition of the word ‘*pūrva*’ suggests that the substitute would be of the preceding vowel. We have also the rule Pāṇini, 6.1.107 “*ami pūrvah*” (when ‘*am*’ follows, then there should be one substitute of the nature of the preceding in the place of the preceding and the following). Here also the word ‘*pūrva*’ is taken. The next rule is “*samprasāraṇāc ca*” (when a vowel follows after a *samprasāraṇa*, there would be one substitute for the two which would be of the nature of the preceding. These and other rules will solve the difficulty and obviate the necessity of the substitutes being *dirgha* in such cases as ‘*paśum*’, ‘*viddham*’, ‘*pacanti*’. It is therefore permissible to have the rule “*akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*” as interpreted by ‘*yoga-vibhāga*’, as will be found in the translation of the following *Bhāṣya*.

71. The word ‘*yoga-vibhāga*’ in the *Bhāṣya* means that the *sūtra* is split it into two parts. Thus the rule “*akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*” is interpreted firstly by taking “*akaḥ savarṇe*”, and then the meaning obtained is associated with the word ‘*dirgha*’.

72. The rule means that where a *guṇa* follows an *a-kāra* which is not at the end of a *pada*, then there will be one vowel in place of the preceding and the succeeding and this one vowel will be of the type of the succeeding one, because though the injunction

(In order to support the Vārttika the Bhāṣya says as follows) : We do not say that where there is any fault in doing the operation (i.e. of 'ekādeśa' as in the rule "vrddhir eci" we should do it (enjoin the dīrgha). But where there is no fault in such an operation, we should do it. Where is there no such fault ?

(The reply is) — In the case of forming technical names, as in "vrddhir ādaij dīrghah", "adeñ guno dīrghah". Then there the term 'dīrgha' should be pronounced. No, it should not be pronounced. Why, on account of the maxim of proximity in place of vowels of three or four mātrās, ādeśa should not be of three or four mātrās also ?

(The reply is) — The gunas and the vrddhis are followed by 'ta'. What is the meaning of followed by 'ta' (taparah) ? Does it mean that 'which is followed by ta' ? No, it also means 'after the ta', i.e. preceded by 'ta'.

(The objection comes) — If it means that also which is after 'ta' then it should apply only to such rules as "ṛdorap", but not in the case of 'lavah', 'pavah'.

(But again the conclusive answer comes) — But it is not 'ta-kāra', but 'da-kāra'. But what is the utility of 'ta-kāra' ? If 'ta-kāra' is for certainty, 'da-kāra' may as well be that. If 'ta-kāra' is for facility of pronunciation, 'da-kāra' may as well be so.<sup>73</sup>

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leading to 'ekādeśa' was secured, yet the word 'rūpa' was added to 'para' as 'pararūpam' in the rule 'enī pararūpam' (6.1.94) (from which the word 'para-rūpam' is extended to the rule "ato gunē" by contextual continuity) and this was done to indicate that the ādeśa that comes in the place of the preceding and succeeding, should be of the nature of the succeeding.

In the case of Khaṭvā+ṛṣya and mālā+ṛṣya, we have 'khaṭvarṣya' and 'mālarṣya'. There cannot be any a-kāra here, because dīrgha has been enjoined. From want of proximity there cannot be any e-kāra or o-kāra. But then, what is the harm? Then there ought to be no conjunction of vowels and instead of 'khaṭvarṣya', we should have 'khatvarṣya', i.e. we should have to utter the word as unconjoined in euphonic combination.

73. Bhaṭṭoiji in his Śadba-kaustubha explains the general idea of the Vārttika and the Bhāṣya as follows: The question was whether the conjunct syllables should be pronounced with a supplementary 'ta' or not. Now, if there is no supplementary 'ta' in the case of such vowel combinations as is found in 'ganigodaka', we have a combination between 'ā' and 'u' and in 'rameśa', 'ā' and 'i', i.e. in the former we have three mātrās and in the latter four mātrās. The ādeśa that is to take place in their place by the rule "ād gunah" (6.1.87). (When a vowel follows 'a', then the two together would be replaced by one guna ādeśa, i.e. by 'e' or 'o' or 'ar' or 'al') will be as said above, 'e' or 'o', or 'ar' 'al' and there being no further definitive direction, we may expect that in place of a trimātra, the ādeśa will be trimātra and in the case of

caturmātra the ādeśa will be of four mātrās. The objection that according to the rule “*akah savarṇe dirghah*” interpreted according to the *yoga-vibhāga* principle would enjoin only a long vowel and therefore the ādeśa of a *guṇa* in the rule “*ād guṇah*” will be *dirgha* and therefore the former supposition that a *trimātra* should be followed by a *trimātra* and *caturmātra* by a *caturmātra*, will not hold, for in the case of *paśu + am* in place of two *mātrās* we have only one *mātrā* which tallies with the preceding vowel. We have seen that the supplementary word ‘*pūrvā*’ in ‘*ami pūrvah*’ is supposed to indicate (by virtue of the fact that though ‘*pūrvā*’ was received in the rule ‘*ami*’ from its contextual continuity with ‘*pūrvā*’ in ‘*ekah pūrva-parayoh*’, the additional word ‘*pūrvā*’ in ‘*ami pūrvah*’ suggests that the ādeśa should be of the type of the preceding vowel) that the ādeśa will be of the type of the preceding vowel. In the rule “*samprasāraṇāc ca*” we have also the contextual continuity to the word ‘*pūrvā*’ and consequently there is no *dirgha* here also and we have the form ‘*viddha*’ from the root *vyadh + kta*. This, however, can also be obtained from the indicatory suggestion contained in the rule “*halah*” (6.4.2), which means that a ‘*samprasāraṇa*’ of concluding vowel becomes long after a consonant, as in ‘*hutah*’. From this the ‘*samprasāraṇa*’ of ‘*vyadh*’ being an initial one, is clearly out of the scope of the rule and, therefore, short and thus explaining to us the form ‘*viddha*’. In connection with rule “*ato guṇe*” (6.1.97) also we have the contextual continuity with the ‘*para-rūpam*’ from the previous rule “*etii para-rūpam*” (6.1.94). In this latter rule simple ‘*para*’ might have served the purpose; the additional redundant ‘*rūpam*’ is supposed to suggest that the vowel that replaces the preceding and the succeeding vowels, should be in the nature of the succeeding one, and this explains why in *paca + anti* in place of two *mātrās*, we have only an ‘*a*’ of one *mātrā* giving us the form ‘*pacanti*’. So there is no fault in enjoining *dirgha* by *yoga-vibhāga* in the rule “*akah savarṇe dirghah*”. But there is a further objection — how on such a supposition we may have *kṛṣṇa + ṛddhi = kṛṣṇarddhi*? For, here the ‘*ekādeśa*’ being *dirgha*, we cannot have ‘*a*’, and for absence of proximity we cannot have ‘*a*’ or ‘*o*’. So it may be said that to interpret the rule “*akah savarṇe dirghah*” as enjoining a *dirgha ekādeśa* will be faulty. If this objection holds, then we fall back upon the old contingency that the *trimātra* should be succeeded by the *trimātra*, and the *caturmātra* by the *caturmātra*. But to this a further objection can be made that a *caturmātra* does not exist. To this the reply is that it exists traditionally among the Sāma songsters and the *Bhāṣya* itself admits it in the rule “*plutā vai ca idutau*” (8.2.106).

With reference to this whole discussion Bhaṭṭoji says that the appendage of ‘*ta*’ is admitted only with reference to *guṇa samjñā* and *vrddhi samjñā*. But if it is admitted that the appending of ‘*ta*’ applies only to the *samjñā* of *guṇa* and *vrddhi*, how can ‘*en*’ and ‘*aic*’ refer to their own units of time? It may be pointed out that in the rule “*sahivahor od avarṇasya*” (6.3.112), when ‘*dha*’ and ‘*ra*’ are elided there, the ‘*a*’ of ‘*saha*’ and ‘*vaha*’ become ‘*o*’. The maxim, that ‘*tapara*’ means that which is followed by ‘*ta*’ and preceded by ‘*ta*’, makes it possible to enjoin that *a-varṇa* here, means only the short variety of ‘*a*’, and not the long or the *pluta* variety. Here, therefore, both ‘*o*’ and ‘*a*’ refer to their own units of time or *mātrā*, so ‘*aiu*’ and ‘*aic*’ that may come after ‘*ta*’ may be supposed to indicate the long variety. The rest, however, should naturally include other varieties as well, as they cannot be regarded as coming after ‘*ta*’ as these

Bhāṣya.	idam vicāryate — ya ete varṇeṣu varṇaikadeśā varṇāntara-samānākṛtaya eteśām avayava-grahaṇena grahaṇam syād vā na veti. kutaḥ punar iyaṁ vicāraṇā? iha hi samudāyā apy upadiṣyante, avayavā api. abhyantaraś ca samudāye'vayavah. tad yathā vrkṣah pracalan sahāvayavaiḥ pracalati. tatra samudāyasthasyāvayavasyāvayava-graha- ṇena grahaṇam syād vā na veti jāyate vicāraṇā. kaś cātra viseṣah?
Vārttika.	varṇaikadeśā varṇa-grahaṇena cet sandhyakṣare samānākṣara-vidhi- pratiṣedhah.
Bhāṣya.	varṇaikadeśā varṇa-grahaṇena cet sandhy- akṣare samānākṣarāśrayo vidhiḥ prāpnoti. sa pratiṣedhyah. agne, indra, vāyo, udakam. “akāḥ savarṇe dīrghah” iti dīrghatvam prāpnoti.
Vārttika.	dīrgha hrasva-vidhi-pratiṣedhah.
Bhāṣya.	dīrgha hrasyāśrayo vidhiḥ prāpnoti, sa

are not so pronounced. We have thus to admit that only in the case of *guṇa samjñā* and *vṛddhi samjñā* ‘enī’ and ‘aic’ do not include its homologous vowels or *savarṇas*. The appendage of ‘ta’ there is only for clarity.

The view is a correct one, for, with reference to ‘a’ in the rule “*vṛddhir ād aic*”, the ‘ā’ form not being included in the Śivasūtra “a, i, uṇ”, it cannot be valid with its other homologous sounds, and, therefore, since ‘a’ cannot be extended to any of its *savarṇas* the appendage of ‘ta’ is unnecessary. In that case the association of ‘ta’ will only be for the sake of ‘aic’. But here also the ‘enī’ and ‘aic’ according to our discussion cannot be confused with any of its *savarṇas* and, therefore, the association of ‘ta’ is unnecessary here also.

To the point that in the rule ‘*ṛdor ap*’ (3.3.57) the appendage of ‘ta’ would restrict the scope of the rule only to verbs ending in short ‘a’, and the verbs ending in long ‘u’ would not be within its purview, elicits the answer that the terminal be here is not ‘ta’, but ‘da’.

pratiṣedhyah. ‘ālūya’, ‘pralūya’. “hrasvasya  
piti kṛti tuk” (Pā. 6.1.71) iti tuk prāpnoti.

naiṣa doṣah, ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati —  
‘na dīrghe hrasvāśrayo vidhir bhavati’ iti.  
yad ayam dīrghāc che tukam śāsti.

naitad asti jñāpakam, asti hy anyad etasya  
vacane prayojanam. ‘kim’? “padāntād vā”  
(Pā. 6.1.76) iti vibhāṣām̄ vakṣyāmīti.

yat tarhi yoga-vibhāgaṁ karoti. itarathā hi  
“dīrghāt padāntād vā” ity eva brūyāt.

iha tarhi — ‘khaṭvābhiḥ’, ‘mālābhiḥ’, ‘ato  
bhisa ais’ (Pā. 7.1.9) ity ais-bhāvah prāpnoti.

ta-para-karaṇa-sāmarthyān na bhaviṣyati.

iha tarhi — ‘yātā’, ‘vātā’, ‘ato lopah’  
ārdha-dhātuke ity akāra-lopah prāpnoti.

nanu ca atrāpi tapara-karaṇa-sāmarthyād  
eva na bhaviṣyati.

asti hy anyat tāpara-karaṇe prayojanam.  
kim? sarvasya lopo mā bhūd iti.

atha kriyamāṇe’pi ta-pare parasya lope  
kṛte pūrvasya kasmān na bhavati?

paralopasya sthānivad-bhāvād asiddha-  
tvāc ca.

evam tarhy ācārya-pravittir jñāpayati —  
‘nākārasthasyākārasya lopo bhavati’ iti. yad  
ayam “āto nupasarge kah” (Pā. 3.2.3) iti  
kakāram anubandham karoti. katham kṛtvā  
jñāpakam? kit-karaṇe etat prayojanam —  
kitity ākāralopo yathā syād iti. yady ākāra-  
sthasyākāra-lopah syāt, kit-karaṇam an-  
arthakam syāt; parasyākārasya lope kṛte  
dvayor akārayoh para-rūpe hi siddham  
rūpam syāt — ‘godah, kambaladah’ iti.  
paśyati tvācāryo — nākārasthasyākārasya

lopaḥ syād iti, ataḥ kakāram anubandham  
karoti.

naitad asti jñāpakam. uttarārtham etat  
syāt “*tunda-śokayoh parimṛjāpanudoh*”  
(Pā.3.2.5) iti.

yat tarhi “*gāpoṣṭak*” (Pā.3..2.8) ity  
ananyārtham kakāram anubandham karoti.

ekavarṇavac ca.

**Vārttika.** ekavarṇavac ca dīrgho bhavati iti vaktavyam.

**Bhāṣya.** kim prayojanam ? vācā taratīti dvyaj-  
lakṣṇaś-ṭhan mā bhūd iti. iha ca vāco nimit-  
tam “*tasya nimittam saṃyogotpātāu*”  
(Pā. 5.1.38) ity anuvartamāne “*godvyaca*”  
(Pā. 5.1.39) iti dvyaj-lakṣaṇo yan mā bhūd iti.

atrāpi go-nau-grahaṇam jñāpakam—  
'dīrghād dvyaj-lakṣaṇo vidhir na bhavati' iti.  
ayaṁ tu sarveśām eva parihārah.

**Vārttika.** nāvyapavṛktasya avayave tad vidhir  
yathā dravyeṣu.

**Bhāṣya.** nāvyapavṛktasyāvayavasyāvayavāśrayo  
vidhir bhavati yathā dravyeṣu. tad yathā  
dravyeṣu “*saptadaśa sāmidhenyo bhavanti*”  
iti na saptadaśāratnimātram kāṣṭham agnau  
abhyādhīyate.

viṣama upanyāsaḥ, pratyṛcam caiva hi tat-  
karma codyate. asambhavaś cāgnau vedyām  
ca.

yathā tarhi “*saptadaśa prādeśamātrīr  
āśvatthīḥ samidho 'bhyādadhiṭa*” iti na  
saptadaśa-prādeśa-mātram kāṣṭham agnau  
abhyādhīyate.

atrāpi pratipraṇavam caitat karma codyate.  
tulyaś cāsaṁbhavo'gnau vedyām ca.

yathā tarhi "tailam na vikretavyam",  
"māṁsam na vikretavyam" iti vyapavṛktam  
ca na vikriyate, avyapavṛktam — gāvah  
sarṣapāś ca vikriyante, tathā "loma-nakham  
sprṣṭvā ūaucam kartavyam" iti vyapavṛktam  
sprṣṭvā niyogataḥ kartavyam, avyapavṛkte  
kāmacāraḥ.

yatra tarhi vyapavargo'sti. kva ca vya-  
pavargo' sti? sandhyakṣareṣu.

*Vārttika.* sandhyakṣareṣu vivṛtatvāt.

*Bhāṣya.* (sandhyakṣareṣu) yad atrāvarṇam vivṛtataram  
tadanyasmād avarṇāt. ye api ivarṇovarṇe  
vivṛtatare te anyābhyaṁ ivarṇovarṇābhyaṁ.  
athavā punar na gṛhyante.

*Vārttika.* agraḥaṇam cen nuḍvidhi-lādeśa-  
vināmeṣu ḥkāragraḥaṇam.

*Bhāṣya.* agraḥaṇam cen nuḍvidhi-lādeśa-vināmeṣu  
ḥkāra-graḥaṇam kartavyam. "tasmānnuḍ  
dviḥalāḥ" (Pā.7.4.71) ḥkāre ca iti vaktavyam.  
ihāpi yathā syāt— 'ānṛdhatuḥ', 'ānṛdhuḥ' iti.  
yasya punar gṛhyante "dviḥalāḥ" ity eva  
tasya siddham.

yasyāpi na gṛhyante tasyāpy eṣa na doṣaḥ.  
dviḥal-graḥaṇam na kariṣyate tasmān nuḍ  
bhavati ity eva.

yadi na kriyate, 'āṭatuḥ', 'āṭuḥ' ity atrāpi  
prāpnoti.

āśnoti-graḥaṇam niyamārtham bha-  
viṣyati— 'āśnoter evāvarṇopadhasya  
nānyasyāvarṇopadhasya' iti. [nuḍvidhiḥ].

lādeśe ca ṛkāra-grahaṇam kartavyam.  
“*kṛpo ro laḥ*” (Pā.8.2.18) ṛkārasya ca iti  
vaktavyam. ihāpi yathā syāt — ‘*kṛptah*’,  
‘*kṛptavān*’ iti, yasya punar gṛhyante ‘*ra*’ ity  
eva tasya siddham.

yasyāpi na gṛhyante tasyāpy eṣa na doṣah.  
ṛkāro’py atra nirdiṣyate. katham ? avibhak-  
tiko nirdeśah — kṛpa, uh, rah, laḥ = “*kṛpo ro*  
*laḥ*” iti. athavā ubhayataḥ sphoṭa-māṭram  
nirdiṣyate — ra-śruter la-śruti bhavati iti.

[lādeśah]

vināme ṛ-kāra-grahaṇam kartavyam.  
“*raśābhyām no ṣaḥ samānapade*” (Pā.8.4.1),  
“*ṛkārāc ca*” iti vaktavyam. ihāpi yathā syāt—  
‘*māṭṛṇām*’, ‘*piṭṛṇām*’ iti. yasya punar gṛhy-  
ante “*raśābhyām*” ity eva tasya siddham.

na sidhyati. yat tad repḥat param bhaktes  
tena vyavahitatvān na prāpnoti.

mā bhūd evam. advyavāya ity eva siddham.  
na sidhyati. varṇaikadeśah ke varṇa-gra-  
haṇena gṛhyante, ye vyapavṛktā api varṇā  
bhavanti. yac cāpi repḥat param bhakteḥ, na  
tat kvacid api vyapavṛktam dṛṣyate.

evam tarhi yoga-vibhāgah kariṣyate,  
“*raśābhyām no ṣaḥ samānapade*”. tataḥ  
“*vyavāye*”, vyavāye ca raśābhyām no ṣo  
bhavati iti. tataḥ — “*aṭ-ku-pvāṇnumbhiḥ*” iti.

idam idānīm kirmartham ? niyamārtham—  
‘etair evākṣarasamāmnāyikair vyavāye,  
nānyair’ iti.

yasyāpi na gṛhyante tasyāpy eṣa na doṣah.  
ācāryapravṛtitir jñāpayati — ‘bhavaty ṛkārān  
no ṣātvam’ iti. yad ayam kṣubhnādiṣu nṛna-  
mana-śabdam paṭhati.

naitad asti jñāpakam. vṛddhy artham etat syāt—‘nārnamanīh’.

yat tarhi tṛpnoti śabdaṁ paṭhati. yaccāpi nṛnamana-śabdaṁ paṭhati.

nanu coktaṁ—‘vṛddhyartham etat syāt.’

bahiraṅgā vṛddhir antaraṅgam ḥatvam. asiddhaṁ bahiraṅgam antaraṅge. athavā upariṣṭād yoga-vibhāgah kariṣyate—ṛtaḥ no ḥo bhavati. tataḥ “chandasv avagrahāt”. ‘ṛta’ ity eva.

Vārttika.

plutāvaica idutau.

Bhāṣya.

[plutāvaica idutau] etac ca vaktavyam. yasya punar ḡṛhyante, ‘guroṣṭer’ ity eva plutoyā tasya siddhaṁ.

yasyāpi na ḡṛhyante tasyāpy eṣa na doṣaḥ. kriyata etan nyāsa eva.

Vārttika.

tulyarūpe samyoge dvivyañjanavidhiḥ.

Bhāṣya.

tulyarūpe samyoge dvivyañjanāśrayo vidhir na sidhyati — ‘ku2kkuṭaḥ’, ‘pi3ppali’, ‘pi3ttam’ iti. yasya punar ḡṛhyante tasya dvau kakārau, dvau pakārau, dvau takārau.

yasyāpi na ḡṛhyante tasyāpi dvau kakārau, dvau pakārau, dvau takārau. katham? mātrākālo’tra gamyate. na ca mātrikam vyañjanam asti. anupadiṣṭam sat katham śakyam vijñātum? asac ca katham śakyam pratipattum?

yady api tāvad atraitac chakyate vaktum yatraitan nāsti — ‘ansavarnān ḡṛhṇāti’ iti. iha tu katham— ‘saṄyantā’, ‘saṄvtsarah’, ‘yallokam’, ‘taṄlokam’ iti yatraitad astyaṄ savarnān ḡṛhṇāti iti?

atrāpi mātrākālo ḡṛhyate. na ca mātrikam

vyañjanam asti. anupadiṣṭam sat katham  
 śakyam vijñātum. asac ca katham śakyam  
 pratipattum?

This is being discussed — in some of the vowels (of a compound or conjunct nature) there are other vowels constituted of them (e.g., 'a', 'i' in 'e'). Now, the question is whether vowels similar to these constitutive vowels would be analogous to them.

What is this discussion ?

Here instructions have been made regarding collections and parts. The parts fall within the collection. When a tree moves, it moves with all its parts. There an enquiry arises— whether one speaks of parts, such as those that exist in collections. Will analogous parts in the collection be affected or included or not ?<sup>74</sup>

74. In *a-kāra* there are parts like 'a'; in *r-kāra* and *l-kāra* there are parts like 'ra' and 'la'; in *e-kāra* and *o-kāra* and in *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra* there are parts like 'a', 'e', or 'o'. Now the question is— whether vowel operations may be extended to the vowels which are constitutive parts of the compound words. The collective or *samudāya* consists of *r*, *l*, *e*, *ai*, *o*, *au* and the parts *a*, *i*, *u*, *ra* and *la*. Now, when any rule refers to the collective vowels, though the constitutive members exist there, they are not within the operation of those rules, though they exist there. When again rules refer to the parts of the simple vowels, the collective ones have no status there. Thus consonants like *ha*, *ya* and *va* are associated with *a-kāra* in normal utterance on account of the difficulty that is experienced in pronouncing them without the terminal vowel. But in 'dadhyatra' they enjoin 'ya' in place of 'i' as to be without the terminal *a-kāra*.

Now an *ādeśa* 'ay' etc. is enjoined in place of collective vowels. In such a case the simple vowels forming their part are invariably ruled out of operation. But when the case is such that there is the opportunity for the effectuation of vowel-change in the simple part of vowels as well as in the synthetic vowels, it is the former that finds preference. Thus, in the phrase 'agnā indra' existing before the combination as 'agnē indra', we have the euphonic combination 'agnayindra' and further the other form 'agnā indra'. No further euphonic combination takes place. The 'a' of 'agnā' and the 'i' of 'indra' do not further enter into any euphonic combination. Here there is an opportunity for the operation both of the simple vowel and of the collective. Thus, in 'agnē indra', the 'e' is compound of 'a' and 'i'; and since 'i' of 'indra' follows there is a case for the lengthening of the vowel 'i', as also the *ādeśa* of 'ay' in place of 'e'. (This is 'samudāya kārya' and the former was 'avayava kārya'). Now it is suggested that preference should be given to the 'avayava kārya', i.e., operation of change in the constitutive vowels and again since we can know the whole only through the parts (i.e., of the change of the 'i' in 'e' together with the following 'i' of 'indra') is more proximate than the vowel change of 'e' in 'ay' which is a *samudāya kārya* and of an external operation (*bahirāṅga*). But, as a matter of fact the change of 'e' into 'ay' takes place and we have 'agnā āyāhi'. The reply to such an objection is that the constitutive vowels have disappeared in the conjunct vowel and have no independence in making

(The *Bhāṣya* in introducing the *Vārttika* says as follows:—)

What is the difference? (Here the *Vārttika* intervenes) — If the constitutive parts of a syllable be included within the syllable, then in a conjunct syllable a rule should be made for the operation of changes of similar syllables (a, a, i, i, u, u, ṛ, ṛ, l, l). (The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows:—) If in enjoining an operation about syllables the constitutive vowels of a conjunct syllable be taken into account, then the operation should apply to all the similar vowels (a, a, i, i, u, u, ṛ, ṛ, l, l). This should be prohibited. ‘*Agni*’, ‘*indra*’, ‘*vāyo*’, ‘*udakam*’ — (in such places the ‘i’ in ‘*agni*’ might combine with ‘i’ in ‘*indra*’, or the ‘u’ of ‘*vāyo*’ might combine with ‘u’ in ‘*udakam*’ and become lengthened by the rule “*akah savarṇe dirghah*”— the vowels, a, i, u, ṛ, l when followed by homologous vowels, will be transformed into one long vowel; thus, there is a case here for the lengthening operation.

(Another *Vārttika* intervenes) — In the case of long vowels there should be prohibitory rules against shortening them.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs as follows) — In the case of long operations of making short become applicable and this should be prohibited — ‘ālūya’, ‘prolūya’. There is also the case here for the coming in of the augment ‘*tuk*’ by the rule “*hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk*” when a *kṛt* suffix with a redundant ‘*pa*’ follows, the augment ‘*tuk*’ follows after a short-vowel.<sup>75</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* in refuting this objection says) — This is no fault. Pāṇini’s rule “*dirghāt*” (6.1.75, i.e. when a ‘*cha*’ follows a long vowel, the augment ‘*tuk*’ comes in between the long vowel and the ‘*cha*’) provides for an operation of ‘*tuk*’ after a long vowel and this implies that there is no further operation to be prescribed for the short constitutive vowel.

(Now an objection is raised by the *Bhāṣya* against the above answer) — There is no scope for inferring such an indicatory suggestion. Another purpose is served by this rule, for in the next rule “*padāntād vā*” (6.1.76) it is enjoined that if the long vowel is at the end of a *pada*, the appearance of the augment ‘*tuk*’ will only be optional.

(To this the *Bhāṣya* further says) — But still there may be another purpose. It may be for the purpose of splitting up one whole into two

a free combination (*tirohitatvād avayavānām samudāyakāryapāratantryāt*). The e-kāra though constituted of a-kāra and i-kāra, has become a new vowel as it were. This is what has been referred to in the *Bhāṣya* by the phrase, ‘*abhyantaraś ca samudāyah avayavah*’.

75. ‘ālūya’ = ā + lū + yap. Now if we consider the constitution of ‘ū’ in the root ‘lū’, we find that it is composed of two short ‘u’-s. Now, if the vowel operation is allowed to extend to the constitutive vowels, it would apply to the short vowel ‘u’ and as such it would come under the operation of the rule. “*hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk*”, when a ‘*pit kṛt*’ like ‘*yap*’ follows. But to prevent this there ought to be a prohibitory rule.

by *yoga-vibhāga*, otherwise the *sūtra* might have been ‘*dirghāt padāntād vā*’.<sup>76</sup>

According to that principle then, in the instances of ‘*khaṭvābhiḥ*’ and ‘*mālābhiḥ*’ the ‘*bhis*’ ought to become ‘*ais*’ after ‘*a-kāra*’ by the rule “*ato bhisa ais*” (7.1.9). If ‘*mālā*’ be reducible into two vowels ‘*a*’ and ‘*a*’, then word ‘*mālā*’ may be regarded as ending in ‘*a*’, and thus instead of ‘*bhis*’ there might be ‘*ais*’ as in ‘*naraiḥ*’. (The reply is)—‘*bhis*’ does not become ‘*ais*’, because the rule “*ato bhisa ais*” provides only for words ending only in ‘*a*’, because the ‘*a*’ in the *sūtra* “*ato*” etc. has a terminal ‘*ta*’.

(Another objection is raised in the *Bhāṣya* as follows):

How then ‘*yātā*’, ‘*vātā*’? There is the rule “*ato lopah*” (6.4.48, the *a-kāra* is elided when an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows) and according to this rule the ‘*a*’ of ‘*yā*’ might be elided. To this also it may be said that as in the rule ‘*a*’ has a terminal ‘*ta*’ it only refers to the short ‘*a*’ and therefore the rule has no shortening application to the root ‘*yā*’. But there is also another purpose served in the terminal ‘*ta*’ and this is to prevent the addition of the whole vowel ‘*a*’. (But it may be asked)—that even though there is a terminal ‘*ta*’ we may by virtue of it elide the second ‘*a*’, in ‘*a*’ in the root ‘*yā*’, and then why should not there be a further elision of the first ‘*a*’ (leading thus to the complete elision of ‘*ā*’)? (The reply is)—that the elision of the second ‘*a*’ has to be regarded as implying that what has been eliding was as if it had not been elided, and moreover, this rule “*ato lopah*” should be treated as if it had no application according to the rule “*asiddhavad atrābhāt*” (6.4.22)—(which means that all the rules from 6.4.22 to the end of that chapter should be regarded as having no scope with reference to the operations that have been directed with reference that are technically called ‘*bha*’).

Pāṇini’s intention thus shows that the ‘*a*’ of ‘*ā*’ is not elided and this intention is manifested from the rule “*āto’upasarge kah*” (3.2.3)—(the ‘*ka*’ suffix is to be added to roots ending in ‘*ā*’ and not preceded by an

76. By the rule “*dirghāt*” we have ‘*tuk*’ after a long vowel followed by ‘*cha*’ and by the next rule “*padāntād vā*” we have the provision of an optional operation in case of a long vowel at the end of a *pada* and the suggestion here given is that the rule ‘*dirghāt*’ has been given not for prohibiting the vowel operation of the constitutive simple vowels but for enjoining the optional application of ‘*tuk*’ in the case of a ‘*padānta dirgha*’ and the formation of the two rules—“*dirghāt*” and “*padāntād vā*” has been by way of splitting up of one idea into *sūtras*, and not for prohibiting the vowel operation of constitutive simple vowels. So far, then the result is that vowel changes ought to be applicable to the constitutive simple vowels. Other objections are being enunciated in the *Bhāṣya* that follows.

*upasarga*), where a 'ka' has been added to 'a' as a supplementary attachment. How can this express the intention of Pāṇini? Because this purpose is revealed in the attachment of the redundant 'ka' that on this account the final ā should be elided by the rule "āto lopa iti ca" (6.4.64)—(when an ārdhadhātuka vibhakti follows beginning with an initial 'it' or a suffix having a redundant attachment of 'ka' or 'ñ' follows the ā of a root ending in ā is elided) the ā of the roots that take 'ka' are elided. If it was the intention of Pāṇini to drop the *a-kāra* constitutive of ā, then it would be unnecessary to have the redundant attachment 'ka' for by eliding the second 'a', and by advising that the first 'a' together with the 'a' of 'ka' will take the form of the latter 'a' of 'ka' by the principle of 'para-rūpa', we can have the derived form as in 'godah', 'kambaladah'. Thus Pāṇini desires that the 'a' in ā should not be elided and for this reason he had advised the redundant 'ka' attachment to 'a' in the rule "āto 'nupasarge kah".

It is not for this suggestion (the objector says)—that the redundant 'ka'-attachment was made. This 'ka'-attachment has been advised here for a later *sūtra* "tunda-śokayoḥ parimṛjāpanudoḥ" (3.2.5, the roots 'parimṛj' and 'apanud' take 'ka' when followed by 'tunda' and 'śoka').

But in the rule 'gāpoṣṭhak' (3.2.8)—(to the roots 'gā' and 'pā' the suffix 'thak' is added and there is no *upasarga*). The redundant 'ka' has been added to 'a' only for the purpose of dropping the ā of the roots 'gā' and 'pā' and not for any other purpose.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—the long conjunct vowel should be treated as a single one.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—a long vowel should be advised as being like a single vowel. What is the necessity? (We have) 'vācā tarati' (but not *vācika*) so that there may not be 'thañ' which is suffixed to words having two syllables. Here again, in the rule "tasya nimittam̄ samyogotpātā" (5.1.38)—(a word takes the suffix 'yat' and 'thañ' when a contact or an omen is signified as being for the sake of the object denoted by that word)—'śatasya nimittam̄ dhanapatinā samyogah̄ śatyah̄ śatikah̄, śatasya nimittam̄ utpāto dakṣiṇākṣi-spandanam̄'. According to this rule, we may expect to have a 'yat'-pratyaya to the word 'vāc' according to the meaning for the sake of words, by the rule "godvyaco' samkhyā-parimānāśvāder yat" the 'yat' is suffixed to the word 'go', words containing two vowels or denoting number and measure and the word 'aśva' etc. in the context of the rule, 5.1.38. A *dīrgha* vowel is to be regarded as a single vowel in order that we may not regard the word 'vāc' as consisting of two vowels (*a + a = ā*), so that they may not have the 'yat' suffix according to the rule

5.1.39, just referred to. Again, here also the inclusion of the word 'go' in the rule 5.1.39 along with 'dvyac' (words containing two vowels) shows that 'go' is not regarded as 'dvyac' and it is regarded merely as a simple long vowel to which the rule does not apply. So also the inclusion of the word 'nau' in the *sūtra*, "nau-dvyacaṣṭhanī" (4.4.7). (The *Bhāṣya* introduces a *Vārttika* and says)—That this is a refutation of all objections.

(Thus the *Vārttika* says)—the injunction may be with regard to the whole, it would not be applicable to any of its parts which have been fused together with it as one whole and this will be after the analogy of things.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows)—No injunction applying to parts should be applicable to such parts as are one with the whole as in the case of things. (This is a line in the *Vārttika* which the *Bhāṣya* quotes for explanation)—"there are seventeen logs". This phrase does not mean that a log seventeen cubits long should be put into fire.<sup>77</sup>

(Hence the *Bhāṣya* says)—the analogy is contrariwise (for two reasons), for one with each *Rk-mantra* a log has to be put into the fire, two, it is impossible to put it in the fire on the sacrificial altar.<sup>78</sup>

77. 'Sāmidheni' is a word denoting the *Rk-mantras*. The word 'sāmidheni' denotes the *Rk-mantra* by the *Vārttika* 'sāmidhenyo mantrāḥ' contained in Pāṇini (4.3.120). It originates from the word 'sāmidhena' from 'samidh'. From association it means the logs that are put in the sacrificial fire. "Saptadaśa sāmidhenyo bhavantī"—would thus mean that logs seventeen cubits long, should be put in the fire. The question is—whether these should be one log 17 cubit long, or these should be 17 logs each one cubit long. The idea is that though each log a cubit long and taken 17 times, would make a log of 17 cubits; yet, since the injunction speaks of a log 17 cubits long, we cannot break it up into 17 bits. These parts, the cubit bits, being one with the whole and the injunction being with reference to the whole, it cannot apply to the part. So also when an injunction is made with reference to a whole vowel, that injunction cannot apply to the constitutive parts of which it is made. But as a matter of fact not one log 17 cubits long is to be applied to the fire in the sacrificial altar. The analogy thus points the other way, i.e. the injunction with reference to the whole applies to the parts.

78. A sacrificial altar is a three-and-a-half cubits square and it is impossible to put a log that is 17 cubits long, for it is prohibited that a log should not extend out of the limit of the altar. Therefore it is impossible to put a 17 cubits long log into the sacrificial altar and for the reasons stated above one cannot put the same log into the fire with 17 *Rk-mantras*; for these two reasons one cannot take the whole log in 17 cubits, but in parts. The point that was wanted to be established was that an injunction referring to the whole, cannot apply to the part with which it forms a whole. Now, therefore, the analogy is contrary to what was intended to be established, for here an injunction referring to the whole, applies to the part. The reply in the *Bhāṣya* is that

But again, with reference to the Vedic passage “*saptadaśa prādeśa-mātrī āśvatthīḥ samidho'bhyādodhīta*” — one should lay 17 bits of āśvattha wood as big as spans of the hand in the fire; the word used is ‘*saptadaśa mātrī*’ and not ‘*saptadaśamātrām*’, i.e. of 17 spans and not 17 span.<sup>79</sup>

Here also with each *prāṇava mantra* the operation is to be performed. It is equally impossible to put a bit of wood into the fire on the altar. (Because of log 17 spans long would be too big for an altar which is three and a half cubits square and according to the injunction no log of wood would extend out of the limits of the altar).

(The *Bhāṣya* again runs)—(There is an injunction:) oil should not be sold and meat should not be sold. The divided parts are not to be sold, but the whole cows and mustards are sold. So also (there is an injunction) after touching hair and nails one should purify oneself. By touching the divided one’s, one must purify oneself but by touching the undivided ones, one may or may not.<sup>80</sup>

It may then be that there is a real separation. Now where is the separation? In the conjunct syllables. (The idea is that in the articulation of *ā, ī, ū, r̥, l̥*, and *o*, union of syllables is so complete that there is no sign of division and these syllables appear in sound as single, simple, homologous ones; but in ‘*ai*’ and ‘*au*’ the mark of division is perceptible).

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)— in the case of conjunct vowels (no separation is to be recognised) on account of the fact that their difference consists only in the more openness of their articulation.

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this has been so, because it was impossible to carry out the injunction with reference to the whole.

79. The idea is: that there should be 17 bits of āśvattha wood each as big as the span of the hand and not one bit 17 spans long. Here also each of the bits is to be put in the fire with the *prāṇava mantra* and it is impossible that one bit 17 spans long would be put into the fire, for in that case one cannot satisfy the injunction that with each bit of log the *mantra* is to be uttered and uttered 17 times.

80. The idea is that an injunction may apply to parts, but may not apply to the whole. Thus, the cow contains flesh and the mustard contains the oil; but the injunction against selling meat and oil does not apply to the respective wholes to which they belong, i.e. the cow and the mustard. Therefore the injunction does not apply against the selling of cows and mustard. Again, there is the injunction against touching hair and nails, but only to such hair and nails that are separated from human body. There is no injunction against touching hair and nails unseparated from the whole human body.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows) — the *a-kāra* in ‘ai’ and ‘au’ are wider than the other *a-kāras*, and the *i-kāra* and *u-kāra* here are wider than other *i-kāras* and *u-kāras*.<sup>81</sup>

Or rather it may be said that these simple vowels are not constitutive elements in ‘ai’ or ‘au’.<sup>82</sup>

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—if the conjunct vowels are not regarded as constitutive of the simple ones, then in the case of the injunction of ‘*nuṭ*’, the augment of ‘*la*’ and in the change of ‘*na*’ into ‘*ṇa*’ the name of *r* ought to be specially specified.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets this as follows)—if not included then in the case of enjoining ‘*nuṭ*’ the prescription of the augment ‘*la*’ and in the change into cerebral *ṇa* (*vināma* is the technical name for *ṇa*), *r* should be specially mentioned. Thus as a supplement to the rule, “*tasmān nuḍ dvihalāḥ*” (7.4.71) a reduplicated verb with a double consonant ending in *a* should have ‘*nuṭ*’ after it — *ānaṇja* — but the rule would not apply unless there are two consonants as in ‘*āṭa*’, ‘*āṭatuh*’ (here *r* is regarded as compound of *r* and therefore the root ‘*rdh*’ is regarded as being constituted of two consonants). There should be a separate rule for the inclusion of *r* as ‘*r-kārāś ca*’ (also in the case of *r*) — ‘*āṇḍhatuh*’, ‘*āṇḍhuḥ*’.

Those who would take *r*, within it, may well do with the rule “*tasmān nuḍ dvihalāḥ*”, as it stands.

But even if *r* is not included, there will be no fault if the condition of two consonants is not taken, and the *sūtra* may be allowed to rest “*tasmān nuḍ*”; no, if the condition of two consonants be dropped then this should repeat ‘*nuṭ*’ also in the root ‘*ā*’ and we cannot have the forms *āṭatuh*, *āṭuh*. For the purpose of ruling out ‘*āśnoti*’ may be included within the rule — among those roots that *a* as the penultimate only *āśnoti* is to be ruled out, but not any other root having *a* as penultimate. (Now if in the above rule the combination of ‘*dvihalāḥ*’ or two consonants be omitted then the rule may be made ‘*avarṇopadhasya*’, i.e. those roots which have *a* in the *upadhā* are liable to get ‘*nuṭ*’. In such a case we have to make an exception with regard to the root ‘*ā*’ (to eat), for in all cases where *ā* is in the penultimate, there may be ‘*nuṭ*’, except in the case of the root ‘*as*’. In such

81. The idea is that the *a-kāra*, *i-kāra* and the *u-kāra* in ‘ai’ and ‘au’ being wider and opener in other ‘*a*’, ‘*i*’, or ‘*u*’, there cannot be any homologousness between the two and therefore there cannot be any combination between constitutive ‘*a*’, ‘*i*’ or ‘*u*’ in the conjunct syllables ‘ai’ and ‘au’ and other varieties of ‘*a*’, ‘*i*’ and ‘*u*’.

82. It is only a mistake to suppose that *e*, *ai*, *o* and *au* are made up of other simple vowels, for they can be regarded as homologous in themselves.

a remodelling of the *sūtra* we can do without including the constitutive vowels within the conjunct.

Again in enjoining a *la*, *r* is to be specified—thus as a supplement to the rule “*kṛpo ro laḥ*” (8.2.18— the *r* sound of the root *kṛp* should be changed into *la*) we should have to say ‘*r-kārasya ca*’ (*r-kāra* also should be taken in) so that we may get the forms ‘*klptah*’, ‘*klptavān*’. For those who would include (simple vowels) the ‘*r*’ in the rule will be sufficient.

Those who would not include (the simple vowels) may also pass the rule as being without a fault, for here *r* is also included; how? The words in the *sūtra* will then have to be regarded as being without the declension suffixes such as *kṛpa uh rāḥ laḥ* = *kṛpo ro laḥ*, or in both cases only the joint whole sound is to be taken; the *ra* sound becomes the *la* sound.<sup>83</sup>

Again in the change of cerebral *ṇa* the *r-kāra* has to be mentioned separately (as a constitutive factor of ‘*ra*’).

(Thus the *Bhāṣya* says)— in the change of cerebral *ṇa* the *r* has to be specially mentioned. The rule for enjoining the change of dental into cerebral *ṇa* is “*raṣābhyām no ṇaḥ samānapade*” (8.4.1—if the dental *na* is changed into cerebral *ṇa* after *ra* and *ṣa*) and with it one has to add ‘*r-kārāc ca*’ also after *r*, so that we have cerebral *ṇa* in ‘*māṭīṇām*’ and ‘*piṭīṇām*’. Those who include *r* within *ra*, may allow the rule ‘*raṣābhyām*’ without any supplementary addition.

(But an opponent urges) — that if by ‘*ra*’ of ‘*raṣābhyām*’, the mere *r*-sound is meant, then there is an intervention of ‘*a*’ between this *r*-sound and the dental *na* that follows and consequently one may expect that the dental *na* will not be changed.

(To this the *Bhāṣya* replies) — it cannot be so, because it has been enjoined by another rule, “*at-kupvāñ-num-vyavāye’pi*” (8.4.2— the change into cerebral *ṇa* will be affected even if there is an intervention of *at*, *ku* or the *ka*-group, *pu* or the *pa*-group, *āñ* and *num*) that the change into cerebral will take place even if there is an intervention by ‘*at*’.

(Now, the *Bhāṣya* raises the view of those who would not include the simple vowels as effective constituents of the conjunct vowels and says) — it would not do what syllables being parts of vowels may be regarded as constitutives of vowels, only those that when separated will also remain as whole vowels. To say that in ‘*ra*’ there is a division between the *r*-sound (*repha*) and *a* is meaningless, for there is no vowel of the nature of a *repha* or *r* which is used separately.

83. The idea is explained in the *Uddyota* in detail. There is one class of sound as implying both *ra* and *la*.

(Again the *Bhāṣya* raises the points of those who are in favour of including the constitutive vowels and say)—In that case it is possible to make a split. (The first part standing as “*raśābhyaṁ no ṇaḥ samānapade*”—in the same *pada* the dental *na* after ‘*ra*’ and ‘*ṣa*’ will be changed into cerebral). Then we may have another rule *vyavāye*. In the case of intervention the dental *na* in the same *pada* after ‘*ra*’ and ‘*ṣa*’ will be changed into cerebral; then the other part of the rule—“*aṭ-ku-pvāinumbhiḥ*” (i.e. by the intervention of ‘*aṭ*’, the *ka*-group, *pa*-group, *num* and *ā*). Why is this condition?—For restricting the scope—i.e. a change into cerebral *ṇa* will be effected with the intervention only of those syllables of the syllabic order. Those who would not regard the simple vowels as constituents, for them also there is no trouble. There is an indicatory suggestion from Pāṇini to the effect that the *na* after *r* becomes cerebral, for in the list of words read in the ‘*kṣubhnādi*’ list Pāṇini reads the word ‘*nṛnamana*’. <sup>84</sup>

(To this the reply is:)—that *vṛddhi* is external while cerebralisation is internal and there is a *paribhāṣā* or maxim that the internal should have preference over the external; or rather, the *sūtra* may be split up in the form ‘*rtaḥ*’ (after *r*) i.e. after *r* the *na* should be changed into *ṇa*. There is a rule: ‘*chandas yd avagrahāt*’ (8.4.26— in the *Vedas* the *na* occurring in word after *r* occurring in another word separate from it, is cerebralised). This rule may be split up by *yoga-vibhāga* as ‘*chandas avagrahāt*’ and ‘*rtaḥ*’ (after *r*). <sup>85</sup>

84. There is the rule “*kṣubhnādiṣu ca*” (8.4.39—the *na* of the words belonging to the ‘*kṣubhnādi*’ list shall not be changed into cerebral) and in this list there is a word ‘*nṛnamana*’ (the name of a man); this suggests that it is expected that the second *na* in ‘*nṛnamana*’ should have been changed into cerebral since it comes after *r*, but it would not be so changed because it is included in the ‘*kṣubhnādi*’ list. But this is no indicatory suggestion (*jñāpaka*) as has been suggested, for it may as well be said to be a provision for the reviving cerebral *ṇa* in the case of *vṛddhi*, we may have a dental *na* in ‘*nānamani*’ from ‘*nṛnamana*’; but the word ‘*trpnoti*’ is also read in the ‘*kṣubhnādi*’ list (and this proves that it was the intention of Pāṇini that *na* after *r* should be cerebral and this *r* is contained in the *ra* of ‘*raśābhyaṁ no ṇaḥ*’). In this connection we may think that the reading of the word ‘*nṛnamana*’ also indicates the same interpretation. But it has been suggested that the word ‘*nṛnamana*’ has been read in the ‘*kṣubhnādi*’ list for providing a cerebral *ṇa* in the case of *vṛddhi* as in the word ‘*nānamana*’.

85. There is a maxim “*asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge*”, the operating cases directly constitutive to the desired operation are called ‘*antaraṅga*’. The cases or conditions not having a direct bearing to the constitutive operation is called ‘*bahiraṅga*’. Thus there is a rule “*kharavasānayor visarjanīyah*” (8.3.15— i.e. the *r*-terminal to a

(Here the Vārttika intervenes)—(in the view that simple vowels are not constitutive of conjunct ones, the Vārttika says as follows) —When one is regarded as *pluta* or long-drawn intonation the *i* and the *u* within it are to be regarded as *pluta*.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows)— The above rule has to be separately enjoined according to those who would not put simple vowels as operative parts in the conjunct ones. For those who hold the reverse view, it is enough to have the *sūtra* formed as ‘*guroṣṭeh*’ — in the case of long vowel the *pluta* intonation should be ascribed to the ‘*ti*’ (i.e the part of a word beginning with the last vowel is called ‘*ti*’— *aco’ntyādi tī* 1.1.64).<sup>86</sup>

*pada* is changed into aspirate (*visarga*) when followed by tenuis consonants and tenuis aspirates and sibilants and stoppage. Thus the *r* after *vṛkṣa* becomes changed into an aspirate *vṛkṣah*, when the *cha* of *chādayati* follows and we have *vṛkṣaś chādayati*. But we have *nṛkuṭyāḥ bhāvah* = *nārkuṭyah*, here the *r* of *nṛkuṭa* has been changed into *nār* by the application of *taddhita* suffix to the whole word *nṛkuṭa*. It is on account of this *taddhita* suffix that *nṛ* has become *nār*. The *ra*-terminal of *nār* from *nṛ* has been caused by virtue of the *taddhita* suffix which is not constitutive to the word ‘*nṛkuṭa*’; it is true that here we have a terminal *ra* in *nār* followed by a tenuis *ka* and might have expected here that the *r* of the *nār* changed into an aspirate as in ‘*vṛkṣaś chādayati*’; but this change of *nṛ* into *nār* being caused by conditions and causes belonging to the suffix is external to the constitution of the word ‘*nṛkuṭa*’. In the formation, therefore, of the changes it would have been due to the internal constitution of the word *nṛkuṭa*—the *ka*’s following the *r*, the operation caused by the *taddhita* suffix, viz., that of changing *nṛ* into *nār*, should be regarded as not having happened as it is an external influence not constitutive to the word. Now, it is suggested in the *Bhāṣya* that *vṛddhi* in ‘*nārnamani*’ is external to the cerebralisation of *na* in *namani*, and for this reason the *ār* of *nārnamani* should be regarded as not having happened, and consequently the inclusion of *nṛnamana* in the *kṣubhnādi* list cannot be for the prohibition of the cerebralisation of *na* in *nārnamani* as that prohibition is already effected in accordance with the maxim, “*asiddham bahiraigam antarange*”. The other alternative suggestion is that the rule “*chandas yd avagrahāt*” may be split up into two parts as ‘*chandas yd avagrahāt*’ and ‘*ṛtah*’ so that it may be definitely specified that the *na* after *r* should be cerebralised, in the case *r* is not included within *ra* of ‘*raśābhyaṁ no naḥ*’ and the provision for the cerebralisation of *na* is made by a specific enjoining that the *na* after *r* should be cerebralised.

86. The idea is that there is a rule—“*plutāvica idutau*” (8.2.106). The rule means that when in calling or singing, the *pluta* accent is enjoined with regard to ‘*ai*’ or ‘*au*’. The accent is to be given to their constitutive *i* or *u*. This rule would be unnecessary for those who would admit the operative function of the constitutive vowels; for then it would be enough to say that in the case of long syllable about which the *pluta* accent has to be made, the accent is to be ascribed to the portion technically called ‘*ti*’, i.e. on the portion commencing with the last vowel and the rule should be ‘*guroṣṭeh*’.

(But the *Bhāṣya* here says)—even in the latter case there is no harm in having this *sūtra* and the *sūtra* is therefore put.

(Kaiyatā here says that even in the view in which the operative function of the constitutive syllables is admitted the *sūtra* “*plutāvaica idutau*” has to be made, for the constitutive parts being wider and opener than the normal variety they would not be homologous with the normal ones and therefore they could not be styled as normal *i* or *u*).

(Here again the *Vārttika* intervenes) — when the connection is of the same type, i.e. when consonants combine in the same manner as the vowels, then according to the negative view the injunction with regard to double consonants would not apply.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows:) — when the vowels are of the same form as parts they may be regarded as forming according to one view a simple homologous vowel, and according to the other view, a compound vowel which on account of quickness of articulation appears as one.

(The *Bhāṣya* says) — the compounding being of the same form, the rules of *pluta* accents regarding double consonants should not apply, as it is formed to do in the *pluta* accents in words involving such double consonants, such as ‘*ku2 kkutah*’, ‘*pi3ppali*’, ‘*pi 3ttam*’. According to the positive view there are two ‘*pa*’s and two ‘*ta*’s.<sup>87</sup>

(The above objection raised in the *Vārttika* is repudiated in the *Bhāṣya* as follows:) — Those who do not hold the positive view, have also to admit the double consonants as double and two ‘*kas*’, two ‘*pa*’s, two ‘*ta*’s in the above example. How so? — There is evidently some difference of time; but there is a further objection that consonants have no difference in time. When such differences have not been instructed, how can we know that, and if they do not exist, how can we understand that?

(A further objection has been raised in favour of the positive view in the *Bhāṣya*) — though it may be said here that in the case of double consonants such difference in timing cannot be known; yet, just as in the case of *pratyāhāra* ‘*aŋ*’, each syllable includes within it its homologous ones, so here also it may be expected that the consonants also have some timing in articulation which determines their homologous character.

87. The principle contained in the problem of regarding conjunct syllables as made up of operative constitutives or not, would apply also to the case of articulation of double consonants, and in their case also unless the double consonants are regarded as made up of two operative consonants, they (the double consonants) cannot be regarded as double and therefore the rule regarding their *pluta* accent would not apply.

Otherwise how can we have such examples as 'saṄyantā', 'saṄvatsaran' 'yaṄlokam', 'taṄlokam'.

(In the above cases *ya*, *ra*, *la*, *va* are supposed to have nasal varieties which argues for the supposition that the consonants also have homologous varieties. In the rule "halo'nantarāḥ samyogah" (1.1.7) it is said that consonants unintervened by vowels are to be regarded as compound consonants and this shows that it is admitted that the two consonants may join together to form compound consonants). Where such conditions prevail, the consonants would intrude in them their homologous variety. Here also then there is timing in articulation of consonants, as in the case of 'saṄyantā' etc. But it has been said that the consonants have no timing in articulation. Unless so advised, how can it be known, and if it does not exist, how can we understand it?

<i>Pāṇini.</i>	<b>ha ya va raṭ 5.</b>
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	sarve varṇāḥ sakṛd upadiṣṭāḥ, ayaṁ hakāro dvir ḫupadiṣyate — pūrvaś caiva paraś ca. yadi punaḥ pūrva evopadiṣyeta, para eva vā. kaś cātra viṣeṣah?
<i>Vārttika.</i>	hakārasya paropadeśe'ad-grahaṇeṣu hagrahaṇaṁ.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	hakārasya paropadeśe ad-grahaṇeṣu hagrahaṇaṁ kartavyam— "āto 'ti nityam" (Pā. 8.3.3), "śaśchoṭi" (Pā. 8.4.63), "dīrghād aṭi samāna-pāde" (Pā. 8.3.9), "hakāre ca" iti vaktavyam. ihāpi yathā syāt — 'mahā hi saḥ'.
<i>Vārttika.</i>	uttve ca.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	uttve ca hakāra-grahaṇaṁ kartavyam. "ato ror aplutād aplute" (Pā. 6.1.113), "haśi ca" (Pā. 6.1.114), "hakāre ca" iti vaktavyam. ihāpi yathā syāt — 'puruṣo hasati', 'brāhmaṇo hasati' iti. astu tarhi pūrvopadeśah.

*Vārtika.* pūrvopadeśe kittvaksed-vidhayo jhal-grahaṇāni ca.

*Bhāṣya.* yadi pūrvopadeśah kittvam̄ vidheyam—‘snihitvā’, ‘snehitvā’, ‘sisnihiṣati’, ‘sisnehiṣati’. “*ralo*’ *vvyupadhād halādeḥ*” (*Pā.* 1.2.26) iti kittvam̄ na prāpnoti. ksa-vidhiḥ—ksaś ca vidheyah—‘adhukṣat’, ‘aliksat’. “*śala igupadhād aniṭah ksaḥ*” (*Pā.* 3.1.45) iti kso na prāpnoti. id-vidhiḥ. it̄ ca vidheyah—‘rudihi’. valādi-lakṣaṇa in̄ na prāpnoti.

jhal-grahaṇāni ca. kim? a-hakārāni syuh. tatra ko doṣah? “*jhalo jhali*” (*Pā.* 8.2.26) itīha na syāt—‘adāgdhām’, ‘adāgdham’. tasmāt pūrvaś caivopadeṣṭavyah paraś ca.

yadi ca kiñcid anyatrāpy upadeśe prayojanam asti, tatrāpy upadeśah kartavyah.

idam vicāryate—ayam̄ repho ya-kāra-va-kārābhyām pūrva evopadiṣyeta—‘haya-varaṭ’ iti, para eva vā yathānyāsam iti.

kaś cātra višeṣah?

*Vārtika.* rephasya paropadeśe anunāsika-dvirvacana-parasavarṇa-pratiṣedhaḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* rephasya paropadeśe anunāsika-dvirvacana-parasavarṇānām pratiṣedho vaktavyah.

anunāsikasya—‘svarnayati’, ‘prātar-nayati’. “*yaro’ nunāsike anunāsiko vā*” (*Pā.* 8.4.45) ity anunāsikah prāpnoti.

dvirvacanasya—‘madra-hradah’, ‘bhadra-hradah’. “*yarah*” iti dvirvacanam̄ prāpnoti.

parasavarṇasya—‘kuṇḍam̄ rathena’, ‘vanam̄ rathena’. “*anusvārasya yayi*” (*Pā.* 8.4.58) iti para-savarṇah prāpnoti.

All the *varṇas* have been pronounced in the *Śiva-sūtras* only once; but this *ha* has been pronounced twice, once first and the other in the end. What would be the difference if it would have been pronounced only at the commencement or only in the end?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—if *ha* was pronounced only in the end, then for including *ha* within the *pratyāhāra aṭ*, a special direction would be necessary.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows:)—If *ha* was pronounced only in the end, then its special direction is necessary that those directions that are applicable in the case of ‘*aṭ*’ are also applicable in the case of ‘*ha*’. Thus there is the rule “*āto ’ti nityam*” (2.8.3—i.e. when ‘*aṭ*’ follows, then the *a-kāra* preceding ‘*ru*’ should be made nasal, e.g. *mahā asi*; the *ru* is effected by the rule “*dīrghād aṭi samāna-pāde*”—the terminal *na-kāra* of a *pāda* preceded by a long vowel should have ‘*ru*’ after it when ‘*aṭ*’ follows, if the two occur in the same line of a verse). Then there is the rule “*śaś chōḍī*” (8.4.63—when *aṭ* follows then the *śa* preceded by ‘*jhay*’ would have ‘*cha*’ after it). In the case of all these rules one should have to direct that the operations referred to by the above *sūtras* should take place also when *ha* follows, so that the derived nasal change may occur in such an example as ‘*mahā hi saḥ*’.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—For the formation of ‘*u*’ also.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows:)—If the first ‘*ha*’ is not pronounced, then for the formation of ‘*u*’ a separate direction should be given for ‘*ha*’. There is a rule “*ato roraplutād aplute*” (6.1.113—i.e. after ‘*a*’ which is not of a long-drawn nature, the ‘*ru*’ preceding an ‘*akāra*’ which is not a long-drawn nature, would be changed into ‘*u*’—‘*vṛkṣo tra*’). There is another rule “*haśi ca*” (6.1.114—when ‘*has*’ follows, then the ‘*ru*’ after ‘*a*’ becomes ‘*u*’—‘*puruṣo hasati*’). If the first ‘*ha*’ was not in the *Śiva-sūtra* list, then it would not be possible to form the rule, “*haśi ca*” and a separate rule has to be made—‘*hakāre ca*’, that when *ha-kāra* follows, then also the ‘*ru*’ is to be changed into ‘*u*’ so that we may have such forms as ‘*puruṣo hasati*’, ‘*brāhmaṇo hasati*’.

Then let the first instruction of ‘*ha*’ in the *Śiva-sūtra* be regarded as justified.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes pointing out the difficulty for not recognising the instruction of the later ‘*ha*’ in the *Śiva-sūtra* as justifiable): (Thus the *Vārttika*)—if only the instruction of the first ‘*ha*’ is admitted, then in the enjoining of ‘*kit*’, ‘*ksa*’ and ‘*it*’ and the *pratyāhāra ‘jhal’* would be in trouble.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs as follows:)—If the ‘ha’ is only instructed in the beginning, then a separate rule has to be made in enjoining ‘kittva’ in such cases as the following: ‘snihitvā’ and ‘snehitvā’, ‘sisnihisati’ and ‘sisnehiṣati’, for there will be no ‘kittva’ by the rule—“ralovvuyupadhāddhalādeḥ” (1.2.26—roots having ‘u’ or ‘i’ as their penultimate and beginning with a ‘hal’ and ending with a ‘ral’ would be optionally regarded as ‘set’ and optionally ‘kit’ when ‘san’ and ‘ktvāc’ follow—‘dyutitvā’, and ‘dyotitvā’, ‘dīdyutiṣate’ and ‘dīdyotiṣate’—there is a rule “knīti ca” (1.1.5) which means that when a suffix has redundant (it), ‘k’, ‘n’, then on their account there will be no *guṇa* (change of ‘i’, ‘u’ and ‘ṛ’ into ‘e’, ‘o’ and ‘ar’) and *vṛddhi* (change of ‘a’, ‘i’, ‘u’, and ‘ṛ’ into ‘a’, ‘ai’, ‘au’ and ‘ar’). Now ‘it’ is an additional suffix often added as a supplementary suffix before other suffixes. ‘set’ means to be associated with ‘it’ and ‘kittva’ means the state of being associated with a ‘kit’ suffix, i.e. to be debarred from the normal change of *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* suffixes which are not be nature ‘kit’, but may be declared by a rule to be ‘kit’ in order to enjoin the prescription that there should be no *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* when such suffixes follow. ‘Hal’ means all the consonants including ‘ha’ and ‘ral’ means all consonants with the exception of ‘ya’ and ‘va’. Now, in the case of the root ‘dyut’, we have a root beginning with ‘da’, a ‘hal’, and we have ‘u’ in the *upadhā* and it ends in ‘t’ which is a ‘ral’. Therefore, it comes under the operation of the rule just mentioned and there is *guṇa* of the penultimate ‘u’ only optionally, becasue according to the rule such roots when ‘san’ and ‘tva’ follow, should be regarded as optionally ‘kit’. But if ‘ha’ is not included within ‘ral’, i.e. if the ‘ha’ is not instructed in the ‘Śiva-sūtra for the second time, then the roots ‘snih’ when ‘san’ and ‘ktvāc’ follow, we cannot have the optional forms of ‘snihitvā’ and ‘snehitvā’ i.e. having loved, ‘sisnihisati’ and ‘sisnehiṣati’.

‘Kṣa’ has also to be separately enjoined for the providing for such uses as ‘adhukṣat’, ‘alikṣat’, for if ‘ha’ is not pronounced a second time in the Śiva-sūtra there will be no ‘kṣa’ by the rule, “śala igupadhādaniṭah kṣah” (3.1.45—the rule means that roots that do not have ‘iṭ’ as a supplementary suffix and which have ‘i’ ‘u’ ‘ṛ’ ‘l’ (ik) as their penultimate and ending in ś, s, ṣ and ‘ha’ (śal) get their suffix ‘cli’ in the ‘lun’ changed into ‘kṣa’ as we had ‘adhukṣat’ from the root ‘duḥ’ and ‘alikṣat’ from the root ‘lih’).

(If the second ‘ha’ is not taken into consideration then the *pratyāhāra* ‘śal’ would not include within it ‘ha’ and therefore the root ‘duḥ’ or ‘lih’ would not be a root ending in ‘śal’ and would not therefore come under the operation of the above rule 3.1.45 and would not have the forms ‘adhukṣat’ and ‘alikṣat’).

‘*If*’ also has to be separately enjoined for the formation of such a word as ‘*rudihi*’, for there would be no ‘*if*’ here which is enjoined to roots beginning with the consonants included within the *pratyahāra* ‘*ra*’.

(There is a rule: “*ārdhadhātukasyedvalādeḥ*”, 7.2.35— according to which it is enjoined to suffixes beginning with all the consonants with the exception of ‘*ya*’ of an *ārdhadhātuka* nature. Now, if ‘*ha*’ is not taken a second time then ‘*hi*’ would not be a *valādi* suffix and we cannot have the supplementary suffix ‘*if*’ for the formation of ‘*rudihi*’).

‘*Ha*’ has to be separately enjoined. Why? Because the ‘*jhal*’ would not include ‘*ha*’ within it. What is the harm? There would be no scope for the operation of the rule: “*Jhalo jhali*” for the formation of such words as ‘*adāgdhām*’ and ‘*adāgdham*’. Therefore both the first ‘*ha*’ and the second ‘*ha*’ are justifiable.

(There is a rule: “*jhalo jhali*”— 8.2.26. The rule means that a *s-kāra* coming after the consonants included in ‘*hal*’, i.e. all the consonants excluding ‘*ya*’, ‘*va*’, ‘*ra*’, ‘*la*’, when followed by consonants included in ‘*jhal*’, shall be elided. If the second ‘*ha*’ is not taken then the root ‘*dah*’ would not be regarded as a root ending in ‘*jhal*’ and as such the ‘*sic*’ suffix in *luṇi* would not be elided, when another ‘*jhal*’ suffix followed, as in the case of *adāgdhām* and *adāgdham*, and should have to make another rule, ‘*hācca*’).

(It should be noted in this connection that the enunciation of vowels and consonants in the *Śiva-sūtras* is not for giving a list of alphabets but for providing for such future use of them as may be regarded as necessary or economical in the interest of the *sūtras* of Pāṇini that follow).

(The *Bhāṣya* continuing says:)— If it was necessary to articulate any syllable at any other place, the same may be done (because the articulation of syllables in the *Śiva-sūtras* is for the advantage of making the *sūtras* as has been just stated).

(Then another problem arises about placing of the ‘*ra*’ and the *Bhāṣya* on the subject introducing a *Vārttika* follows:)— This is being discussed. Should this ‘*ra*’ in the ‘*ha-ya-va-raṭ*’ be placed before ‘*ya*’, ‘*va*’ or after them as it stands. What is the difference?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—if ‘*ra*’ should stand after ‘*ya*’ and ‘*va*’ then there will be no nasal nor duplication, nor the amalgamation of a vowel with a following homologous one.

(Here the *Bhāṣya* follows:)—if ‘*ra*’ is allowed to stand after ‘*ya*’ and ‘*va*’, as in the *Śiva-sūtra* “*ha-ya-va-raṭ*”, then there would be no nasalising and no transformation into a homologous sound. Thus, in ‘*svarnayati*’ and

‘prātarnayati’, there would be a nasal by the rule “yaro’nuṇāsike’nuṇāsikova” (8.4.45 — when consonants included within ‘yar’, come as the last member of a *pada* and an ‘anuṇāsika’ follows, then those consonants will be nasalised optionally. Now, if ‘ra’ is regarded as coming after ‘ya’, ‘va’ as it stands in the *Śiva-sūtra* “ha-ya-va-raf” then it would include also ‘ra’ for the consonants that come under ‘yar’ are really all the consonants excepting ‘ha’ and therefore ‘ra’ being included within it, there ought to be a nasalising of it into cerebral *ṇa*, for the cerebral *ṇa* is the appropriate nasal of the cerebral ‘ra’).

Then also again by the rule, “aco rahābhyaṁ dve” (8.4.46—the consonants that come under ‘yar’ preceded by ‘ra’ and ‘ha’ which are preceded by a vowel is doubled) which refers to the consonants that come under ‘yar’, we shall expect a doubling of ‘ra’ after ‘ha’ in such words as “madra-hrada” and ‘bhadra-hrada’.

Again by the rule, “anuṣvārasya yayi parasavarṇah” (8.4.58—i.e. when the consonants included in the ‘yay’ i.e. all the consonants excepting the sibilants and ‘ha’ follow, then the *anuṣvāra* becomes changed into homologous consonants; e.g. ‘Śaṅkita’ we should expect the transformation of the *anuṣvāra* in ‘kuṇḍam’ into the homologous syllable *ṇ* when followed by ‘rathena’ or in the case of ‘vanam rathena’.

<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	astu tarhi pūrvopadeśah.
<i>Vārttika.</i>	pūrvopadeśe kittva-pratiṣedho vyalopa-vacanam ca.
<i>Bhāṣya.</i>	yadi pūrvopadeśah kittvam pratiṣedhyam. ‘devitvā’, ‘dideviṣati’—“ralo’vyupadhād” iti kittvam prāpnoti. naiṣa doṣah, naivam vijñāyate—“ralah-vyupadhād” iti. kim tarhi? ‘ralah-av-vyupadhād’ iti. kim idam—‘av vyupadhād’ iti? avakārāntād vyupadhād av-vyupadhād iti. ‘vyalopa-vacanam ca’. vyoś ca lopo vaktavyah. ‘gaudherah’—‘paceran’, ‘yajeran’. ‘jīve radānuh’ —‘jīradānuh’, valīti lopo na prāpnoti.

naisa doṣaḥ, repho'py atra nirdiṣyate—  
“*lopo vyor vali*” (Pa. 6.1.66) iti. repho ca  
vali ceti.

atha vā punar ḥaṣṭu paropadeṣaḥ. nanu  
coktam—“*rephasya paropadeṣe anunāsika-  
dvirvacana-parasavarnā-pratiṣedhaḥ*” iti.

anunāsika-parasavarnayos tāvat prati-  
ṣedho na vaktavyaḥ, rephoṣmaṇāṁ savarnā  
na santi.

*dvirvacane*'pi. nemau rahau kāryināu  
dvirvacanasya. kiṁ tarhi? nimittam imau ra-  
hau dvirvacanasya. tad yathā—‘brāhmaṇā  
bhojyantāṁ, Māṭhara-Kauṇḍinyau pari-  
veviṣṭātāṁ’ iti. nedānīṁ tau bhuñjāte.

Then let ‘ra’ be pronounced immediately before ‘ya’.

(Here the *Bhāṣya* intervening objects to it and says:)—If it is supposed to be pronounced before ‘ya’ then there will be no ‘*kittva*’, nor the elision of ‘i’ or ‘u’.

(Here the *Bhāṣyaruns* as follows:)—If it is articulated before ‘ya’, then ‘*kittva*’ has to be prohibited, as in the examples ‘*devitvā*’, and ‘*dideviṣati*’; ‘*kitva*’ is enjoined by the rule: “*ralo vyupadhād dhalādeḥ samśca*” (1.2.26 — meaning already explained). This is no criticism, for the meaning of the *sūtra* is not “*ralaḥ vyupadhāt*”. What is it then? - “*ralaḥ avvyupadhāt*”. What is the meaning of the phrase, “*avvyupadhāt*”? The meaning is: that the rule applies to those roots which do not end in ‘va’ and which have ‘i’ and ‘u’ in the penultimate. (The objection was that if ‘ra’ was placed before ‘ya’ and ‘va’ then the root ‘*div*’ would be a root ending in ‘*ral*’ and would therefore be optionally ‘*kit*’ by the rule “*ralo*” etc. (1.2.26) and we should have a form ‘*divitvā*’ and not merely ‘*devitvā*’. But if the rule is read as ‘*ralaḥ avvyupadhāt*’ then the roots like ‘*div*’ which end in ‘va’ should not come under its operation and should not be optionally ‘*kit*’ and we should therefore have only one form — ‘*devitvā*’ which shows that the root ‘*div*’ cannot be a ‘*kit*’ within the sphere of the application of the rule 1.2.26).

Then again there is a rule, “*lopo vyor vali*” (6.1.66 — a *dhātu* or a substantive ending in ‘va’ or ‘ya’ should have these consonants elided when the consonants included in ‘val’ follows.). Now, if ‘ra’ is placed

before 'ya', 'va', then 'val' should not include 'ra' and as such the elision of 'va' and 'ya' that are expected to take place when 'ra' follows, as in 'gaudherah', 'paceran', 'yajeran' would not take place; and for securing the elisions of 'va' and 'ya' that take place when 'ra' follows, a separate rule has to be made that 'va' and 'ya' should be elided when 'ra' follows and the elision of 'va' of the word 'jīva' when the suffix 'radānuk' follows, cannot take place by the rule, 'lopo vyorvali', for 'ra' being placed before 'ya', 'va', 'val' would not include 'ra' and for this a separate rule has to be made.

(It is urged in the *Bhāṣya* that)—this criticism can be avoided by splitting up the *sūtra* as "lopo vyorvali" and thus only provision can be made for the elision of 'va' and 'ya' when 'val' follows : and the *sūtra* would then mean:— when 'ra' and 'val' follows, the preceding consonant should be elided. But in such a case the word 'rvali' would have to be interpreted as — when 'ra' and the consonants included in 'val' follow, 'va' and 'ya' are elided. Then, let us suppose that 'ra' is articulated after 'ya', 'va'.

(To this however we are reminded of the former objection).

Thus, it has been already objected that if 'ra' is articulated after 'ya', 'va', then the nasalisation, the doubling and enjoining of the homologous in consonance with what follows, would be inapplicable.

(The reply is that:) There is no necessity of enjoining nasalisation and transformation of the homologous in consonance with what follows, for there are no homologous sounds to *anunāsika* (nasals), and the *uṣma* sounds have no homologous consonants.

In the case of doubling also the 'ha' and 'ra' are not productive of the doubling (in the rule, "aco rahābhyaṁ dve" 8.4.46 see above for meaning). They are but reasons for the doubling. (We have a popular illustration:) Feed the Brahmins but let Māṭhara and Kaundinya distribute.<sup>87</sup>

87. The point of discussion here is as follows: The *Śiva-sūtra* gives the *pratyāhāra* 'ha-ya-va-rat'. If the *pratyāhāra* stands in this form, then the *pratyāhāra* 'yar' would include 'ra' within it and therefore three difficulties arise—according to the rule "yaro'nunāsike'nunāsiko vā" (8.4.45) and "aco rahābhyaṁ dve" (yarah) — 8.4.46, and "anuśvārasya yayi parasavarnah" (8.4.58). According to the first rule the 'ra' in 'svarnayati' would become optionally nasal. The nasal appropriate to 'ra' is 'na', and we should expect 'svarnayati' to be optionally 'svannayati' which is not a possible form. According to the second rule, in the form 'madra-hrada', the 'ra' after 'ha' should be duplicated and this duplication being in the *tripādī*, a later rule (8.4.46) is to be regarded as *asiddha* with reference to the rule—"rori" (8.3.14) and therefore one

of the 'ra's cannot be elided by the previous rule (8.3.14) and should expect the form—'madra-hṛadah' which is an impossible form. In the case of the third rule, since 'yay' would include within it 'ra', in the form—kuṇḍam rathena, we should expect the doubling of the 'r', i.e. kuṇḍam rrathena, and "rori" (8.3.14) being a previous rule in the *tipādi*, would not apply to "anuśārasya yayi parasavarṇah" (8.4.58), a later rule in *tripādi*.

Again, if with the *pratyāhāra* we put 'ra' before 'ya' then we have the form 'ha-ra-ya-va'. This saves us from the previous criticisms just mentioned; but other objections creep in. If 'ra' is placed before 'ya', then the *pratyāhāra* 'ral' would include 'ya', and difficulties arise with reference to the rule "ralo vyupadahāt" (1.2.26), which means that a 'vyupadahā' root ending in 'ral' and beginning in a consonant will be optionally 'kit' and always a *set* when 'ktvā' and 'san' follow. Thus the root 'div' would fulfil the conditions of this rule and we are barred from making a *guna* of the verb 'div', i.e. transforming it into 'dev' in the forms 'devitvā' and 'didevisati' (for a 'kit' cannot have a *guna*). This objection can be overruled by supposing the above rule (1.2.26) to read as "ralo vvyupadahāt", i.e. 'ralah avvyupadahāt' in which case an exception would be made in the case of not ending in 'va', and thus the root 'div' would be naturally excluded and difficulties obviated. But another difficulty may creep in, in the case of the rule, "lopo vyorvali" (6.1.66) which means that a terminal 'va' and 'ya' will be elided when 'val' follows. Here if 'ra' is placed before 'ya' and 'va' then the *pratyāhāra* 'val' would not include 'ra' and we cannot have the word 'jiradānu' by suffixing the suffix 'radānu' to the word 'jīra' for, the formation of the word 'jiradānu' would require us to drop 'va' of 'jīva', when the 'ra' of 'radānuk' follows. Such an elision was only possible to the above rule, "lopo vyorvali" if 'val' would include 'ra' which it does not according to the above supposition that 'ra' should be placed before 'ya', 'va'. But this objection can also be obviated if the rule is read as 'lopo vyorvali' in which case 'ra' will be separately added as a condition along with 'val'.

Weighing the two alternatives, the author of the *Bhāṣya* decided in favour of placing 'ra' after 'va', i.e. keeping it as 'ha-ya-va-ra' as it exists in the *pratyāhāra*. The objections urged in the case of possibility of doubling or 'ra' by the rule "aco rahābhyaṁ dve" is ignored by the supposition that 'ra' ought not to perform two functions at the same time. In the rule "aco rahābhyaṁ" it is suggested that the consonants included in 'yar' should be doubled when it follows 'ra', and it so happens that 'ra' is a consonant included in 'yar'. It is suggested, therefore, that as in the popular maxim in which all Brahmins are asked to dine and the two Brahmins called Māṭhara and Kaunḍinya are asked to distribute [serve], we cannot expect that the two Brahmins can both dine and distribute [serve]. So here also, when the doubling is enjoined after 'ra', 'ra' should perform in this context its special function only and 'ra' which is included only in a general way within the *pratyāhāra* 'yar' should not come within the scope of rule and doubled. The supposition that 'ra' should undergo an operation of doubling, is obviated by the fact that the 'ra' plays the part of an operator (*rephasya kāryatvam nimittatvena vādhyate*). But, as Bhaṭṭoji points out, the same difficulty may arise in the rule "iko yanaci" (6.1.77), which means that when any vowel follows, 'i', 'u', 'ṛ', 'ṝ', will be changed into 'ya' 'va' 'ra' 'T'. Here ac includes

*Bhāṣya.* idam vicāryate—ime' yogavāhā na kvacid upadiṣyante, śrūyante ca. teṣāṁ kāryārtha upadeśah kartavyah. ke punar ayoga-vāhāḥ? visarjanīya-jihvāmūliyopadhmānya-anusvāra-nāsikya-yamāḥ. katham punar ayoga-vāhāḥ? yad ayuktā vahanti, anupadiṣṭāś ca śrūyante,  
kva punar eṣām upadeśah kartavyah?

*Vārttika.* ayoga-vāhānām aṭsu, ḡatvam.

*Bhāṣya.* ayoga-vāhānām aṭsu upadeśah kartavyah. kim prayojanam? ḡatvam—‘urahkeṇa’, ‘uraxkeṇa’, ‘urahpeṇa’, ‘uraxpeṇa’. “advyavāye”(Pā. 8.4.2), iti ḡatvam siddham bhavati.

*Vārttika.* śarṣu jaśbhāvaṣatve.

*Bhāṣya.* śarṣu upadeśah kartavyah. kim prayojanam? jaśbhāva-ṣatve. ayam ubjirupadhmāniyopadah paṭhyate, tasya jaśtve kṛte ubjītā ubjītum ity etad rupam yathā syāt.

This is being discussed—these ‘ayogavāhas’ that pass without being enjoined had nowhere been instructed, nor do we hear of them. So they ought to be instructed for the operations they are to undergo. Who are they which have not been enjoined? These are: ‘visarjanīya’ ‘jihvāmūliya’, ‘upadhmāniya’, ‘anusvāra’ and the nasal ‘ya’ and ‘ma’. These are current though not enjoined, and are heard though not instructed. But where should they be instructed?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—these that are current without being enjoined, should be instructed within the *pratyāhāra* ‘aṭ’ for cerebralisation of ‘na’.

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*i, u, ḡ, l*, and since ‘i’ is both an operator and being operated upon, we cannot expect ‘i’ to turn into ‘ya’ according to the former analogy. To this Bhaṭṭoji replies that since ‘yan’ has been performed and *i, u, ḡ, l*, individually mentioned in ‘k’, it should not be arrested from undergoing a change after the former analogy. But the difficulty regarding ‘madra-hrada’, where the above analogy cannot apply, remains as before.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows:)— These ‘ayogavāhas’, i.e. those that are current without being enjoined, should be instructed within the *pratyāhāra* ‘aṭ’. What is the necessity? For cerebralisation of ‘na’, as in ‘urahkeṇa’, ‘uraxkeṇa’, ‘urahpena’; ‘uraxpeṇa’, so that we may have the cerebralisation of ‘na’ through the intervention of ‘aṭ’ (according to the rule, “aṭ kupvāñ-num-vyavāye’p” 8.4.2— i.e. the dental *na* becomes cerebralised when it comes after ‘ra’ and ‘sa’ even when intervened by ‘aṭ’, ‘ku’, ‘āñ’, and ‘num’). We know that when there is an intervention of ‘yisarga’, ‘jihvāmūliya’ and ‘upadhmāniya’, the cerebralisation take place. It has, therefore, been suggested that ‘visarjaniya’, ‘upadhmāniya’ and ‘jihvāmūliya’ would take their place within the *pratyāhāra* ‘aṭ’.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes and suggests:)— That they should have their place within ‘śar’ for effecting ‘jaśta’ and ‘śatva’.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows:)— The above *ayogavāha*-s should also be included within the *pratyāhāra* ‘śar’. What is the use? The root ‘ubja’ is regarded as having ‘upadhmāniya’ in its *upadhā*. This ‘upadhmāniya’ becomes changed to ‘va’ by the rule “jhalāñ jaśi”. (Thus there was *upadhmāniya* after ‘u’ and this was followed by ‘jitā’ and ‘jitum’ and we have thus the forms ‘ubjitā’ and ‘ubjitum’). If the ‘upadhmāniya’ is included within ‘jhal’, it will be placed within ‘śar’ and thus it is changed to ‘jaś’.

(But with this view of the *Vārttikakāra*, the *Bhāṣya* does not agree, and he says as follows:)— The *ayogavāhas* should be included within ‘śar’. What is the necessity? In order that ‘jaś’ may be enjoined and the cerebrals may be prescribed. The word ‘ubji’ is to be regarded as having for its penultimate an *upadhmāniya* (the form being ‘uji’ and if this *upadhmāniya* is regarded as having its place within the ‘śar’ *pratyāhāra* then it will be a ‘jhal’ and therefore be liable to be changed into ‘jaś’ (the relevant *jaś* being here ‘va’) by the rule “jhalāñ jaśo’nte” (8.2.39). (The ‘jhal’ consonants occurring at the end of a *pada*, is transformed into a relevant ‘jaś’ consonant. Thus we may have the forms ‘ubjitā’, and ‘ubjitum’.

[The Second Āhnika stops here in the manuscript.—Editor]

## THIRD ĀHNIKA

Pāṇini. vrddhir ādaic. 1.1.1

‘Āt’ and ‘aic’ are called *vrddhi*.

The *Bhāṣyakāra* does not attempt any formal explanation of the *sūtra*, but he starts at once with the different enquiries. The *Uddyota* first says that the *sūtra* is composed of two *padas*, 'vrddhiḥ' and 'ādaic', for from an indication of the *Bhāṣya* (kṛtam anayoh sādhutvam) it is unnecessary to support the correctness of the two) we find that by the word 'anayoh' in the dual number it has been suggested that the *sūtra* consists of two members. If it is supposed that the *sūtra* does not consist of two members, then the word 'vrddhi' should have to be repeated once in the case of 'āt' and again in the case of 'aic' i.e. we have to interpret as 'āt' is called 'vrddhi' and 'aic' is called 'vrddhi'. If it is supposed to be of two members, we may say, 'āt' and 'aic' are called 'vrddhi'. In that case 'ādaic' will be a 'dvandva' compound, but yet we need not suppose that there should have been 'tac' as the *samāsānta* suffix by rule 5.4.106, for owing to the indication contained in the rule 5.4.115, the *samāsānta* rule is not obligatory.

On this point Bhaṭṭoji in his *Śabdakaustubha* introduces further subtle considerations in support of the view that the concluding suffix at the end of a *saṃāsa* is not obligatory. The *Uddyota*, however, refers to the rule 6.2.193 when it is supposed that even when 'rājan' becomes the last member of a *attpuruṣa*, it may not have so-called obligatory 'tac', and in such a case when the word is preceded by 'prati', the last member is associated with the *udātta* accent 'pratirājā'. This suggests that the *saṃāsānta* rule is not obligatory. The alternative interpretation that the *sūtra* consists of three members, has also the support of the *Bhāṣya*, for in *Paspāśa* he definitely splits up the *sūtra* as 'vrddhiḥ' 'āt' and 'aic'. In such a case the word 'vrddhi' has to be taken twice as shown above, and the reference by the word 'anayoh' has to be taken as referring to the two parts of the *sūtra* — one part is 'vrddhi' and the other part is 'ādaic' consisting of the parts 'āt' and 'aic' and the case is not one of a compound.

*Bhāṣya.*      *kutvam* *kasmān* *na bhavati* “*coh kuh*”,

(Pā.8.2.30) “padasya” (Pā.8.1.16) iti? bhatvāt. katham bha-samjñā? “ayasmayādīni

	cchandasī” ( <i>Pā.</i> 1.4.20) iti. ‘chandasī’ ity ucyate, na cedam chandah.
Vārttika.	chandovat sūtrāṇi.
Bhāṣya	chandovat sūtrāṇi bhavanti. yadi bha-samjñā, “vṛddhir ād aij”, “adeñ guṇah” ( <i>Pā.</i> 1.1.2) iti jaśtvam api na prāpnoti.
Vārttika.	ubhaya-samjñāny api cchandāṁsi.
Bhāṣya.	ubhaya-samjñāny api cchadāṁsi dṛṣyante. tad yathā— “sa suṣṭhubhā sa ṛkvatā gaṇena”. padatvāt kutvam, bhatvāj jaśtvam na bhavati. evam ihāpi padatvāj jaśtvam, bhatvāt kutvam na bhaviṣyati. kim punar idam tadbhāvita-grahaṇam— vṛddhir ity evam ye ākāraikāraukārā bhāvyante teṣām grahaṇam, āhosvid ād- aijmātrasya ? kim cātaḥ ? yadi tadbhāvita- grahaṇam, ‘śāliyo’, ‘māliya’ iti vṛddha- lakṣaṇaś cho na prāpnoti. ‘āmramāyam’, ‘śālamāyam’, vṛddhilakṣaṇo mayaṇ na prāpnoti. ‘āmraguptāyaniḥ’, ‘śālaguptā- yaniḥ’, vṛddhalakṣaṇaḥ phiṇ na prāpnoti.

Why should not there be *ka*-group, that is why the ‘*ca*’ of ‘*aic*’ should not be changed into ‘*ka*’ when it is at the end of a *pada*. by the rule that a *ka*-group will replace the *ca*-group.<sup>88</sup> (Now the *ca* in ‘*aic*’ being at the end of a *pada* ought to be transformed into *ka* by this rule — this is the question. The answer is that) — Because it is ‘*bha*’. Why the *bha*-nomenclature? The words like ‘*ayasmaya*’ etc. (1.4.20) are to be regarded as correct as having the *bha*-nomenclature in the Vedas. It is said that it is to be so in the Vedas. This is not Vedas.

88. *coḥ kuḥ* (8.2.30)— a *cavarga* or *ca*-group becomes transformed into a *kavarga* or *ka*-group when consonants of the ‘*jhal*’ follow or at the end of a *pada*, e.g. *paktvā*, *vāk*, etc.

(Here the *Vārttika* runs)—That the *sūtras* are like the Vedas.

(This *Vārttika* is explained by the *Bhāṣya* as follows:)—The *sūtras* are to be regarded as being like the Vedas. If, however, there is *bhānumenclature*, then in the rules, “*vṛddhir ād aij; adeś guṇah*” (1.1.1 and 1.1.2) the ‘c’ of ‘aic’ should not be replaced by a ‘jaś’ as a ‘ja’.<sup>89</sup>

89. These comments and discussions have no direct grammatical bearing of any importance. They are intended to show that the words used in the *sūtras* have been correctly used. These discussions have elicited further discussions from commentators like Kaiyaṭa, Nāgeśa and Bhṛtoji Dīkṣita which are based on the later developed principles of the logical language. It is worthwhile showing the essential points of their arguments. Thus Kaiyaṭa says that a word has many functions and when it is used as a nomenclature, its function is limited to a particular object. But in spite of such limitation, the potency of a word to be used as a nomenclature remains always valid. The whole point of the question here is as to whether the words used here should be regarded as one in the ordinary language or not, and in the former case whether it is to be regarded as being like an imitative word (*anukarana Śabda*) or a class-name, or merely as a proper name as technical words signifying certain objects. Commenting on this point Nāgeśa says that first of all the relations between words and their objects are to be regarded as constant and eternal, and in the usage of words to denote particular objects by convention should also be regarded as always valid. Even though in such cases the connotation of the word is limited by convention, yet once accepted the potency of the word to denote its own special object remains unrestrained and at the time of denoting such an object the other functions of the word become arrested and its other meanings cannot operate. Nāgeśa further says that words may have various meanings. Thus the word *vṛddhi* has many meanings, but in the context of the grammatical *sūtras* of *Pāṇini* the word *vṛddhi* has specific meaning as denoting ‘ād aic’, and at the time of such denotations these other meanings are arrested. Some say that words are of different functions in accordance with the objects with which they are associated; others say, that the divergence of function or potency depends upon its divergent powers of denotation. It is admitted that the relation of words with their objects is beginningless and as such the human behaviour ought not to produce any change in the denotative power of words and there is a dictum that all words may mean unrestrictedly all objects. Thus though words may have many meanings, the real power, potency or function of a word rests on an identity with the object it denotes.

The point that is insisted on in the present situation is that words used in special senses in the grammatical literature have the force of popular usage. On one alternative it may be regarded as limitative word. Thus ‘aic’ is a *pratyāhāra* denoting ‘ai’ and ‘au’ and the word ‘aic’ in limitation of it stands as a separate word and may yet through association denote the same two alphabets ‘ai’ and ‘au’.

According to others, however, the technical terms used in grammar having specific denotation and connotation, have the force of popular class-names.

Again the word *vṛddhi* means growth, expansion and as such it might have meant any long or *pluta* sound. This *saṃjñā* rule is made in order to restrict the meaning of

(Thus the idea introduced by the *Vārttika* that in Vedic usage a word may have two nomenclature as a 'bha' and 'pada' at the same time and the *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows:)

Vedic words may have two nomenclatures, i.e. they may enjoy the privilege of transformation of two nomenclatures at the same time. (Thus the Vedic passage runs as follows:) "sa suṣṭhubhā sa ṛkvatā gaṇena". Here with reference to the word 'ṛkvatā' it is said, because it is a *pada*, therefore *c* becomes *k* and because it is 'bha' therefore it does not come under the group 'jaś' (and therefore it does not become *g*). So here also on account of being *pada*, it can become 'jaś' (there is change of *ca* into *ja* with a

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the word *vṛddhi* only to *ā*, *ai*, and *au*. Such an interpretation, however, is objected to on the ground that such an analysis would not apply to its sister nomenclature *guṇa* means quality and *at + eñ* cannot be by the largest stretch of imagination brought under the ordinary meaning of *guṇa* as a quality or a rope.

Bhaṭṭoji does not contribute anything to the discussion. The association of 'ta' with *ā* limits the long vowels *ā*, *ai*, *au* to two *mātrās* only. These vowels when pronounced with the third and fourth *mātrās* are hereby excluded from the nomenclature, i.e. *vṛddhi* is *ā*, *ai*, and *au* of the second *mātrā* only. On the utility of associating 'ta' for restricting the time of the sound to a particular model, see "taparas tatkālasya" (1.1.70).

The whole point here is the problem that the 'c' of 'aic' does not become 'k' but become 'j' by phonetically combining with *a* of the next rule "adeñ guṇah". The 'c' is to become 'k', or for the matter of that a *ca-varga* is to be replaced by a *ka-varga* at the end of a *pada* by the rule 8.2.30. ('coh kuḥ'). In the case of such a transformation we should have the rule "vṛddhir ādaik" (there *c* becoming *k*). The danger is avoided by supposing that 'aic' is not to be regarded as a *pada*, but as 'bha' after the analogy of the rule, "ayasmayādinic chandasī" (1.4.20) 'bha' is a technical term which is applied to words with certain suffixes and which contrives thereby to suspend the operation of all rules that would be set loose by the word becoming a *pada*. The *bha*-nomenclature is affected by the rule "yaci bham" (1.4.18) and this *bha*-nomenclature is extended towards 'ayasmaya'. So if *aic* has to be treated as 'bha', it has to be regarded as a Vedic word. On this point the *Vārttika* comes to our help and says that the words of the rules of Pāṇini are to be regarded as Vedic words. But then if it is a Vedic word, then *c* would not become *k* indeed, but in that case the *c* cannot be *j* which is effected only if *c* is regarded as a *padānta* letter by the rule "jhalāṁ jaśo 'nte" (8.2.39). But there is a general rule that in Vedic usage all rules are flexible and thus we have Vedic words which in the same use once enjoy the privilege of being a 'bha' and at another time of being a *padānta*. Thus in the passage "sa suṣṭhubhā sa ṛkvatā gaṇena" in the word 'ṛkvatā' the *c* becomes *k* as it is allowed to have the privilege of a *padānta*, and the *c* is transformed into *k* by the rule "coh kuḥ" (8.2.30). But when it were further to enjoy its rights of being a *padānta* by change of *k* into *g* by the rule "jhalāṁ jaśo 'nte" (8.2.39), it suddenly begins to behave as a 'bha' and the transformation of *k* into *g* is not effected (*padatvāt kutvām bhatvāt jaśtvām na bhavati*).

following *a* by the rule “*adenguṇah*” and because it is ‘*bha*’ therefore it is not transformed into a *ka*-group, i.e. *c* changed into *k*).

(Another point referred to by Nāgeśa on the treatment of *sūtra* words as being of Vedic usage. It is said that grammar is a principal accessory (*aṅga*) to the Vedas. The words of the *sūtra* do not follow the Vedic usage, because the *sūtras* were written by a Ṛṣi, but because according to the instruction of the *Bhāṣya*, we sometimes find words in the *sūtras* the same elasticity as we notice in the Vedic usage).

(A new point of discussion arises. The point is, whether the *ā*, *ai*, and *au* are original forms or transformatory forms. Thus the *Bhāṣya* runs:—)

Are these forms to be regarded as having been effected by grammatical change when *ā*, *ai* and *au* are produced under the instruction that there should be a *vrddhi*? Now, should the *ā* and *ai* and *au* be formed through modification under the application of *vrddhi* or are they to be regarded as the simple vowels *ā*, *ai* and *au*?

What is the idea? If it means those which are produced by modification, then such forms as ‘*śāliya*’ and ‘*māliya*’ formed by the suffix ‘*cha*’, that is enjoined after long words, would not be justifiable, and the words like ‘*āmramaya*’ and ‘*śālamaya*’, where ‘*maya*’ is applied to long words, would not also be justified. So also the ‘*fiñ*’ suffix which is enjoined after long words, should not be justifiable to form the words ‘*āmraguptāyani*’ and ‘*śālaguptāyani*’.<sup>90</sup>

90. Pāṇini has made two *saṃjñās* or nomenclatures, ‘*vrddhi*’ and ‘*vrddha*’. We are discussing the nomenclature ‘*vrddhi*’ here. The term ‘*vrddha*’ has been defined in Pāṇini’s rules 1.1.73, 1.1.74 and 1.1.75. The rule 1.1.73 “*vrddhir yasyācām ādis tad vrddham*” means that a word is called *vrddha* when out of the vowels that form its constitution, the first one falls on the nomenclature of ‘*vrddhi*’. The rule 1.1.74 is “*tadādīni.ca*”. The words ‘*tad*’ ‘*yad*’ ‘*etad*’, etc. are also called ‘*vrddha*’. The rule 1.1.75 is “*ei prācāmdeśe*” meaning where of the composite vowels forming a word, the vowels of the group ‘*ei*’ come first, the word is called ‘*vrddha*’ when it is used to denote a country, e.g. ‘*bhoja-kotīya*’, ‘*gonardiya*’. The necessity of forming the nomenclature ‘*vrddha*’ is the enjoining with the suffix ‘*cha*’ or ‘*cya*’ by the rule “*vrddhāc chah*” (4.2.114). Other occasions for the use of the nomenclature ‘*vrddha*’ is to be found in the rule “*nityam vrddha-śabdādibhyah*” (4.3.144), and the rule, “*udicām vrddhād agotrāt*” (4.1.157). By the rule 4.3.144 the ‘*maya*’ suffix is enjoined as in ‘*āmramaya*’, ‘*śālamaya*’ referred to above and by the rule 4.1.157, the suffix ‘*phiñ*’, is to be enjoined.

Bhāṭṭoḍi notes in his *Śabdakaustubha* that there is a non-distinction ‘*abheda*’ between *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra* and *vrddhi*. What is *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra* and *vrddhi*? This view finds justification in the fact that Pāṇini has himself designated *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra* as *vrddhi* in the rules 1.1.73 and 1.1.75. But a further

Bhāṣya.

atha ād-aij-mātrasya grahaṇam, sarvo bhāṣah sarva-bhāṣa iti, “*uttara-pada-vṛddhau sarvam ca*” (Pā. 6.2.105) ity eṣa vidhiḥ prāpnoti. iha ca tāvatī bhāryā yasya tāvadbhāryah, yāvadbhāryah. “*vṛddhi-nimittasya*” (Pā. 6.3.39) iti pumvadbhāva-pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti.

astu tarhi ād-aijmātrasya grahaṇam.

nanu coktam—sarvo bhāṣah sarvabhāṣa iti, “*uttarapada-vṛddhau sarvam ca*” ity eṣa vidhiḥ prāpnoti iti.

naiṣa doṣaḥ. naivam vijñāyate—uttara-padasya vṛddhir uttarapada-vṛddhir uttarapada-vṛddhau iti. kathaṁ tarhi? “*uttara-padasya*” ity evam prakṛtya yā vṛddhis tad-vaty uttarapade ity evam etad vijñāyate.

avaśyam caited evam vijñeyam. tadbhāvitagrahaṇe saty apiha prasajyeta—sarvah kārakah sarvakāraka iti.

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difficulty arises from another point of view. *Vṛddhi* is indeed equivalent to *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra*, but are these vowels to be regarded as the long vowels that are read in the alphabetic list, or are they to be regarded as similar forms of vowels arising out of grammatical transformation? In this connection it is worthwhile noting that I have taken some licence in translating the word *vṛddha* as long. But the word *vṛddha* is a technical word and a technical nomenclature which though applicable to words having long *ā*, *ai* and *au* as the initial vowel, there are cases in which words like ‘*yad*’, ‘*idam*’, etc. which have no such characteristic, are also called ‘*vṛddha*’.

Now the point raised in the *Bhāṣya* is that since the word ‘*vṛddha*’ has been used merely to designate the simple *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra*, these cannot be taken as being equivalent to the equivalent forms of the vowels as produced through grammatical transformations as a result of the enjoining of *vṛddhi* in certain conditions. Thus the special suffixes ‘*cha*’, ‘*mayaṭ*’, ‘*phiñ*’, etc. enjoined to words which may be styled *vṛddha*, should not be applicable to their respective spheres. If the word *vṛddhi* as used here, should mean only the *ā-kāra*, etc. formed by grammatical modifications as a result of an operation of *vṛddhi*, then the pure long vowels that have been called *vṛddhi* in the rules for forming the technical nomenclature of *vṛddha*, would not be applicable to those words, for according to hypothesis *vṛddhi* can only have the designation to mean the vowels transformed under the injunctions of *vṛddhi* operation.

yad apy ucyate—“iha tāvatī bhāryā yasya tāvad-bhāryah, yāvad-bhāryah” iti. ca “vṛddhi-nimittasya” iti pūrvavadbhāva- pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti iti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. naivam vijñāyate—vṛddher nimittam vṛddhinimittam vṛddhinimittasya iti.

katham tarhi? vṛddher nimittam yasmin so’- yam vṛddhinimittah, vṛddhinimittasya iti. kim ca vṛddher nimittam? yo’sau kakāro ḡakāro ḡakāro vā. athavā yaḥ kṛtsnāyā vṛddher nimittam. kaś ca kṛtsanāyā vṛddher nimittam? yas trayāṇām ākāraikāraukāraṇām.

(The *Bhāṣya* now takes up the other alternative, viz. the view of treating *āt* and *āic* as mere simple long vowels and demonstrates the apparent objections. Thus the *Bhāṣya* says:— If only *āt* and *āic* (simple long vowels) are taken (as the proper meaning) then in the case of ‘sarvo bhāsaḥ sarvabhāsaḥ’ the rule “*uttarapada-vṛddhau sarvam ca*” (6.2.105) where a *vṛddhi* is advised to *uttarapada*, there is the latter member by virtue of *adhikāra*, the words ‘*sarva*’ and ‘*diś*’ induce the *udātta* accent as the concluding accent of the word containing ‘*sarva*’ and words signifying ‘*dik*’, i.e. a quarter of the sky, such as east, west, etc.<sup>91</sup>

Here again the phrase, ‘he who has so much (*tāvati*) wife’ yields the compound ‘*tāvadbhāryah*’, analogously ‘*yāvadbhāryah*’ (one possessing

91. It should be noted here that there is a rule “*susarvārdhāj janapadasya*” (7.3.12) and a rule “*diśo madrānām*” (7.3.13) which carry with them as ‘*adhikāra*’ the word ‘*uttarapadasya*’ from the rule ‘*uttarapadasya*’ (7.3.10). The rule “*susarvārdhāj janapadasya*” thus means that when a word denoting a place is preceded by the word ‘*su*’, ‘*sarva*’ and ‘*ardha*’ then that word denoting a city which is also the last member of a compound, should have its first vowel lengthened by ‘*vṛddhi*’. There is another rule “*uttarapada-vṛddhau sarvam ca*” (6.2.105) meaning that in the case of words whose last members are affected by *vṛddhi* according to the rules 7.3.12 and 7.3.13, the words that contain the word ‘*sarva*’ and words denoting ‘*diś*’ or direction should be associated with the terminal *udātta* accent. Now, the point here is that the words ‘*sarvabhāsa*’ and ‘*sarvakāraka*’ consist of each of two members ‘*sarva*’ and ‘*bhāsa*’, ‘*sarva*’ and ‘*kāraka*’. ‘*Bhāsa*’ and ‘*kāraka*’ have both a long ā, and a *vṛddhi* means the long ‘ā’, then ‘*sarvabhāsa*’ and ‘*sarvakāraka*’ are words which have *vṛddhi* in the last member, and as such the words ‘*sarvabhāsa*’ and ‘*sarvakāraka*’ should be associated with the terminal *udātta*. This generates the suspicion that *vṛddhi* does not mean ‘ā’ and ‘*āic*’ as suggested in the alternative interpretation under consideration.

as many wives). By the rule “*vṛddhi-nimittasya ca taddhitasyāraktavikāre*” (6.3.39)— if a word having such a *taddhita* suffix that may cause *vṛddhi* provided also that such a *taddhita* suffix has not been enjoined in the sense of redness or modification, then a feminine suffix with which it may be associated, is not masculinised), there should be no masculinisation (in ‘*yāvadbhāryah*’ and ‘*tāvadbhāryah*’) as might have been expected.<sup>92</sup>

Let us then take merely the simple vowels, āt and aic. But it has been objected that in the case of ‘*sarvo bhāsah sarvabhāsah*’ the rule “*uttara-pada-vṛddhau sarvam ca*” becomes operative. This is no criticism. We do not understand that *vṛddhi* of the ‘*uttarapda*’ has been equivalent to ‘*uttarapda-vṛddhi*’ and then (in the locative) ‘*uttarapada-vṛddhau*’ (i.e. in the case of the *vṛddhi* of the last member). How then? It means a *vṛddhi* which has been sanctioned by the rule “*uttarapadasya*” (with reference to a ‘*uttarapada*’ and the word ‘*uttarapada-vṛddhi*’ means a ‘*uttarapada*’ that contains such a ‘*vṛddhi*’). This is the way in which we understand it. Certainly this is the way in which we understand it, for even if we take *vṛddhi* in the modificatory sense (as against the simple sense) the same difficulty occurs with reference to ‘*sarvah*’ (all)kārakah (agent)—‘*sarvakārakah*’.<sup>93</sup>

92. There is a rule ‘ā *sarvanāmnah*’ (6.3.91). It means when the suffixes ‘*dr̥k*’, ‘*dr̥s*’ and ‘*vatu*’ follow, then a ‘*sarvanāman*’ word will have the augment ā in place of all vowels and consonants excluding the first consonant. Thus in the case of ‘*yāvat*’ and ‘*tāvat*’ we have the suffix ‘*vatu*’ to the words ‘*yad*’ and ‘*tad*’. This ‘*vatu*’ is a *nimitta* or in other words it causes the augment ā by virtue of which ‘*yad*’ and ‘*tad*’ become ‘*yā*’ and ‘*tā*’ and then in association with ‘*vatu*’ they become ‘*yāvat*’ and ‘*tāvat*’ and in association with the feminine suffix they become ‘*yāvati*’ and ‘*tāvati*’. Now if this simple ‘ā’ may be styled a *vṛddhi* then it has to be admitted that the suffix ‘*vatu*’ is the ‘*nimitta*’ of this ‘ā’, i.e. it has caused the ‘*vṛddhi*’ (i.e. ā). Consequently the phrase — ‘*yāvati bhāryā yasya sah*’) comes under the purview of the rule “*vṛddhi-nimittasya*” etc. (6.3.39) which would be a bar to masculinisation. But yet there is no masculinisation.

93. Now we have the rule “*uttarapada-vṛddhau sarvam ca*” (6.2.105). If instead of this, the rule would have been ‘*vṛddhau sarvam ca*’ and we had dropped the word ‘*uttarapada*’, then the meaning would have been a ‘*uttarapada*’ that contain the *vṛddhi* vowel. The fact that the word ‘*uttarapada*’ had been inserted in the *sūtra*, would therefore have significance. This significance is interpreted to be that where *vṛddhi* is enjoined as to take place in the last member of the compound, the subtle point thus is that the word ‘*uttarapada-vṛddhau*’ means that it has reference only to those words where a *vṛddhi* has been enjoined to a ‘*uttarapada*’ by virtue of its being an ‘*uttarapada*’ and according to the rule ‘*uttarapadasya*’ or rather to the rules which carry the word ‘*uttarapadasya ca*’ as *adhikāra* along with them. Now the word ‘*bhāsa*’

Again it is said here he who has ‘*tāvati*’ (such like) ‘*bhāryā*’ is ‘*tāvadbhāryah*’ and analogously ‘*yāvadbhāryah* according to the rule “*vrddhi-nimittasya*” (6.3.39) which has no masculinisation here. This is no criticism. The meaning of the word ‘*vrddhi-nimitta*’ is not that which is the first of ‘*vrddhi*’, but it means that which induces ‘*vrddhi*’ or which may induce ‘*vrddhi*’. How then wherever there is a cause of *vrddhi* that is called ‘*vrddhi-nimitta*’ and then the genitive ‘*vrddhi-nimittasya*’? What is the cause of *vrddhi*? The suffix in which the *k*-sound has been elided, or from which the ‘*η*’ or ‘*ñ*’ has been elided, or that which is the cause of all *vrddhis*. Again what is the cause of all *vrddhis*, namely that of the three—*ākāra*, *aikāra* and *aukāra*.<sup>94</sup>

*Vārttika.* samjñādhikārah samjñā-sampratyayārthaḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* “atha samjñā” ity evam prakṛtya vrddhyādayaḥ śabdāḥ paṭhitavyāḥ. kim prayojanam? samjñāsampratyayārthaḥ. vrddhyādīnāṁ śabdānāṁ ‘samjñā’ ity esa sampratyayo yathā syāt.

*Vārttika.* itarathā hy asampratyayo yathā loke.

in ‘*svavabhāṣaḥ*’, no doubt, contains a *vrddhi* vowel ā, but this *vrddhi* vowel has not been indicated in the ‘*uttarapada*’ by any special rule which speaks of ‘*uttarapada-vrddhi*’ and takes its ‘*uttarapada*’ as an *adhikāra* from the rule, “*uttarapadasya*” (7.3.10).

In the case of ‘*svaḥ kārakaḥ svavakārakaḥ*’ the long vowel in the word ‘*kāraka*’ is a modificatory vowel and as such it ought to have come under the rule (6.2.105), but it does not do so, for with reference to the rule 6.3.105 it is innocuous whether *vrddhi* is taken as a modificatory vowel produced by a rule enjoining *vrddhi*, or simple long vowel. The point that matters is whether there have been any ‘*uttarapada-vrddhi*’ or a *vrddhi* of the last member of a compound by the *adhikāra* taken from the rule ‘*uttarapadasya*’.

94. The question of ‘*pumvadbhāva*’ or masculinisation of ‘*tāvadbhāryah*’ and ‘*yāvadbhāryah*’ as against the rule “*vrddhi-nimittasya taddhitasya araktavikare*” (6.3.39) the whole difficulty is about the meaning of the word ‘*vrddhinimittasya*’. The *Bhāṣya* says that the word ‘*vrddhi-nimitta*’ does not mean the *taddhita*-suffix which is the ‘*nimitta*’ or cause of *vrddhi*. But the word “*vrddhi-nimitta*” means that in which the “*nimitta*” of *vrddhi*, viz. such conditions that by their existence in a *taddhita*-suffix induce *vrddhi*, such as suffixes that elide ‘*k*’, ‘*ñ*’ and ‘*η*’. Thus in the word,

Bhāṣya.

akriyamāṇe hi samjñādhikāre vrddhyādinām  
'samjñā', ity eṣa sampratyayo na syāt. idam  
idānīm bahusūtram anarthakam syāt.

'anarthakam' ity āha. katham? 'yathā  
loke' loke hy arthavanti cānarthakāni ca  
vākyāni dṛṣyante. arthavanti tāvat— 'de-  
vadatta gāmabhāyaśu klām daṇḍena',  
'devadatta gāmabhāyaśu kṛṣṇām' iti.  
anarthakāni— 'daśa dādimāni, ṣaḍapūpāḥ,  
kundam ajājinām, palala-piṇḍāḥ, adha-  
rorukam etat kumāryāḥ, sphaiyakṛtasya pīṭa  
pratiśīnāḥ' iti.

Vārtikka.

samjñā-samjñyasamdehaś ca.

'śraughnībhāryah' we have first the word 'śraughnī' — 'śrughnasya ayam iti  
śraughnah' formed by the adding of the suffix *añ* to 'śrughna' and then we had the  
feminine suffix '*ñip*' to 'śraughna' forming the word 'śraughnī'. Now 'śraughnī' is  
a word which is formed by a *taddhita*-suffix that possesses conditions for indicating  
a *vrddhi*. The word 'śraughna' is formed by the addition of '*añ*' to 'śrughna', and '*añ*'  
being a suffix that elides '*na*', generated *vrddhi*. But 'tāvati-bhāryah' or 'yāvati-  
bhāryah' does not contain any word where a *vrddhi* has been initiated by the  
prescription of a suffix that has dropped its '*k*', '*ṇ*' or '*ñ*'. Therefore it is quite natural  
that the *sūtra* "vrddhi-nimittasya" etc. is quite unconcerned as to whether a *vrddhi*  
means the simple *ā*, *ai*, etc. or the modificatory *ā*, *ai*, etc. It only lays down provisions  
for the arrest of masculinisation in the case of words formed by *taddhita* suffixes that  
drop '*k*', '*ṇ*' or '*ñ*'.

Now the *Bhāṣya* raises the question— does the '*nimitta*' means that which is the  
cause of all types of *vrddhi*, i.e. *vrddhi* as *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra*. On this point  
Bhaṭṭoji says that it cannot be supposed that this would create any trouble in the case of '*vaiyākaraṇa-bhāryah*' and '*sauvaśya-bhāryah*' for the *ai-kāra* in '*vaiyākaraṇī*' has  
not been generated entirely by the influence of the '*añ*' suffix (in the word '*vaiyākaraṇī*'  
the transformation takes place by the rule 7.3.3), for it involves the application of the  
influence of *samprasāraṇa*. But in the case of '*pāriṣadyabhāryah*', we have the  
negation of masculinisation. The '*pāriṣadya*' is formed by the rule '*pāriṣadah nyah*'.  
Here, since the whole word '*pāriṣadya*' is formed by '*nyah*', '*pāriṣadya-bhārya*' is  
akin to '*śraughnī-bhārya*', because it contains the *taddhita* suffix which is responsible  
for the *vrddhi*.

The conclusion then is that *vrddhi* is to be regarded as equivalent to the simple *ā-  
kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra*. This conclusion is endorsed both by Nāgeśa and Bhaṭṭoji.

*Bhāṣya.* kriyamāṇe'pi samjñādhikāre samjñā-samjñinor asaṃdeho vaktavyaḥ. kuto hy etat—vṛddhi-śabdaḥ samjñā, ādaicah samjñinah iti. na punar ādaicah samjñā, vṛddhi-śabdaḥ samjñī iti?  
yat tāvad ucyate—‘samjñādhikāraḥ kartavyaḥ samjñā-sampratyayārthah’ iti. na kartavyaḥ.

*Vārttika.* ācāryācārāt samjñāsiddhiḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* ācāryācārāt samjñā-siddhir bhaviṣyati. kim idam ‘ācāryācārād’ iti? ācāryānām upacārāt.

*Vārttika.* yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu.

*Bhāṣya.* tad yathā laukikeṣu vaidikeṣu ca kṛtānteṣu. loke tāvan mātā-pitarau putrasya jātasya samvṛte’vakāśe nāma kurvātē—‘devadattah’ ‘yajñādattah’ iti. taylor ūpacārād anyepi jānanti—‘iyam asya samjñā’ iti. vede yajñikāḥ samjñām kurvanti —‘sphyah’, ‘yūpah’, ‘caṣālah’ iti. tatrabhavatām upacārād anye’pi jānanti—‘iyam asya samjñā’ iti.  
evam ihāpi. ihaiva tāvat kecid vyācakṣāṇā āhuḥ—‘vṛddhi-śabdaḥ samjñā, ādaicah samjñinah’ iti. apare punaḥ—“sici vṛddhiḥ” (Pā.7.2.1) ity uktvā ākāraikāraukārān udāharanti. tena manyāmahe—‘yayā pratyāyyante sā samjñā, ye pratīyante te samjñinah’ iti, yad apy ucyate—‘kriyamāṇe’pi samjñā-dhikāre samjñā-samjñinor asaṃdeho vaktavyaḥ’ iti. (na vaktavyaḥ).

*Vārttika.* samjñā-samjñyasaṁdehaś ca.

*Bhāṣya.* samjñā-samjñinoś cāsandehaḥ siddhah. kutaḥ? ācāryācārād eva. ukta ācāryācārāḥ. anākṛtiḥ.

*Vārttika.* athavā anākṛtiḥ samjñā, ākṛtimantah samjñinah. loke'pi hy ākṛtimato māṁsapīṇḍasya 'devadatta' iti samjñā kriyate.

*Bhāṣya.* liṅgena vā.

*Vārttika.* athavā kiṁcīl liṅgam āsajya vakṣyāmi— 'itthāmliṅgā samjñā' iti. vṛddhi-śabde ca tallingam kariṣyate, na ādaic- chabde— idam tāvad ayuktam, yad apy ucyate— 'ācāryācārād' iti. kim atrāyuktam? tam eva upālabhya 'agamakām te sūtram' iti tasyaiva punah pramāṇikaraṇam ity etad ayuktam. aparītuṣyan khalvapi bhavān anena pariḥāreṇa "anākṛtir liṅgena vā" ity āha.

    tac cāpi vaktavyam. yady apy etad ucyate, athavā etarhi it-samjñā na vaktavyā. lopoś ca na vaktavyah. samjñāliṅgam anubandheṣu kariṣyate. na ca samjñāyā nivṛttir ucyate. svabhāvataḥ samjñā samjñinām pratyāyya svayaṁ nivartate. tena anubandhānām api nivṛttir bhaviṣyati.

    siddhyaty evam. apāṇinīyam tu bhavati. yathānyāsam eva astu.

    nanu coktaṁ—“*saṁjñādhikāraḥ saṁjñā-saṁpratyayātrtha itarathā hy aśaṁpratyayo yathā loke*” iti.

    na ca yathā loke tathā vyākaraṇe. pramāṇa-bhūta ācāryo darbha-pavitra-pāṇih

śucāvavakāśe prāṇmukha upaviśya mahatā prayatnena sūtrāṇi praṇayati sma. tatrā-śakyam varṇenāpy anarthakena bhavitum, kim punar iyatā sūtreṇa. kim ato yad aśakyam? atah samjñā-samjñināveva.

kuto nu khalvetat—samjñā-samjñināveva iti. na punah sādhvanuśāsane asmiñ śāstre sādhutvam anena kriyate?

kṛtam anayoḥ sādhutvam. katham? vṛdhir asmāya-višeṣenopadiṣṭah prakṛtipāṭhe, tasmāt ktin-pratyayah. ādaico'py akṣara-samāmnāye upadiṣṭah.

prayoga-niyamārtham tarhi idam syāt—‘vṛddhi-śabdāt pare ādaicah prayoktavyāḥ’, iti.

neha prayoganiyama ārabhyate. kim tarhi? samṣkṛtya samṣkṛtya padāny utsṛjyante teṣāṁ yatheṣṭam abhisam̄bandho bhavati. tad yatha—‘āhara pātram’, ‘pātram āhara’ iti.

ādeśās tarhi ime syuḥ. vṛddhi-śabdasya ādaica ādeśāḥ.

śaṣṭhīnirdiṣṭasyādeśā ucyante. na cātra śaṣṭhīm paśyāmaḥ.

āgamās tarhi ime syuḥ. vṛddhi-śabdasya ādaica āgamāḥ. āgamā api śaṣṭhīnirdiṣṭasya eva ucyante, liṅgena vā. na cātra śaṣṭhīm, na khalv apy āgamaliṅgam paśyāmaḥ.

idam khalvapi bhūyah sāmānādhika-rāṇyam eka-vibhaktivām ca. dvayoś caitad bhavati. kayoḥ? višeṣaṇa-višeṣyayor vā samjñā-samjñinor vā. tatra itat syād višeṣaṇa-višeṣye iti.

tac ca na. dvayor hi pratīta-padārthakayor  
loke viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvo bhavati. na ca  
ādaic chabdaḥ pratīta-padārthakah. tasmāt  
saṃjñā-saṃjñināveva.

tatra tu etāvān sandehah—‘kah saṃjñī kā  
saṃjñā’ iti. sa cāpi kva sandehah? yatrobhe  
saṃānākṣare? yatra tu anyataral laghu sā  
saṃjñā, yad guru sa saṃjñī. kuta etat?

*Vārttika.*

anākṛtiḥ saṃjñā, ākṛtimantah saṃjñinah.  
loke’ pi hy ākṛtimato māṃsa-piṇḍasya de-  
vadatta iti saṃjñā kriyate.

*Vārttika.*

āvartinyah saṃjñāḥ.

*Bhāṣya.*

athavā āvarttinyah saṃjñā bhavanti.  
vṛddhiśabdaś ca āvartate, na ādaic chabdaḥ,  
tad yathā—itaratrāpi devadatta-śabda āvar-  
tate, na māṃsa-piṇḍah.

*Vārttika.*

pūrvoccāritah saṃjñī paroccāritā  
saṃjñā.

*Bhāṣya.*

athavā pūrvoccāritah saṃjñī, paroccāritā  
saṃjñā. kuta etat? sato hi kāryiṇah kāryeṇa  
bhavitavyam. tad yathā—itaratrāpi sato  
māṃsapiṇḍasya ‘devadatta’ iti saṃjñā kri-  
yate.

katham ‘vṛddhir ādaij’ iti?

*Vārttika.*

vṛddhirādaij iti maṅgalārtham.

*Bhāṣya.*

etad ekam ācāryasya maṅgalārtham  
mṛṣyatām. māṅgalika ācāryo mahataḥ  
śāstraughhasya maṅgalārtham vṛddhi-śabdam  
āditaḥ prayuṇkte. maṅgalādīni hi śāstrāṇi  
prathante, vīra-puruṣakāṇi bhavanty āyuṣ-

mat-puruṣakāṇi ca adhyetāraś ca vṛddhi-yuktā yathā syur iti. sarvatraiva hi vyākaraṇe pūrvoccāritaḥ samjñī, paroccāritā samjñā—“adeṇ guṇaḥ” iti yathā.

doṣavān khalvapi samjñādhikārah. aştame’pi hi samjñā kriyate—“*tasya param āmreditam*” (Pā. 8.1.2) iti. tatrāpi idam anuvartyaṁ syāt.

athavā’sthāne’yaṁ yatnah kriyate. na hīdaṁ lokād bhidyate. yadi idaṁ lokād bhidyeta tato yatnārhaṁ syāt. tad yathā—agojñāya kaścid gāṁ sakthani karṇe vā gṛhitvā upadiśati — ‘ayam gaur’ iti. na ca asmāyacaṣṭe ‘iyam asya samjñā’ iti. bhavati cāsyā sampratyayah.

tatratit syāt—‘kṛtas tatra pūrvair abhisambandhah’ iti. ihāpi kṛtaḥ pūrvair abhisambandhah. kaiḥ? ācāryaiḥ.

tatratit syāt—‘yasmai tarhi sampraty upadiśati tasyākṛtaḥ’ iti. loke’pi hi yasmai sampraty upadiśati tasyākṛtaḥ. atha tatra kṛtaḥ, ihāpi kṛto draṣṭavyah.

Vārttika. sato vṛddhyādiṣu samjñā-bhāvāt tadāśraya itaretarāśrayatvād aprasiddhiḥ.

Bhāṣya. sataḥ samjñināḥ samjñābhāvāt. tadāśraye samjñāśraye samjñinī vṛddhyādiṣu itaretarāśrayatvād aprasiddhiḥ.

kā itaretarāśrayatā? satām ādaicām samjñayā bhavitavyam, samjñayā ādaico bhāvyante, tad etad itaretarāśrayam bhavati, itaretarāśrayāṇi ca kāryāṇi na prakalpante.

tad yathā—naur nāvi baddhā netaratrāṇāya  
bhavati.

nanu ca bho itaretarāśrayāṇy api kāryāṇi  
drṣyante. tad yathā—‘nauḥ śakaṭam vahati’,  
‘śakaṭam ca nāvam vahati’.

anyad api tatra kiṃcid bhavati. jalāṇi vā  
sthalam vā. sthale śakaṭam nāvam vahati.  
jale nauḥ śakaṭam vahati.

yathā tarhi triviṣṭabdhakam, tatrāpy an-  
tataḥ sūtrakam bhavati.

idam punah itaretarāśrayam eva.

*Vārttika.*

siddham tu nityaśabdatvāt.

*Bhāṣya.*

siddham etat. katham? nitya-śabdatvāt.

nityāḥ śabdāḥ, nityeṣu śabdeṣu satām  
ādaicām samjñā kriyate. na ca samjñayā āda-  
ico bhāvyante.

(The *Vārttika* starts with the remark that) the topic regarding nomenclatures is for the purpose of proper understanding of the nomenclature or in other words for the proper understanding of the nomenclature a separate topic on nomenclature should be made.

(This is interpreted by the *Bhāṣya* as follows:—)

The words *vrddhi* etc. ought to be read after putting the characteristic form such as now, the topic of names. What is the good? For explaining the names; so that people may easily understand that the words *vrddhi* etc. are but grammatical technical names.

(The intervening *Vārttika* says:) Otherwise as in the popular usage, it would not be so apprehended.

(This is interpreted by *Bhāṣya* as follows:) If a topic for *saṃjñā* or names be not made people will not understand that the words like *vrddhi* etc. has been introduced merely as names. In such a case a *śāstra* would have often to contain two many *sūtras* which would not strictly be useful.<sup>95</sup>

95. In the translation of the line ‘*idam idānīm bahusūtram anarthakam syāt*’, I have rendered it as what appeared to me as the obvious meaning. The traditional meaning as has been imperfectly suggested in the *Pradīpa* and the *Uddyota* seems to me to be rather lame. But at least I have not been able to appreciate its force so as to carry conviction.

You say meaningless, why? as in the world we find sentences that have meaning, and sentences that have no meaning. Significant sentences are as 'Devadatta drives the white cow with a stick.' 'Devadatta drives the black cow with a stick.' Meaningless sentences are as follows: 'ten pomegranates,'<sup>96</sup> the six cakes, the feet goat skin, lump of flesh, petticoat of this girl, the father of the abundantly made this limb.'<sup>97</sup>

(The *Vārttika* intervenes and says)— some words have to be used to remove the doubt as to which is the name and which is the named.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—Even when a special topic for names is made there ought to be words to resolve the possible doubt as to what is the name and what is the named. How is that? The word *vṛddhi* is the name and 'āt' or 'aic' is the bearer of the name and not that āt or aic is the name and *vṛddhi* is the named.

It has been suggested that for the proper understanding of the names there should be special topic of names—it should not be made.

(The *Vārttika* says)—The symbolic or technical names will be intelligible from the manner of the master's treatment.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—The treatment of names will be accomplished by the manner of the master. What is this? This manner of the master? By the usage of the master.

(Here the *Vārttika* says)—As in the popular and the Vedic words.

(Here the *Bhāṣya* says)—Just as in the case of the popular and Vedic doctrines. In the world the mother and the father give the name, 'Devadatta', 'Yajñadatta', to the son in a closed or secreted place. From their usage others are to know. In the Vedas the sacrificers invent the names,

96. As there is no final vowel attached to it, it is difficult to understand anything about the ten pomegranates.

97. As a matter of fact these are not examples of *vākyā* or significant sentences. Each sentence must be a completed relation of significant terms. But here only words have been taken to be called *vākyā*, and want of significance is due to the introduction of more words without forming them into *vākyas*. The whole point of the agreement is that the technical words are merely used and if it is not indicated that these have been introduced only as technical names, people who are unacquainted with the unfailing authority of another, may feel confused and regard these to be meaningless. It is also to be noted that it is only for the particular kind of relation between significant terms so as to make these facts occur that there is a meaning to be attached to the propositions which expressed them. Neither names which are neither here nor there. They have no status in the world of meaningless matter. If technical terms are introduced without the specification that they are symbols, they would carry no sense.

—‘sphaya’ (wooden implement resembling a sword), ‘yūpa’, ‘the sacrificial post), ‘caṣāla’ (the ring of the sacrificial post). So here also some in trying to interpret say, the word *vrddhi* is the name and ‘āt’, ‘aic’ are the bearer of the name. Others agian after referring to the rule “*sici vrddhiḥ pasmaipadeṣu*”(7.2.1) give as examples of ‘*vrddhi*’—ā, ai and au. So we think those by which things are denoted are called ‘*saṃjñā*’ and those which are denoted are ‘*saṃjñināḥ*’—the bearers of the ‘*saṃjñās*’.

It is further said that even when a special topic of technical names is made, even then something has to be said to eliminate any doubt as to what is ‘*saṃjñā*’ and what is ‘*saṃjñinā*’.

(To this the *Vārttika* says)—That there is no ground of doubt between the name and the bearer of the name.

(This is explained by the *Bhāṣya* as follows:)—There is no room for any doubt between names and those that bear names. Why? From the manner of the master. This manner has been explained as the usage of the master.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—The names have no structure.

(This is explained by the *Bhāṣya* as follows)—The names have no structure; but those who bear the names are structural. Thus in the world also a lump of flesh having a particular structure is associated with the name ‘*Devadatta*’.

(Here again the *Vārttika* intervenes)—The name and the object denoted by it is distinguished by the special signs of the name.

(Here the *Bhāṣya* interprets)—Or, rather I should say, referring to some particular sign, such should be the sign of this name and then one should attach those signs to the word ‘*vrddhi*’ and these signs are not to be attached to ‘āt’ or ‘aic’.

It is reasonable what is said by the manner of the master (the difference of the *saṃjñā* and the *saṃjñī* will be intelligible). What is here unreasonable? You criticise the writer of the *sūtra* and practically say that his *sūtra* does not convey any meaning, and then you look to his manner as valid in doing the same thing. This is rather contradictory. Being dissatisfied again you had introduced another way of escape, i.e the name is to be distinguished by the fact that it has no structure or that it has special signs. Now you must say what are those signs. Again it is said that in such a case it is unnecessary to give any names, for the ‘it’, the elisions also need not be described, the supplementary sounds (*anubandha*) may be associated with the signs of the name (*saṃjñā*). We do not speak that the *saṃjñā* should cease, but naturally the *saṃjñā* or the name will after denoting the

object vanish and those supplementary consonants or vowels (*anubandha*) would vanish.

This is possible no doubt, but it would not be in accordance with the system of Pāṇini. Then let them remain as they are. Now it has been said that the topic of names is necessary for making people properly comprehend the meaning of names. Otherwise there will be no such comprehension as may be illustrated from the world.

(The reply is)—what happens in the world does not happen in grammar. The master who is authority himself, with a ring of the *kuśa* grass in his hand sitting, looking towards the east in a pure and secreted place, composed the *sūtras* with great effort and it is impossible that there should be a single alphabet meaningless, not to speak of so many *sūtras*. What, if no fault can be found in his system? For this reason you must accept his method of designating names and those that carry them. But why should it be so that there should only be names and those that carry them? This grammar has been made for instructing correct words and you cannot introduce correctness of speech in this manner. It is unnecessary to demonstrate the correctness of these two—the name and that which is denoted by it. How so? The root ‘*vṛddhi*’ has been instructed in the original list without any variation of meaning and the ‘*ktin*’ *pratyaya* has been associated with it. ‘*Āt*’ and ‘*aic*’ are vowels which have been enumerated in the vowel list.

(The opponent says)—may it not be suggested that this *sūtra* had been formed for regulating the usage such that in the usage ‘*ādaic*’ should follow *vṛddhi*, *vṛddhi* should not follow *ādaic*.<sup>98</sup>

(The reply given by the *Bhāṣya* is)—no regulation regarding syntactical order is attempted here. What then? After determining each word it is let go for relating itself as it pleases. Thus one may say ‘*āhara*’ (bring) ‘*pātram*’ (the vessel). or one may say ‘*pātram āhara*’.

Shall these then be regarded as ‘*ādeśas*’ or augments such as the word ‘*vṛddhi*’ should have *āt* and *aic* as *ādeśas*? (But this cannot be so). The augments are directed as taking in place of those that have the genitive case-ending. But we do not find any genitive case-ending here? (The opponent again repeats his contention and says)—let these be regarded as ‘*āgamas*’ in place of the word ‘*vṛddhi*’, there should be the augments *āt* and *aic*.

98. The opponent suggests that the rule may have been formed for regulating the method of syntax in which one is allowed to say ‘*vṛddhir ādaic*’ and not ‘*ādaic vṛddhiḥ*’

(The *Bhāṣya* replies)—the augments also can only be in place of words marked with genitive suffix, for through other indicatory signs we do not find here any genitive, nor do we find any indication of an augment.<sup>99</sup>

(Again the *Bhāṣya* says)—the rule is that the two should have the same case-inflexion and the same relation to each other as that of a substance or quality. This happens in the case of the two. Of which two? Either in the case of the symbol and the symbolised. May it not be there that here the relation is that of substantive and adjective. No. The relation of the substantive and the adjective can hold only with reference to the objects that are empirically perceived. *Āt* and *aic* are not empirically perceived objects. Therefore they are related as the symbol and the symbolised.<sup>100</sup>

Now there is this doubt which is the symbolised and what is the symbol? Where is the doubt? The two have the same number of letters. Where one is simple that is the symbol. That which is complex is symbolised. How do you know this?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—symbolisation is for the purpose of making things simpler.

(To this the *Bhāṣya* says)—is not always that symbolisation directed to making simple what is complex? What then? To denote the unstructural character also.

99. Whenever an augment is prescribed, it is prescribed to take place with reference to a word in the genitive case. But there are cases as in “*na yvābhyaṁ padāntābhyaṁ*” etc. (7.3.3) where an *aic* *āgama* is prescribed to take place before the *y* and *v* of a word and there is no indication of the prescription of this augment by any genitive case-ending. But in such cases it has been specially enjoined. Without such special injunction, as a general rule the augment takes place only in place of the genitive.

100. The substance and a quality are supposed to reside in the same locus and therefore they are called ‘*sāmānādhikarāṇya*’. They have therefore the same case-ending. Others, however, think that in adjectival phrases like ‘*nilam utpalam*’ (the blue lotus) the word ‘*nila*’ is used to denote a quality, blue, and ‘*utpala*’ the class notion of lotus. The two are objectively in the same locus and this constitutes the ‘*sāmānādhikarāṇya*’. The two views are on the question as to whether the relation of ‘*sāmānādhikarāṇya*’ is a propositional quality or quality of the objects.

When the *Bhāṣya* used the word ‘*saṃjñā*’ and ‘*saṃjñin*’, the symbol and the symbolised, the word ‘*saṃjñin*’ or the symbolised means the particular word or words of which a ‘*saṃjñā*’ or name has been framed. Thus Nāgeśa says ‘*saṃjñī-padena saṃjñi-samarpakah ūabdō-bhīpretaḥ*’. Bhaṭṭoji also says that ‘*vṛddhi*’ etc. are words denoting nothing else but themselves and they are related with words *ādaic* etc. as the symbol with the symbolised—‘*vṛddhyādayo yathā ūabdāḥ svarūpopanibandhanāḥ ādaic-pratyayitaiḥ ūabdaiḥ sambandham yānti saṃjñibhiḥ*’.

(Here the *Vārttika* says)—the symbol has no structure. The symbolised ones are structural.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—in the world also a lump of flesh having structure is given the name ‘Devadatta’.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—or rather the symbols are frequently repeated.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—the names are frequently repeated. Thus the word ‘vr̥ddhi’ is frequently repeated, but not the words ‘āt’ and ‘aic’. So elsewhere also the name ‘Devadatta’ is repeated, but not the lump of flesh.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—what is pronounced first is the symbolised and what is pronounced later, is the name.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—or, rather what is first pronounced is symbolised and what is pronounced next is the symbol. How so? It is only with reference to existing things that any action can be prescribed. Thus elsewhere also it is because the lump of flesh exists that the name ‘Devadatta’ can be given to it. Why then the form “vr̥ddhir ādaic”<sup>101</sup>

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—the form ‘vr̥ddhir ādaic’ has been chosen (the word ‘vr̥ddhi’ has been pronounced first) to make it an auspicious sign.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—one may take this as the desire of the master for beginning his work with an auspicious word. Desiring the good of the readers the master used the word ‘vr̥ddhi’ at the commencement as an auspicious rite to the great collection of grammatical dictates. The scriptures beginning with auspicious words find a wide currency. They generate heroism and produce long life so that readers may become prosperous. Everywhere else in grammar the symbolised is spoken first and the symbol is spoken later as in “adeṅguṇāḥ”.

It is wrong to suggest that there should be a topic of symbols (which must first enumereate all the symbols) for Pāṇini makes symbols even in the Eighth Book as in the rule “tasya paramāmreditam” (8.1.2)—(when a word or a phrase is pronounced twice for chastisement or other purposes, the second of these words or phrases is technically called ‘āmredita’). (According to the suggestion that there should be a separate topic denoting only the symbols the difficulty of such a procedure would be that) in that case these *sūtras* relating to ‘samjñā’ should have to be carried forth as ‘adhibhāra’ even to this 8th Book.

101. It has been said that the symbolised is that which is pronounced first and the symbol is pronounced later; but in the present case the word ‘vr̥ddhi’ is regarded as a symbol. Why then it is pronounced first?

This is much ado over nothing in a wrong place. This does not differ from the practice of the people in the world. Thus a person does not know a cow and in giving him a cow one might hold the cow by the ears or the bones and say 'do not worry, here is the cow' and the man recognised the cow. (And there is a recognition).<sup>102</sup>

(Thus the *Bhāṣya* says)—it may be that previous teachers had already defined this relation between symbols and symbolised, between *vrddhi* and *āt* and *aic*. Here also the previous people had already established such a relation. By which previous people? By the teachers (i.e. the teachers that flourished before Pāṇini). Since the relation has, already been established by the teachers, it becomes new to those to whom it is taught now.

In the world also, when even an already established name is instructed for the first time to some people, it is done to them for the first time then. If others are instructed these symbolic names before, well and good, it will be instructed now again.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes and says)—since the words *vrddhi* etc., which are already existent, are being associated and being now known as a *saṃjñā* or symbol, then in this regulation of the symbol and the symbolised we have the form of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*).

(This is explained by the *Bhāṣya*)—it is the symbolised that is associated with the symbol or the name.<sup>103</sup>

102. The idea is that even without the use of a word which is a symbol, people have a knowledge of the symbol through the popular usage. Thus no one has defined a particular structure and said that it should be called a cow; but when one sees that a person does not know a cow and goes to the cow and shows it as 'here is the cow' So symbols and names are known to people through popular usage and for that any definition of symbols is unnecessary. This would naturally presuppose that the words 'āt' and 'ec' have been known to people by popular usage called the *vrddhi*, and therefore, they might know them from that without any such definition. This idea is expressed by the *Bhāṣya* as follows.

103. Thus where it is enjoined that in the 'parasmaipada' when there is a 'sic' there will be 'vrddhi' (*sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadeśu* — 7.2.1.) one may expect that when in the 'parasmaipada' there is 'sic', the word 'vrddhi' would be introduced there. The point is that when the *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra* are known as *vrddhi*, the name and the *vrddhi* are the same and are known by *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra*. One is not certain whether the words *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra* should be introduced or the word *vrddhi* should be introduced.

When the symbolised is known only as the object of the symbol in the determination of the word 'vrddhi' etc., we have the fallacy of mutual dependence, and may not, therefore, be able to say, which of these is definitely meant. What is the mutual dependence? 'Āt' and 'aic' should be known through its name, and it is by the name again that we know the 'āt' and 'aic'. This is mutual dependence. Any direction that involves mutual dependence, cannot be put into action. A boat that is tied with another, cannot save anybody. But it may be asked that many actions are seen performed even though they involve mutual dependence. Thus, the boat carries the chariot and the chariot carries the boat, but in such cases there is some other condition such as water or land. Thus, one may say that in the land the chariot carries a boat, in the water the boat carries the chariot. But what about a tripod?<sup>104</sup>

But there are at least grooves or nails to connect them. But here it is only a case of simple mutual dependence.

(Here the Vārttika intervenes and says)—such a relation can hold because of the eternity of sound.

(The Bhāṣya runs as follows)—the difficulty is solved. How? Because the words are eternal. When the words are eternal, āt, aic, etc. are given a particular name. The name does not create or constitute 'ādaic'.<sup>105</sup>

*Bhāṣya.* yadi tarhi nityāḥ śabdāḥ, kimartham  
śāstram?

*Vārttika.* kimartham śāstram iti cen nivartakatvāt  
siddham.

104. A tripod is three-legged depending on the other, but inspite of its mutual dependence, they can produce any action viz. that of carrying and holding things—so it is not always right to say that things mutually depending on each other cannot be fruitful in action.

105. The objection of mutual dependence consisted in this that the opponent supposed that it is only through the name that 'āt' and 'aic' are known and it is only through 'āt' and 'aic' that the name is known. Each is known by the other and none has any separate root of existence. This opens the door for the charge of mutual dependence. But if words are existing eternally by themselves then the charge of mutual dependence falls to the ground, for then each of them has a separate root of existence. Thus when we have the form 'māṛṣṭi' from 'mṝṣṭi', then we have 'ār̄' from 'ṝ' and one may naturally be in doubt as to whether this is correct. In such circumstances the sūtra enjoining vrddhi makes it clear to all that the form is correct.

*Bhāṣya* . nivartakam śāstram. kathaṁ? mr̄jir as-māyaviśeṣeṇa upadiṣṭah. tasya sarvatra mr̄jibuddhiḥ prasaktā. tatrānena nivṛttiḥ kriyate, mr̄jer akñitsu pratyayeṣu mr̄jī-pra-saṅge mārjih sādhur bhavati iti.

*Vārttika*. pratyekam vṛddhi-guṇa-saṃjñā-vacanam.

*Bhāṣya*. (pratyekam vṛddhi-guṇa-saṃjñā—vacanam kartavyam). pratyekam vṛddhi-guṇa-saṃjñē bhavata iti vaktavyam, kiṁ prayojanam? samudāye mā bhūtām iti.

*Vārttika*. anyatra sahavacānāt samudāye saṃjñā-prasaṅgah.

*Bhāṣya*. anyatra saha-vacanāt samudāye vṛddhi-guṇa-saṃjñayor aprasaṅgah. yatra icchatī saha-bhūtānām kāryam karoti tatra ‘saha’-grahaṇam. tad yathā —“saha supā”, (Pā. 2.1.4), “ubhe abhyastam saha” (Pā. 6.1.5) iti.

*Vārttika*. pratyavayavam ca vākyā-parisamāpteh.

*Bhāṣya*. pratyavayavam ca vākyā-parisamāptir dṛṣyate. tad yathā—devadatta-yajñadatta-viṣṇumitrā bhojyantām iti. na ca ucyate—‘pratyekam’ iti. pratyekam ca bhujih parisamāpyate.

nanu cāyam apy asti dṛṣṭāntah—‘samudāye vākyaparisamāptir’ iti. tad yathā—‘gargāḥ śatam daṇḍyantām’ iti. arthinaś ca rājāno hiranyena bhavanti, na ca pratyekam daṇḍayanti.

saty etasmin dṛṣṭānte yadi tatra saha-  
grahaṇam kriyate, ihāpi pratyekam iti  
vaktavyam. atha tatrāntareṇa saha-grahaṇam  
sahabhūtānām kāryam  
bhavati, ihāpi nārthaḥ pratyekam iti vacanena.

If words were eternal, what is the good of writing this *śāstra*?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—if it is questioned why then the *śāstra*?  
(The answer is that) the function of the *śāstra* is satisfied by the restrictions  
that are imposed.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it thus)—the *śāstra* is prohibitive. How? The root  
'*mījī*' is offered without any adjective. So everywhere it appears to be the  
same '*mījī*'. The *śāstra* makes the prohibitory rule that when suffixes that  
have no redundant 'k' and 'ṇ', follow in place of '*mījī*' '*mārjī*' will be  
correct (by the rule '*mījer-vyddhiḥ*' 7.2.114).

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—the ascription of the name '*vṛddhi*'  
and '*guṇa*' should be made severally.

(Here the *Bhāṣya* runs)—the names '*vṛddhi*' and '*guṇa*' should apply  
severally so that it may not apply to the whole.<sup>106</sup>

(Here the *Vārttika* says)—in other places since the ascription is  
collective, here the name should not be used collectively.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—In other cases (in places other than the ascriptions  
of '*guṇa-vṛddhi*') since the ascription is made exclusively collective, here  
the names '*vṛddhi*' and '*guṇa*' should not be used collectively. Wherever  
the master desires that they should act collectively, he used the word  
'*saha*' or 'together with' Thus there are the rules "sahasupā" (2.1.4,  
i.e. '*subanta*' word should be compounded with a '*subanta*' word—here  
both the *subantas* are taken collectively and therefore the word '*saha*' or  
together has been used), "*ubhe abhyastam*" *saha* (6.1.5; i.e. the two  
together should have the name '*abhyasta*').<sup>107</sup>

106. In the case of the ascription of *vṛddhi* as in the *sūtra* "*mījer vṛddhiḥ*"  
(7.2.114), the *vṛddhi* should apply to particular vowels and not to the whole '*mījī*'.  
Thus, when it is said 'the day on which the father and mother died' does not mean that  
the day should be such that on which both of them should die—but it is enough if any  
one of them dies.

107. The idea is that the master whenever he intends to mean that the *sāmījñā*  
should apply to two together, he uses the words '*saha*' and '*ubhe*' as in 2.1.4 and 6.1.5.  
So where that device is not employed, no *sāmījñā* should apply to two terms. The word  
'*vṛddhi*' should not, therefore, in absence of such a device, mean both 'āt' and 'aic',  
but only severally, *ā-kāra*, *ai-kāra* and *au-kāra*.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—because of the fact that a proposition or *vākyā* is complete in each of its parts.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs)—a *vākyā* or proposition is seen to be completed in each of its parts. Thus in the phrase—‘let Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra be fed’ — it is not said that they should be severally fed for the eating is completed in each one of them. But there are instances where a proposition is completed collectively. Thus it is said— let the Gargas be fined hundred rupees (here the fine is not singly, but collectively); the kings are in need of gold, but they do not fine each person. In this example that would be so, if the word ‘*saha*’ or together were introduced (as in “*saha supā*”). Here also it is necessary to say that the ascription is made severally. But there also, without the ‘*saha*’, collective action is seen to take place. (In the rule “*saha supā*” there is a *yoga-vibhāga* or splitting up of the rule for yielding two meanings at the same time. The word ‘*saha*’ has been put in there in order to facilitate the *yoga-vibhāga*, otherwise it was not indispensable. This shows that even without the use of the word ‘*saha*’ collective action may take place). So here also it is not necessary to use the word ‘*pratyekam*’ or ‘*severally*’.<sup>108</sup>

108. Kaiyatā says here ‘*vṛddhi-saṃjñā tu lakṣye pratyekam ādaicām darśanāt*’, i.e. the name *vṛddhi* should apply to ‘āt’ and ‘aic’ severally and not jointly. The whole argument has been to prove that ‘*vṛddhi*’ is not the name jointly of ‘āt’ and ‘aic’. The reasons are two-fold: One, the technical reason that whenever any name applies jointly to two terms, the collective appellation is definitely declared by the use of the word ‘*saha*’ or ‘*together*’. This implies (i.e this is a *jñāpaka*) that whenever such indicatory ‘*saha*’ is not used, the name applies, severally to ‘āt’ and ‘aic’. But this method is subject to criticism that indicatory ‘*saha*’ is not indispensable for appellations that are used jointly to indicate two terms. For this Patañjali introduces his second reason illustrative from popular usage, every action can apply only severally to two agents when he says, ‘*vākyārtha*’ he really means ‘*padārtha*’. The propositional meaning is not indeed completed severally, but in the actual world of facts, actions are generally completed severally by several agents. Thus when we say let the people eat, then there is actually no collective eating, each person eats and his eating completes his action. But there are, of course, actions like that of the enacting of a drama which is the result of a collective action (as noted by Kaiyatā). Kaiyatā also points out another *jñāpaka* to justify the contention that the word ‘*vṛddhi*’ applies severally to ‘āt’ etc. His argument is as follows: There is the Pāṇini’s rule, “*prasthe vṛddham akarkyādinām*” (6.2.87). This rule means when ‘*prastha*’ is the last member of a compound and the first word is a word which not being of the class of ‘*kārkyādi*’ does not also contain a *vṛddha*-vowel gets an ‘*udātta*’ accent in the first *pada*. Now the next rule is “*mālādināñ ca*” (6.2.88) which means that ‘*prastha*’ being the last

*Bhāṣya.* atha kimartham ākāras taparah kriyate?

*Vārttika.* ākārasya tapara-karaṇam savarṇārtham.

*Bhāṣya.* ākārasya tapara-karaṇam kriyate. kim prayojanam? savarṇārtham. “*taparas tatkālasya*” (Pā.1.1.70) iti tatkālānām savarṇānām grahaṇam yathā syāt. keśām? udāttānudāttā-svaritānām. kim ca kāraṇam na syāt?

*Vārttika.* bhedakatvāt svarasya.

*Bhāṣya.* bhedakā udāttādayah. katham punar jñāyate ‘bhedakā udāttādayah’ iti? evam hi drṣyate loke—ya udātte kartavye anudāttam karoti khaṇḍikopādhyāyas tasmai capeṭām dadāti— ‘anyat tvam karoṣi’ iti. asti prayojanam etat? kim tarhi iti.

*Vārttika.* bhedakatvād guṇasya.

*Bhāṣya.* bhedakatvād guṇasya iti vaktavyam. kim prayojanam? ānunāsikyam nāma guṇas tad-bhinnasyāpi grahaṇam yathā syāt. kim ca kāraṇam na syāt? “*bhedakatvād guṇasya*.” bhedakā guṇāḥ. katham punar jñāyate bedakā guṇā iti? evam hi drṣyate loke, eko’ yam ātmā udakam nāma, tasya guṇa-bhedād anyatvam bhavati— anyad idam śītam, anyad idam uṣṇam iti.

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member of a compound and the words ‘*mālā*’, ‘*śāla*’, etc. being the first member, the first vowel should be with the ‘*udāttā*’ accent. Now, a *vṛddha*-vowel is equivalent to *vṛddhi*, and if *vṛddhi* meant jointly ‘*āt*’ and ‘*aic*’ there would be no meaning in making an exception in the case of ‘*mālādi*’ which has only ā-kāra as the initial vowel.

nanu ca bho abhedakā api guṇā dṛṣyante.  
tad yathā—devadatto muṇḍyapi jaṭyapi  
śikhyapi svām ākhyāṁ na jahāti. tathā bālo  
yuvā vṛddho vatso damyo balivarda iti.

ubhayam idam guṇeṣu uktam—bhedakāḥ,  
abhedakā iti. kim punar atra nyāyyam?

abhedakā guṇā ity eva nyāyyam. kuta  
etat? yad ayam—“asthi-dadhi-sakthy-  
akṣṇām anañ udāttah” (Pā. 7.1.75) ity  
udāttta-grahaṇam karoti, taj-jñāpayat  
ācāryo’ bhedakā guṇā iti. yadi hi bhedakā  
guṇāḥ syur udāttam evoccārayet.

yadi tarhy abhedakā guṇāḥ, anudāttāder  
antodāttāc ca yad ucyate tat svaritādeḥ  
svaritāntāc ca prāpnoti.

naiṣa doṣāḥ. āśrīyamāno guṇo bhedako  
bhavati. tad yathā—‘śuklam ālabheta’,  
‘kṛṣṇam ālabheta’. tatra yaḥ śukla ālab-  
dhavye kṛṣṇam ālabhate, na hi tena  
yathoktam kṛtam bhavati.

asandehārthas tarhi takārah. ‘aic’ ity  
ucyamāne sandehaḥ syāt—kim imau  
‘aicau’eva, āhosvid ākāro’py atra nirdiṣyata  
iti?

sandeha-mātram etad bhavati. sarva-  
sandehaṣu cedam upatiṣṭhate—“vākhyā-  
nato viśeṣapratipattir na hi sandehād  
alakṣaṇam” iti. trayāṇāṁ grahaṇam iti  
vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. anyatrāpi hy ayam evam-  
jātiyakeṣu sandehaṣu na kaṃcid yatnam  
karoti. tad yathā—“automśasor”  
(Pā. 6.1.93) iti.

idam tarhi prayojanam— āntaryatas  
 trimātra-caturmātrānām sthāninām trimātra-  
 caturmātrā ādeśā mā bhūvanniti. khaṭvā  
 indraḥ = khaṭvendraḥ, khaṭvā udakam =  
 khaṭvodakam, khaṭvā īṣā = khaṭvesā,  
 khaṭvā ūḍhā = khaṭvoḍhā, khaṭvā elakā =  
 khaṭvailakā, khaṭvā odanāḥ = khaṭvaudanāḥ,  
 khaṭvā aitikāyanaḥ = khaṭvaitikāyanaḥ.  
 khaṭvā aupagavaḥ = khaṭvaupagava iti.

atha kriyamāṇe'pi takāre kasmād eva  
 trimātra-caturmātrānām sthāninām trimātra-  
 caturmātrā ādeśā na bhavanti ?

“*taparas tatkālasya*” iti niyamāt.  
 nanu taḥ paro yasmāt so'yaṁ taparah.  
 ‘na’ ity āha. tād api paras taparah.  
 yadi tād api paras taparah “*ṛdor ap*”  
 (Pā.3.3.57) iti ihaiva syāt— yavaḥ, stavaḥ,  
 lavaḥ, pava ity atra na syāt.

naiṣa takāraḥ. kas tarhi? dakāraḥ.  
 kiṁ dakāre prayojanam?  
 atha kiṁ takāre? yady asandehārthas  
 takāraḥ, dakāro'pi. atha mukha-sukhārthas  
 takāraḥ dakāro'pi.

(*vṛddhir ādaic* 1).

Why is ā (in *vṛddhir ādaic*) associated with *ta* in the end?

(Here the *Vārttika* runs)—the ākāra is associated with *ta* as following it in order that vowels of the same measure (*savarṇa*) may be included within it.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs)—the ākāra is made with *ta* following it. What for? For including the *savarṇas*. By the rule “*taparas tatkālasya*” (1.1.70); a vowel is followed by *ta* or which follows *ta* will include vowels of the same measure and same time. Thus in the rule, “*ato bhisa ais*” (7.1.9); i.e in the case of a word ending in ‘*at*’, ‘*bhis*’ will be changed into ‘*ais*’; thus *nara + bhis* is equal to ‘*naraais*’. This ‘*at*’ is one in which ‘*a*’ is followed by ‘*ta*’ and for that reason it only includes within it the simple ‘*a*’ — nasal or

unnasal, but not the long variety as ā or the *pluta* variety which takes a longer time in pronunciation. Thus, when 'bhīs' follows 'mālā', the 'bhīs' is not changed into 'ais' (and we have *mālābhīḥ*), all the vowels of the same measure and time are accepted. Which are they? *Udātta*, *anudātta* and *svarita*. (Though the association of *ta* excludes the long vowels, yet it includes the vowels of the same time of pronunciation though they may differ in accent). Why should it not be so?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)— because of the variation of the accent.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs) — the accents like *udātta* etc. distinguish the same vowel. How do you know that accents produce such a variation? So it is seen in the world, that he, who pronounces a word with *udātta* accent with *anudātta*, receives a slap on his face from his teacher saying, " You are mispronouncing it". Is there any necessity? What is that? They produce qualitative difference. In the case of the nasal also there is a quantitative difference and this should also be included within the term 'savarṇa' referred to by the *tapara* vowel. Because it is the *guṇas* that differentiate one from another. The *guṇas* or qualities are separators. How do you know that the *guṇas* are separators? So it is seen in the world that there is one substance water which on account of its difference in quality appears as different. This is cold, is something different, and this is not and is something different. But there are qualities which do not differentiate. Thus the same Devadatta with a shaven head, or with a tuft of hair, or with long-plaited hair does not lose his own name. So also the calf, the heifer and the bull are the same though they differ in age as too young, young and old.

Both have been affirmed of the qualities. Some say they are separators, some say they are not. What is correct? It is correct to say they are not separators. Why so? That this "asthi-dadhi-sakthy-akṣṇām anāi udāttah" (7.1.75, the augment *anāi* with an *udātta* accent is prescribed to come after the words 'asthi'(bone), 'dadhi' (curd), *sakthi* (strength) and 'akṣi' (eye) in case-endings beginning with a vowel from the third case-ending onwards to all the other case-endings). Here the word 'udātta' has been specifically mentioned in this *sūtra*; by this the master indicates that the *guṇas* i.e. the qualities (of accent etc.) cannot distinguish or differentiate. If these *guṇas* could differentiate (instead of mentioning the word 'udātta', the master would have pronounced the word as 'udātta').<sup>109</sup>

109. The point raised is as follows: whenever a vowel is pronounced, it has to be pronounced with an accent. The question is whether such an accentuation has produced any such difference in the vowel that it can be distinguished from other

If then the qualities cannot distinguish, then whatever has been prescribed about words having the *anudātta* accent or with an *antodātta* accent, should apply also to those that have an initial *svarita* or concluding *svarita* accent. This is no criticism. For when definitely declared, the qualities can distinguish. Thus, when it is advised that one should

vowels or from the same vowel of other varieties. Thus when one says *ā*, he has distinguished it from its other variety *a*; so when one has pronounced *i*, he has distinguished it from its short variety *ī*; but one pronounces an *udātta* accent and that accentuation does not so distinguish the vowel as to make it a recognisable variety. For this reason instead of pronouncing the *anāi* in the rule 7.1.75 with an *udātta* accent, the master uses the word 'udātta' for definitely distinguishing this particular 'anāi'. From this indication it appears that accentual differentiation does not differentiate the individuality of a vowel. Another point is raised here. There is a rule "hano vadha *lini*" (2.4.42), i.e. the root 'han' becomes 'vadha' when 'ārdhadhātuka' suffixes of 'lini' follow, the augment 'vadha' ends with the vowel *a* but this *a* is elided. But though it is elided, it is regarded as existent for purposes of 'guṇa-vṛddhi'. Thus there is no optional *vṛddhi* here by the rule "ato halādē laghoh" (7.2.7) which means that when a 'sic' with an 'it āgama' follows in *parasmaipada*, then a root beginning with a consonant and ending in *akāra*, should have *vṛddhi* optionally—as 'akānīt', 'akānīl'. For the purpose of this rule by the 'sthānivadbhāvah'- maxim the āgama 'vadha' is regarded as ending in *a*, though its *a* is elided. The maxim of 'sthānivadbhāvā' is derived from the rule 1.1.56 which declares that 'ādeśa' should be regarded as having the same functions as that in place of which it has occurred.

Now an accent of the 'sthānivadbhāvā' rule, 'vadha' means associated with an 'anudātta' accent and the 'āgama' of *it* being prohibited thereby, there occurs a difficulty that no 'it' augment can be advised, and this would render the derivation of 'akānīt' impossible. For this purpose it has been said that here the 'vadha' should be regarded as *udātta*. We know that by the rule "ekāca upadeśe anudāttā" (7.2.10, i.e. a root having one vowel only in the original list should be regarded as *anudātta* and there should be no 'it'-augment after that), there ought not to be any 'it-āgama' after 'han' which is a one-vowel verb and therefore *anudātta*. 'Vadha' being an 'ādeśa' in place of 'han' is *anudātta* by the 'sthānivadbhāvā' maxim, therefore it could not get 'it' after it by the present rule 7.2.19; but still without it we cannot have the form 'akānīt'. Therefore 'vadha' has to be regarded as 'udātta' by special declaration. Here also we find that when a vowel is pronounced as *anudātta*, it cannot differentiate itself as such, and when it is to be rendered *udātta*, it has to be specifically mentioned. The same rule applies to the nasal, i.e. nasality also cannot distinguish a vowel by itself, but has to be specifically mentioned. Thus by the rule "uñah" (1.1.17) and "ū" (1.1.18) it is declared that the vowels included in 'uñ' should be regarded as being nasal. Thus, nasality cannot differentiate a vowel merely by pronunciation. It has to be declared separately. So also it is asked in the rule 7.2.10— which mono-vowelic root is *anudātta*? The reply is — those that have been so pronounced by the master. How to know which have been so pronounced by the master? These have been separately shown or collected in the verse list (*kārikā*) of roots to which 'anīt' is prohibited.

immolate the white cow or that one should immolate the black cow, one behaves otherwise, that is when the white is to be killed, he kills the black, he does not behave in the proper manner. The *ta-kāra* is thus inserted for removing the doubt. In the case of ‘aic’ there is the doubt whether ‘aic’ means only *ai* and *au* or whether it includes the ā-sound also. This is a mere doubt. In all cases of doubt the principle is that the special meaning can be obtained only by the interpretation and a *sūtra* should not be left as meaningless because there is any doubt. In other places also in similar cases of doubt no further effort is made, as in the case of the rule “*automśasoh*” (6.1.93, i.e. when ‘am’ and ‘śas’ follow a word ending in ‘au’, should have the vowel ā in place of *au* and the vowel following it — here also there may be a doubt as to whether ‘au’ is composed of ā and *au*, but no attempt has been made in the *sūtras* to remove the doubt. For this reason it should be noted that for such cases of doubt one should look to the traditional interpretation only.<sup>110</sup>

This is then the purpose. On account of proximity it might have been expected that the augments, that occur in place of vowels having three measures or four measures (*trimātra* or *caturmātra*) should be of the same measure. But, that this should not be so. Thus— *khaṭvā* + *indra* = *khaṭvendra*; *khaṭvā* + *udakam* = *khaṭvodakam*; *khaṭvā* + *iṣā* = *khaṭveṣā*; *khaṭvā* + *ūḍhā* = *khaṭvoḍhā*; *khaṭvā* + *elakā* = *khaṭvailakā*; *khaṭvā* + *odanah* = *khaṭvaudanah*; *khaṭvā* + *aitikāyanah* = *khaṭvaitikāyanah*; *khaṭvā* + *aupagavaḥ* = *khaṭvaupagavah*. (These are instances of euphonic combinations between *khaṭvā* and the different words beginning with *i* in *Indra* (god) *u* in *udaka* (water), *i* in *iṣā* (a pole), long *ū* in *ūḍhā* (borne), *e* in *Elakā* (the name of a woman) *o* in *odana* food), *ai* in *Aitikāyana* (the son of

110. It is thus seen that the insertion of *ta* cannot be for the removal of any doubt. We have seen that the first alternative interpretation offered was that *ta* has been associated with ā in order that ā may include vowels of the same measure, i.e. vowels having the same time, but differing in accentuation and nasalisation. The discussion proves that accentuation and nasalisation are not distinctive marks of vowels and that in case where such distinctions are intended, it has to be specifically mentioned. This alternative explanation therefore for the association of *ta* fails. The other alternative interpretation is that *ta* stands as barrier between ā and *aic* and it shows that the *aic* does not contain within it ā. But the *ta* could not have been associated for the removal of such doubts, for in similar cases as in 6.1.33 there might have been a similar doubt, but the master is quite indifferent to this. Such doubts are to be removed through traditional interpretations and now a third alternative is proposed as the *Bhāṣya*, that follows, would show.

*etikāyana*), *au* in *Aupagava* (the son of *upagava*). The point raised here in this—an ‘aic’ would mean *ai* and *au* and these may be of three measures or four measures, but the putting of *aic* after the ‘*ta*’ or ‘ā’ shows that in this context the *aic* after should be of two *mātrās*, and not of three or four, and incidentally this is to be regarded as an exception that though generally an augment vowel has the same measure as that in place of which it occurs, yet in these cases an augment in place of a vowel with three or four measures should not be of three or four measures).

Well then even when *takāra* is associated, why should not an *āgama* occurring in the place of a vowel having three or four *mātrās* should not have three or four *mātrās* by the rule “*taparas tat-kālasya*” (1.1.70). Now what does ‘*tapara*’ mean? That which has *ta* after it. No, that is not the only meaning. It also means that which is preceded by *ta* or that which follows *ta*. If it is to mean that which follows *ta*, then by the rule “*ṛdor ap*” (3.3.57, a root ending in *r* or *u* should have the suffix ‘*ap*’) we should have only ‘*yavah*’ (barley), *stavah* (hymn), but not ‘*lavaḥ*’ and ‘*pavaḥ*’.<sup>111</sup>

Here the vowel short *u* is after *la* and not *ta*. What is the necessity of *da*? Well then, what is the necessity of *ta*? If *ta* is for the removal of doubts, so may also the *da*. If *ta* is for the facility of pronunciation, so may also be *da*.

### *Pāṇini. ikō guṇavṛddhī 1.1.3.*

The ‘*guṇa*’ and the ‘*vrddhi*’ will take place in place of ‘*ik*’. Here ‘*ikah*’ in the sixth case and the meaning of the sixth case in a *sūtra* is given in the rule ‘*saṣṭhī sthaneyoga*’ (1.1.9). That *sūtra* as well as the present one are ‘*paribhāṣā*’ *sūtras* or general maxims, ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*vrddhi*’ can take place only with reference to ‘*ik*’, (*i, u, r, l*) and no other word. The rule 1.1.49 determining the meaning of the sixth case means that in place when something is directed to take place with reference to words in the sixth case, then the meaning will be that whatever is directed to take place will occur in place of that which has the sixth case. Therefore when ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*vrddhi*’ are directed they are to occur in place of *i, u, r, l*.

111. The words ‘*lavaḥ*’ and ‘*pavaḥ*’ have to be formed from the roots ‘*lu*’ and ‘*pu*’ respectively. Now in “*ṛdorap*” the *u* is preceded by ‘*ta*’ and therefore it ought to include only the vowels of the same measure, i.e. vowels of the short variety and therefore we can have by this rule the ‘*ap*’ suffix to verbs ending in short *u*, but not verbs ending long *u*. How can we then have words like ‘*lava*’ and ‘*pava*’ which are formed by ‘*ap*’ being added to roots ending in long vowels?

*Bhāṣya.* ig-grahaṇam kimartham?

*Vārttika.* ig-grahaṇam āt-sandhyakṣara-vyañjana-nivṛttyartham.

*Bhāṣya.* ig-grahaṇam kriyate. kiṃ prayojanam ? ākāra-nivṛttyartham sandhyakṣara-nivṛttyartham vyañjana-nivṛttyartham ca. ākāra-nivṛttyartham tāvat—‘yātā’, ‘vātā’. ākārasya guṇah prāpnoti. ig-grahaṇān na bhavati.

sandhyakṣara-nivṛttyartham—‘glāyati’, ‘mlāyati’. sandhyakṣarasya gunah prāpnoti. ig-grahaṇān na bhavati.

vyañjana-nivṛttyartham—‘umbhitā’, ‘umbhitum’, ‘umbhitavyam’. vyañjanasya gunah prāpnoti. ig-grahaṇān na bhavati.

ākāra-nivṛttyarthena tāvan nārthah. ācārya-pravṛttir jñāpayati—‘nākārasya guṇo bhavati’ iti yad ayam—“āto ‘nupasarge kah” iti kakāram anubandham karoti. katham kṛtvā jñāpakam? kit-karaṇa etat prayojanam — ‘kiti’ ityākāralopo yathā syāt. yadi ca ākārasya guṇah syāt kitkaraṇam anarthakam syāt. guṇe kṛte dvayor akārayoh pararūpeṇa siddham rūpam syāt — ‘godah’, ‘kambaladah’ iti. paśyati tv ācāryo—‘nākārasya guṇo bhavati’ iti, tataḥ kakāram anubandham karoti.

sandhyakṣara-nivṛttyarthēnāpi nārthah. upadeśa-sāmarthyāt sandhyakṣarasya guṇo na bhavati.

vyañjana-nivṛttyarthēnāpi nārthah. ācārya-pravṛttir jñāpayati— ‘na vyañjanasya guṇo

bhavati' iti, yad ayam janer ḍam śāsti. katham kṛtvā jñāpakam? dīt-karaṇa etat prayojanam—‘dīti’ iti tī-lopo yathā syāt. yadi vyañjanasya guṇaḥ syād dīt-karaṇam anarthakam syāt. guṇe kṛte trayāṇām akārāṇām para-rūpeṇa siddham rūpam syāt—‘upasarajah’, ‘mandurajah’ iti. paśyati tv ācāryo—‘na vyañjanasya guṇo bhavati’ iti. tato janer ḍam śāsti.

naītāni santi jñāpakāni. yat tāvad ucyate—‘kit-karaṇam jñāpakam nākārasya guṇo bhavati’ iti. uttarārtham etat syāt—“tunda-śokayoḥ parimṛjāpanudoḥ” iti. yat tarhi “gāpoṣṭak” ity ananyārtham kakāram anubandham karoti.

yad api ucyate—‘upadeśa-sāmarthyāt sandhyakṣarasya guṇo na bhavati’ iti. yadi yad yat sandhyakṣarasya prāpnoti tat tad upadeśa-sāmarthyād bādhyate, āyādayo’ pi tarhi na prāpnuvanti.

naiṣa doṣaḥ. yam vidhiṁ praty upadeśo-narthakah sa vidhir bādhyate. yasya tu vidher nimittam eva, nāsau bādhyate. guṇam ca praty upadeśo’narthakah. āyādinām punar nimittam eva.

yad apy ucyate—janer ḍa-vacanam jñāpakam, na vyañjanasya guṇo bhavati’ iti. siddhe vidhir ārabhyamāṇo jñāpakārtho bhavati. na ca janer guṇena siddhyati. kuto hy etat—‘janer guṇa ucyamāṇo’kāro bhavati, na punar ekāro vā syād okāro vā’ iti?

āntaryato’rdhamātrikasya vyañjanasya mātriko’kāro bhaviṣyati.

evam apy anunāsikah prāpnoti.  
 pararūpeṇa śuddho bhaviṣyati. evam tarhi  
 gamer apy ayaṁ do vaktavyah. gameś ca  
 guṇa ucyamāna āntaryata okārah prāpnoti.  
 tasmād ig-grahaṇam kartavyam.

Why does the *sūtra* speak of 'ik'?

(Here the *Vārttika* says)— 'ik' has been taken to secure that no *guṇayrddhi* can occur in place of 'āt', a euphonic vowel or a consonant.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs)— if the 'ik' is taken what for? For prohibiting ā, an euphonic vowel or consonant. For prohibiting ā, such as 'yātā', 'vātā', the *guṇa* should have taken place in place of ā, but since it is said that *guna* and *vṛddhi* can occur only in place of 'ik' no *guṇa* occurs in place of 'ā'.<sup>112</sup>

For prohibiting the euphonic vowels—'glāyati', 'mlāyati' the euphonic vowels of 'glai' and 'mlai' could have *guṇa* in the above cases; but, since there can be no *guṇa* to any vowel *i*, *u*, *r*, *l*, that does not occur. For prohibiting the consonants as in 'umbhitā', 'umbhitum', and 'umbhitavyam' *guṇa* could have occurred in the place of the consonant, but it does not, because of speaking of 'ik' only in the *sūtra*. In opposing the above preliminary thesis, as to the explanation as to why 'ik' has been spoken of in the *sūtra*, the *Bhāṣya* runs as follows:— It is not for the sake of prohibiting ākāra. The intention of the master shows that *guṇa* cannot occur in place of ā, because in the rule "āto'nupasarge kah" (3.2.3; i.e. roots ending in ā having no *upasarga* and having a *karma* to it will take the suffix 'ka' in place of suffix 'aṇ'). How does it indicate anything? Because the suffix has been made to contain a 'ka'? How does it then serve the purpose? So that by the rule "ato lopah iti ca" (6.4.64; when suffixes with redundant 'ka' and 'n' follow, the ā of the root should be elided) it should not have been arranged that for securing the elision of the ā, a suffix with a *ka*-redundant is to follow. If any *guṇa* could occur in place of ā, then the elision through a suffix with redundant 'ka' would be unnecessary, for once the ā, is changed into a by *guṇa*, the a of the root and of the suffix could very well get changed into 'akāra' (like words of the 'karkandhu'

112. If ārdhadhātuka suffix follows, there is general direction for *vṛddhi*. There is a special rule "ato lopah" (6.4.48) which directs the elision of a, the short sound. The long sound ā of the root 'yā' or 'vā' could then have undergone *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* as the case may have been, had it not been for the fact that *guṇa* cannot occur in place of any other vowel than *i*, *u*, *r*, *l*.

list) and we could have the forms 'godah' and 'kambaladah'. By this the master indicates that there should be no *guṇa* in place of ā; for this reason he prescribes a suffix with a redundant 'ka' for the elision of ā of the roots ending in ā.

*Ik* has not also been taken for prohibiting *guṇa* to euphonic vowels. By force of the original introduction the euphonic vowels would not suffer any *guṇa*. (As Nāgeśa says the 'in' and 'aic' have been definitely declared to retain the specific character and therefore they cannot have *guṇa* in their case). It is not also for prohibiting the consonants, for the manner of the master shows that in place of the consonants there cannot be any *guṇa*. This is done when he advises *da*-suffix to 'jana'. How does this indicate it? By virtue of the redundant 'da' by the rule "teḥ" (6.4.143). It has been prescribed that the 'ti' of a 'bha' should be elided when a suffix with a *da*-redundant should follow.<sup>113</sup> If *guṇa* could occur in place of a consonant, the provision of the suffix with the *da*-redundant will be unnecessary. For, if *guṇa* was advised then the three 'a's could have combined to form an a and that would have served the purpose. In forming such words as 'upasarajah' (a calf born at the first pregnancy of the cow), 'mandurajah' (insect born in a mat), the master wishes to indicate that no *guṇa* should occur in place of consonants. For this purpose he advises the rule "janer dah" (3.2.97; when a word in the 7th case precedes, then the root 'jana' should have 'da' as its suffix). These are not indicatory illustrations—that it is said that by advising a suffix with redundant-*k* it is to indicate that no *guṇa* will occur in place of ā. It has a future utility in the rule "tunda-śokayoh parimṛjāpanudoḥ" (3.2.5; when the words 'tunda' and 'śoka' in the accusative case are associated with the roots 'parimṛja' and 'apanuda', then they will take the *ka*-suffix).<sup>114</sup>

There is however the rule "gāpoṣṭak" (3.2.8, i.e the root 'gā' and 'pā' with an accusative case in association with it and bearing no 'upasarga' will take the suffix 'tak', e.g. 'sāmagah', 'surāpah'). Where the redundant

113. 'Ti' means a part of a word commencing with the last vowel.

114. 'Tunda' means a protuberent belly and 'tunda-parimṛja' is one who is in the habit of strolling his belly.

The *k*-suffix was introduced in the above rule 3.2.5 and not so much for ordinary ākārānta roots. If it was introduced only for ākārānta roots, then the contention that it was indicatory to the fact that Pāṇini had already shown that there will be no *guṇa* in place of ā.

*ka* of the suffix may be regarded as demonstrating the same purpose (viz. that Pāṇini indicates that there will no *guṇa* in place of *ā*). It has been said that by force of the original instructions, the *guṇa*, does not occur in place of euphonic vowels.

(To this the reply is)—that if by force of the original instruction, such a rule applies to the euphonic vowels, then it ought to apply in the case of ‘āy’, ‘āv’, etc., (i.e. *ai*, *au*, etc. are always to remain as *ai*, *au* and ought not to be transformed into *āy*, *āv*). This is no criticism. The rule with reference to which the original instructions would be regarded meaningless, would be negated. But where it becomes the occasion of the rules, it cannot be negated. With reference to *guṇa* the original instructions become meaningless, but with reference to ‘āy’, etc. it is the occasion.<sup>115</sup> Why so?

Where is it said ‘*jana*’ will have *guṇa*? We do not know whether there would be *a-kāra*, *e-kāra* or *o-kāra*. Well then (the reply is) on account of the rule of proximity in place of the consonant of half measure we may have the *a* of a single measure. Well, again this *a* may be nasal one. Even if it be a nasal one by its assumption of the form of the succeeding vowel (*pararūpa*), the form will justify it.<sup>116</sup>

Well, then the ‘*da*’ has been advised also to the rule ‘*gami*’, that there should be *guṇa* in the place of ‘*gami*’ then ‘*okāra*’ will be more proximate and therefore the desired form will not be possible. For this reason it is necessary that *sūtra* should speak of ‘*ik*’.<sup>117</sup>

115. It is on the occasion of ‘*ai*’ that it becomes changed into ‘āy’ and therefore this rule cannot be negated. It is urged that the rule “*janer ḍah*” is indicatory that *guṇa* cannot occur in the place of a consonant. When the rule is already known there is a further enumeration of it. It would mean that such an enumeration must have some special indication. It is not enough here to say that the root ‘*jana*’ should have *guṇa*.

116. The rule of proximity is “*sthāne 'ntarataṁah*” (1.1.50) when there is a doubt as to which of the many possible ones any particular one is to take place on a particular occasion, the rule of proximity i.e., that which is nearest in the articulating effort (to that in whose place it is to occur) will take the role of precedence.

117. In actuality there is no such rule as “*gamer ḍah*”, but there is a rule “*saptamīyām janer ḍah*” (3.2.97) and thereafter the other rule “*anyevapi ḍṛṣyate*” (3.2.101) and another Vārttika rule ‘*anyatrāpi ḍṛṣyate*’ in association with the *sūtra* ‘*antāyatādhva-dūra-pāra-sarvānanteṣu ḍah*’ (3.2.48) by which you may have ‘*ḍa*’ to ‘*gama*’. The substance of the discussion then is that by prescribing a suffix with a redundant ‘*ḍa*’ Pāṇini does not indicate any particular intention as suggested by the opponent.

*Bhāṣya.* yadi ig-grahaṇam kriyate, ‘dyauḥ’, ‘panthāḥ’, ‘sah’, ‘imam’ iti, ete api ikaḥ prāpnuvanti.

*Vārttika.* samjñayā vidhāne niyamah.

*Bhāṣya.* samjñayā ye vidhiyante teṣu niyamah.  
kim vaktavyam etat?  
nahi. katham anucyamānam gamṣyate?  
guṇa-vṛddhi-grahaṇa-sāmarthyāt.  
katham punar antareṇa guṇa-vṛddhi-grahaṇam iko guṇa-vṛddhi syātām?  
prakṛtam guṇa-vṛddhi-grahaṇam anuvar-tate. kva prakṛtam? “vṛddhir ādaij”, “adeñ guṇah” iti.  
yadi tad anuvartate ‘adeñguṇo vṛddhiś ca’ ity adeñām vṛddhi-samjñā’pi prāpnoti.

*Vārttika.* saṃbandham anuvartīsyate.

*Bhāṣya.* saṃbandham anuvartīsyate “vṛddhir ādaic”, “adeñ guṇah” iti vṛddhir ādaic. tataḥ—“iko guṇa-vṛddhi” iti. guṇa-vṛddhi-grahaṇam anuvartate, ādaij-adeñ-grahaṇam nivṛttam.

*Vārttika.* maṇḍūkagatayo’dhikārāḥ.

*Bhāṣya* athavā maṇḍūkagatayo’dhikārāḥ. yathā maṇḍūkā utplutyotplutya gacchanti tādvad adhikārāḥ.

*Vārttika.* ekayogo vā.

*Bhāṣya.* athavā ekayogaḥ kariṣyate—“vṛddhir ādaijadeñ guṇah”. tataḥ “iko guṇavṛddhi” iti. na caikayoge’nuvṛttir bhavati.  
athavā—“anyavacanāc cakārākaraṇāc ca prakṛtāpavādo vijñāyate, yathotsargeṇa prasaktasyāpavādo bādhako bhavati.”

anyasyāḥ saṃjñāyā vacanāc cakārasya  
cānukarṣaṇārthasya akaraṇāt prakṛtāyā  
vṛddhi-saṃjñāyā guṇasamjñā bādhikā bha-  
viṣyati, yathā utsargeṇa prasaktasyāpavādo  
bādhako bhavati.

athavā vakṣyat y etat—“anuvartante ca  
nāma vidhayaḥ. na cānuvartanād eva  
bhavanti. kiṃ tarhi? yatnād bhavanti” iti.

athavā ubhayam nivṛttam. tad apekṣi-  
ṣyāmahe.

kiṃ punar ayam alo’ntyaśeṣaḥ, āhosvid  
alo’ntyāpavādaḥ?

katham ca ayam tac-cheṣaḥ syāt, katham  
vā tad-apavādaḥ?

yady ekaṃ vākyam—tac cedaṃ ca, ‘alo’-  
ntyasya vidhayo bhavanti’. “iko guṇa-  
vṛddhi, alo’ntyasya” iti. tato’yam tac-cheṣaḥ.  
atha nānāvākyam—taccedaṃ ca, alo’ntyasya  
vidhayo bhavanti. “iko guṇa-vṛddhi, an-  
tyasya cānantasya ca” iti. tato’yam tada-  
pavādaḥ.

kas cātra višeṣaḥ?

*Vārttika.* vṛddhi-guṇāv alo’ntyasyeti cen midi-  
mr̥ji-puganta-laghūpadharcchi-dṛṣi-  
kṣipra- kṣudreṣv ig-grahaṇam.

*Bhāṣya.* vṛddhi-guṇau alon’tyasyeti cen midi-mr̥ji-  
puganta-laghūpadharcchi-dṛṣi-kṣipra-  
kṣudreṣv ig-grahaṇam kartavyam.

“mider guṇaḥ” (Pā. 7.3.82), “ika iti  
vaktavyam” anantyatvād hi na prāpnoti.

“mr̥jer vṛddhiḥ” (Pā. 7.2.114) “ika iti

vaktavyam”, anantyatvād hi na prāpnoti. “*puganta-laghūpadhasya guṇah*”(Pā. 7.3.86), “ika iti vaktavyam” anantyatvād hi na prāpnoti.

ṛccher liṭi guṇah, “ika iti vaktavym” anantyatvād hi na prāpnoti.

“*ṛdrśo ’ni guṇah*”(Pā. 7.4.16), “ika iti vaktavyam”, anantyatvād hi na prāpnoti.

kṣipra-kṣudrayor guṇah, “ika iti vaktavyam”, anantyatvād hi na prāpnoti.

*Vārttika.* sarvādeśaprasaṅgaś cānigantasya.

*Bhāṣya.* sarvādeśāś ca guṇo’ nigantasya prāpnoti. ‘yātā’, ‘vātā’. kiṁ kārṇam? “alo’ntyasya” iti saṣṭhī caiva hy antyam ikam upasamkrāntā. aṅgasya iti ca sthānaśaṣṭhī. tad yad idānīm anigantam aṅgam tasya guṇah sarvādeśah prāpnoti.

naiṣa doṣah, yathaiva hy alo’ntyasya iti saṣṭhī antyam ikam upasamkrāntā, evam aṅgasya ity api sthāna-śaṣṭhī. tad yad idānīm anigantam aṅgam tatra ṣaṣṭhy eva nāsti kuto guṇah, kutaḥ sarvādeśah?

evam tarhi nāyam doṣa-samuccayah. kiṁ tarhi? pūrvāpekṣo’yam doṣah. hy arthe cāyam ‘caḥ’ paṭhitah—“*midi-mṛjī-puganta-laghūpadha-ṛcchi-ṛṣi-kṣipra-kṣudreśv ig-grahṇam sarvādeśa-prasaṅgo hy anigantsya*” iti. mider guṇah, ‘ika’ iti vacanād antyasya na, “alo’ntyasya” iti vacanād iko na. ucyate ca guṇah. sa sarvādeśah prāpnoti, evam sarvatra.

astu tarhi tadapavādah.

*Vārttika.* iñmātrasyeti cej jusisārvadhātukār-dhadhātuka-hrasvādyor guṇeṣvanantya-pratiṣedhaḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* iñ-mātrasya iti cej jusi-sārvadhātukārdha-dhātuka-hrasvādyor guṇeṣu anantya-pratiṣedho vaktavyah.

    jusi guṇah—sa yatheha bhavati—‘ajuhavuh’, ‘abibhayuh’, iti. evam—‘anenijuḥ’, ‘paryaveviṣuh’, atrāpi prāpnoti.

    sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayor guṇah—sa yatheha bhavati—‘kartā’, ‘hartā’, ‘nayati’, ‘tarati’ iti. evam—‘ihitā’, ‘ihitum’, ‘ihitavyam’—ity atrāpi prāpnoti.

    hrasvasya guṇah—sa yatheha bhavati—‘he agne’, ‘he vāyo’ iti. evam ‘he agnicit’, ‘he somasut’ ityatrāpi prāpnoti.

    jasi guṇah—sa yatheha bhavati—‘agnayo vāyavah’ iti. evam ‘agnicitah somasutah’ ity atrāpi prāpnoti.

    ṛtoni-sarvanāmāsthānayor guṇah — sa yatheha bhavati—‘kartari, kartārau, kartārah’ iti, evam ‘sukṛti, sukṛtau, sukṛtah’ ity atrāpi prāpnoti.

    gherniti guṇah — sa yatheha bhavati—‘agnaye’, ‘vāyave’ iti, evam ‘agnicite somasute’ ity atrāpi prāpnoti.

    or guṇah—sa yatheha bhavati—‘bābhravyo māṇḍavyah’ iti. evam ‘suśrut-sauśrutah’ ity atrāpi prāpnoti.

    naiṣa dosah.

*Vārttika.* puganta-laghūpadha-grahaṇam anantya-niyamārtham.

*Bhāṣya.*

puganta-laghūpadha-grahaṇam anantya-niyamārtham bhaviṣyati—puganta-laghū-padhasyaiva anantasya, nānyasya anantya-sya iti.

prakṛtasyaiva niyamaḥ syāt. kiṃ ca prakṛtam? “sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh” iti. tena bhaved iha niyamān na syāt—‘īhitā’, ‘īhitum’, ‘īhitavyam’ iti. hrasvādyor guṇas tvaniyataḥ, so’nantyasyāpi prāpnoti.

athāpy evam niyamaḥ syāt— puganta-laghūpadhasya sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayor eveti. evam api sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayor guṇo’niyataḥ so’nantyasyāpi prāpnoti—‘īhitā’, ‘īhitum’, ‘īhitavyam’ iti.

athāpy ubhayato niyamaḥ syāt— puganta-laghūpadhasyaiva sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayor eva puganta-laghūpadhasya iti. evam apy ayaṁ jusiguṇo’niyataḥ so’nantyasyāpi prāpnoti—, ‘anenijuḥ’, ‘paryaveviṣuḥ’ iti.

evam tarhi—nāyam taccheṣah, nāpi tad-apavādaḥ. anyad evedam paribhāṣāntaram asaṁbaddham anayā paribhāṣayā.

paribhāṣāntaram iti ca matvā kroṣṭrīyāḥ paṭhanti—

*Vārttika.*

niyamād iko guṇa-vṛddhī bhavato vipratiṣedhena.

*Bhāṣya.*

iti. yadi cāyam taccheṣah syāt tenaiva tasyā-yukto vipratiṣedhaḥ. athāpi tad-apavādaḥ, utsargāpavādayor apy ayukto vipratiṣedhaḥ. tatra niyamasyāvakāśah—“rājñāḥ ka ca” (Pā. 4.2.140) rājakīyaṁ. “iko guṇa-vṛddhī”

ity asyāvakāśah—‘cayanam’, ‘cāyako’, ‘lavanam’, ‘lāvakah’ iti. iḥobhayam prāpnoti—‘medyati’, mārṣṭi’ — iti, “iko guna-vṛddhī” ity etad bhavati vipratiṣedhena.

naiṣa yukto vipratiṣedhah. “vipratiṣedhe param” (Pā. 1.4.2) ity ucyate. pūrvas cāyam yogah, paro niyamah.

iṣṭa-vācī para-śabdaḥ. vipratiṣedhe param yad iṣṭam tad bhavati iti.

evam apy ayukto vipratiṣedhah. dvikārya-yogo hi vipratiṣedhah. na cātraiko dvikārya-yuktaḥ.

nāvaśyam dvikārya-yoga eva vipratiṣedhah. kim tarhi? asaṁbhavo’ pi. sa cāstyatrāsaṁbhavaḥ. ko’ sāvasaṁbhavaḥ? iha tāvad—‘vṛkṣebhyah’, ‘plakṣebhyah’, iti. ekaḥ sthānī, dvāv ādeśau, na cāsti saṁbhavo yad ekasya sthānino dvāv ādeśau syātām. ihedānīm ‘medyati, medyataḥ, medyanti’ iti dvau sthāninau, eka ādeśah na cāsti saṁbhavaḥ—dvayoh sthāninor eka ādeśah syād ity eṣo’ saṁbhavaḥ. saty etasminn asaṁbhave yukto vipratiṣedhah.

evam apy ayukto vipratiṣedhah. dvayor hi sāvakāśayoḥ samavasthitayor vipratiṣedho bhavati. anavakāśaś cāyam yogah.

nanu ca—idānīm eva asyāvakāśah praklptah—‘cayanam, cāyako’, ‘lavanam, lāvakah’ iti?

atrāpi niyamah prāpnoti. nāprāpte niyamo’yam yoga ārabhyate. yāvatā ca nāprāpte niyamo’yam yoga ārabhyate, tatas

tasyāpavādo'yaṁ yogo bhavati. utsargāpavādayośca ayukto vipratiṣedhah. athāpi kathamcit “*iko guṇa vṛddhi*” ity asyāvakāśah syāt. evam api yatheha vipratiṣedhādiko guṇo bhavati ‘medyati medyataḥ, medyanti’ iti, evam ihāpi syāt—‘anenijuḥ’, ‘paryaveviṣuḥ’ iti.

evam tarhi—vṛddhir bhavati guṇo bhavati iti yatra brūyād ‘ikah’ ity etat tatropasthitam draṣṭavyam. kim kṛtam bhavati? dvitīyā ṣaṣṭhī prādurbhāvyate. tatra kāmacāraḥ—gṛhyamāṇena vekam višeṣayitum, ikā vā gṛhyamāṇam. yāvatā kāmacāraḥ, iha tāvan midi-mṛji-pugantalaghūpadharcchi-dṛśi-kṣipra-kṣudreṣu gṛhyamāṇam anekam višeṣayiṣyāmaḥ—eteṣām ya ig iti. ihedānīm jusi-sārvadhātukārdhadhātuka-hrasvādyor guṇeṣvikā gṛhyamāṇam višeṣayiṣyāmaḥ—eteṣām guṇo bhavati, ‘ikah’ igantānām iti.

athavā sarvatraivātra sthānī nirdiṣyate. iha tāvan mider ity avibhaktiko nirdeśah —mideḥ mider iti. athavā ṣaṣṭhīsamāśo bhaviṣyati—mida iḥ midih mider iti.

pugantalaghūpadhasyeti. naivam vijñāyate—pugantāṅgasya laghūpadhasya ca iti. katham tarhi? puki antaḥ pugantah, laghvi upadhā lughūpadhā, pugantaś ca laghūpadhā ca pugantalaghūpadham, puganta-laghūpadhasya iti. avaśyam caitad eva vijñeyam, aṅgaviṣeṣaṇe satīha prasajyeta—‘bhinatti’, ‘chinatti’ iti.

ṛccher api praślṣṭanirdeśo'yaṁ —ṛcchati ṛ  
ṛ ṛtām = “ṛcchatyṛtām” (Pā. 7.4.11) iti. dṛśer  
api yoga-vibhāgaḥ kariṣyate—“uraṇi guṇaḥ”  
uḥ aṇi guṇo bhavati. tato “dṛṣeḥ” dṛṣeś cāṇi  
guṇo bhavati. ur ity eva.

kṣipra-kṣudrayor api—“yaṇādiparam  
guṇaḥ” itiyatā siddham. so'yaṁ evaṁ  
siddhe sati yat pūrva-grahaṇaṁ karoti  
tasyaitat prayojanam—iko yathā syād aniko  
mā bhūd iti.

atha vṛddhi-grahaṇaṁ kimarthaṁ?

kim višeṣena vṛddhi-grahaṇaṁ codyate,  
na punar guṇa-grahaṇaṁ api. yadi kimcid  
guṇa-grahaṇasya prayojanam asti, vṛddhi-  
grahaṇasyāpi tad bhavitum arhati.

ko vā višeṣaḥ?

ayam asti višeṣaḥ. guṇavidhau na kvacit  
sthānī nirdiṣyate. tatrāvaśyaṁ sthāninirde-  
śārthaṁ guṇa-grahaṇaṁ kartavyam. vṛddhi-  
vidhau punaḥ sarvatraiva sthānī nirdiṣyate  
—“acoñ ḥiti” (Pā. 7.2.115), “ata upadhāyāḥ”  
(Pā. 7.2.116), “taddhiteśvacām ādeḥ” (Pā.  
7.2.117) iti.

ata uttaram paṭhati—

Vārttika. vṛddhi-grahaṇaṁ uttarātham.

Bhāṣya. vṛddhigrahaṇaṁ kriyate. kimarthaṁ? utta-  
rārthaṁ “knīti” (Pā. 1.1.5) iti pratiṣedhaṁ  
vakṣyati. sa vṛddher api yathā syāt.

kaś cedāṇīm knīt-pratyayeṣu vṛddheḥ  
prasāṅgaḥ. yāvatā “ññīti” (Pā. 7.2.115) ity  
ucyate?

Vārttika. tac ca mr̄jyartham.

*Bhāṣya.* mr̄jer vṛddhir aviśeṣeṇocyate, sā kn̄iti mā bhūt, ‘mr̄ṣṭah’ ‘mr̄ṣṭavān’ iti.

*Vārttika.* ihārtham̄ cāpi.

*Bhāṣya.* ihārtham̄ cāpi mr̄jyartham̄ vṛddhi-grahaṇam̄ kartavyam. mr̄jer vṛddhir aviśeṣeṇocyate, seko yathā syād, aniko mā bhūd iti.

*Vārttika.* mr̄jyartham̄ iti ced yoga-vibhāgāt sidhām̄.

*Bhāṣya.* mr̄jyartham̄ iti ced yoga-vibhāgaḥ kariṣyate— “mr̄jer vṛddhir acaḥ”. tataḥ—“ñ̄nīti” nīti n̄ti ca vṛddhir bhavati. ‘acaḥ’ ity eva. yady aco vṛddhir ucyate —‘nyamār̄t’ aṭo’pi vṛddhiḥ prāpnoti.

*Vārttika.* aṭi coktam̄.

*Bhāṣya.* kim uktam? “anantya-vikāre”, “antya-sadeśasya kāryam̄ bhavati” iti.

*Vārttika.* vṛddhipratiṣedhānupapattis tv ik-prakaraṇāt [tasmād iglakṣaṇā vṛddhiḥ].

*Bhāṣya.* vṛddhestu pratiṣedho nopapadyate. kim kāraṇam̄? ikprakaraṇāt. iglakṣaṇayor guṇavṛddhyoḥ pratiṣedhaḥ. na caivam̄ sati mr̄jer iglakṣaṇā vṛddhir bhavati. tasmān̄ mr̄jer iglakṣaṇā vṛddhir eşitavyā. evam̄ tarhi—ihānye vaiyākaraṇā mr̄jer ajādau saṃkrame vibhāṣā vṛddhim̄ ārabhante— ‘parimṛjanti’, ‘parimārjanti’, ‘parimṛjantu’, parimārjantu’, ‘parimṛjatuḥ’, ‘parimamārjatuḥ’ ityādyartham. tad ihāpi sādhyam̄. tasmin̄ sādhye yoga-vibhāgah̄ kariṣyate—“mr̄jer vṛddhir aco” bhavati.

tataḥ—“aci kniti”. ajādau ca kniti mr̄jer vṛddhir bhavati—‘parimārjanti, parimārjantu, parimamārjatuḥ’. kimartham idam? niyamārthaṁ, ajādāveva kniti, nānyatra. kvānyatra mā bhūt? ‘mr̄ṣṭah’, ‘mr̄ṣṭavān’ iti.

tato ‘vā’ vāci kniti mr̄jer vṛddhir bhavati—‘parimārjanti parimārjanti parimamārjatuḥ parimamārjatur’ iti.

ihārtham eva tarhi sijarthaṁ vṛddhigra-  
haṇam kartavyaṁ. sici vṛddhir  
avišeṣenōcyate seko yathā syād, aniko mā  
bhūd iti.

kasya punar anikah prāpnoti? akārasya  
‘acikīrṣit’, ‘ajihīrṣit’. naitad asti lopo’tra  
bādhako bhaviṣyati.

ākārasya tarhi prāpnoti—‘ayāsīt’,  
‘avāsīt.’ nāsty atra višeṣah — satyām  
vṛddhāvasatyām vā.

sandhyakṣarāsyā tarhi prāpnoti. naiva  
sandhyakṣaram antyam asti.

nanu cedam asti-dhalope kṛte ‘udavo-  
dhām’, ‘udavodham’, ‘udavodhe’ iti.

(naitad asti). asiddho dhalopah. tasyāsid-  
dhatvān naitad antyam bhavati.

vyañjanasya tarhi prāpnoti—‘abhaitsīt’,  
‘acchaitsīt’.

halantalakṣaṇā vṛddhir bādhikā bhaviṣyati.  
yatra tarhi sā pratiṣidhyate—“netī”  
(Pā. 7.2.4) iti—‘akoṣīt’, ‘amoṣīt’.

sici vṛddher apy eṣa pratiṣedhaḥ. kathaṁ?  
lakṣaṇam hi nāma dhvanati, bhramati, mu-  
hūrtam api nāvatiṣṭhate.

athavā “sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeṣu” (Pā. 7.2.1) iti sici vṛddhiḥ prāpnoti. tasyā halantalakṣaṇā vṛddhir bādhikā. tasyā pi “neṭī” iti pratiṣedhah.

asti punaḥ kvacid anyatrāpi apavāde pratiṣiddhe utsargo’pi na bhavati?

asti ityāha— “sujāte aśvasūnṛte”, “adhvaryo adribhiḥ sutam”, “śukram te anyat” iti. pūrva-rūpe pratiṣiddhe’ yādayo’ pi na bhavanti.

uttarārtham eva tarhi sijartham vṛddhi-grahaṇam kartavyam. sici vṛddhir avi-šeṣenocyate. sā knīti mā bhūt—‘nyanuvīt’, ‘nyadhuvīt’.

naitad asti prayojanam. antaraṅgatvād atrova niñādeśe kṛte’ nantyatvād vṛddhir na bhaviṣyati.

yadi tarhi sicy antaraṅgam bhavati — ‘akārṣit’, ‘ahārṣit’, guṇe kṛte raparative cānanyatvād vṛddhir na prāpnoti.

mā bhūd evam. “halantasya” ity evam bhaviṣyati.

iha tarhi ‘nyastārīt’, ‘nyadārīt’. guṇe kṛte-raparative ca anantyatvād vṛddhir na prāpnoti. halantalakṣṇāyāś ca “neṭī” iti pratiṣedhah.

mā bhūd evam, “lrāntasya” ity evam bhaviṣyati.

iha tarhi — ‘alāvīt’, ‘ayāvīt’. guṇe kṛte’-vādeśe cānanyatvād vṛddhir na prāpnoti. halantalakṣṇāyāś ca “neṭī” iti pratiṣedhah.

mā bhūd evam, “lrāntasya” (Pā. 7.2.2) ity evam bhaviṣyati.

“Irāntasya” ity ucyate, na cedam Irāntam.  
“Irāntasya” ity atra vakāro’pi nirdiṣyate. kiṃ  
vakāro na śrūyate? lupta-nirdiṣṭo vakārah.

yady evam—‘mā bhavān avīt’, ‘mā bhavān  
mavīt’—atrāpi prāpnoti. ‘avimavyor  
na’ iti vakṣyāmi.

tad vaktavyam.

na vaktavyam. ‘niśvibhyām tau nimā-  
tavyau’. yady apy etad ucyate. atha-  
vaitarhi niśvyoḥ pratiṣedho na vaktavyo  
bhavati. guṇe kṛte’yādeśe ca ‘yāntānām na’  
ity eva pratiṣedho bhaviṣyati.

evam tarhy ācārya-pravṛttir jñāpayati—  
‘na sicy antaraṅgam bhavati’ iti. yad ayam  
“ato halāder laghoḥ” (Pā. 7.2.7) ity akāra-  
grahaṇām karoti.

kathaṃ kṛtva jñāpakam? akāra-grahaṇa-  
syaitat prayojanam. iha mā bhūt—‘akoṣīt’,  
‘amoṣīt’. yadi sicy antaraṅgam syād akāra-  
grahaṇam anarthakam syāt. guṇe kṛte’-  
laghutvād vṛddhir na bhaviṣyati. paśyati  
tvācāryo ‘na sicy antaraṅgam bhavati’ iti.  
tato’kāragrahaṇām karoti.

naitad asti jñāpakam. asty anyad etasya  
vacane prayojanam. kim? yatra guṇaḥ prati-  
ṣidhyate tadartham etat syāt—‘nyakuṣīt’,  
‘nyapuṣīt’.

yat tarhi niśvyoḥ pratiṣedham śāsti. tena  
‘nehāntaraṅgam asti’ iti darśayati.

yac ca karoty akāragrahaṇam ‘laghor’ iti  
kṛte’pi.

Vārttika. tasmād iglakṣaṇā vṛddhiḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* tasmād iglakṣaṇā vṛddhir āstheyā.

*Vārttika.* ṣaṣṭhyāḥ sthāneyogatvād ig-nivṛttiḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* ṣaṣṭhyāḥ sthāneyogatvāt sarveṣām ikāṁ nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti. asyāpi prāpnoti— ‘dadhi’, ‘madhu’.

punarvacanam idāniṁ kimartham syāt?

*Vārttika.* anyatarārtham punarvacanam.

*Bhāṣya.* anytarātham etat syāt— “sārvadhātukārdhādhatukayor guṇah” eva iti.

*Vārttika.* prasāraṇe ca.

*Bhāṣya.* prasāraṇe ca sarveṣām yaṇām nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti. asyāpi prāpnoti — ‘yātā’, ‘vātā’.

punarvacanam idāniṁ kimartham syāt?

*Vārttika.* viṣayārtham punarvacanam.

*Bhāṣya.* viṣayārtham etat syāt — “vaci- svapi-yajā-dināṁ kitī” (Pā. 6.1.15) eva iti.

*Vārttika.* uraṇrapare ca.

*Bhāṣya.* uraṇrapare ca sarveṣām ṛkārāṇāṁ nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti. asyāpi prāpnoti — ‘kartṛ’, ‘hartṛ’.

*Vārttika.* siddhamtu ṣaṣṭhyadhikāre vacanāt.

*Bhāṣya.* siddham etat. katham? ṣaṣṭhyadhikāre ime yogāḥ kartavyāḥ. ekas tāvat kriyate tatraiva. imāvapi yogau ṣaṣṭhyadhikāram anuvartiyete.

athavā ṣaṣṭhyadhikāre imau yogav apekṣi-ṣyāmahe.

athavedam tāvad ayam praṣṭavyah— “sārvadhātukārdhādhatukayor guṇo bhavati” itiha kasmān na bhavati — ‘yātā’, ‘vātā’?

idam tatrāpekṣiṣyate—“*iko guṇavṛddhi*” iti. yathaiva tarhi idam tatrāpekṣiṣyate, evam ihāpi tad apekṣiṣyāmahe “*sārvadhātu kārdhadhātukayoh*” iti.

(*iko guṇavṛddhi*)

Since ‘*ik*’ has been read in the *sūtra* (the *au-kāra*, etc.) in ‘*dyauḥ*’ ‘*panthāḥ*’, ‘*sah*’, ‘*imam*’, in these also there would be ‘*ik*’.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—the rule of effectuation is made by nomenclature.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—only those that have been advised through the nomenclature will be allowed to take place.<sup>118</sup>

Is it necessary to decalre it? No.

How can it be understood without being told? By the very fact that the word ‘*guṇavṛddhi*’ has been read along with *ik*. If the word ‘*guṇavṛddhi*’ was not read with ‘*ik*’, how was one to understand that ‘*guṇavṛddhi*’ would occur in place of *ik*, but *guṇavṛddhi* was actually available from the context. Which context? Why, ‘*vṛddhir ādaic*’, ‘*aderīguṇah*’. Well, if in such a manner the contextual words are carried forward, then the word ‘*vṛddhi*’ would run along with the *sūtra* *aderīguṇah* and ‘*at*’ and ‘*en*’, will be both *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—the contextual continuity will be in the inter-related form.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—it is the inter-related whole that will be continued — “*vṛddhir ādaic*,” “*aderīguṇah*”<sup>119</sup>

In such case as in the rule “*iko guṇavṛddhi*” the word ‘*guṇavṛddhi*’ is continued and ‘*ādaic*’ ceases.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—the contunuity has frog-like gait.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)— or rather the continuity jumps like a frog just as the frogs jump from place to place. So does the continuity.

118. We had first the rule “*vṛddhir ādaic*”, then the rule ‘*aderīguṇah*’; the words ‘*vṛddhi*’ and ‘*guṇa*’ would have been easily transmitted to the next *sūtra* and in that case it was sufficient, if that *sūtra* was read as merely ‘*ikah*’ in that case what is the meaning that the word ‘*guṇa-vṛddhi*’ should again be read with ‘*ikah*’. The interpretation is that those of which the names or symbols have been defined as *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*, will only take place in place of *ik*.

119. It is said here that since the rule runs as “*vṛddhir ādaic*” the continuity can only be of *vṛddhi* as associated with *ādaic*.

(The *Vārttika* says)— or rather the three are connected in one.

(The *Bhāṣya* runs) — or rather the three may be united together—

“*vṛddhir ādaic*”, “*adeinguṇah*” and “*iko guṇavṛddhi*”. If the three are taken together as one, there cannot be continuity of ‘*adhikāra*’.<sup>120</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* further says)—in such a case there being no *ca-kāra* and to connect the two, the latter may be taken as the exception to the former just as what is prescribed by general rule is nullified by special rule acting as exception. There will be no *ca-kāra* from another *saṃjñā*. There cannot be a joining together of the two and it would as if the original instruction of *vṛddhi* is contradicted by the nomenclature of *guṇa* just as a general rule is nullified by a special rule. Or rather, as we shall say later on, it is the prescriptions that are continued. But merely by being continued nothing can be regarded as a prescription: for that one has to make a special effort.<sup>121</sup>

Or rather both the words *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* may be regarded as having ceased (to operate in the next rule ‘*iko gunavṛddhi*’). So the word ‘*ikah*’

120. The solution proposed was that the three *sūtras* might be regarded as forming one whole, but there can be no internal unity of meaning between the *sūtras* which can hold them together as forming parts of a complex proposition: for, “*vṛddhir ādaic*” cannot be united with ‘*adeinguṇah*’ and neither of them can be united with “*iko guṇavṛddhi*”. For this reason the proposed solution cannot work.

121. There is a rule “*dhānyānām bhavane kṣetre khañ*”(5.2.1). The suffix ‘*khañ*’ is added to special kinds of seeds to denote the field in which they are grown. After this in the same meaning ‘*thak*’ and ‘*yat*’ are prescribed respectively to ‘*vṛhi-śāli*’ and ‘*yava*’, ‘*yavaka*’, ‘*śaṣṭhika*’. The fourth rule is “*vibhāṣā tila-māsa-umā-bhaṅga-anubhyah*”—to the words ‘*tila*’, ‘*māsa*’, ‘*umā*’, ‘*bhaṅga*’ and ‘*anu*’ there will be optionally the ‘*yat*’- suffix to denote the field in which they are grown. Now, ‘*tila*’ and ‘*māsa*’ are seeds and they might have ‘*khañ*’ by the rule “*dhānyānām bhavane*” etc. (5.2.1); but ‘*umā*’ and ‘*bhaṅga*’ not being grain seeds (‘*umā*’ means lincid and ‘*bhaṅga*’ means hemp) there could not be any ‘*khañ*’ to it. But here the ‘*khañ*’ continues from the rule 5.2.1. But in the case of the previous two *sūtras* 5.2.2. and 5.2.3. where ‘*dhak*’ and ‘*yat*’ are prescribed for ‘*vṛhi-śāli*’ and ‘*yava-yavaka-śaṣṭhika*’ the ‘*khañ*’ has no continuity, for there has been no effort on the part of the writer of *sūtra* to carry on the continuity. But in “*vibhāṣā tila-māsa-umā-bhaṅga-anubhyah*” (5.2.4) the application of the term *vibhāṣā* (i.e. optionally) is an explicit hint that ‘*khañ*’ should continue in this *sūtra*. So here also the word ‘*vṛddhi*’ would have continued to the rule ‘*adeinguṇah*’ if there was any hint on the part of the master. But in the absence of that the word is not continued.

requires the words *guṇa-vṛddhi* to complete its meaning (as there is no continuity of *guṇavṛddhi* from the previous rules).<sup>122</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* introduces now another question)—how are we to interpret the sixth case-ending in ‘*ikah*’. There is a rule “*alo’ntyasya*” (1.1.52)—when any augment is prescribed with reference to a word in the genitive case, that augment is to take the place of the last vowel or consonant of the word in the genitive case. Now, if this rule is applied there is the occasion that *guṇavṛddhi* should take place in the place of the last consonant ‘*ka*’ of ‘*ika*’ which is in the genitive case in the rule ‘*iko guṇavṛddhi*’. Thus the *Bhāṣya* says—should this be regarded as taking place in place of the last consonant (of ‘*ik*’ by the rule “*alo’ntyasya*”) or should it be regarded as an exception to the rule “*alo’ntyasya*”.<sup>123</sup>

(The *Bhāṣya* further continues)—how should it be that it refer to the last member and how should it be regarded as an exception? If the two form one sentence that and this, the prescription regarding genitive case should be in the place of the last alphabet of the word in the genitive case. *ik* should have *guṇavṛddhi* with reference to the last alphabet of the word. In that case it becomes the best one.<sup>124</sup>

If the two are two different propositions—that and this, then the prescription takes place according to “*alo’ntyasya*”. There is the prescription that *guṇavṛddhi* should take in place of ‘*ik*’ and this is supplemented

122. The word ‘*apekṣīṣyāmahe*’ means that the word ‘*ikah*’ having been left alone is in await for some word to render itself significant.

123. The meaning of *śaṣṭhi* has been interpreted in two ways, as *sthāna-śaṣṭhi* and *avayava-yoga-śaṣṭhi*. The *sthāna-śaṣṭhi* is by the rule “*śaṣṭhi sthāneyogā*” (1.1.43) and the special method of the application of this rule is determined by the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” (1.1.52). If *sthāna-śaṣṭhi* cannot be applied here, then this must be in exception to the general rule which is always that of *sthāna-śaṣṭhi* and then this would be *avayava-śaṣṭhi*. This question is raised in the *Bhāṣya*, viz., should we regard it as a general case of *sthāna-śaṣṭhi* or should it be an exception?

124. There is no difficulty in the above construction. Here the *Bhāṣya* attempts to explain in what particular way the prescription of *guṇavṛddhi* should refer to the last alphabet of ‘*ik*’. He says this can be so if the two *sūtras* “*iko guṇavṛddhi*”, and “*alon’tyasya*” be regarded as forming one compound or complex sentence for in that case alone the meaning of the phrase “*iko guṇavṛddhi*” can be constructed in association with the phrase “*alon’tyasya*” so that the prescription may be said to occur with reference to the last (*śeṣa*) alphabet of ‘*ik*’.

by the further provision and also with reference to the last alphabet. In this case this is an exception of that.<sup>125</sup>

What is the difference? (There are a number of rules such as “*mider gunah*” (7.3.82), “*mrjer vṛddhiḥ*” (7.2.114), “*pugantalaghūpadhasya ca*” (7.3.82) in which *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* are advised. Now, these *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* refer to ‘*ik*’ and this seems to be in opposition to the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” according to which a prescription with reference to a word in genitive case should apply to the last alphabet. Thus referring to this discrepancy the *Vārttika* says)—

(*Vārttika*:) If the prescription of *vṛddhi* and *guṇa* is to be determined by the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” then the *sūtras* that dictate *guṇa vṛddhi* with reference to *mr̥di*, *mr̥ji*, roots ending in ‘*puk*’ and having a short penultimate, the roots ‘*rcchi*’, ‘*dr̥si*’, ‘*kṣipra*’ and ‘*kṣudra*’ should read ‘*ik*’ along with it.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—If *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* is to be determined by the rule (“*alo’ntyasya*”) then in the case of the verbs ‘*mr̥di*; ‘*mr̥ji*’, roots ending in ‘*puk*’ and short penultimate, the roots ‘*rcchi*’, ‘*dr̥si*’, ‘*kṣipra*’ and ‘*kṣudra*’, the rules prescribing *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* should specifically mention ‘*ik*’ (i.e. that *guṇavṛddhi* prescribed by the rule should apply to *i, u, r, l* and not to the last alphabet of the root in the genitive case). The root ‘*mr̥di*’ should have *guṇa* by the rule 7.3.82. Here ‘*ik*’ has to be mentioned for ‘*ik*’ not being the last member the *guṇa* would not apply to it.

125. The point is that if the two *sūtras* are supposed to have different fields of application, they cannot be joined together. The difference between *sthānaśaṣṭhi* and *avayavaśaṣṭhi* is this: In the case of *sthānaśaṣṭhi* to which the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” refers, the *śaṣṭhi* or the genitive case refers to the *arīga* or the part, i.e. the last part or the last alphabet. A *śaṣṭhi* or the genitive case may have various senses, e.g., possession, proximity, collection, modification, parts, etc. The rule “*śaṣṭhi sthāneyogā*” (1.1.49) makes the *niyama* or restriction that though *śaṣṭhi* may be in various senses, yet it should be accepted in grammar only to have the sense of ‘*sthāneyogā*’, i.e. ‘in place of’. This ‘in place of’ is further modified by the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” which says that the augment should take place not in the place of the whole word, but in the place of the last alphabet of the word. But here since “*alo’ntyasya*” is not combined with “*iko guṇavṛddhi*”; the rule “*śaṣṭhi-sthāneyogā*” as determining the meaning of the *śaṣṭhi*, also does not apply. It is therefore an exception in which we may accept the meaning of *śaṣṭhi* as *avayava* *śaṣṭhi* and *sthāneyogā* *śaṣṭhi*. *Avayava-śaṣṭhi* means that the genitive relation applies severally to the parts of alphabets composing the whole of ‘*ik*’. The parts of which ‘*ik*’ is composed are *i, u, r, l*.

‘*Mṛji*’ should have *vṛddhi* by 7.2.114. Here also ‘*ik*’ has to be mentioned, for ‘*ik*’ not being the concluding vowel *vṛddhi* would not apply to it. There will be *guṇa* to roots ending in ‘*puk*’ and having a short penultimate. Here also ‘*ik*’ should be mentioned, for ‘*ik*’ not being the last member the *guṇa* would not apply to it. ‘*Rcchi*’ should have *guṇa* when ‘*li*’ suffixes follow. Here also ‘*ik*’ has to be mentioned, for ‘*ik*’ not being the concluding vowel *guṇa* would not apply to it. ‘*Drśi*’ would have *guṇa* if ‘*na*’ follows. Here also ‘*ik*’ has to be mentioned for ‘*ik*’ not being the concluding vowel, *guṇa* would not apply to it. The roots ‘*ksipra*’ and ‘*kṣudra*’ should have *guṇa* for ‘*ik*’ not being the concluding vowel, *guṇa* would not apply to them.<sup>126</sup>

(Thus the *Varttika* says)—in the case of those that do not end in ‘*ik*’ there is the occasion of the augment occurring in place of the whole word.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—in the case of the roots not ending in ‘*ik*’ the *guṇa* ought to take place in place of the whole word. ‘*yātā*’, ‘*vātā*’—why so? The sixth case in the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” refers to the last ‘*ik*’ and we have the case of a *sthāne ṣaṣṭhī* here. So whatever roots do not end in ‘*ik*’ should have *guṇa* in the place of the whole of it. This is no criticism. Thus just as the genitive in the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” refers only to ‘*ik*’, so where it is said that the *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* occurs in place of the part by *sthāne ṣaṣṭhī*, that part can necessarily be only the ‘*ik*’. Now that which does not end in ‘*ik*’, has no genitive case and so how can there be *guṇa*, or how can there be any substitution in place of the whole word? This is no criticism. Just as the genitive case would by the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” refer to the concluding ‘*ik*’, so would also the *sthāne ṣaṣṭhī* refer to the part of the word. So if there is a part which though forming the last alphabet is not ‘*ik*’; then there is no genitive case referring to it and consequently no *guṇa* or no substitution for the complete word.<sup>127</sup>

126. It seems that the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” can have its scope only where the root ends in ‘*ik*’. In other cases, the prescription of an augment can only apply in place of the whole word bearing the genitive suffix.

127. The point is this: according to the rule “*alo’ntyasya*” an augment directed to occur in place of a word in the genitive case, will take place with reference to the last alphabet of the word. Now when *guṇavṛddhi* is advised, *guṇavṛddhi* being of the nature of the vowel—*a, e, o, ā, ai, au* can only occur in place of the vowels included with any ‘*ik*’. According to the principle of “*sthāne’ntaratamah*” (1.1.50) when there is an occasion of the occurrence of many indiscriminately, the selection is made in

This is then no new criticism. What then? This fault appears to relate to the first. Thus we get that with reference to the verbs not ending in 'ik' such as 'mr̥di', 'mr̥ji' roots ending in 'puk' or short penultimate, 'ṛcchi', 'dr̥śi', 'kṣipra' and 'kṣudra' 'ik' should be definitely read in the sūtra and there is a chance of a substitution in place of the whole word.

There will be *guṇa* in place of 'mr̥di'. Here 'ik' being taken, the *guṇa* will not be with reference to the last alphabet. By the rule "alo'ntyasya" it cannot take place in place of the 'ik' that with which the verb does not end. Yet *guṇa* is advised, so this *guṇa* ought to be in place of the whole word and so everywhere. Then let it be considered as an exception.<sup>128</sup>

(*Vārttika*.) If it is held that the 'ik' whether it be an ultimate vowel or not (should have the transformation by *guṇa*). Then in the case of the rules "jusi ca" (7.3.83), "sarvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh" (7.3.84), the *guṇa* that is advised with reference to short vowels should have a prohibition affecting the application of *guṇa* to ultimate vowels. (This is explained by the *Bhāṣya* as follows):—

(*Bhāṣya*) If the *guṇa* is to apply to all 'ik' irrespective of its place, then in the 'jus' *vibhakti* and when suffixes of the 'sārvadhātuka' and 'ārdhadhātuka' type follow, the *guṇa*, that takes place in place of the short vowel, should be declared to be of the type in which the prohibition against

accordance with the principle that which is most proximate from the point of view of utterance, shall have preference in occurrence. Now, therefore according to what has been said in case of *guṇavṛddhi* "alo'ntyasya" and therefore "śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā" will always require for its field of operation, a word ending in 'ik'. In the case of words not ending in 'ik' neither the genitive case rule "śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā", nor the rule "alo'ntyasya" would have any application. Therefore in such a case there cannot be any occasion for *guṇa* or for substitution by the rule "śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā"

128. In the case of *avayavāṣṭhī* there is no scope for the rule "alo'ntyasya", for "alo'ntyasya" has reference only to *sthāna* *śaṣṭhī* but in that case the 'ik' which is not the concluding part of a verb, becomes also liable to *guṇa* transformation. But there are cases in which *guṇa* is advised with reference to the last 'ik', e.g. "hrasvasya *guṇah*" (7.3.108). In the vocative case the last short 'ik' of a word becomes replaced by a *guṇa*. Here we have the scope of the rule "śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā" and "alo'ntyasya". There is a rule "orguṇah" (6.4.146)— a *bha* ending in *u* will have the *u* replaced by a *guṇa* when *taddhita* suffixes follows. In this rule also "śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā" and "alo'ntyasya" have scope. From this point of view the replacement of an 'ik' which is not the ultimate vowel by *guṇa* should be regarded as an exception. The *Vārttika* now intervenes to criticise their view that the transformation by *guṇa* of a 'ik' which is not ultimate, should be regarded as an exception.

the transformation of the ultimate has been withdrawn.<sup>129</sup> When 'jus' follows, the ultimate 'ik' is replaced by *guṇa* and this leads to the forms 'ajuhavuh' (they offered oblations), 'avibhayuh' (they were afraid). So also 'anenijuh', 'paryaveviṣuh'. Here also it applies. Then there is the rule that when 'sārvadhātuka' and 'ārdhadhātuka' suffixes follow the ultimate 'ik' is replaced by *guṇa* 7.3.84 leading to the forms 'kartā', 'harta', 'nayati', 'tarati'. But then here also in 'ihitā', 'ihitum', 'ihitavyam'—there ought to be *guṇa*.<sup>130</sup>

There is a rule "hrasvasya *guṇa*" (7.3.108) when the vocative follows the ultimate short vowel, is replaced by a *guṇa*. Thus we have 'he agne', 'he vāyo'. But then we might have *guṇa* also in the case of the phrase 'he agnivit', 'he somasūt'. If there is *guṇa* when 'jas' follows, such as agnayoh, vāyavaḥ then there also ought to take place *guṇa* in 'Agnivitah', 'somasūtah'. Then there is a rule "ṛto ni-sarvanāmastiñayoh" (7.3.110); where a *sarvanāmastiñā-vibhakti* follows and when *ni* follows, the ultimate 'ṛ' of a word will be replaced by a *guṇa*, *ni* as in 'mātari', in *sarvanāmastiñā* as 'kartārah' by which we have the forms 'kartari', 'kartārau', 'kartārah'. But then there ought to be *guṇa* in 'sukṛti', 'sukṛtau', 'sukṛtah' (su + kṛ + kvip = *sukṛt*—the objection is that there ought to have been *guṇa* of the *ṛ-kāra* in *sukṛti*, *sukṛtau*, *sukṛtah*, for according to hypothesis 'ik' should have *guṇa* wherever it may occur). According to the rule "gher niiti" (7.3.111), when a suffix having a redundant *na* follows words called 'ghi', i.e., words having ultimate *i* and *u* not being 'sakhi' have their ultimate 'ik' replaced by 'guṇa' (for 'ghi-samjñā' see "śeṣo ghyasakhi" 1.4.7), *guṇa* occurs in place of the ultimate *i* and *u* and we have

129. If the description of *guṇa* is to be regarded as applying to all 'ik', then it has to be definitely stated that there is no ban to the *guṇa* occurring in place of 'ik' at the end of the verb as in the case of the rules 7.3.83 and 7.3.84 where changes of 'ik' are affected with reference to the last vowel.

130. The point of the augment is this—If the application of *guṇa* to non-ultimate 'ik' be regarded as being provided through exception then the injunction and exception together would make it such that *guṇa* will be applicable to all 'ik' ultimate or not. But in the examples are so given that where *guṇa* takes place in one case it does not take place in another. If in 'kartā' we have *guṇa* of *ṛ* into *ar*, then why not the root 'ihī' should have *guṇa* and the second *i* be replaced by *e*?

*agnaye, vāyave*. But why then you have not *guṇa* in ‘agnicite’ ‘somasūte’. By the rule ‘or *guṇah*’ (6.4.146: a *bha* ending in *u* should have its *u* replaced by *guṇa* when a *taddhita* suffix follows), we have *vābhravyah māṇḍavyah*. But why not in the case of ‘*sūśru*’ and *sauśrutah*’. This is no fault.

(The *Vārttika* here intervenes)— The reading of both ‘*puganta*’ and ‘*laghūpadha*’ in the *sūtra* “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*” (7.3.86) directs that the *guṇa* can also take place for ‘*ik*’ other than the ultimate ones.

(The *bhāṣya* says)—The *sūtra* “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*” (7.3.86) is for the purpose of restriction so that we have only a non-ultimate ‘*ik*’ of the ‘*puganta-laghūpadha*’ type that will be replaced by a *guṇa* and by no other non-ultimate.<sup>131</sup>

The *niyama* or restriction should apply to the first instruction. What is the first instruction ? ‘*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh*’. Then it follows that on account of the *niyama* we should not have any *guṇa* as in ‘*ihitā*’, ‘*ihitum*’, ‘*ihitavyam*’. In the case of roots beginning with a vowel the *guṇa* is unrestricted. (In that case) the *guṇa* can take place of the initial vowel

131. The concept of *niyama* should first be grasped. When there is a particular instruction to some particular effect and if there is again another instruction to the same purport, then it is to be understood that the first *vidhi* of instruction should have its application curbed or restricted to some extent. *Guṇa* was prescribed as taking place with reference to roots having ‘*ik*’ as its part when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow (*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh* 7.3.84). The next rule 7.3.85 is “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*”, i.e. when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow *guṇa* will occur in place of *puganta* and *laghūpadha* words. Thus the first rule was without any restriction, the second rule applies only to *puganta-laghūpadha*. If the first rule was unrestricted there was no necessity for the second rule for here also *guṇa* takes place when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. Consequently the conclusion is that the first rule is not unrestricted in its meaning. The restriction is to the effect that when *guṇa* takes place with reference to an ‘*ik*’ which is not ultimate that ‘*ik*’ must only be of verbs that end in ‘*pa*’ and have a short penultimate. So the rule “*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh*”, is the *vidhi* and “*pugantalaghūpadhasya ca*” is *niyama*. We know from the *Mīmāṃsā* *vidhi* and *niyama*. Thus ‘*vṛihīvahanyāt*’, ‘*vṛihī*’ mean the husked paddy seed. The ‘*vṛihī*’ could be unhusked in various ways, but ‘*vṛihīvahanyāt*’ is a *niyama* rule by virtue of which we are to understand that if ‘*vṛihī*’ is to be unhusked for sacrificial purposes, it should not be unhusked in any manner that one pleases, but that it should be unhusked in an iron or wooden pit, and then striking it with a heavy-mouthed hammer. *Vṛihī* unhusked for sacrificial purposes should be only of one type namely that obtained by hammering it in a pit.

in an unrestricted manner (i.e. such *guṇa* can take place of roots other than *puganta-laghūpadha*).<sup>132</sup>

If such a restriction is made, *guṇa* in case of *pugantalaṁghūpadha* verbs should take place only when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. But even on such an interpretation, the *guṇa* prescribed with reference to *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes, would be unrestricted and be applicable to non-ultimate 'ik'— 'ihitā', 'ihitum', 'ihitavyam'. But if both the restrictions are operative, i.e. *guṇa* should take place when *sārvadhātuka*, *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow only of *puganta-laghūpadha* verbs and only with reference to *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes *guṇa* is prescribed for *puganta-laghūpadha* verbs. Then also the *guṇa* when 'jus' follows, ought to be unrestricted and would also apply to non-ultimate 'ik'. Thus we have 'anenijuḥ', 'paryaveviṣuḥ'.<sup>133</sup>

(Thus after criticising the two views that sought to explain the rule on the basis of *apavāda* or exception he takes up the criticism of those that want to explain it on a *paribhāṣā* basis. Thus the *Bhāṣya* says)—This is then not to be taken to mean only the ultimate nor also its exception. They are two different maxims which are independent of each other.

The Kroṣṭriyas considering it a different *paribhāṣā* read a *vārttika* as follows. Owing to the restriction *guṇa* and *vrddhi* takes place by the

132. The conclusion so far attained may be stated as follows. The 'ik' may be ultimate, penultimate or initial. About the ultimate and penultimate 'ik', *guṇa* takes place everywhere. There is no restriction. And it is only in the case of the penultimate 'ik' that the restriction applies and *guṇa* takes place only in the case. A distinction is to be made between the two *niyamas* 'puganta-laghūadhasyaiva sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh' and 'sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoreva puganta-laghūpadhaya'. The first means— *guṇa* occurs only with reference to *puganta-laghūpadha* verbs when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. The other one means that *guṇa* takes place only when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow with reference to *puganta-laghūpadha* verbs. The distinction is clear. The second one means that *guṇa* takes place of *puganta-laghūpadha* verbs that can only be with reference to *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes. The second *niyama* is now discussed in the *Bhāṣya* as follows.

133. The root in 'anenijuḥ' is a *laghūpadha* and 'jus' is a *sārvadhātuka* suffix and therefore there is *guṇa*. In such words as 'he buddhe— buddhayah' the *upadhā* is not *laghū* and therefore the *guṇa* for the non-ultimate is not barred. For according to the second *niyama* *puganta* *laghūpadha* should have *guṇa* of the non-ultimate only in *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka*, but nothing is said about what is not *puganta-laghūpadha*. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the *guṇa* with reference to non-ultimate vowels.

principle of supersession or *vipratiṣedha*. The principle of supersession is not proper. (For the rule about it is, in case of equal mutual opposition, the last one should prevail, “*vipratiṣedhe param kāryam*” 1.4.2.). But here the prescription comes first and the *niyama* comes later.<sup>134</sup>

The word ‘*para*’ in the rule 1.4.2. means that which is desirable. In the case of equal mutual operation that which is desirable, takes place. In such a case also the word ‘*vipratiṣedha*’ would be improperly used; *vipratiṣedha* means the occasion of two contrary operations. There is no occasion for ‘*ik*’ here to be liable to two contrary oppositions. But *vipratiṣedha* is not necessarily the occasion for two contrary oppositions. It also means ‘impossible’ and here it is impossible. What is the impossibility? Here is the impossibility— ‘*vṛkṣebhyah*’, ‘*plakṣebhyah*’.<sup>135</sup>

Here thus we have ‘*vṛkṣebhyah*’, ‘*plakṣebhyah*’. There is once *sthānī* or term of operation and two augments. It is not possible that one term of operation should be replaced by two different augments. Here again ‘*medyati*’, ‘*medyataḥ*’, ‘*medyanti*’. There are two terms of operation and one augment. It is not possible that the augment should replace two terms of operation. This is the impossibility here. This being thus impossible it becomes *vipratiṣedha* or equal mutual operation of which the other meaning is impossibility.<sup>136</sup>

134. The *utsarga* and *apavāda*, i.e. the general and the special rule and the principle of ‘*antaraṅga*’ and ‘*bahirāṅga*’, i.e. internal and external operation do not come under the principle of equal mutual operation.

135. “*Ato dīrgho yañi*”, “*supi*” 7.3.101,102 when suffixes of the *sārvadhātuka* class beginning with ‘*yañi*’ follow, then words ending in a are lengthened. There is another rule 7.3.103 “*bahuvacane jhalyet*” which means that when a *suvanta* suffix in the plural number beginning with *jhal* follows, then the ultimate a of the preceding word should be changed in e. Now in the formation of the word ‘*vṛkṣebhyah*’ there is occasion for the operation of the rule “*ato dīrgho yañi*” etc. 7.3.101. In the case of the formation of the word ‘*vṛkṣeṣu*’ there is occasion for the operation of the rule “*bahuvacane*” etc. 7.3.103. In the matter of the formation of the word ‘*vṛkṣebhyah*’ there is occasion of the operation of both the rules (7.3.101 and 7.3.103). Consequently the second rule being the later one takes precedence and gets its operation.

136. The point raised is this: The root ‘*midi*’ has genitive case-ending. If this genitive case is an *avayava-śaṣṭhī*, then it will be replaced by *guṇa*. But if it is *sthāna-śaṣṭhī* then by the rule “*alo’ntyasya*”, *guṇa* should replace *da-kāra*. Now one *guṇa* cannot at the same time perform these two functions. Therefore there is an impossibility of operation. And if the word ‘*vipratiṣedha*’ means impossibility of operation as suggested above, then the rule “*vipratiṣedhe param kāryam*” ought to take its course here.

But even in such a case it is improper to urge that here is a case of impossibility of *vipratiṣedha*. *Vipratiṣedha* takes place there where in the same field two different operations seem to be equally liable, but that is not the case here. But such an occasion can be easily met as in the instance, ‘cayanam’, ‘cāyakah’, ‘lavanam’, ‘lāvakah’. But here also it is the *niyama* of the rule “alo’ntyasya” that becomes operative. If the *niyama* could not be applied then the original prescription becomes applicable. Since without the *niyama* the original prescription would have been applicable, the *niyama* should be regarded as having the status of an exception. The principle of ‘*vipratiṣedha*’ cannot be applied to principles that are related as *utsarga* and *apavāda*, i.e. general and special rule. If it is supposed that somehow there is scope for the operation of the rule “*iko guṇavṛddhi*” then just as through *vipratiṣedha*, *guṇa* is applicable in ‘*medyati*’, ‘*medyataḥ*’, etc. in place of ‘*ik*’. So here also in ‘*anenijuh*’ and ‘*paryaveviṣuh*’. This is behaving at pleasure. Once we qualify the ‘*ik*’ with the predicate advised and at another time we qualify the predicate advised by ‘*ik*’. The irregularity of behaviour is shown in this—in the case of the roots ‘*midi*’, ‘*mṛjī*’, the roots ending in *pa* and having a short penultimate, ‘*rcchi*’, ‘*drśi*’, ‘*kṣipra*’ and ‘*kṣudra*’, we are qualifying the ‘*ik*’ with *guṇa* and say that the ‘*ik*’ of these verbs becomes *guṇa*. But here again when ‘*jas*’ follows and when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow, we are qualifying the *guṇa* by the ‘*ik*’ and say that there is *guṇa* in the case of these verbs and they end in ‘*ik*’. Or rather in all these places it is the *sthāne* that is denoted. In the case of ‘*mideḥ*’, there is no suffix, it is ‘*mida eḥ = mideḥ*’, or rather it may be the sixth case. ‘*mit i = midi*’, then the genitive case *mideḥ*'. In the case of the rule “*puganta laghūpadhasya ca*” the interpretation is not that *guṇa* will take place with reference to roots having ‘*puk*’ in them and also a short penultimate. But then what it is? *puki antaḥ pugantah* where the end is in *puk* and *laghūpadha* mean a short penultimate, then “*pugantasya laghūpadhā ca*” where that which is *puk* in the end also a short penultimate, this must have to be interpreted in this manner. For if the existence of short penultimate were to qualify the verb as such, then *guṇa* ought to take place in ‘*bhinatti*’ and ‘*chinatti*’. In the case of ‘*rccha*’ also it should be read as *rcchati*, *r*, *r*, *ṛtam*, *rcchatyṛtam*. In the case of ‘*drśi*’ also, we have to split up. The *ṛkārānta* words have *guṇa* when *ai* follows. (The *sūtra* being “*r-drśo’ni guṇah*” 7.4.16 have to be split up into ‘*urani guṇah*’ and ‘*drśo’ni guṇah*’, *uh* is the genitive case of the root *r* in “*r-drśo’ni guṇah*”). So when *ai* follows the *r* of *ṛkārānta* roots will be

replaced by *guṇa* and we have the other rule by splitting up *drśāḥ*. When *ai* follows *drśa* will be replaced by *guṇa*. This replacement is of the *r* or *drśa*.<sup>137</sup>

In the case of *kṣipra*, *kṣudra* also, the interpretation is that of which the *yaṇādi* comes later, undergoes *guṇa*. It is explained so far. As this was sufficient to explain the fact that the *sūtra* again speaks of ‘*pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*’, there will be *guṇa* of the previous—naturally suggests its purpose, viz. that the *guṇa* should be only of ‘*ik*’ and not of any alphabet other than ‘*ik*’<sup>138</sup>

137. There is a rule “*sthūla-dūra-yuva-hrasva-kṣipra-kṣudrāṇām yaṇādiparam pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*” (6.4.156)—with reference to the above words when *iṣṭha*, *iman*, and *iyas* follow, the vowel of the first alphabet is replaced by *guṇa* and the *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* belonging to them is elided. So we have *sthūla* + *iṣṭha* = *sthaviṣṭha*, *kṣipra* + *iṣṭha* = *kṣepiṣṭha*. The phrase ‘*yaṇādiparam*’, means *yaṇ yaṇādir yasya tadrūpam param lupyate tataḥ pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*. This would mean that *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* will be elided and the vowel immediately preceding *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* will be replaced by *guṇa*. So in the case *sthūla*, *la* was elided and the vowel immediately preceding *la*, the long *ū* of *sthū* is replaced by *guṇa*. But what about *kṣipra*? The *ra* may be elided, but immediately preceding the *ra* there is *pa* and you cannot have a *guṇa* of *pa*. So the word ‘*pūrvasya ca gunāḥ*’ has to be taken by *yoga-vibhāga*. In one case for the words *sthūla*, etc. we have first the elision of *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* and then *guṇa* of the immediately preceding vowel. Then we have the words ‘*pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*’, in the case of ‘*kṣipra*’, ‘*kṣudra*’ etc. We have the first vowel that is to undergo the *guṇa*. In the case of the words ‘*kṣipra*’, ‘*kṣudra*’ the meaning of the phrase ‘*yaṇādiparam*’ is *yaṇāḥ*, *ādīḥ* (previous to *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* or *yaṇ*)—in the case of ‘*kṣipra*’, ‘*kṣudra*’ only *pa* and *da* are previous to the ‘*yaṇ*’. The ‘*yaṇādiparam*’ means following *yaṇādi*. Since *yaṇādi* means *pa* and *da* in ‘*kṣipra*’, ‘*kṣudra*’, ‘*yaṇādiparam*’ means the following *ra* which is elided (*yaṇādiparam lupyate*). The phrase ‘*pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*’ has reference to the *pūrva* or *yaṇādi* and what is *pūrva* of *yaṇādi* in *kṣipra* and *kṣudra*, the *i* and the *u*. These therefore undergo *guṇa* by the phrase ‘*pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*’ which is a part of the rule. This is summarised in the *Bhāṣya* that follows.

138. The point suggested is this: The word ‘*yaṇādiparam*’ is interpreted by the *Bhāṣya* as having two different interpretations. In the one interpretation *yaṇādi* means *yaṇāḥ* *ādīḥ* and *yaṇādiparam* means that which follows *yaṇādi*. The other interpretation is that of which *yaṇādi* is the sequent. Now in *kṣipra* *pa* is *yaṇādi* and *i* of *kṣi* is *yaṇādiparam*. According to the meaning of *yaṇādi* in the first interpretation there is elision of *ra* in *kṣipra*. According to the second interpretation *yaṇādiparam* means the *i-kāra* of which *yaṇādiparam* is the sequent, and *i* and *u* suffer *guṇa*. So it was unnecessary for the rule to add the phrase ‘*pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*’, for we get ‘*pūrva*’ by the interpretation of ‘*yaṇādiparam*’ as shown above. There is a maxim that if a direction is added where it is already patent it should be understood for a special purpose. Here the direction ‘*pūrvasya ca guṇāḥ*’ has been only repeated and therefore it indicates some special purpose.

(The *Bhāṣya* says that)—That purpose is this that it directs if there is any *guṇa*, that *guṇa* should apply only to ‘*ik*’ and to no other vowel or consonant.

(The opponent’s objection on the subject of *vṛddhi* is anticipated in the *Bhāṣya*. Thus the *Bhāṣya* says)—Why does the *sūtra* speak of *vṛddhi*? But why do you ask particularly of *vṛddhi* and not of *guṇa*? If there is any utility in *guṇa* the same may be in the case of *vṛddhi* what is the difference? There is some difference (says the opponent).

In the matter of the instruction of *guṇa* the *sthānin* (that which is replaced by *guṇa*) is not definitely mentioned. Therefore in every case for instructing the *sthānin*, the *guṇa* has to be mentioned. In instructing the *vṛddhi*, however, the *sthānin* has always to be mentioned, as in the following rules—“*aco ḥṇiti*” (7.2.115; words ending in vowels should have the vowel replaced by *vṛddhi* when suffixes having redundant *ñ* and cerebral *ṇ* follow, there is *vṛddhi* in place of the penultimate *a* such as *pācakah*), “*taddhīteṣv acāṁ ādeḥ*” (7.2.117; when *taddhīta* suffixes having redundant *ñ* and cerebral *ṇ* follows, then *vṛddhi* should be directed to the first vowel of the word). The answer is given by the *Vārttika*.

(The *Vārttika* intervenes) — The word ‘*vṛddhi*’ has been taken for a later purpose.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—The *vṛddhi* has been taken. What for? For a later purpose. The master will speak of exceptions (of *guṇa-vṛddhi*) when suffixes that have the redundant *ka* and *ñ* follow, so that it can apply also with reference to *vṛddhi* (so that the rule may apply to *vṛddhi* as well). What is the occasion of the *vṛddhi* when suffixes having the redundant *ka* and *ṇia* follow? For *vṛddhi* is directed to occur with reference to suffixes that have the redundant *ñ* and *ṇ*.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—That is for the root ‘*mrj*’.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—The *vṛddhi* has been directed with reference to ‘*mrj*’ without any qualification and rule “*kniti ca*” (1.1.5) is there to prevent the occurrence of any *vṛddhi* when suffixes having redundant *ka* and *ñ* follow—*mrṣṭah*, *mrṣṭavān* (no *vṛddhi* here, because there is *kta* and *ktavatu* suffixes which have redundant *ka*).

(The *Vārttika* again says)—(*vṛddhi* has been taken) for this also.

(The *Bhāṣya* says)—For this also, for the root ‘*mrj*’, *vṛddhi* has to be directed. There is no qualification for the *vṛddhi* of *mrj*.

(A qualification is introduced)—*vṛddhi* must be of ‘*ik*’ and not of non-*ik*.

(Again the *Vārttika* says)—If for the root ‘*mrj*’, then the meaning can be settled by the principle of ‘*yoga-vibhāga*’ or splitting up.

(*Bhāṣya*) If it is not of the root ‘*mr̥j*’, then let us split it up by ‘*yoga-vibhaga*’. *Vṛddhi* will occur in place of the vowel ‘*mr̥j*’ “*mr̥jer vṛddhih*” (7.2.114; there is a *vṛddhi* of the vowels in ‘*mr̥j*’ when suffixes having redundant *ñ* and *ṇ* follow and this *vṛddhi* applies only to the vowels). A *vṛddhi* is to be spoken of vowels ? Then how ‘*nyamārt*’ ? The ‘*at*’ also should have *vṛddhi*.

(Here *Bhāṣya* says)— What do you say ? In the case of modifications not affecting the ultimate, there can be operations in regions near about the ultimate.<sup>139</sup>

(Here the *Vārttika* comes)— The unreasonableness of prohibiting *vṛddhi* comes from the fact of its having reference only to ‘*ik*’. Therefore *vṛddhi* is conditional to ‘*ik*’.

(Now the *Bhāṣya* explains it)— The prohibition of *vṛddhi* is not reasonable. What is the reason ? Because it belongs to the ‘*ik*’ context. The prohibition would be of ‘*guṇa-vṛddhi*’ of those that have ‘*ik*’. In such a case, there cannot be any *vṛddhi* or ‘*ik*’ belonging to ‘*mr̥j*’ should have *vṛddhi* with reference to its ‘*ik*’. But here other grammarians have desired an optional *vṛddhi* with reference to ‘*mr̥j*’ when a suffix with an initial vowel followed *parimṛjanti*, *parimāṛjanti*, *parimṛjantu*, *parimāṛjantu*, *parimamṛjatuh*, *parimamāṛjatuh* - for solving these cases. So here also that has to be done and if that is to be done, one has to split up the *sūtra* ‘*mr̥jer vṛddhir acāḥ*’. The vowel of ‘*mr̥j*’ undergoes *vṛddhi*. Then we the rule ‘*aci kiniti*’ i.e., the suffixes having the redundant *ka* and *ṇia* and beginning with a vowel, ‘*mr̥j*’ should have a *vṛddhi*—‘*parimāṛjanti*’, ‘*parimāṛjantu*’, ‘*parimamāṛjatuh*’. Why is this ? For the purpose of restriction. In the case of *ka-it* and *ṇia-it* suffixes, *vṛddhi* should take place only with reference to suffixes having an initial vowel. From where is the *vṛddhi* restricted ? From *mr̥ṣṭah*, *mr̥ṣṭavān*. Then we have the option. It is only optionally that

139. This is a *paribhāṣā* which the *Bhāṣya* introduces in his interpretation of the rule 6.1.13 “*antyasamānadeśa*”— means the last alphabet and whatever is without any in conjunction with it. The point raised is in the case where there is an ‘*at* *āgama*’ in *vibhakti* such as *lari*; *luṇi*, etc. *vṛddhi* should take place before the ‘*at*’ takes place and therefore when ‘*at*’ is made, there is no occasion for *vṛddhi*. But then again the *paribhāṣā* has been raised by which cases of modification that does not take place with reference to the ultimate, may as well take place with alphabets near about the ultimate. But *Nāgeśa* points out that if *vṛddhi* is to be effected with reference to ‘*ik*’ only, it cannot apply to ‘*at*’ naturally. The present *paribhāṣā* occurs as *paribhāṣā* No. 103 in the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*. We shall take up a more elaborate examination of this *paribhāṣā* in connection with the treatment of the interpretation of *Bhāṣya* 6.1.13.

when suffixes having the redundant *ka* and *ṇa* and beginning with an initial vowel follow that 'mṛj' suffers *vṛddhi*—'parimṛjanti', 'parimāṛjanti'.

If the taking of *vṛddhi* is not necessary for 'mṛj' then it ought to be for 'sic'. When 'sic' follows *vṛddhi* has been enjoined in a general manner for 'sic' and that *vṛddhi* should refer to 'ik'. In which case the non-*ik* has the occasion for *vṛddhi*? The ākara has the occasion for *vṛddhi* as in 'acikīṛṣit', 'ajihīṛṣit'. This is not so. The occasion for elision will arrest it. Well, then it may be for *a-kāra* as in 'ayāsīt', 'avāsīt'. There is no difference here whether there is *vṛddhi* or not. Then it may be with reference to euphonic vowels. There are no roots ending in euphonic vowels. But it may be for that when *ḍha* is elided we have 'udavodhām', 'udavodham', 'udavodhā'. Not for this. (Being a rule in the *tripādī* it should be regarded as not having taken place at all, so) the elision of *ḍha* is to be regarded as not having taken place. That being ineffective it cannot be regarded as being in the end.<sup>140</sup>

Then the *vṛddhi* applies in the case of consonants such as *abhaitsīt*, *acchaitṣīt*. But this would be arrested by the rule that prohibits *vṛddhi* with reference to words ending in consonants (by the rule "neṭī" 7.2.4—a verb ending in consonants would have no *vṛddhi* when 'sic' with the augment 'iṭ' follows). But this prohibition is with reference to all that falls within the scope of the rule "neṭī" (7.2.4), *akoṣīt*, *amoṣīt*. But this ('neṭī') is a prohibition also of *vṛddhi* when 'sic' follows. How so? The prohibitory

140. The point is this: It was suggested that there was no root ending in a 'sandhyakṣara' (euphonic vowels), but taking the case of the word *udvodhām*, *ut* + *vaha* + *tām* we have the *aṭ* before *vaha* due to *lui*, we have *ut* + *a* + *vaha* + *tām*, then we have the rule "ho *ḍhaṭī*" when a *jhal* follows and at the end of a *pada* the *ha* is changed into *ḍha*)—thus we have *ut* + *a* + *vaha* + *tām*, then we have the rule 'jhalām jaso' 'nte' by which *ta* of *tām* is changed into *ḍha*, thus *ut* + *a* + *vaha* + *ḍhām*, then by "dho dhe *lopaṭī*" the first *ḍha* is elided, then by "sahi-vahor *odavarṇasya*" the *a* of *vaha* is changed into *o* and we have *udavodhām*. Now, since the elision of *ḍha* as well as the transformation are both ineffective or *asiddha* being in the *tripādī*, i.e. the last three chapters of Pāṇini (see *pūrvatrāśiddham* 8.2.1) we have the occasion of *vṛddhi* and the chance of 'vaha' being changed into 'vāha' by the rule "ato halāder *laghoh*" (7.2.7). Again when the *a-kāra* of 'vaha' is changed into *o*, we should have the occasions of *vṛddhi* as applying to *o*. This was the contention of the previous *Bhāṣya* that the injunction of *vṛddhi* has been declared definitely with regard to 'ik' in order to prevent *vṛddhi* of the euphonic vowels. It was first declared that no roots end in an euphonic vowel, but then even though they may not end so, there may be other occasions for effecting *vṛddhi* with reference to euphonic vowels as in the case of *vṛddhi* in place of *o-kāra* in *vodha*.

rule makes the general prohibition of *vṛddhi*. But it does not stop there. It moves about and does not cease for a moment.<sup>141</sup>

Or rather by the rule “*sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeṣu*” (7.2.1) we have the occasion of *vṛddhi* when ‘sic’ follows. This again is restricted with reference to verbs ending in consonant and this again is further restricted by the rule ‘*neti*’, (with reference to those that have the augment ‘*it*’). But does it so occur in other places that when an exception is ruled the general rule is also inoperative ? Yes, there is. ‘*Sujāte aśvasūnṛte*’. ‘*Adhvaryo adribhiḥ sutam. Śukraṇ te anyat*’. When the *pūrvavarūpa* is prohibited then the general rule prescribing ‘*āy*’, etc. also does not take place.<sup>142</sup>

It may be that *vṛddhi* has to be mentioned with reference to ‘sic’ for a later purpose. Firstly, *vṛddhi* is advised to ‘sic’ without restriction. Then it is prohibited with reference to suffixes having the redundant *ka* and *ni*—‘*nyanuvīt*’, ‘*nyadhvūt*’. There is no necessity for this. Here the fixing of the augment—*uvaṇi* being more internal, the verb no longer ends in *u* and therefore there is no *vṛddhi*.<sup>143</sup>

But then it may be by the rule that prohibits *vṛddhi* with reference to the words ending in consonants. Here then ‘*nyastārīt*’ ‘*nyadārīt*’. When

141. The prohibitory rule “*neti*” may seem to prohibit only the *vṛddhi*. This is expressed by the word ‘*dhvanati*’ in ‘*lakṣṇam hi nāma dhvanati*’. ‘*Dhvanati*’ means ‘speaks in an inarticulate manner’, i.e. it is not clear that it prohibits only the *vṛddhi* here. If it was only intended for that it could not make other prohibitions. But this prohibitory rule moves from one to the other. It not only thus prohibits *vṛddhi*, but prohibits it with reference to roots ending in consonants. This is the purport of the word ‘*bhramati*’. ‘*Bhramati*’ means ‘*sarvatra vyāpṛyate ubhayatrāpi vyāpārāt na ekatā viśrāmyati*’.

142. In the Vedic passage the word ‘*aśvasunṛte*’ follows the word ‘*sunṛte*’ i.e. a follows e. But the rule “*eco yavāyāvah*” (6.1.78) there e was expected to be ‘ay’. This was overruled by the rule “*eñāḥ padāñtād ati*” (6.1.109), i.e. when a follows the *ei* takes the place of both the vowels *ei* and a and we should have expected here *sujāte Śvasunṛte* (this being a later rule to *eco yavāyāvah*). But this rule is again negated by the rule “*pluta-pragṛhyā aci*” (6.1.125), this being a still later rule— by this rule the *pūrvavarūpa* advised in 6.1.109 is negated. Thus here when one prohibition is cancelled by another prohibition but still the general rule in “*eco yavāyāvah*” does not become operative and the e of ‘*sujātē*’ is not changed into ‘ay’.

143. *uvaṇi*— “*aci śnudhātū-bhruvāñ yvor iyañ-uvaiñau*” (6.4.77). There are the roots ‘*nu*’ and ‘*dhu*’ and in forming the ‘*lunī*’ we have the words ‘*anuvīt*’ and ‘*adhuvīt*’. It is suggested that there in order to prohibit the *vṛddhi* of ‘sic’ when suffixes having the redundant ‘*ka*’ and ‘*na*’ follow, the word *vṛddhi* has been taken in the rule “*sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeṣu*” but to this it is objected that the augment ‘*uvaṇi*’ being prior to ‘sic’ for the purposes of ‘sic’ the verb is supposed to be ending in *va* and therefore the question of ‘*vṛddhi*’ does not occur. ‘*uvaṇi*’ is *antaraṅga* with reference to ‘sic’ and we have the *paribhāṣā*—‘*asiddhaṁ bahirāgam antaraṅge*’.

we make the *guṇa* and root ends in *ar*, the *a* of *ar* not being an ultimate, there is no *vṛddhi*. The *vṛddhi* of words ending in consonant, is prohibited by “*neti*”. May it be so, but it may be by the rule “*ato Irāntasya*” (7.2.2; the *a* takes *vṛddhi* when it is the ultimate and is associated directly with *ra* and *la*). Here then ‘*alāvīt*’, ‘*ayāvīt*’. Here when *guṇa* has once been made the root ‘*lu*’ becoming ‘*av*’ can no longer be regarded as ending in *u* and there should be no *vṛddhi*. *Vṛddhi* will be arrested as the word ends in consonant by the rule ‘*neti*’. No, it would not be so. The rule “*Irāntasya*” (7.2.2.) will apply. You speak of ‘*Irāntasya*’, but this is no a *Irānta*. In the rule “*Irāntasya*”, *ra* is also included. But we do not find any *va-kāra* (*va* being elided by the rule “*lopo vyor vali*” 6.1.66). If so, then ‘*mā bhavān avīt*’ and ‘*mā bhavān mavīt*’. Here also there is occasion. (In ‘*sic*’ the root ‘*avi*’ will get ‘*āt*’ as an augment in the beginning and therefore it will be impossible to understand when there will be any *vrddhi*. or not and therefore in order to prevent the augment ‘*āt*’, the *Bhāṣya* uses the word ‘*māni*’. In the case of ‘*mavi*’, there was no such necessity of adding ‘*māni*’, it was added only out of uniformity).

It will be advised later on that there will be no *vṛddhi* for the roots ‘*avi*’ and ‘*mavi*’ (by the rule “*hmyantakṣaṇaśvasa-jāgr-ṇiśvyeditām*” (7.2.5—roots ending in *ha* and *ma* and *ya* and *kṣaṇa*, *śvasa*, *jāgr*, *ni*, *śvi*, and those having a redundant *e* should not undergo any *vrddhi* in the *parasmaipada* when a *sic* with an augment ‘*īf*’ follows). This is a restriction to the rule “*ato halāder laghoḥ*” (7.2.7) by which one could have *vrddhi* optionally. It also restricts the *vṛddhi* by “*ato Irāntasya*” (7.2.2). Then that ought to be said. No. Instead of *ni*, *śvi* ( in the rule “*hmyantakṣaṇa-jāgr*” etc.) one should read ‘*avi*’, ‘*mavi*’. Then one should have to declare separately the prohibition regarding *ni*, *śvi*. No. When *guṇa* is made and the *e* is changed into ‘*ay*’, then there will be prohibition by the rule “*yāntānām na*” (i.e. ‘*hmyanta-kṣaṇaśvasa*’ etc. 7.2.5) then the manner of the master shows that the ‘*antaraṅga bahiraṅga*’ rule does not apply in ‘*sic*’, and for this reason in the rule “*ato halāder laghoḥ*”, *a* has been definitely mentioned. How does it indicate anything ? For this purpose that there may not be any *vṛddhi* in ‘*akoṣīt*’, ‘*amoṣīt*’. If the *antaraṅga* rule had applied in ‘*sic*’, then the reading of *a* in “*ato halāder laghoḥ*” would be unnecessary, for when *guṇa* is made the vowel would be long and therefore there will be *vṛddhi*. Therefore the master shows here (by taking *a* in “*ato halāder laghoḥ*”) that there will be no *antaraṅga* rule in ‘*sic*’. Therefore he reads *a* in “*ato halāder laghoḥ*”. This does not indicate anything. Let there be something else for which it is done. What is that ? It is for those cases in which *guṇa* is

prohibited. Thus it may be for 'nyakutīt', 'nyaputīt', that *vṛddhi* for *ni*, *śvi* has been prohibited, it is for the purpose of showing that with reference to 'sic', the *antaranga* principle does not apply. This is evident that the master speaks of even when he has already mentioned that the operation should be of short vowels.

(Here comes the conclusive *Vārttika*)—For all these reasons *vṛddhi* should be only with reference to 'ik'.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains)—therefore the *vṛddhi* should be with reference to 'ik'.

(The opponent's view is again ushered in by the *Vārttika*)—since *saṣṭhi* has been marked as being *sthāneyoga*, there is prohibition of 'ik'.

If the genitive in 'ikah' is to be understood in the meaning of 'sthāneyoga', then everywhere the 'ik' ceases and here also it applies in 'dadhī', 'madhu'. Why is again *guṇa* taken up (as in 'mr̥der (guṇah)' ?

(Now the *Vārttika* says)—This may have been taken up for another purpose.

(*Bhāṣya*:) It may be another purpose, so that in case of *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka vibhaktis* there may be only *guṇa*.

(The *Vārttika* intervenes)—and in the case of expansion.

(*Bhāṣya*:) In the case of expansion (*samprasāraṇa*) all alphabets included in 'yan' should cease. Then it may be also in the case of 'yātā', 'vātā'. (Another objection is anticipated). Then, why is it taken again ?

(The *Vārttika* intervenes)—It may have been taken again for regulating the nature of conditions.

For regulating the nature of conditions as in "vacisvapiyajādīnām kitī" (6.1.15) only (—in the case of the roots *vac*, *svap*, *yaj*, etc. there is *samprasāraṇa* or expansion when a suffix with redundant *ka*—*samprasāraṇa* means the replacement of *ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la* by *i*, *u*, *r̥*, *l̥*, e.g. *vac* + *kta* = *ukta*).

(*Vārttika*) For the rule "uraṇ raparah" (1.1.51).

(*Bhāṣya*) In the rule "uraṇ raparah" (1.1.51), all *r̥* should cease. Here also there is occasion, *kartṛ*, *hṛtṛ*.

(*Vārttika*) The difficulty will be solved if *saṣṭhi* is taken as *adhibhāra*.

(*Bhāṣya*) The difficulty is solved. How ? In the genitive as *adhibhāra* these further should be added in those places. These also should come in, whenever there is genitive case. Or rather when there is the sixth case there would be these two additional prescriptions. Or rather this has to be asked. If there is *guṇa* in the case of *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes, why not here in 'yātā' and 'vātā'? Because it refers to "iko gunavṛddhi"

As this awaits that, so here also we shall refer to the rule “sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh” (7.3.84).<sup>144</sup>

144. In “iko guṇa-vṛddhi” it is first suggested that *vṛddhi* has been spoken of as referring to ‘*ik*’ and that is for advising *vṛddhi* in the case of ‘*sic*’ in *lun*. *vṛddhi* has been advised to ‘*sic*’ with reference to ‘*ik*’ and that should not take place in the case of *k-it* suffixes as in the *lun* of ‘*nu*’ or ‘*dhū*’, e.g. ‘*nyanuvīt*’ and ‘*nyadhuvīt*’. But this view is rejected, for in both these cases, there is ‘*uvañ*’ augment by the rule “*aci-śnu-dhātu-bhruvāñyvor iyan-uvāñau*” (6.4.77) and this being an *antaraṅga*, the prescription of *vṛddhi* in ‘*sic*’ being *bahirāṅga*, will not have any effect, i.e., the verb would be supposed to be ending in *va* of *uvāñ* and therefore the *vṛddhi* consequent upon ‘*sic*’ will not apply as it has application only to verbs ending in vowels. But then there is the rule “*netī*” (7.2.4) which prohibits *vṛddhi* to verb ending in consonants. Thus the provisional conclusion is that the *vṛddhi* in *nyanyvīt* and *nyadhuvīt* is arrested by ‘*netī*’ and it has no utility in the case of “*sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeśu*” 7.2.1 as restricted by “*kniti ca*” (1.1.5). Provisionally it is also accepted that the *antaraṅga*-rule applies in the context of ‘*sic*’ (*sic prakarāṇa*).

Then it is suggested that *vṛddhi* has been taken for effecting the words ‘*nyastārīt*’, ‘*nyadārīt*’. By *guṇa* here we could have or and that would make the rule end in constant and hence make it liable to prohibition or *vṛddhi* by ‘*netī*’ (7.2.4), but the opponent suggests that *vṛddhi* might be affected by the rule “*ato lrāntasya*” (7.2.2). But how shall we then effect ‘*alāvīt*’ and ‘*ayāvīt*’? After effecting the *guṇa* the roots ends in ‘*av*’ and thus having an ultimate consonant has its prohibition of *vṛddhi* by ‘*netī*’. But in reply to it is suggested that *vṛddhi* will be effected by “*lrāntasya*”, for the *ra* in ‘*lrānta*’ is supposed to include *va*. But then there ought to be *vṛddhi* also in the case of ‘*avīt*’ and ‘*mavīt*’. But here it is suggested that ‘*avī*’ and ‘*mavī*’ should be specially prohibited. But there is no such prohibitory rule. But the *Bhāṣya* suggests here the opponent’s opinion that in the rule “*hmyanta-kṣaṇa-śvasa*” etc. (7.2.5), ‘*ṇī*’, ‘*śvī*’ should be replaced by ‘*avi*’ ‘*mavi*’. But then how to effect the prohibition in ‘*ṇī*’ ‘*śvī*’. Thus in having the *lun* of ‘*śvī*’ as ‘*āśvayīt*’, the ‘*śvī*’ has *guṇa* as ‘*śve*’ and *e* becomes changed in *ay*, then the root ending in ‘*ya*’ should be naturally ending in constant and has no *vṛddhi*. But this is in accordance with the provisional view that the ‘*antaraṅga*’ rule applies in ‘*sic*’, but we have the exactly opposite view that in the *sic-prakarāṇa antaraṅga* maxim does not apply. To the question as to why ‘*sic*’ should be taken as a sphere (i.e. context) where the *antaraṅga-bahirāṅga* maxim does not apply. The answer is that the fact that in this rule “*ato halāder laghoh*” *a-kāra* should be definitely mentioned in the *sūtra* to prevent *vṛddhi* in ‘*akoṣīt*’ and ‘*amoṣīt*’. Here *guṇa* is effected, we have ‘*koṣā*’ and the *o* of ‘*koṣā*’ not being a short vowel, there will be naturally no *vṛddhi*. But still that to prevent *vṛddhi*, the word ‘*ataḥ*’ should be added, shows that the *antaraṅga* *guṇa* is regarded as imperative before the *bahirāṅga sic*. This, therefore, indicates that the *antaraṅga* rule does not apply to the *sic-prakarāṇa*. Now this view runs counter to the provisional acceptance that the *antaraṅga* rule applies in the *sic-prakarāṇa* by which ‘*avīt*’, ‘*mavīt*’, etc. was explained by which again ‘*ṇī*’ and ‘*śvī*’ is suggested to be replaced by *avi*, *mavi* in the rule ‘*hmyanta*’ etc.

The *Bhāṣya* here suggests that the word 'ataḥ' in "ato halāder laghoh" has been given to prevent *vrddhi* in those cases where there is no *guṇa* as in 'nyakuṭīt' and 'nyapuṭīt'. But the fact that *vrddhi* has been prohibited with reference to 'ṇī', 'śvī', in the rule 'hmyanta' etc. shown that the *antaraṅga* rule does not apply in the *sic-prakaraṇa*. The conclusion as declared by the *Vārtika* is that *vrddhi* has to be declared to happen to 'ik'. We have seen that in 'nyanuvīl' the *vrddhi* had a chance of occurring in place of 'uvātī', yet the same *vrddhi* was prohibited by 'sici vrddhiḥ' where the direction was that *vrddhi* must take place.

The other point raised by the opponent is with reference to the genitive case-ending of the 'ik' in "iko guna-vrddhi". The opponent urges that since *śaṣṭhi* is *sthāne-yogā* we have *guṇa-vrddhi* in place of 'ikah'. Though *guṇa-vrddhi* could be got from the *adhikāra* by "vrddhir ādaic" and "adeṅguṇah", it may have been for the purpose that no one should have *guṇa-vrddhi* except that which is 'ik' and that whenever there is *guṇa-vrddhi* enjoined, the word 'ik' should naturally go there. The same maxim may be followed with reference to the rule "ig yanah samprasāraṇam" (1.1.45)—there should be 'ik' in place of 'yan' and this is called *samprasāraṇa*. Again, we have the rule "vaci-svapi-yajādinām kitu" (6.1.15) which means *samprasāraṇa* will take place with regard to the verbs—'vaci', 'svapi', etc. when a *k-it* suffix follows. This is limitation of the sphere. Having followed the same maxim one may apply the rule "uraṇ raparah" (1.1.51), which means that the 'aṇ' occurring in place of 'r' should be followed by *ra* and may be used to mean that *r* should cease and in place of it 'aṇ' should come, and of the three vowels 'aṇ' none being more in proximity to *r* than other, there is no rule which can determine which of the vowels of 'aṇ' should take place in which context in all such cases the maxim 'sthāne antarataṁah' applies, but there being no relative 'āntarataṁya' there is nothing for us to determine which *r* will be *ar*, which *ir* and which *ur*. Therefore in all such cases where there is injunction by *śaṣṭhi*, the special conditions have to be mentioned. There is a further point raised by the *Bhāṣya* that as the determining *guṇa* we have to mention the condition "sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh" so we have also to mention the fact that if *guṇa-vrddhi* is to take place it has to take place with reference to *ik* alone.

## SUMMARY

The whole discussion of “*iko guṇa-vṛddhī*” passes through many stages. The first point raised, is—why the word ‘*ik*’ has been taken in the genitive case ? The reply to this is that ‘*ik*’ has been taken in order to declare that *guṇa-vṛddhī* can take place only with reference to ‘*ik*’. Thus there is a “*yoga-vibhāga*” in the rule “*iko guṇa-vṛddhī*” — ‘*ikah*’ and ‘*guṇa-vṛddhī*’ — *guṇa-vṛddhī syātām* — there will be *guṇa-vṛddhī* — this is an injunction. *yadi guṇa-vṛddhī syātām* — then it will occur in place of ‘*ik*’, *tataḥ ika eva*. This interpretation is derived from indications of other rules. The ‘*ik*’ therefore has been taken to prohibit any *guṇa-vṛddhī* with reference to ‘ā’ and the euphonic vowel *e, ai, o, au*, and also the consonants. But now objections are raised by those who think that this *sūtra* is unnecessary. They say that it is certainly not for prohibiting *guṇa* with reference to ā-*kāra*, for had it been the case, in the *sūtra* “*āto-nupasarge kah*” (3.2.3) the suffix should not have redundant *ka*, for if *guṇa* could be adduced to ā-*kāra*, a will be reduced to *a* and this *a* with the *a* of the suffix will combine into one *a* by *para-rūpa* and we get such forms as ‘*kambaladah*’. By associating the suffix with the redundant ‘*ka*’, the elision of *a* has been enjoined. This injunction would have been unnecessary if *guṇa* could occur in place of ā. The associating of the suffix with the redundant *ka* would be unnecessary. This latter fact thus indicates that *guṇa* should not occur in place of ā-*kāra*. The prohibition cannot apply with reference to the euphonic vowels, for that has been well done in the *Śikṣā-prakarana*. It cannot be also for prohibiting the consonants. There is a rule “*janer dah*” (3.2.97) — the suffix here has a redundant *da* which indicates the elision of ‘*ti*’, “*aco’ntyādi ti*” (1.1.64; the portion of a word beginning from the last vowel is called ‘*ti*’, it is elided when a redundant *da* suffix follows, by the rule “*teh*” (6.4.143). If the *na* of ‘*jana*’ could undergo *guṇa* it would be *a* and the *a* of *ja* of *jana*, the *a* of *na* of *jana* and the *a* of the suffix would together form one *a* by *pararūpa* and therefore the fact that the suffix has been associated with redundant *da* (as in the case of the redundant *ka* of the suffix in “*ato-nupasarge kah*” suggests that no *guṇa* can be ascribed to consonants.

The *Bhāṣya* denies all this and justifies the existence of ‘*ikah*’ in “*iko guṇa-vṛddhī*”. The *k-it* suffix is not for indicating that *guṇa* would not apply to ā-*kāra*, but it is a *pratyaya* (i.e. a suffix) which is necessary in another rule (“*tunda-śokayoh*” etc. in 3.2.5). Being necessary in another

rule the *ka*-suffix had to be coined. Being coined once it has been applied in “āto’*nupasarge kah*” (3.2.3). In the rule “*gāpoṣṭak*” (3.2.8; the root ‘*gā*’ and ‘*pā*’ take the suffix ‘*tak*’ when there is a *karma* before it) ‘*tak*’ with a redundant *ka* has been prescribed to ‘*gā*’ and ‘*pā*’ preceded by an accusative case. The reference to this rule, however, rather strengthens the view of the opponents rather than the respondents.

Again, if by force of the ‘*śikṣā*’, *e*, *ai*, *o*, *au* were to remain unchanged then the prescription of ‘*ay*’, ‘*āy*’, etc. in place of *e*, *ai*, etc. would be inapplicable.

In the case of the consonants it cannot be said that the purpose of ‘*janer dah*’ would have been served by such a rule as ‘*janer guṇah*’, for how do we know that the *guṇa* would be *a-kāra* and not *e-kāra* or *o-kāra* for the rule of proximity does not apply in case of consonants as relating to vowels. So in the case of ‘*gamer dah*’ if we had said ‘*gamer guṇah*’, then we should expect *o-kāra* by the rule of proximity in place of *ma* and the form ‘*ga*’ would not be possible. For this reason the word ‘*ik*’ in “*iko guṇavṛddhi*” may be regarded as barring *guṇavṛddhi* to other vowels and consonants.

The opponent again persists in his objection and says that in the rule “*diva ut*” (7.1.84) ‘*ut*’ is prescribed in place of the *va* which is a consonant and *au* in a *vṛddhi*. To this the reply is that only those places where *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* are prescribed by the name *guṇa-vṛddhi* that we hold that such *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* can take place only with reference to ‘*ik*’. Here the rule does not say ‘*divah vṛddhiḥ*’, but ‘*diva ut*’. *Vṛddhi* has not been prescribed by the term ‘*vṛddhi*’ and therefore the condition of ‘*ik*’ does not apply here.

Again the *Bhāṣya* says that if instead of the rule “*iko guṇa-vṛddhi*” we had only *guṇa-vṛddhi*, then of which should we think that *guṇa-vṛddhi* has been prescribed. So by force of the proposition the ‘*ik*’ has to be supplied of which the ‘*guṇa-vṛddhi*’ take place.

Here another topic arises. The opponent says if the rules “*vṛddhir ādaic*”, “*adeñ guṇah*” follow in the next rule, or even if *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* follow from the previous rule then the form would be ‘*adeñ gunah vṛddhiś ca*’ which would mean that *at-eñ* are both *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*. The answer is that *vṛddhi* is taken with *ādaic* and therefore it cannot be separated from it and therefore it cannot relate itself to ‘*adeñ*’. Here leaving *āt* and *aic* we have only the continuity of *guṇa-vṛddhi*, or we may suppose that *vṛddhi* and *guṇa* has jumped off the previous *sūtra* to the *sūtra* “*iko guṇa-vṛddhi*”, or the three *sūtras* may be taken together as occurring one after another, forming one whole “*vṛddhir ādaic*”, “*adeñ guṇah*” and “*iko guṇa-vṛddhi*”

and therefore there is no continuity of any word from the previous rules, as the three may be regarded to form one compact body.

If *vrddhi* had come by *adhikāra*, then *vrddhi* and *guṇa* would have mutually contradicted each other and we could not get at any meaning. Moreover it is the instruction that continues, but there cannot be any instruction by mere continuity.

(See note of the relevant passage). Or, we may think that both *guṇa-vrddhi* have ceased to be continuous. Here another topic arises : 'ikah' is in the genitive case and of the various meanings of the genitive case the *paribhāṣā* rule "śaṣṭhi sthāneyogā" accepts only the meaning in place (*sthāneyogā*) of called *sthāne-śaṣṭhi*. The meaning of 'in place of' has been further modified by the rule "alo'ntyasya"— i.e. where anything is prescribed in place of a word it means in place of last alphabet of the word. But in the case of the genitive case in "ikah" we cannot accept the *sthāna-śaṣṭhi* rule. We may have here the case of *avayava-śaṣṭhi* and the genitive case applies to *i, u, r, l* separately as forming the *avayavas* or parts of 'ik'. Is this to be regarded as an exception to 'sthāne-śaṣṭhi'? In discussing this point the *Bhāṣya* says that if the rule "iko guṇa-vrddhi" was within the purview of the rule "śaṣṭhi sthāneyogā" and "alo'ntyasya"— then in the case of the principle of *guṇa-vrddhi* with reference to 'mṛdi', 'mṛji' and *puganta-laghūpadha* verbs 'ik' should have to be specially mentioned. Otherwise there will be no *guṇa* or *vrddhi* or *vrddhi* to the *ikāra* of 'mida' or the *r-kāra* of 'mṛja' for they are not ultimates and according to "alo'ntyasya" prescription can only take place with reference to ultimates. So also in the case of many other rules, such as "puganta laghūpadhasya", "r-dṛśo'mi", etc. The difference between the two views of *śeṣa* and *apavāda* raised before, is this—that in the interpretation of *śeṣa* the two prescription "iko guṇa-vrddhi" and "alo'ntyasya ca" are to be taken as one sentence in which the meaning turns to be the *guṇa-vrddhi* prescribed in 'ik' which would take place only with regard to the ultimate. In the other interpretation the two are two different sentences. First we have the unrestricted *guṇa-vrddhi* of 'ik' and then we have "alo'ntyasya ca" and also of the ultimate. In this case we have one general rule in "iko guṇa-vrddhi" and a special rule in "alo'ntyasya ca". One stands as the general rule and the other, the exception. The difference between the two views was affecting usage and the formation of *sūtras* is pointed out and the *Vārttika* and the *Bhāṣya* say that in the former view, i.e. when it means only the ultimate, in the rule mentioned above, i.e. 'mida-mṛja' etc. 'ik' should be mentioned or otherwise the vowels affected thereby by *guṇa* or

*vṛddhi* being non-ultimate should not be liable to such modification. Moreover in the cases of verbs not ending in 'ik' we should expect *guṇa* to take place as in the verbs ending in a in 'yātā', 'vātā'. There is another difficulty also: if, as in the *śeṣa*-view, the rule "alo'ntyasya" be read as forming one sentence with "iko *guṇavṛddhi*" then "alo'ntyasya" would have no application to cases not ending 'ik' and in those cases according to "śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā" the augment advised should have to occur in place of the whole word (*sarvādeśa*). The argument is refuted by the *Bhāṣya* on the ground that "alo'ntyasya" was read with 'ik' because 'ik' was in the genitive. So, 'alo'ntyasya' would join itself to every rule that have a word in the genitive case and thus there is no chance of *sarvādeśa*.

But then there is another objection. By the rule "mider *guṇah*" since 'ik' has to be taken here as specially mentioned, the *guṇa* cannot refer to the *antya* vowel, but by the rule "alo'ntyasya" *guṇa* cannot refer to 'ik' if 'guṇa' is prescribed. Then *guṇa* must therefore be in place of the whole word 'midi' (*sarvādeśa*) which is impossible. Thus criticising the *śeṣa* or the ultimate view the *Bhāṣya* is trying the *apavāda* view. Where in "iko *guṇa-vṛddhi*" *ik* is taken in a general manner applying to all 'ik' wherever it may occur and "alo'ntyasya" is taken as a *apavāda* restricting the *guṇa-vṛddhi* only to the last alphabet. But in that case *guṇa-vṛddhi* might apply indiscriminately to all cases whenever the 'ik' might occur. If there is *guṇa* in *kartā*, *hartā* and *sārvadhātuka* suffixes follow then there ought to be *guṇa* also in *ihitā*, *ihitum*. To this a partial reply is given at first. There is a rule "puganta-laghūpadhasya ca" (7.3.86), i.e. when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow, all verbs ending in 'puk' and with a short penultimate will have *guṇa*. Since we could have *guṇa* in all such cases by the rule "sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh" (7.3.84), the further injunction in "puganta-laghūpadhasya ca" mean that no *guṇa* with reference to verbs having a long penultimate as in 'ihitā'. Now, therefore, it comes to this that a restriction is on the rule "sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh" i.e. the *guṇa* prescribed there, may apply to ultimates and non-ultimates, but not to chose having a long penultimate. This is a *niyama* or restriction on the *guṇa*. When *sārvadhātutuka* *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow, *guṇa* is to occur only with reference to *puganta-laghūpadha* vowels. An alternative suggestion is made that *guṇa* will apply to *puganta-laghūpadha* vowels only when *sārvadhātuka*, *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. In this interpretation *guṇa* will be unrestricted with reference to *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes and in this case there will be chance of *guṇa* even in 'ihitā'. The two interpretations in Sanskrit stand as follows: One,

‘*puganta-laghūpadhasya eva sārvadhātukārdhādhātukayoh*’ and the second alternative is — ‘*puganta-laghūpadhasya sārvadhātukārdhatukayoh eva*. The ‘*eva*’ is taken in the first case with ‘*puganta-laghūpadha*’ narrowing the circles of verbs only to *puganta-laghūpadha*’ and in the second case ‘*eva*’ is taken with ‘*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh*’ and as such no restriction is made to *guṇa* when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhādhātuka* suffixes follow. Thus *puganta-laghūpadhas* may have *guṇa* as well as others. In such a case the objection is that there ought to be *guṇa* even in ‘*ihitā*’ where there is a long penultimate. The objection against this two-fold *niyama* that the *guṇa* in the case of *jas-vibhakti* becomes unrestricted and applies also to the non-ultimate.

Here the Kroṣṭriyas are supposed to make their comments. They hold that there is not a case of ‘*utsarga*’ and ‘*apavāda*’ or of ‘*śesa*’, but a case of *vipratiṣedha*. In the later *Bhāṣya* after some discussion the principle of *vipratiṣedha* is refuted. (See discussion in the previous notes).

The final suggestion of the *Bhāṣya* is that in each case it is definitely mentioned to which the *guṇa* or the *vṛddhi* would apply. Such as instead of “*mider gunah*” one should read ‘*midah er gunah*’ and so on.


After this, another discussion arises regarding *vṛddhi*. The opponent starts the objection that there was a difference between *vṛddhi* and *guṇa*. Where *guṇa* is spoken of, the *sthānin*, i.e. in whose place *guṇa* is to be, is not mentioned always in the *sūtras*. But in the case of *vṛddhi* the *sthānin* is always mentioned in the *sūtras* as in “*aco’ñpiti*” etc. Therefore the objection is that the word ‘*vṛddhi*’ should not have been mentioned in the rule “*iko guṇa-vṛddhi*”, for *vṛddhi* is always directed specifically in the *sūtras* prescribing *vṛddhi*.

They reply is that this is done for other *sūtras* such as “*kniti ca*” (1.1.5) which enjoins the prohibition of ‘*vṛddhi*’. Then again in the case of “*mrjer vṛddhiḥ*” there is no specific mention of the *sthānin*. Then follows a discussion— if the rule “*mrjer vṛddhiḥ*” could be so explained that for securing the *vṛddhi* or ‘*ik*’ in it, one should not use the word *vṛddhi* in “*iko guṇa-vṛddhi*”.

The conclusion is that there is no necessity of using the word *vṛddhi* in “*iko guṇa-vṛddhi*” for the sake of the word ‘*mrj*’.

The next suggestion is that *vṛddhi* may be taken for ‘*sic*’ for in the rule “*sici vṛddih parasmaipadeṣu*” the *sthānin* is not mentioned and there was a chance that if it was not mentioned that *vṛddhi* should take place of ‘*ik*’ in the cause of ‘*sic*’, one could have *vṛddhi* both for ‘*ik*’ and for ‘non-*ik*’. This discussion continues and the conclusion is that even for ‘*sic*’ there is

no necessity for using the word 'vrddhi' in "iko guṇa-vrddhi". The use of the word *vrddhi* in 'sic' is for other purposes, i.e. to rule out *vrddhi* in cases of suffixes having *ka* or *na* redundant. Then arises a criticism of this necessity leading to the discussion as to whether the *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga* rule should apply in the *sic-prakaraṇa* and the conclusion is that in the *sic-prakaraṇa* the *antaraṅga* rule does not apply and therefore the word 'vrddhi' in 'sici vrddhīḥ' is for the purpose of the rule "kniti". In that case ultimately the mentioning of the word *vrddhi* in 'iko guṇa-vrddhi' is justified.



## FOURTH ĀHNIKA

Panini.

### na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke. 1.1.4.

No *guṇa-vṛddhi*, when elision of *dhātu* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes).

The *sūtra* plainly means that there will be no *guṇa-vṛddhi* when roots are elided and when *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. The rules that determined *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* are “*tiñ-śit sārvadhātukam*”—(the *tiñanta* suffixes and suffixes having a redundant *śa* are called *sārvadhātuka*); “*ārdhadhātukam śeṣaḥ*” (all the other suffixes are called *ārdhadhātuka*). Suffixes were therefore twofold; ‘*tiñ*’ and ‘*śit*’ being called *sārvadhātuka* and the rest *ārdhadhātuka*. Now the question is—is *ārdhadhātuka* an adjective to *dhātulopa* or not, i.e. will the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi* as prescribed by the *sūtra* apply only to those cases where the *dhātu* has been elided on account of *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes and when such suffixes follow? Or whether the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi* should apply whenever an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows provided the *dhātu* has been elided? The elision of a *dhātu* generally means the elision of a part of a *dhātu*. To state it more clearly we know that the part of a *dhātu* may be elided either on account of an *ārdhadhātuka* or for other reasons. The *sūtra* is ambiguous. There is the phrase ‘*dhātulope*’ and the phrase ‘*ārdhadhātuka*’ and we do not know if *ārdhadhātuka* should be made adjectival to ‘*dhātulope*’, or the two should remain as if separate conditions. On one meaning the prohibition of *guṇavṛddhi* takes place only when such *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow that have been the cause of the elision of a part of the *dhātu* to which *guṇa-vṛddhi* is to apply. The other meaning is that there will be no *guṇa-vṛddhi* when a root has lost its part for whatever reasons, when *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. The whole of the *Bhāṣya* seeks to clarify the meaning by a reference to various usages.

*Bhāṣya*.

dhātugrahaṇam kimartham ? iha mā bhūt—  
lūñ—‘lavitā’, ‘lavitum’, pūñ—‘pavitā’,  
‘pavitum’,

ārdhadhātuka iti kimartham ? “*tridhā  
baddho vṛṣabho roravīti.* (R. V. 4.58.3) ”

kim punar idam ārdhadhātuka-grahaṇam

lopa-višeṣaṇam—‘ārdhadhātuka-nimitte lope sati ye guṇa-vṛddhī prāpnutas te na bhavataḥ’ iti, āhosvit—guṇa-vṛddhi- višeṣaṇam ārdhadhātuka-grahaṇam ‘dhātulope saty ārdhadhātuka-nimitte ye guṇa-vṛddhī prāpnutas te na bhavataḥ’ iti ?

kim cātah ? yadi lopa-višeṣaṇam—‘upeddhah’, ‘preddhaḥ’ atrāpi prāpnoti. atha guṇavṛddhi-višeṣaṇam —‘knopayati’ ity atrāpi prāpnoti. yathēcchasi tathā’stu.

astu lopa-višeṣaṇam. katham ‘upeddhah’, ‘preddhaḥ’ iti ? bahiraṅgo guṇah, antaraṅgah pratiṣedhaḥ—“asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge”.

yady evam, nārtho dhātugrahaṇena. iha kasmān na bhavati—lūñ ‘lavitā’, ‘lavitum’?

ārdhadhātuka-nimitte lope pratiṣedhaḥ. na caivam ārdhadhātuka-nimitte lopah.

athavā—punar astu guṇavṛddhi-višeṣaṇam. nanu coktam—knopayatīty atrāpi prāpnoti iti.

naiṣa doṣah. nipātanāt siddham. kim nipātanam ? “cele knopeḥ” (Pā. 3.4.33) iti.

parigaṇanaṁ kartavyam.

Vārttika.

yaṇyakkyava-lope pratiṣedhaḥ.

Bhāṣya.

yaṇyakkyavalope pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ. yañ—‘bebhiditā, marīmrjah’, yak—‘kuṣubhitā magadhakah’. kya—‘samidhitā dṛṣadakah’ valope— jīradānuḥ.

kim prayojanam ?

Vārttika.

numlopa-srivyanubandha lope’- pratiṣedhārtham.

*Bhāṣya.* numlope srivyanubandha-lope ca pratiṣedho mā bhūd iti. numlope — ‘abḥāji’, ‘rāgah’, ‘upabarhaṇaṇ’. sriveḥ—‘āsremāṇam’. anubandhalope—lūñ ‘lavitā’, ‘lavitum’.

yadi parigaṇanam kriyate, ‘syadah’, ‘praśrathah’, ‘himaśrathah’ ity atrāpi prāpnoti. vakṣyat� etat—“*nipātanāt syadādiṣu*” iti.

tat tarhi parigaṇanam kartavyam? na kartavyam. numlope kasmān na bhavati?

*Vārttika.* ik-prakaraṇān numlope vṛddhiḥ.

*Bhāṣya.* iglakṣaṇayor guṇa-vṛddhyoh pratiṣedhah, na ca eṣā iglakṣaṇā vṛddhiḥ.

yadi iglakṣaṇayor guṇa-vṛddhyoh pratiṣedhah, ‘syadah’, ‘praśrathah’, ‘himaśrathah’ ity atra na prāpnoti. iha ca prāpnoti—‘avodah’, ‘edhah’ ‘odmaḥ’ iti.

*Vārttika.* *nipātanāt syadādiṣu*.

*Bhāṣya.* *nipātanāt syadādiṣu* pratiṣedho bhaviṣyati, na ca bhaviṣyati.

yadi iglakṣaṇayor guṇa-vṛddhyoh pratiṣedhah, srivyanubandha-lope katham?

*Vārttika.* pratyayāśrayatvād anyatra siddham.

*Bhāṣya.* ārdhadhātukanimitte lope pratiṣedhah. na caiṣa ārdhadhātuka-nimitto lopah.

yady ārdhadhātukanimitte lope pratiṣedhah, ‘jīradānuḥ’ (RV. 5.83.1) atra na prāpnoti.

*Vārttika.* raki jyah samprasāraṇam.

*Bhāṣya.* naitaj jīve rūpam, raky etajjyah sam-pra-

sāraṇām bhavati. yāvatā ca idānīm raki, jīver  
api siddham bhavati.

katham upabarhaṇam ? bṛhiḥ prakṛtyan-  
tarām.

katham jñāyate — bṛhiḥ prakṛtyantaram  
iti ? acīti hi lopa ucyate, anajādāvapi dṛ-  
śyate—‘nibrhyate’. aniṣīti cocyate, idādāv  
api dṛśyate — ‘nibrāhitā’, ‘nibrāhitum’ iti.  
ajdāvapi na dṛśyate—‘bṛmhayati’, ‘bṛmhakah’  
tasmān nārthaḥ parigaṇanena.

yadi parigaṇanām na kriyate — ‘bhe-  
dyate’, ‘chedyate’ atrā’pi prāpnoti.

naiṣa doṣaḥ. dhātulopa iti naivam vijñā-  
yate — ‘dhātor lopo dhātulopo, dhātu-lope’  
iti. katham tarhi ? ‘dhātor lopo yasmiṁs tad  
idam dhātu-lopam, dhātulope’ iti.

tasmād iglakṣaṇā vṛddhiḥ.

yadi tarhi iglakṣaṇayor guṇa-vṛddhyoh  
pratiṣedhaḥ—‘pāpacakah’, ‘pāpaṭakah’,  
‘magadhakah’, ‘dṛṣadakah’—atra na prāpnoti.

allopasya sthānivattvāt.

Vārttika.

akāralope kṛte tasya sthānivattvād guṇa-

vṛddhī na bhaviṣyataḥ.

Bhāṣya.

anārambho vā.

anārambho vā punar asya yogasya nyāyyaḥ.

katham ‘bebhiditā’, ‘marīmṛjakah’,  
‘kuṣubhitā’, ‘samidhitā’, iti ? atrāpy akāra-  
lope kṛte tasya sthānivadbhāvād guṇa-vṛddhī<sup>1</sup>  
na bhaviṣyataḥ.

yatra tarhi sthānivadbhāvo nāsti tadartham  
ayam yogo vaktavyaḥ. kva ca sthānivadbhā-

vo nāsti? yatra hal-acorādeśah — ‘loluvaḥ’, ‘popuvaḥ’, ‘marīmṛjaḥ’, ‘sarīṣṛpaḥ’ iti.

atrāpy akāralope kṛte tasya sthānivad-  
bhāvād guṇavṛddhī na bhaviṣyataḥ.

luki kṛte na prāpnoti. idam iha sampra-  
dhāryam — ‘luk kriyatām allopaḥ’ iti. kim  
atra kartavyam ? paratvād-allopaḥ.

nityo luk. kṛte’py allope prāpnoti, akrte’pi  
prāpnoti.

lug apy anityaḥ. katham ? anyasya kṛte’l-  
lope prāpnoti, anyasyākṛte. “śabdāntarasya  
ca prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati”.

anavakāśas tarhi luk.

sāvakāśo luk. ko’vakāśah ? avaśiṣṭah.

athāpi kathamcid anavakāśo luk syād  
evam api na doṣaḥ. allope yoga-vibhāgaḥ  
kariṣyate —“ato lopah” (ato lopo bhavati).  
tato “yasya”, yasya ca lopo bhavati. ‘ata’  
ity eva. kim artham idam ? lukam vakṣyati  
tadbādhanārtham. tato “halah”, hala uttara-  
sya yasya ca lopo bhavati iti.

ihāpi tarhi paratvād yoga-vibhāgād vā  
lopo lukam bādheta—“kṛṣṇo nonāva  
vṛṣabho yadidam” (R. V. 1.79.2). nonūyater  
nonāva.

samānāśrayo lug lopena bādhyate. kaś ca  
samānāśrayaḥ ? yah pratyayāśrayaḥ, atra ca  
prāg eva pratyayotpatter lug bhavati. katham  
—‘syadaḥ’, ‘praśrathah’, ‘himaśrathah’,  
‘jīradānuḥ’, ‘nikucita’ iti ?

Vārttika. uktam śeṣe.

*Bhāṣya.* (śeṣe uktam) kim uktam ? “*nipātanāt syadādiṣu*”, “*pratyayāśrayatvād anyatra siddham*”, “*rakī jyāḥ samprasāraṇam*” iti. nikucite’py uktam. kim ? “*sannipāta-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittam tadvighātasya*” iti.

(*na dhātulopa*)

Why is the word ‘*dhātu*’ (in the rule *na dhātulopa* etc.)? So that there may not be in such cases as *lūñ*, *lavitā*, *lavitum*, *pūñ*, *pavitā*, *pavitum*.<sup>145</sup>

Why has the word ‘*ardhadhātuka*’ been taken ? “*tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti*” (Bound in three directions the bull roars)<sup>146</sup>

Had the word ‘*ardhadhātuka*’ been taken to qualify *lopa* ? (i.e. is it to be interpreted) as that there will be no *guṇa-vṛddhī* when there is a *lopa* in consequence of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix (or is to be interpreted as when there is a *dhātulopa* then the *guṇa-vṛddhī* consequential to *ārdhadhātuka*

145. There is a maxim that the grammarians consider it a source of great joy if they can do away with even half a syllable in a *sūtra*. Brevity is the sole principle in the construction of the *sūtras*. In the *sūtra* here there is a word ‘*dhātulope*’. The question is: could not have been the word ‘*dhātu*’ left out ? Even if the word ‘*dhātu*’ was not taken, the *ārdhadhātuka* might have been taken as adjectival to *lopa* and the meaning would have been ‘when in consequence of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix there is an elision? This was sufficient for the purpose. The word ‘*dhātu*’ could not have been taken to exclude the directive redundant syllables (*anubandha* or *it*), for it has been decided later on that the elision of such *anubandhas* should not be regarded as the elision of a part of a *dhātu*. Now in reply it may be said that the inclusion of the word ‘*dhātu*’ shows that the word ‘*ārdhadhātuka*’ does not refer to ‘*dhātulope*’ at its adjective, but as the adjective to *guṇa-vṛddhī*, i.e. there will be no *guṇa-vṛddhī* when *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow, provided there is *dhātulopa*. Or in other words ‘*dhātulope sati na ārdhadhātuke guṇa-vṛddhī*’. Under such a meaning it is obvious that *dhātu* has been taken along with *lopa*. Otherwise there will be doubt as to what kind of *lopa* is it that is to be regarded as a condition of a *guṇa-vṛddhī* when *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. We know that an *anubandha* is not a part of a *dhātu*, for they have been separated from the *dhātu* by the fact that they have been designated as ‘*it*’ in the original instruction of *dhātus*. Therefore in the root ‘*lūñ*’ the root is ‘*lū*’ and there is a ‘*ṭrc*’ suffix. So also is the case with *pūñ* where ‘*pū*’ is the root. *ṭrc* is an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix; but still there is *guṇa*, for there has been no ‘*dhātulopa*’. It has been already said that the elision of the *anubandha* does not constitute a *dhātulopa*, for *anubandha* is not a part of the *dhātu*.

146. Now, ‘*roravīti*’ is from the root ‘*ru*’—‘*rauti*’ —‘*roars*’, and the word ‘*roravīti*’ is formed by a ‘*tiñ*’ suffix which is *sārvadhātuka* and, therefore there has been *guṇa*. Had the *ārdhadhātuka* been not mentioned then the prohibition of *guṇa* would have been extended to *sārvadhātuka* suffixes as well. Now again another criticism follows.

suffixes will not take place. Here the word *ārdhadhātuka* has been taken as an adjective to *guṇa-vṛddhī*.<sup>147</sup>

What then ? If adjectival to *lopa*, the prohibition applies also in '*upeddhā*', '*preddha*'. If it is an adjective to *guṇa-vṛddhī*, then it ought to apply in such cases as '*knopayati*'.<sup>148</sup>

The *guṇa* is *bahirāṅga* and the prohibition is *antaraṅga* and there is the

147. The reader should note that the discussion alluded to in the preamble to our translation, commences from here. The views of two different parties have been clearly stated in the *Bhāṣya*.

148. *Upa + idhi + kta = upeddhā; pra + idhi + kta = preddha; ‘niindhī diptau’ = idhi* means ‘to shine’. The root ‘*idhi*’ gets a *num* augment by the rule “*idito num dhātōh*” (7.1.58) (the roots that have *i* as an *anubandha* gets the augment *num* of which *na* remains). The root ‘*idhi*’ now becomes ‘*indhi*’, *upa + indhi* or *indh + kta*; ‘*kta*’ is a *k-it* suffix and an *ārdhadhātuka* and by the rule 6.4.24 the *na* is elided in association with an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix that has a redundant *k* as in *kta*. The form is changed thus: *upa + idh + kta = upeddhā* — by euphonic rules. Now the point is that the *a* of *upa* and *i* of *iddha* has both together been replaced here by a *guṇa* according to the rule “*ādgunaḥ*” (6.1.87; when a vowel follows a *a* or *ā*, then the vowel together with the *a* or *ā* is replaced by one *guna*, *tava + idam = tavedam*). The commentators have raised points of discussion. The first point is that the prohibition of *guṇa* as directed here applies only to *guṇa* as occurring in place of ‘*ik*’, for there is a continuity of the rule “*iko guṇa-vṛddhī*” in this rule. But it is restricted in its sphere by the present rule “*na dhātulopa*” etc. “*iko gunavṛddhī iti sampūrṇam anuvartya yatredam tatra ‘na dhātū’ ity upatiṣṭhate*” — *Uddyota*). It therefore follows that there was no scope of *guṇa* here which could have been prohibited by this rule. It is true that in association with an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix there has been a *dhātulopa* (as the *na* in ‘*indhā*’ has been elided in association with ‘*kta*’ which is an *ārdhadhātuka*). But the rule by which *guṇa* has taken place here, is, “*ād gunaḥ*” by which *a* of *upa* and *i* of ‘*indhā*’ have been replaced by a *guṇa*. This rule could not have prohibited *guṇa* by “*ād gunaḥ*”, for that the ascription of *guṇa* there is not in place of an ‘*ik*’, and it is only the *guna* that occurs in place of an ‘*ik*’ that can be prohibited by the present rule. Hence this example is quite out of place. *Guṇa* could not have been arrested here under any circumstances. In defence of the illustration of the writer of the *Bhāṣya* it is said that this point need not be pressed, for the author of the *Bhāṣya* will give quite another explanation later on, and here is only a provisional criticism by the opponent. Dīkṣita in his *Śabda-kaustubha* makes another relevant discussion. Assuming for argument that this rule could prohibit *guṇa* by “*ād gunaḥ*” he raises the objection that the possible inadmissibility of ‘*upeddhā*’ and ‘*preddha*’ here as raised in the *Bhāṣya*, may indeed be regarded as unjustifiable. Thus there may be two views:

One, that the root ‘*idh*’ as first combines with the suffix forming the word ‘*iddha*’, the *upasarga* ‘*pra*’ then combines with and ‘*preddha*’ is formed; two, the *upasarga* ‘*pra*’ combines with the *i* of ‘*idh*’ and we have ‘*predh*’ and this combines with ‘*kta*’ to form ‘*preddha*’. In the first case the elision of *na* of ‘*indhā*’ is due to ‘*kta*’ and is

maxim “*asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge*” (*Paribhāṣā* 50 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*).<sup>149</sup>

If it is so, the word ‘*dhātu*’ should not have been taken (i.e. if the word ‘*ārdhadhātuka*’ is an adjective to *dhātulope*, then the word ‘*dhātu*’ should not have been taken).

Then why not here? (i.e. why does not the prohibition apply here)—in forming ‘*lavitā*’ and ‘*lavitum*’ in ‘*lūñ*’. The prohibition is only according to the interpretation adopted with reference to *ārdhadhātukas*

therefore an *antaraṅga vidhi*. In the second case, *guṇa* becomes *antaraṅga* and in both such cases a *guṇa* cannot be arrested. In the second case, the elision of *na* is a *bahiraṅga vidhi* and therefore the prohibition depending upon the *bahiraṅga* is also *bahiraṅga* itself and it cannot therefore supersede the *antaraṅga vidhi* of a *guṇa*. In the first place the *guṇa* is *bahiraṅga* and therefore it is superseded by the *antaraṅga* and therefore it does not exist when ‘*iddha*’ has been formed. It is a later operation and therefore, since it does not collide with the *antaraṅga*, the consequential operation on the *antaraṅga vidhi* cannot affect it. So here also the *guṇa* takes place. It is true that there has been no *guṇa* of *i* at the time of the formation of the word ‘*iddha*’, but if ‘*iddha*’ later on combines with *pra* to form ‘*preddha*’, how can the application of the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix arrest that *guṇa* which occurs in places of the *a* in *pra + i* in *iddha*. This combination is entirely irrelevant to the subject under discussion. Haradatta has suggested that this *paribhāṣā* of *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* has no application here by the *Paribhāṣā* ‘*nājānantarye bahiṣṭva-praklptih*’, i.e. when there is an operation concerning the replacement of two alphabets of two *padas* by one alphabet, then that becomes a *bahiraṅga-vidhi* and for this reason the *guṇa* in *preddha* is a *bahiraṅga-vidhi* and there that *bahiraṅga* cannot be overridden by the *antaraṅga vidhi*. But Haradatta’s view is criticised by both Kaiyaṭa and Dīkṣita. Kaiyaṭa says that this *paribhāṣā*, i.e. ‘*nājānantarye*’ should be so explained as to have application only in those places where a prescription is made regarding vowels and their proximity in a later operation and thus it has no scope here. It therefore has application in such *sūtras* as “*iko yañ aci*” (6.1.77). (See *Pradīpa* and *Śabda-kaustubha* for greater elaboration of this discussion which for our purpose is unnecessary).

We have now to turn to ‘*knopayati*’. There is a rule “*arti-hrī-vlī-rī-knuyī-kṣmā-yyātām puñnau*” (7.3.36). These verbs get the augment *puk* when ‘*nic*’ follows. The root ‘*knuyī*’ has *i* as *it* or *anubandha*. So the root stands as ‘*knuyī*’, when ‘*nic*’ follows as *pa* comes between the *i* of *nic* and after the *ya* of ‘*knuya*’. Then by the rule “*lopo vyor vali*” the *ya* is elided. Therefore we have a case of *dhātulopa* and an *ārdhadhatuka* suffix. Therefore according to the second interpretation (i.e. when *dhātulopa* and *ārdhadhātuka* are separate conditions or in other words, the *ārdhadhātuka* is an adjective of *guṇavṛddhi*) there is an occasion of the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi*. But there is *guṇa* here. We shall not further discuss this point here, as we shall have to take it up immediately later.

149. This remark is with reference to ‘*upeddhāḥ*’ and ‘*preddhāḥ*’. The relevant discussion has already been made in the note of that word in the previous section.

that produce an elision in the *dhātu*. But here in ‘*lūñ*’ the elision is not on account of a *ārdhadhātuka* suffix.<sup>150</sup>

Then let us take it (*ārdhadhātuka*) as an adjective to ‘*guṇa-vṛddhī*’ (the second alternative meaning). But the objection had already been raised that in that case the prohibition should apply and we cannot have the form ‘*knopayati*’. This is not a fault. ‘*Knopayati*’ can be supported by the special *nipātana* rule. Where is the *nipātana*? In the rule “*cele knopeḥ*” (3.4.33; i.e. when the root ‘*knuy*’ in the sense of making noise or moisten and associated with the suffix ‘*nic*’ has for its accusative a word denoting cloth. Then it takes the ‘*namul*’ *pratyaya*, if by it the extent of rain is understood. Here the word ‘*knopa*’ has been specially allowed and arranged for by its being mentioned in the *sūtra*. So the prohibition of *guṇa* here is arrested by force of this *nipātana*).

It seems that it is desirable to mention the list of those suffixes which produce elision in the *dhātu*.

(The *Vārttika* intervenes and says) — that the prohibition applies with reference to those *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes that produce the elision of ‘*yan*’, ‘*yak*’, ‘*kya*’ and ‘*va*’.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows) — The prohibition applies to the elision of ‘*yan*’, ‘*yak*’, ‘*kya*’ and ‘*va*’.

In ‘*yan*’ — ‘*vebhiditā*’, ‘*marimṛjāḥ*’, ‘*yak*’ — ‘*kuṣubhitā magadhakah*’, ‘*kya*’ — ‘*samidhitā dṛṣadakah*’, ‘*va*’ — ‘*jiradānuḥ*’. <sup>151</sup>

What is the use ?

150. The *ñ* of ‘*lūñ*’ is the *antarāṅga* and has been marked as ‘*it*’ in the Pāṇini’s rule 1.3.3 “*hal-antyam*”. It is according to that rule that it is elided. It is thus really a case of *anubandha-lopa* and not *dhātulopa* and has already been stated to be so in the early part of the *Bhāṣya* of this *sūtra*.

151. The *va* taken here for elision, is the *a-kārānta va* and not merely the consonant. It is by this means that ‘*srivi*’ is excluded from the *va*-eliding group. The word ‘*vebhiditā*’ is derived by applying ‘*trc*’ to the word ‘*vebhidya*’, we have ‘*it*’ here and the *ya* of *vebhidya* is elided by the rule “*yasya halah*” (6.4.49). When *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow then the ‘*ya*’ coming after a consonant is elided. In the word ‘*marimṛjā*’ we have first ‘*yan*’ by the rule “*yanō ci ca*” (2.4.74) — when a suffix with a vowel initial follows then the ‘*ya*’ is elided. So from the *yanānta marimṛjā* we have *marimṛjāḥ*. The words ‘*kuṣubha*’ and ‘*magadha*’ fall under ‘*kaṇḍvādī*’ list, and we have ‘*yak*’ by the rule “*kaṇḍvādibhyo yak*” (3.1.27). We have ‘*trc*’ suffix in the case of ‘*kuṣubhitā*’ and ‘*ṇvul*’ in the case of ‘*magadhakah*’ and the ‘*ya*’ in both cases is elided by ‘*yasya halah*’ mentioned above. In the case of the words ‘*samidhitā*’ and ‘*dṛṣadakah*’ the verbs ending in ‘*kyac*’ get the suffixes ‘*trc*’ and ‘*ṇvul*’ respectively and the ‘*ya*’ of ‘*kyac*’ is optionally elided by the rule “*kyasya vibhāṣā*” (6.4.50).

(Vārttika:) In order to restrict the prohibition in the cases of the elision of 'num', 'srivi', and the elision of *anubandha*.

(The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows)— So that the prohibition may not apply to where the elision of 'num' *anubandha* takes place. The case of 'num'-*lopa* is illustrated in 'abḥājī', 'rāgah', 'upabarhaṇam'. In the case of 'srivi'—āśremāṇam. In the case of the elision of *anubandha* as in 'num'—lavitā, lavitum.<sup>152</sup>

If this list is made then it applies here also. In *syadah* (speed), *praśrathah* (laxity), *himaśrathah* (the moon).<sup>153</sup>

These will be provided for as the cases of 'syadah', etc. are to be solved by *nipātana*. Then the list has to be made. No. Why there then the prohibition should not apply in the case of *num-lopa*.

(The Vārttika says)— *Vṛddhi* takes place in the case of *num-lopa*, because the prohibition only applies to *vṛddhi* in place of 'ik'.

(Bhāṣya:) The *vṛddhi* occurs only in place of 'ik', but this is not a *vṛddhi* in place of 'ik'. If the prohibition is to take place with reference to the *guṇa-vṛddhi* of 'ik', then in 'syadah', 'praśrathah', 'himaśrathah' the

152. The 'num' is the name for *na*. The examples of 'num-lopa' or *na-lopa* is to be made in the cases of 'bhañja' and 'rañja' by the rules "bhañjeś ca ciṇi" (6.4.33), "rañjeś ca" (6.4.26) and "ghañi ca bhāvakaṇayayoh" (6.4.27) i.e., the *na* of 'bhañja' and 'rañja' is elided when the suffixes 'ciṇi' and 'ghañi' follow. In the case of 'upabarhaṇam' the root is 'bṛṇhi' - *vṛddhau*, it being an 'id-it' root, it gets 'num' by the rule "idito numdhātoḥ" (7.1.58). By the Vārttika rule "bṛṇher acyanīpi"—when an 'anīpi' vowel suffix follows, then the *na* of 'bṛṇhi' is elided. The form 'āśremāṇam' is also read as 'āśremāṇam'. Here we have the 'manin'—suffix to 'srivi' and the 'ma' is elided. In all these cases we have the elision of a part of the 'dhātus, and if this list of cases where the prohibition does not apply, is mentioned, and also the cases where the prohibition applies, are stated, then there is no necessity of using the word *dhātu* in 'dhātulope'. But in that case the non-prohibition in the case of *anubandhalopa* has to be specially mentioned. The *va* in 'srivi' being in *upadhā*, should have been changed into 'ut' by the rule, "jara-tvara-srivy-avimavām upadhāyāś ca" (6.4.20). But this being a Vedic usage, such a transformation does not take place here.

153. The word 'syadah' has been formed from the root 'syand' with the suffix 'ghañi' in the sense of speed by the rule "syadau jabe" (6.4.28) which also directs by *nipātane*, the elision of *na* and the prohibition of *vṛddhi* as an exception to the rule 'na dhātulope' etc. The words 'praśrathah' and 'himaśrathah' are also formed by the rule "avodai-dhaudma-praśratha-himaśrathāḥ" (6.4.29) with the suffix 'ghañi' and *na* is elided and the prohibition of *guṇa* as provided for "na dhātulope" etc. does not occur by virtue of this *nipātana*.

prohibition of *vṛddhi* should take place and in the case of *avodah*, *edhah*, *odmaḥ* no such prohibition should take place.

(*Vārttika*) These cases of *syadah* etc. are solved by *nipātana*.

(*Bhāṣya*) The prohibition should take place in the case of *svadādi* by *nipāta*, and it would not take place.<sup>154</sup>

(*Vārttika*) Since the prohibition applies in the case *ārdhādhatuka* suffixes, it does not apply elsewhere.

(*Bhāṣya*) The prohibition applies only to those cases where the elision of a part of a *dhātu* is consequent upon the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix that follows. The elision of *srivi* and *anubandha* is not consequent upon an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix.

If the prohibition applies only to the elision of verbal parts consequent upon an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, then in the case of 'jīradānuḥ' the prohibition ought not to apply.

(The *Vārttika* says)— There is a *samprasāraṇa* of the root 'jya'.

(*Bhāṣya*) This cannot be derived from *jīva*. It is formed by the *samprasāraṇa* (expansion) of the 'jya' when the suffix 'rak' suffix follows. If it can be formed from 'jya' with the 'rak' suffix, it can also be formed from *jīva*.<sup>155</sup>

154. Another objection is raised: if the *guṇa-vṛddhi* refers only with reference to vowels *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *l*, of the 'ik' order, then how do you manage the elision of 'srivi' and the *anubandha* ?

155. An objection is raised that the prohibition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* is not really limited to the suffixes of the *ārdhadhātuka* class that induces the elision of the part of a root; for in the formation of the word 'jīradānu', there is the prohibition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* and yet *jīradānu* is formed from 'jīva' with the suffix 'radānu'. To this it is replied that *jīradānu* is formed from the root 'jya' with the suffix 'rak' by the *samprasāraṇa* of *jya* (*ig yaṇah samprasāraṇam* 1.1.45). But in the same way we can have *jīradānu* from the word 'jīva' by securing the elision of *va* by "lopa vyor vali" (6.1.66) when the suffix 'radānu' followed. The objection raised is that the elision *va*, a part of the root 'jīva' is by the rule "lopa vyor vali". This elision is not consequent upon an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, but still there is prohibition of *guṇa*. The reply was that the word 'jīradānu' is formed from the root 'jya' by *samprasāraṇa* and hence the above objection does not hold good. Nāgeśa comments here that we can form the word from 'jīva' also. The prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi* will then be due to the *vārttika*, but in the case of the elision of 'va' (whatever may be the cause) there will be the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi*. This further shows that the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi* should not be restricted only to those cases where the part of the root has been elided in consequence of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix.

How to derive *upabarhaṇam*? This is another verb. How do you know ‘*bṛhi*’ is another verb? The elision of *na* of ‘*bṛmhi*’ is advised before a suffix beginning with a vowel (*bṛmher acy anīti*), but we find the elision of *na* even before suffixes not beginning with a vowel as in *nibrhyate*, it is conditioned by the absence ‘*if*’, but the elision of *na* takes place here when the ‘*it*’ augment follows as in *nibarhitā*, *nibarhitum*. Again contrary to the direction the elision does not take place when it is followed by a suffix beginning with a vowel as in ‘*bṛmhayati*’, ‘*bṛmhakah*’. Therefore it is not mere counting any list (of operations where the part of the root is elided). But if such lists of operations were not counted, there ought to be prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhī* in ‘*bhedyate*’, ‘*chedyate*’.<sup>156</sup>

This is no fault. Root-elision does not mean the elision of root as being equivalent to root elision and then in root-elision—*dhātulope*. How then? That in which there is elision of root: the *vṛddhi* is to refer to the vowels within the ‘*ik*’-group.<sup>157</sup>

If the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhī* must refer only to vowels of the ‘*ik*’-group, then the prohibition ought not to apply in such cases, as ‘*pāpacaka*’, ‘*pāpaṭhaka*’, ‘*magadhaka*’, ‘*drṣadaka*’.<sup>158</sup>

156. The form ‘*bhedyate*’ is derived as *bhid + ṣnic + yak + te*. We have ‘*yak*’ (an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix by the rule “*sārvadhātuke yak*” 3.1.67) and on account of the *i* of ‘*bhedi*’, is elided. We have thus here a case elision of a part of the *dhātū* by an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, but still there is no prohibition of *guṇa* as in *bhedyate*.

157. If it is taken in the *bahuvrīhi* compound then the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhī* will take place under two conditions—firstly, that the elision of the root should be due to the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix and secondly, the *guṇa-vṛddhī* can only be of the vowels *i,u,r,l* or the *ik*-group.

158. In *pāpacaka* and *pāpaṭhaka* the *vṛddhi* is prescribed by the rule “*ata upadhāyāḥ*” (7.2.116); the penultimate *a* of verbs suffers *vṛddhi* when suffixes having a redundant *ñ* or *ṇ* follow. *Magadhaka* is formed as *magadha + yak* (*kaṇḍvādibhyah*) + *ṇvul*, *ya* is elided by the rule “*yasya halāḥ*” (6.4.49); *drṣadaka* is formed as *drṣad + kyac + ṣvul*, the *ya* of *kyac* is optionally elided by the rule “*kasya vibhāṣā*” (6.4.50). Let us take the problem in *pāpacaka*; the question is—there being no ‘*ik*’ here, *vṛddhi* cannot be arrested by “*na dhātulopa*” and therefore we should have *vṛddhi* by “*ata upadhāyāḥ*”. To this the reply is that we have the *yāniṇta* verb *pāpacya + ṣvul*; the mere consonant *y* is elided by the “*yasya halāḥ*” and we have *pāpacā - aka*. The ultimate *a* of *pāpacā* is elided by the rule “*ato lopāḥ*”. By the maxim of *sthāni* the elision of *a* is to be regarded as not having taken place. The root should appear as if it were *pāpacā* and there is no *upadhā* vowel under such circumstances and the rule “*ata upadhāyāḥ*” (7.2.116) has no field of application. If, however, in the root ‘*pāpacya*’ the ‘*yan*’ (and not merely the consonant) is elided, we have *vṛddhi* and the form with ‘*ṇvul*’ is *pāpacaka*.

(Vārttika here says)—Because the elision of *a* is to be regarded as having the portion of a *sthāni*.

(Bhāṣya:) When *a* is elided, this elision having regarding as being a *sthānin*, there is no *guṇa-vṛddhi*. (*sthāninā tulyam vartate iti sthānivat*, i.e. that which has the same status as a *sthānin*. *Sthānin* is that in the place of which something is directed). (See also rule 1.1.56).

(The Bhāṣya:) Or rather it is proper not to have made this *sūtra*. How then *bebhiditā*, *marimṛjaka*, *kuṣubhitā*, *magadhaka*, here also when *a* is elided, that is in whose place it being a *sthānin*, there is no *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*. The *sūtra* has then to be made for those places where there is no *sthānivadbhāva*. Where the *sthānivadbhāva* does not apply ? Where both the consonant and vowel are elided (as in the case of the elision of the whole 'yāñ')—as in *loluvah*, *popuvah*, *marimṛjah*, *sarisrpah*.<sup>159</sup>

Here also since *a* has been elided, there is scope for *sthānivadbhāva* and consequently no *guṇa-vṛddhi*.<sup>160</sup>

If 'yāñ' is elided, there is no scope for the elision of *ya* (by *ato lopah*). This should be attended to— elision is directed, have the elision of *a* by "ato lopah", because it is the later rule.<sup>161</sup>

The *luk* must take place always, (i.e. it cannot be superseded by any other rule). Even if you have the *luk* of 'yāñ' (2.4.74) you have the elision of *a* by "ato lopah" (6.4.48). But even *luk* is not unobstructed, the *luk* is for one purpose and the elision of *a* is for another purpose. A prescription that applies to other words, cannot be obligatory. The *luk* therefore has no scope of operation. The *luk* has sphere of application. Where ? Elsewhere.<sup>162</sup>

159. The words 'loluva' etc. end in 'yāñ' and then where the suffix 'ac' by the rule 'pacādyac' occurs, the 'yāñ' is elided by the rule "yoñō'ci" (2.4.74). In such a case there is no scope of *sthānivadbhāva*.

160. There is a maxim "ekadeśavikṛtam ananyavat"—that which is changed in part, should be regarded as if it were unchanged and hence the *ya* of 'yāñ' may be looked upon as being as much a *pratyaya* or suffix as *a*, and hence the elision of *ya* need not be treated as an example of *dhātulopa*.

161. The rule for the elision of 'yāñ' is 2.4.74 and the rule for the elision of *a* is 6.4.48. The objector says that the last being a later rule, should have preference by the rule "vīpratiṣedhe paraṇ kāryam" (1.4.2).

162. The drift of all this argument is that the author of the Bhāṣya thinks that the *sūtra* "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" is unnecessary, for its purpose can be served by the rule "ato lopah". There is a maxim among the grammarians that of the three sages—Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali that contributed to the completion of the

If for some reason the *luk* has no sphere of application, then also there is no harm. (We have first) the elision of *a*, then of *y* by 'yasya' in "yasya *halah*". By this the *luk* is contradicted (and its purpose served) and then 'after the consonant' (*halah*), i.e. a *ya* occurring after a consonant is elided.

Then here also either on account of having a later rule or because of splitting the rule (*yoga-vibhāga*) the elision by the word 'lopa' (in

Pāñinian school, the younger sages have greater authority than the older ones. Patañjali being the youngest, his authority is greater than both Kātyāyana and Pāṇini and Kātyāyana's authority is less than that of Patañjali but greater than that of Pāṇini. (*yathottaram muninām prāmānyam*).

The summary of the situation following the *Śabda-kaustubha* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita: The most important application of the rule "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" is in the formation of such forms as *lolupa* from *loluya* + *ac*. The argument in favour of retaining the *sūtra* is that the 'yañ' of 'loluya' is elided by the rule "yañ'ci ca" (2.4.74). This 'yañ' being a part of the *dhātu* and since it has taken place in consequence of the ārdhadhātuka suffix *ac*, the condition for the prohibition of *guṇa* according to the rule "na dhātulopa" etc. has been satisfied and consequently the rule is justified, for without this rule we could not secure the prohibition of *guṇa-vyuddhi* here. The *Bhāṣya* in repeating the necessity of retaining this *sūtra* says that the prohibition of *guṇa* here can be secured in another manner and therefore there is no necessity of having this rule. There are two rules — "ato lopah" (6.4.48) and "yasya halah" (6.4.49). Now the suggestion of the *Bhāṣya* is that the rule "yasya halah" may be split up as *yasya* and *halah*; with *yasya* we can attach "ato lopah" by continuity (*anuvṛtti*). The meaning then would be 'yasya ato lopah', i.e. the *a* of *ya* is to be elided. There being later rules (6.4.48-49) to "yañ'ci ca" (2.4.74), it takes preference and the *a* of 'yañ' is elided by this rule. By the rule "yañ'ci ca" then only the consonant *ya* is elided. 'yañ' was a part of the root 'loluya', but not the mere consonant, then also that *ya* is elided not because it is immediately followed by any ārdhadhātuka suffix, but it has immediately after it only its own *a* which, though elided, should be regarded as existing by the maxim of *sthānivadbhāva*. Thus *guṇa* will be prohibited as in *vebhiditā* and the *sūtra* "na dhātulopa" etc. will not be necessary. The *uvañ* also has been directed in association with the *a* of *yañ* which though elided, is regarded as being present in accordance with the 'sthānivadbhāva' maxim.

The *Bhāṣya* had at first fought in favour of *yañ luk*, but had eventually to give up the contention. His first argument in favour of *yañ luk* was that a *luk* has a superior prerogative and it can even arrest an *antaraṅga* operation as "antaraṅgān hi vidhīn luk bādhate". But then "ato lopah" is a later rule and shows a rift to multiply the preceding rule 'yañ'ci ca'. But then here is no case of multiplication ever, for "ato lopah" refers to the elision of *a*, whereby "yañ'ci ca" the mere consonant *ya* is elided. The two are for two purposes and they do not contradict each other, but only restricts the scope of the other.

The *Bhāṣya* points out that *luk* of 'yañ' takes place even if there is the elision of *a* and if there is no elision of *a*. Such a prescription is not absolutely obligatory, for there is a *paribhāṣā* No. 43—"śabdāntarasya ca prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati". This *paribhāṣā* means that a prescription which works in one connection as well as in other, is not obligatory. This *paribhāṣā* is particularly discussed in 1.3.60.

“atolopah”) will restrain the elision prescribed by *luk* (in “*yaño’ci ca*”) as in *kṛṣṇo nonāva vṛṣabho yadidam; nonuyate, nonāva*.

In such a case there will be no *vrddhi* by “*aco’ññiti*” (7.2.115)—when a suffix with a redundant *ñ* or *ṇ* follows, the ultimate vowel of the verb undergoes *vrddhi*, because the *a*, though elided, is to be regarded as existent by the ‘*sthānivaṭ*’ maxim.

In the same context one ‘*luk*’ is restrained by ‘*lopa*’. What is meant of ‘same context’?—As pertaining to some suffix. Here, however, the *luk* takes its place before the suffix comes. How then—*syadah, praśrathah, himaśrathah, jiradānuh, nikucitah*?

(The *Vārttika* says here)—it has been said about the rest.

(*Bhāṣya*) What has been said—The words ‘*syadah*’, etc. are explained by *nipātana*; with the suffix ‘*rak*’, *jya* undergoes *samprasāraṇa*. The maxim of *nipātana* will apply to all those places where the operation is independent of the suffix. So also in the case of *nikucita*. A prescription, that is to cause a combination, cannot also be the cause of its description.<sup>163</sup>

## Pāṇini.                    **kniti ca 1.1.5.**

Also when suffixes with redundant *k* and *ñ* follow (there is neither *guṇa* nor *vrddhi*).

The main purpose of the discussion in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika* is to discover whether the prohibition of *guṇa*-*vrddhi* is with reference to the immediately preceding ‘*ik*’ or to ‘*ik*’ which is not immediately proximate. Kaiyatā raises the distinction between a prohibition as applying to the act of prohibition or to the objects of prohibition. In the first case it would have applied to the immediately proximate vowel, whereas in the latter case it would apply to wherever there is the occasion and as much would apply also to the ‘*ik*’ in the penultimate. The seventh case in ‘*kniti*’

163. It is suggested that in ‘*nonāva*’ the ‘*yañi*’ is elided before the suffix is added—*bahula-grahanānuvṛtyā anaimittiko “antarañgo luk prāg eva pratyayotpatter bhavati”*—Kaiyatā. *Nikucita*—the *na* of ‘*kuñca*’ is elided by the rule “*aniditām*” etc. (6.4.24) when *knit* suffixes follow. Now when the ‘*kta*’ suffix follows, the root ‘*kuñc*’ becomes ‘*kuc*’ and thus becomes ‘*udupadhā*’ i.e., comes to have *u* in the penultimate and thus comes under the purview of the rule “*ud-upadhād bhāvādikarmaṇo’nyatarasyām*” (1.2.21), i.e. a root with *u* in the penultimate, may be followed by a ‘*niṣṭhā*’ suffix. But this ‘*niṣṭhā*’ also should be regarded as becoming ‘*kit*’ only optionally. Here the root ‘*vi*’ which becomes ‘*ud-upadhā*’ by virtue of being a ‘*kit*’ cannot itself be the case of its not being a ‘*kit*’ by the *paribhāṣā* “*sannipāta-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittam tad-vighātasya*” a prescription which is the cause of a particular operation, cannot itself again be the cause of multiplying it.

is ‘*bhāve saptami*’ which means ‘consequent upon’. Prohibition thus refers to the object of prohibition, that is, the ‘*ik*’, the meaning of the seventh case is *nimitta*, i.e. causal agent. The meaning thus is when a suffix which is ‘*knītī*’ follows as the causal agent, there will be *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* of the relevant ‘*ik*’ whether immediately proximate or not.

**Vārttika.** knīti pratiṣedhe tannimitta-grahaṇam upadhā-roravītyartham.

*Knīti* should be taken as a *nimitta* for extending the prohibition to the penultimates and for forming the word ‘*roravītī*’.

**Bhāṣya.** knīti pratiṣedhe tannimitta-grahaṇam kartavyam. knīn-nimitte ye guṇavṛddhī prāpnutas te na bhavata iti vaktavyam. kim prayojanam ?

**Vārttika.** upadhā-roravītyartham.

**Bhāṣya.** upadhārtham roravītyartham ca. upadhārtham tāvat—‘bhinnah’, ‘bhinnavān’ iti. kim punah kāraṇam na siddhyati ? ‘knīti’ ity ucyate. yatra knīty anantaro guṇabhāvīgasti tatraiva syāt — ‘citam’, ‘stutam’. iha tu na syāt—‘bhinnah’, ‘bhinnavān’. nanu ca — yasya guṇa ucyate, tam knītparatvena viśeṣayiṣyāmaḥ. puganta-laghūpadhasya cāṅgasya guṇa ucyate, ‘bhin-nam’, tac cātra knītparam.

puganta-laghūpadhasya iti naivam vijñāyate — ‘pugantasya aṅgasya laghūpadhasya ca iti. kathaṇam tarhi ? puki antaḥ, pugantah. laghvī upadhā laghūpadhā. pugantaś ca laghūpadhā ca puganta-laghūpadhaṇam, puganta-laghūpadhasya iti. avaśyam caitad evam vijñeyam. aṅgaviśeṣaṇe hi sati ihāpi prasajyeta—‘bhinatti’, ‘chinatti’ iti.

roravītyartham ca. “*tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti*.”

yadi tannimitta-grahaṇam kriyate, śacaṁ-ante doṣah —‘riyati’, ‘piyati’, ‘dhiyati’, ‘prādudruvat’, ‘prāsusruvat’, atra na prāpnoti.

In the prohibition depending upon the following of ‘*knīt*’ it should not be declared that the ‘*knīt*’ suffix here is the *nimitta* or a causal agent. The *guṇa* and *vriddhi* dependent upon the ‘*knīt*’ suffix, should not take place and this is for the purpose of extending the prohibition to the penultimate and for the formation of the word ‘*roravī*’. For the penultimate as in ‘*bhinnā*’, ‘*bhinnavān*’.

(Here the ‘*ik*’ of ‘*bhid*’ is a penultimate, but, thus though it is immediately proximate to the ‘*knīt*’ suffix ‘*kta*’ yet there is the prohibition of *guṇa*). For what reason does not the prohibition apply. Because the *sūtra* ‘*knīt*’, i.e. where there is occasion of *guṇa* in the ‘*ik*’ immediately preceding ‘*knīt*’ suffix, so the prohibition would apply only to ‘*citam*’, ‘*stutam*’.

Now it may be asked—we shall consider the ‘*knīt*’ to refer to all such cases where there is occasion for *guṇa*. *Guṇa* is prescribed for *puganta-laghūpadha* (roots ending in ‘*puk*’ and having a short penultimate— see 7.3.86).

(Two ways of interpretation of the rule are attempted, and the first is repeated). The meaning of the rule “*puganta laghūpadhasya ca*” (7.3.86) is not to be considered as— ‘of *puganta* roots and of the roots ending in short penultimate’. What then? *Puganta* means ending in ‘*puk*’; *laghūpadha* means, short penultimate; *puganta-laghūpadha* means *puganta* and *laghūpadha*, belonging to *puganta-laghūpadha vidhi*. It must be so, for if it referred separately to parts, then there should be *guṇa* even in ‘*bhinatti*’ and ‘*chinatti*’.

(The first point raised is that if it referred to the whole of *puganta-laghūpadha*, then it would not apply to where there is merely the ‘*ik*’. In ‘*bhinatti*’, ‘*chinatti*’, the ‘*ik*’ is not a penultimate).

And also for ‘*roravīti*’ (the root is a *yañanta* word, the *guṇa* is not due to ‘*yañ*’, but to the ‘*sārvadhātuka*’ suffix. If it is taken in the sense of *nimitta* as suggested, then there will be difficulty in case of the words—‘*riyati*’, ‘*piyati*’, ‘*dhiyati*’, ‘*prādudruvat*’, ‘*prāsusruvat*’. (The roots ‘*ri*’, ‘*pi*’, and ‘*dhi*’ are *tudādi* verbs and they get the *vikarana* ‘*śa*’. Here the *i*

of the root is separated from the *tiñ* suffix by the *vikaraṇa* 'śa', but still the prohibition of *guṇa* applies. But the point as explained by the *Bhāṣya* in the immediately later sentence is that the augment of 'iyan' by the rule "acī śnu-dhātu" etc. (6.4.77) is *antaraṅga* and the 'tiñ' is *bahiraṅga*. So 'iyan' first takes place and when it has once taken place, the *i* is no longer an *upadhā* and therefore prohibition by this rule is quite unnecessary. (The objection was that if 'knīt' be regarded as a *nimitta*, even then it cannot solve *riyati* etc.).

(To this objection the *Vārttika* says)—

*Vārttika.* śacaṅantasyāntaraṅga-lakṣaṇatvāt  
[siddham].

*Bhāṣya.* antaraṅga-lakṣaṇatvād atra iyañuvañoh  
kṛtayor anupadhātvād guṇo na bhaviṣyati.  
evam kriyate cedam tannimitta-grahaṇam,  
na ca kaścid doṣo bhavati.

imāni ca bhūyas tannimitta-grahaṇasya  
prayojanāni— 'hato', 'hathah', 'upoyate',  
'ayuata', 'lauyamāniḥ', 'pauyamāniḥ',  
'neniktaḥ' iti.

naitāni santi pryojanāni. iha tāvat—  
'hato', 'hatha' iti. prasaktasyānbhinirvṛt-  
tasya pratiṣedhena nivṛttiḥ śakyā kartum.  
atra ca dhātūpadeśāvasthāyām evākāraḥ.

isha ca 'upoyate', 'ayuata', 'lauyamāniḥ',  
'pauyamāniḥ' iti. bahiraṅge guṇavṛddhī,  
antaraṅgah pratiṣedhah. "asiddham bahir-  
aṅgam antaraṅge."

'nenikta' iti. pareṇa rūpena vyavahita-  
tvān na bhaviṣyati.

upadhārthena tāvan nārthah. dhātor iti var-  
tate. dhātum knīt-paratvena viśeṣayiṣyāmah.

yadi dhātūr viśeṣyate, vikaraṇasya na  
prāpnoti — 'cinutah', 'sunutah', 'lunitah',  
'punītah' iti.

naiṣa doṣaḥ. vihita-viśeṣaṇaṁ dhātugra-  
haṇaṁ—‘dhātor yo vihitah’ iti. dhātor eva  
tarhi na prāpnoti.

naivam vijñāyate—‘dhātor vihitasya kniti’  
iti. katham tarhi ? dhātor vihite kniti iti.

athavā kāryakālam saṃjñā-paribhāṣam  
yatra kāryam tatra draṣṭavyam “puganta-  
laghūpadhasya guṇo bhavati” ity upasthitam  
idam bhavati “kniti na” iti.

athavā yad etasmin yoge knid-grahaṇam  
kriyate tadanavakāśam. tasyānavakāśatvād  
guṇavṛddhī na bhaviṣyataḥ.

athavā “cāryapravṛttir jñāpayati—  
‘bhavaty upadhā-lakṣaṇasya guṇasya  
pratiṣedhaḥ’ iti. yad ayam “trasi-grdhi-dhṛṣi-  
kṣipeḥ knuḥ” (Pā. 3.2.140), “iko jhal,  
halantāc ca” (Pā. 1.2.9-10) knu-sanau kitau  
karoti. katham kṛtvā jñāpakam ? kit-karaṇa  
etat prayojanam — guṇaḥ katham na syād  
iti. yadi cātra guṇa-pratiṣedho na syāt, kit-  
karaṇam anarthakam syāt. paśyati tvācāryo  
‘bhavaty upadhā- lakṣaṇasyāpi guṇasya  
pratiṣedhaḥ’ iti. tataḥ knu-sanau kitau karoti.

roravīty ity arthenāpi nārthaḥ. ‘kniti’ ity  
ucyate, na cātra knitam paśyāmaḥ.

pratyaya-lakṣaṇena prāpnoti. “na lumatā  
tasmin” iti pratyaya-lakṣaṇa- pratiṣedhaḥ.  
athāpi “na lumatāṅgasya” (Pā. 1.1.63) ity  
ucyate, evam api na doṣaḥ. katham? na  
lumatā lupte’ nāgādhikāraḥ pratinirdiṣyate.  
kim tarhi ? yo’ sau lumatā lupyate tasmin  
yad aṅgam tasya yat kāryam tanna bhavati  
iti. athāpy aṅgādhikāraḥ pratinirdiṣyate.

evam api na doṣah. katham ? “*kāryakālam saṃjñā- paribhāṣam*” yatra kāryam tatra draṣṭavyam. “*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayor guṇo bhavati*” ity upasthitam idam bhavati “*knīti na*” iti.

athavā chāndasam etat. drṣṭānuvidhiś chandasi bhavati.

athavā bahiraṅgo guṇah, antaraṅgah pratiṣedhah. “*asiddham bahirāngam antaraṅge*”.

athavā pūrvasmin yoge yad ārdhadhātukagrahaṇam, tad anavakāśam.

tasyānavakāśatvād guṇo bhaviṣyati.

īha kasmān na bhavati —‘*laigavāyanah*’, ‘*kāmayate*’ ?

*Vārttika.* taddhita-kāmyor ik-prakaraṇāt.

*Bhāṣya.* iglakṣaṇayor guṇa-vṛddhyoh pratiṣedhah. na caite iglakṣaṇe.

*Vārttika.* lakārasya nittvād ādeśeṣu sthānivadbhāva-prasaṅgah.

*Bhāṣya.* lakārasya nittvād ādeśeṣu sthānivadbhāvah prāpnoti— ‘*acinavam*’, ‘*asunavam*’, ‘*akaravam*’.

*Vārttika.* lakārasya nittvād ādeśeṣu sthānivadbhāva-praṣaṅga iti ced yāsuṭo nīd-vacanāt siddham.

*Bhāṣya.* yad ayam yāsuṭo nīd-vacanām śāsti taj jñāpayaty ācāryo— ‘na nīd-ādesā nito bhavanti’ iti.

yady etaj jñāpyate, katham—“*nityam  
nītāḥ*” (Pā. 3.4.99), “*ītaś ca*” (Pā. 3.4.100) iti?

ñito yat kāryam tad bhavati, nīti yat  
kāryam tan na bhavati iti.

kim vaktavyam etat? na hi katham  
anucyamānam gaṁsyate?

yāsuṭa eva nīd-vacanād. aparyāptaś caiva  
hi yāsuṭ samudāyasya nīttve, nītam cainam  
karoti. tasyaitat prayojanam — nīto yat  
kāryam tad yathā syād, nīti yat kāryam tan  
mā bhūd iti.

(*knīti ca*)

(*Vārttika*:) In the case of ‘*riyati*’ with *śa* and *cañ*, solution may be arrived at according to the *antaraṅga* maxim.

(*Bhāṣya*:) ‘*iyan*’ and ‘*uvan*’ being *antaraṅga* take place and therefore *i* is no longer in the penultimate and hence there will be no *guṇa*. For this purpose the ‘*knīt*’ has been interpreted as *nimitta* and there is no fault in this.<sup>164</sup>

These also may be regarded as the reason why the seventh case (in ‘*knīti*’) should be taken in the sense of the *nimitta* or cause—*hato*, *hathāḥ*, *upoyate*, *ayata*, *lauyamāniḥ*, *pauyamāniḥ*, *neniktaḥ* iti.<sup>165</sup>

(The interpretation of the seventh case as being of the *nimitta* type is) not necessary, for these words. Thus here *hato* *hathāḥ*. A prohibition may

164. In the case of ‘*prādudruvat*’ we have the root ‘*dru*’, but therefore *guṇa* can take place by the rule “*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh*” (7.3.84), there is ‘*cañ*’ by “*ni-śri-dru-śrubhyah*” (3.1.48). By the rule “*dvirvacane’ci*” (1.1.59), there is no ‘*iyan*’ and so it might be expected that before duplication ‘*dru*’ with ‘*cañ*’ should have *guṇa* as *laghūpadha-guṇa*, but being *antaraṅga*, the duplication takes precedence.

165. The word ‘*ayata*’ has been formed with the preceding ‘*aṭ*’ to which the *vṛddhi* is due. *Vṛddhi* is not due to ‘*yan*’ which is a *knīt*-suffix and therefore cannot have *vṛddhi* by the present rule. The word ‘*lauyamāni*’ has been formed as ‘*luyamānasya  
apatyam*’ and ‘*pauyamāni*’ as ‘*puyamānasya apatyam*’. In both cases the *vṛddhi* is not due to ‘*yan*’ and hence any question of the inference of the scope of this rule does not arise. A discussion then arises about the word ‘*hato*’ and ‘*hathāḥ*’. The root ‘*han*’ gets ‘*śap*’ by the rule “*adi-prabhṛtibhyah śapah*” (2.4.72). The rule means that *śap* *vikaraṇa* is elided after the roots ‘*adi*’ etc., and the elision is to be made by the word ‘*Jūk*’. Now,

be affected by prohibitory rule where something was expected to come, but was not prohibited. Here the *a* (in 'han' and 'hatha') exists in the state of the original instruction of the *dhātu*. In 'upoyate', 'ayuta', 'lauyamāni', 'pauyamāni' the *guṇa* and the *vṛddhi* are external operations, and the prohibition is internal (*antaraṅga*), as there is a *paribhāṣā* — in case of internal operations, the external operations will be invalid — "asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge" (*paribhāṣā* 50). In *nenikta* there will be no prohibition because of the intervention of its own latter part.<sup>166</sup>

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just as by this rule the 'śap' is elided, so it may be expected that the *a* of 'han' (having the nomenclature *guṇa* by the rule "adeñ guṇahī" (1.1.2), i.e. 'at' and 'en' are to be called *guṇa*) may be elided by the rule. In *hata* we have a 'kñit' suffix and according to the interpretation accepted hypothetically 'kñiti' suffix has the power to abolish *guṇa*, not only to those which immediately precede, but also those which are in the *upadhā* and it is suggested here that the prohibition of *guṇa* (in the case of *a* of 'han') should have taken place if the seventh case in 'kñiti' was not understood as indicating the sense of *nimitta*. But this explanation of the necessity of taking the seventh case in the sense of *nimitta*, is not valid, for the 'ik' from the rule "iko guṇa-vṛddhī" (1.1.3) is drawn in here by *adhiśāra* and the *guṇa* which is intended to be prohibited by the present rule is the *guṇa* that takes place as the transformation of 'ik', and hence it can have no reference to a mere *a* of 'han'. Again, the word 'nenikta' has been formed from the root 'nij' and the *guṇa* of the *abhyāsa* portion is due to the rule, "nijāñ trayāñāñ guṇahī ślu" (7.4.45), i.e. the *abhyāsa* portion of the three verbs 'nijir', 'vijir' and 'vis' — is affected by the *guṇa* when an elision affected by the word 'ślu' follows — 'nenikta', but not when there is no elision by 'ślu' as in 'nineja'. Thus the present *sūtra* has no bearing on the formation of this word.

166. The *Bhāṣya* enunciates the principle of prohibition as a general rule and as a special rule. The prohibition as a general rule leaves the scope open for the special cases and it is held that whatever was within the scope of the general rule, was already within the scope of the special rule and in such cases where in the special sphere the general prohibitory rule may not be applicable, the special rule comes in operation and effects the prohibition. But a vowel occurring as a constitutive part of an original *dhātu* or suffix (*upadeśa*) cannot come. In case of such words as 'cita' etc. (*ci + kta*) there could have been *guṇa* of the *i* of *ci* and that *guṇa* is prohibited by the "kñiti ca". But in the words 'hata' and 'hatha' the *a* is already there and it is not a result of transformation and there is no scope of the *guṇa* operation, only the alphabet *a* is technically called *guṇa* and hence this rule "kñiti ca" can have no operation there.

Nāgeśa in commenting on the above point says that the rule — "sārvadhātū-kārdhadhātukayoh" (7.3.34) by which *guṇa* is prescribed to 'ik' when *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* follow — is to be taken along with the prohibitory rule "kñiti ca" as forming one complex proposition the meaning of which will be — except when

It cannot be for providing for *upadhā* or the penultimate, for we get of roots by continuity of *adhikāra* and we shall make the following by 'knit' suffix as qualifying a *dhātu* or a root.

The question of the prohibition of *guṇa-vṛddhi* in penultimates does not occur. For we get the word 'dhātoḥ' by *adhikāra* from the preceding rule. The rule thus interpreted will stand as 'kniti ca dhātor iko na guṇa-vṛddhi'. To be followed by a 'knit'-suffix is a qualification of the 'ik' of a *dhātu* — a qualification that arrests the *guṇa-vṛddhi* of the 'ik' of a *dhātu*. Now, if the rule specifically refers to the 'ik' of a *dhātu*, there is no question of a penultimate, for since the prohibition refers to the 'ik' of a

suffixes with a redundant *k* and *n* follow, the *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes will reduce *guṇa* in the preceding 'ik'. This prohibition is a *paryudāsa* prohibition as a general negative injunction and therefore the rule "kniti ca" may be regarded distinctively leaving *guṇa-vṛddhi* in such occasion. But this cannot refer to the *a* of 'han' as enjoined in the original instruction of *dhātu* (*upadeśa*). Kaiyāṭa in commenting on 'hata' says that here there was the 'śap' and the 'śap' is elided by the rule "adiprabṛhtibhyah śapah" (2.4.72). Now the *a* in 'śap' may be expected to be elided by the rule "kniti ca" because *a* is technically called *guṇa* and therefore its elision cannot be the purport that prohibits *guṇa* (śap bhavati ity asyāṁ codanāyāṁ guṇa-rūpeṇa acodanāt. nāyāṁ guṇa-niṣedha-viṣayāḥ). The word 'upoyate' has been formed from the root—*upa* + *veñ* with *yak* and the consequent *samprasāraṇa* by which *va* becomes *u*. Thus we have *upa* + *u* + *yak* + *tai*. Now the formation from 've' is not an *antaraṅga* process, because according to the rule "grahi-jyā-vayi-vyadhi-vaṣṭi-vicati-vṛścati-prchhati-bhṛjjatīnāṁ nīti ca" (6.1.16), i.e. these roots will undergo *samprasāraṇa* when 'kit' and 'nīt' suffixes follow. Thus the *va* becomes *u* when 'yak' a 'kit' suffix follows. The *samprasāraṇa* having taken place as a change from *va* to *u* is an *antaraṅga* process and it is not allowed to nullify this *ū-kāra* by a rule prohibiting *guṇa* after 'kit' and 'nīt' suffixes, for that is external to it. In the case of 'ānyatā' we have *an* + *veñ* + *yak* + *tai* (*lañ*). Here the *vṛddhi* is equal to *āt* + *u* + *ya* + *ta* and we have *anyatā*. The *vṛddhi* is here affected by "āṭāś ca" (6.1.90). When a vowel follows 'āt' then the 'āt' and the vowel together becomes a *vṛddhi*, e.g. *aiyata*. The 'āt' has been directed by "āḍajāḍinām" (6.4.72) which means that when suffixes of the *luñ*, *lañ* and *lṛi* group follow, there will be the augment 'āt' before verbs having an initial vowel. Here the augment 'āt' depends upon the coming of the suffix of the *lañ* group and the *vṛddhi* takes place entirely as a *bahirāṅga vidhi*. In the case of 'nenikta' we have *nij* + *te* = *nij* + *te* = *ninij* + *te*. Now the *guṇa* of the first *ni* in *ninij* cannot be restricted because the *tañ* (*te*) that follows is an 'nīt' suffix, for between the 'nīt' suffix and the 'ni' there is an intervention by the word part 'nij'. Therefore "kniti ca" cannot prohibit the *guṇa* of *ni* in 'nenikta'. All this shows that the formation of these words could not have been regarded by Pāṇini as objectives when he composed the *sūtra* "kniti ca". Whether we take the meaning of the seventh case in 'kniti' as *nimitta* or otherwise, that would not in any way affect the fate of these words.

*dhātu*, that ‘*ik*’ must be an ultimate ‘*ik*’ and not a penultimate (cf. the rules “*śaṣṭhī sthāneyoga*” (1.1.49) and “*alo’ntyasya*” (1.1.52) previously explained in detail). The word ‘*dhātoḥ*’ comes by *adhikāra* from the *sūtra* “*na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke*” (1.1.4).

If ‘*kniti*’ is regarded as qualifying only to *dhātu* then it would not apply to the inserted suffixes like ‘*śnu*’ (i.e. the *guṇa* of these should not be prohibited when ‘*knit*’ suffixes follow). Thus we have *cinutah*, *sunutah*, *lunitah*, *punitah*, etc. But this is no criticism when (*kniti*) is regarded as qualificatory to the root, the root does not mean ‘of the root’, but it means ‘prescribed after the root’, i.e. that which has been prescribed after the *dhātu*. Then it should not apply to *dhātu*. The meaning is not this that when ‘*knit*’ follows (the prohibition applies) only to what has been prescribed to appear as an inserted suffix after the *dhātu*. What then is the meaning when ‘*knit*’ follows after a ‘*dhātu*’?<sup>167</sup>

Or rather a *saṃjñā* or symbol and a maxim becomes operative in its proper time. It comes in force when it is time for it to operate. There will be *guṇa* in case of verbs which are *puganta* and those which have been a short penultimate. In this field at once comes this rule “*kniti na*”— not in the case of ‘*knit*’ suffixes.<sup>168</sup>

167. The question raised here is this: we know that when ‘*knit*’ suffixes follow, *guṇa* is prohibited. But *guṇa* of what is prohibited? The reply is that the *guṇa* of the ‘*ik*’ part of the *dhātu* is prohibited. But such an answer is faulty, for the prohibition of *guṇa* has reference not only to the ‘*ik*’ part of the *dhātu*, but also to the ‘*ik*’ belonging to the *vikaraṇas* like ‘*śnu*’, ‘*śnā*’, etc., which are prescribed after *dhātu*. But if the ‘*knit*’ prohibition applies only to the *dhātu*, it cannot apply to the *vikaraṇa*, and if it applies to the *vikaraṇa*, it cannot apply to the *dhātu*. How to include them both? If the interpretation was ‘*dhātor vihitasya knitah*’ then ‘*dhātoḥ*’ being in the 6th case and *vihitasya* being in the 6th case, the prohibition applies only to the *dhātus*. The interpretation therefore proposed is ‘*dhātor vihite kniti*’, i.e. when ‘*knit*’ is prescribed after a *dhātu*, then prohibition takes place. Here we do not mention either the *dhātu* or the *vikaraṇa* and therefore we prescribe here the prohibition in a general manner. The purport there will be that when a ‘*knit*’ suffix is prescribed after a *dhātu*, then the *guṇa* of the ‘*ik*’ is prohibited with reference to that which is nearest to the ‘*knit*’ suffix, be it a *dhātu* or a *vikaraṇa*. Therefore when there is an occasion for a *vikaraṇa* to intervene, the prohibition of *guṇa* is directed to the ‘*ik*’ of *vikaraṇa*; and when there is no *vikaraṇa* it is directed to the ‘*ik*’ of the *dhātu*. By qualifying *dhātu* so as to mean ‘*dhātor vihite kniti*’, we can get the prohibition to apply to both the *dhātu* and the *vikaraṇa*.

168. There is a rule “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*” (7.3.86). It prescribes *guṇa* to verbs ending in *p* or *puk* and verbs having a short penultimate. There are two *paribhāṣās* — “*yathoddeśam saṃjñāparibhāṣām*” (2) and “*kāryakālām*

Or, rather in this specific place, there is no room for taking in 'knit'. In absence of its having any room, there will be no *guṇa-vṛddhī*.<sup>169</sup>

*saṃjñāparibhāṣam* (3). The first means that the meaning of a *saṃjñā* and a *paribhāṣā* is to be understood from the context where it is first explained. There one only understands its proper meaning but does not know the scope of its application. There are some however who think that in understanding properly the meaning of a *saṃjñā* and a *paribhāṣā*, one should have in a flash before his mind all the possible occasions where they may have their fields of application and in the totality of that context as a unifying whole one could understand the meaning of *saṃjñā* and *paribhāṣā* when they are explained for the first time. The second maxim or the *kāryakāla-paribhāṣā* agrees with the first in every respect, but enjoins the further provision that they should have their application even in the *tripādī*, i.e. the last three chapters of the 8th book of Pāṇini with reference to which the previous portion of Pāṇini's work, the first seven books and the first chapter of the 8th book are regarded as null (*asiddha*) by the rule "pūrvatrāṣidham" (8.2.1). There is a further subtle point to be noted in this connection. According to the first *paribhāṣā* where one grasps the meaning of a *paribhāṣā* as described in a particular place he has in the back of his mind the different cases of the application of the *paribhāṣā* throughout Pāṇini's work and each case with its distinctive peculiarity affects the understanding of the general meaning of the *paribhāṣā* as if it were a sweet and fragrant drink wherein with each sip of its taste one experiences the taste value of its constituent parts. Thus Kaiyatā says the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* immediately following the present context—*yathoddeṣe pradhānānī ātmasaṃskārāya sannidhiyamānāni guṇa-bhedam prayuñjate*. In the second maxim however, the *paribhāṣā* as explained in the first context, appears immediately in the place where there is a field of its application and along with the context it expresses itself as unified with the meaning of that context—*kāryakāle tu tad-tad-vidhi-pradeṣe paribhāṣā-buddhyā ekavākyatā paribhāṣā*—is there realized as belonging to the place where it was first explained, but being there it simply travels to its new field of operation. Now as soon as we find the *sūtra*, "puganta-laghūpadhasya ca" and find that *guṇa* is prescribed to the *puganta* verbs and verbs with a short penultimate, the rule "kniti ca" arrives there and shows its operating control and thereby where we have *bhid + kta*, the *guṇa* of the *i-kāra* is prohibited.

169. In the preceding section we have regarded 'kniti ca' as a *paribhāṣā* and we have supposed that the *paribhāṣā* appears as a prohibitory qualification at any occasion when *guṇa* is prescribed as in "puganta-laghūpadhasya ca". But here another explanation is suggested as follows: Let us suppose that "kniti ca" is not a *paribhāṣā*; still a prohibitory injunction has its scope of application to any and every place where there are objects of prohibition, and in the case of "puganta-laghūpadhasya ca" the *guṇa* is object to prohibition, and ordinarily we should not expect the *guṇa* to be prohibited, for the prohibition is not to take place with reference to a penultimate 'ik' which is mediated by a consonant from 'ni' suffix. But still there the prohibitory rule has its injunction and it prohibits and *guṇa* of the penultimate though it is mediated by a consonant. Or rather it may be assumed that the *Bhāṣya* here takes "kniti ca" in the sense of 'yathoddeṣam saṃjñā-paribhāṣam' as explained above.

Or, rather, the instruction of the master indicates that even the *guṇa* of a penultimate vowel is affected. Thus there is a rule “*trasi-grdhi-dhṛṣi-kṣipeh knuḥ*” (3.2.140; the roots ‘*trasi*’ etc. take the suffix ‘*knu*’ for indicating a habitual trait of character). There is again the rule “*iko jhal*” (1.2.9— after a *dhātu* ending in ‘*ik*’ a ‘*san*’ beginning with ‘*jhal*’ should be regarded as ‘*kit*’ — as *ciciṣati*). There is also the rule “*halantāc ca*” (1.2.10 - a ‘*san*’ having an initial *jhal* becomes ‘*kit*’ if it follows a consonant with an ‘*ik*’ in proximity). If these rules that have been made ‘*kit*’ (is suggested of the fact that the *guṇa* of the penultimate should be prohibited). In what way has this been suggested? Why should not there be *guṇa*? If there should be no prohibition of *guṇa* it would be unnecessary to make ‘*knu*’ or ‘*san*’ a ‘*kit*’ as has been done in the above *sūtras*. Thus the master holds—even the *guṇa* prescribed about the ‘*ik*’ of a penultimate should be prohibited (when ‘*kit*’ suffixes follow) for otherwise there

This means that in the very comprehension of the meaning of the *paribhāṣā* ‘*kniti ca*’, the types of cases which are somewhat different from one another where it has its field of operation, had been taken together in the comprehension of the meaning of the *paribhāṣā* ‘*kniti ca*’. The point at issue should be carefully noted. The conclusion arrived at in the preceding section, was to the effect that when ‘*kniti*’ suffix follows, there is the prohibition of the *guṇa* with reference to an ‘*ik*’ vowel of a *vikaraṇa* or a *dhātu* provided either of them is in direct proximity to the ‘*kniti*’ and there is no mediation by a consonant. But in such a case there is no provision for the prohibition of *guṇa* in case of verbs which have a short penultimate (where *guṇa* has been prescribed by “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*”). The problem now is to discover the method by which the prohibition in ‘*kniti ca*’ may apply to the *upadhā* ‘*ik*’ of a verb which is not in proximity to the ‘*kniti*’-suffix. Several provisional replies have been attempted in the *Bhāṣya* one after another:

1. “*Kniti ca*” may be regarded as a *paribhāṣā* and enters into the context of the rule “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*”. In such a case the meaning of the rule “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*” would be— except *ni* such cases where ‘*kniti*’ suffixes follow roots having an ultimate ‘*puk*’ and a short penultimate, shall be affected by *guṇa*.

2. Let us not take “*kniti ca*” as *parabhbāṣā*, it is only a prohibitory rule and as such it has within its sphere of prohibition any and every case when *guṇa* is prescribed and as such it has no power to arrest the *guṇa* or the penultimate of a root as against “*puganta-laghūpadhasya ca*”.

3. ‘*Kniti*’ may be taken as a *paribhāṣā* in accordance to its first interpretation in the second maxim “*kāryakālāṇī samjñāparibhāṣam*”. In such a case the *paribhāṣā* ‘*kniti ca*’ has within its scope of meaning all the typical different cases when *guṇa* is prescribed and as such the *guṇa* of the penultimate is also taken within its meaning as an object of prohibition when the *paribhāṣā* was first explained— a *paribhāṣā* in the sense of “*kāryakālāṇī samjñāparibhāṣam*” and in the last interpretation it was taken in the sense of “*yathoddeśāṇī samjñāparibhāṣam*”.

should be no meaning in making 'knu' and 'san' 'kit'. It is not also for forming the word 'roravi' that the rule "kniti" has been made. (The condition of determining the prohibition of *guṇa*) is that 'knit' suffixes follow, as has been said. But here (roravi) we do not find any 'knit'. When a suffix is elided the action demanded by the suffix would still hold good. But when the elision is made by any of the terms 'luk', 'śnu' and 'lup', the effect due to the immediate antecedent on account of the suffix shall not take place or rather there would be no effect on the part of a word due to a suffix when that suffix is elided of any of the terms 'luk', 'ślu' and 'lup'. Thus there is no fault. Why ? When anything is elided by any of the terms 'luk', 'ślu', 'lup', the effects due to the part of the word, are not referred back. What then ? When that, which is elided by any of the words 'luk', 'ślu', 'lup', follows, there will be no action that was due to the part of the word on account of it. Even if it be suggested as the meaning that, that which was due to the part of the word, should be referred back, then also there is no fault. Why ? A *samjñā* or a *paribhāṣā* is stirred into operation by the occasion. Wherever there is an occasion there, one notices its operation. There is a direction of *guṇa* when 'sārvadhātuka' and 'ārdhadhātuka' suffixes follow and there does this provision "kniti ca" appear.<sup>170</sup>

170. By way of conclusive suggestion as against the provisional suggestion mentioned in the previous section, the *Bhāṣya* says that the fact that the prohibition of *guṇa* refers to the penultimate 'ik' vowel also, can be deduced from the fact that the suffix 'knu' has been directed to verbs like 'trasi', 'grdhi', 'dhṛsi' and 'ksip' ('trasi-grdhi-dhṛsi-ksipeh knuh' 3.2.140, meaning already explained), leading to the formation of such words as 'trasnu', 'grdhnu', 'ksipnu'. The object of deducting 'knu', i.e. *nu* with a *knit* has been deliberately intended to prevent the *guṇa* of the penultimate vowel in *grdh* and *ksip*. This shows that it is the intention of the master that 'kñi' suffixes can prohibit the *guṇa* of the penultimate vowel.

A suggestion was made in the previous section that the seventh case in 'kniti' should be regarded as having a causal import and this will be useful also for the formation of the word 'roravi'. The word 'rorav' has been formed from the root 'ru' by the suffix 'yāñ' which was elided by the rule "yāñ ci ca" (2.4.74). which means that when a vowel follows, the 'yāñ' is elided by the term 'luk'. But here the *Bhāṣya* repudiates that provisional suggestion when it says that "kniti ca" is relevant towards the formation of 'roravi'. There is practically no 'knit' suffix in 'roravi'; 'yāñ' has indeed been elided, but 'yāñ' is a part of a *dhātu*. There is indeed a rule "pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam" (1.1.62) which describes that when a suffix is elided, it still can affect such changes in the preceding word or note which was due to it, i.e. even when a suffix is elided its effects on the previous word remains unchanged as if no elision has taken place. But there is another rule "na lumatāṅgasya" (1.1.63). This rule means

Or, rather 'ik' (*roravīti*—this word) is Vedic. A word like that is found to be used in the Vedas. Or, rather, the *guṇa* is *bahirāṅga* or external and the prohibition is internal. There is the maxim the external should be regarded as null (*asiddha*) and the internal is to be performed. Or, rather, in the previous *sūtra* there is no point in altering the word 'ārdhadhātuke'; that being out of point, there is no *guṇa*.<sup>171</sup>

that when an elision is effected by any of the terms 'luk', 'ślu' or 'lup', the effect of the suffix on any part of a previous word shall not take place, notwithstanding what has been said in the previous *sūtra* "pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam" (1.1.62). Commenting upon the *sūtra* "na lumatāṅgasya" the *Bhāṣya* says that the meaning is that when an elision is made by 'slu', 'lup' or 'luk', then the original word immediately preceding is not affected by the action of the suffix, but the rule does not mean that all that was due to the original word, should all be suspended. Even if it is allowed to mean that in cases of such an elision, all that was due to be effected to the original word, could be suspended, even then it is not possible to stop a *paribhāṣā* to appear in such places when there is an occasion for it to do so. This is in consonance to the *kāryakāla paribhāṣā* and there is a rule "sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh" (7.3.84) which directs *guṇa* whenever *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes follow. Now the *guna* for *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes is prohibited by the rule "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" (1.1.4). But for prohibiting *guṇa* we need a rule like "kniti ca", for 'yāñ', which has been elided, is a myth. But there is a further objection that 'kniti ca' is not a *paribhāṣā* and it cannot be allowed to appear whenever there is an occasion for it in according to the maxim "kāryakāla-saṃjñā-paribhāṣam", for that maxim applies only to *paribhāṣā* and "kniti ca" is not a *paribhāṣā*. The reply to such an objection is now being attempted in the *Bhāṣya* immediately following.

171. Since the rule "kniti ca" is not generally regarded as a *paribhāṣā* we have to find some other means of justifying the usage of 'roravīti'. Three provisional answers are given in this connection:

(i) There is a rule "yāñ aci ca" (2.4.74) which means, as we have seen, that before a vowel suffix, *yāñ* is elided. But before this rule there is another rule "bahulam chandasī" (2.4.73) by which 'lyap' is elided optionally in Vedic usage. By force of the word 'ca' in 'yāñ aci ca' the word 'bahula' from the rule 'bahulam chandasī' is drawn in, and thus it may be said that 'yāñ' is elided in the Vedic usage. Thus the word 'roravīti' may be justified as a Vedic usage.

(ii) The view that 'roravīti' should be supported as a Vedic usage, has to be adopted in the last extremity and for this reason, it is worth while to attempt another solution. With this idea in view the *Bhāṣya* says that as the prohibition of *guṇa* is due to the elision of *na* in 'yāñ', this prohibition is internal (*antaraṅga*) with reference to the occasion of *guṇa* that arises when subsequently the *sārvadhātuka* suffixes follow and therefore *sārvadhātuka* suffixes being null (*asiddha*) as being external (*bahirāṅga*), they do not exist and since they do not exist, there is no occasion of *guṇa* and no prohibition is required.

(iii) In the 3rd interpretation it is suggested that the use of the word 'ārdhadhātuke' in the preceding *sūtra* "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke"—it may well be regarded as out

Why not in the case of 'laigavāyana' and 'kāmayate'? (Here the Vārttika intervenes)—in the case of *taddhita* suffixes and the root 'kāmi' (there is a prohibition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*) with reference to 'ik'.

(*Bhāṣya*:) The *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* are prohibited with reference to the vowels that come within the 'ik' group. But these do not belong to the 'ik' group.<sup>172</sup>

(Here the Vārttika intervenes)—the law being 'knit' all the ādeśas prescribed in its place may be regarded to have the same status as law. (The *Bhāṣya* interprets it as follows).

(*Bhāṣya*:) And all the ten suffixes technically called *la-kāra*—and all that are prescribed in their place, should also be 'knit' as they have the same status as the law in whose place they have come.<sup>173</sup>

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of point. For even without the word 'ārdhadhātuke' we can have the sense of 'bahuvrīhi' in the word 'dhātulopa' as 'dhātōr lopo yasmin' and *guṇa* may be prohibited by virtue of the elision of 'yai' by the rule 'na dhātulopah'. The idea is that the rule "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" is split up by *yoga-vibhāga*—na dhātulopa being on one side and ārdhadhātuke on the other. *Dhātulopa* is formed by a genitive compound. *dhātū* means a part of *dhātū* and *dhātulopa* means therefore 'dhātvekadeśalopa' that is why one part of the *dhātū* is elided as in the case of the elision of 'yai'. Now, therefore, when there is such a 'dhātvekadeśa-lopa' if there is on account of that any prohibition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*, then that prohibition should be operative only when ārdhadhātuka suffixes follow. But in 'roravī' there is no ārdhadhātuka suffix and therefore the elision of 'yai' cannot lead to the prohibition of *guṇa*, and even if the prohibition was available by some other *sūtra*, the scope of the operation of that rule will also be arrested, for the rule "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" distinctly shows that *guṇa* will be prohibited only when ārdhadhātuka suffixes follow. Therefore the operation of *guṇa* due to a sārvadhātuka suffix is not arrested, and we have the forms 'rorute' where there is prohibition of *guṇa*. The *Bhāṣya* regards it and such other case where *yai* is elided as being Vedic usage.

172. Nāgeśa in commenting on the above *Bhāṣya*, says that though *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* apply to 'ik' yet in *laigavāyana* (*ligor apatyam pumān*—*ligu + phak* by the rule "na dādibhyah phak" (4.1.99) the *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* apply, because though it is not *ik-lakṣaṇa*, it is *ik-sthānika*. The point is that the *phak*-suffix is added to the *ligoḥ* and not *ligu*. But in *ligoḥ* we have already *o-kāra* and a *visarga* after it. Therefore, it is not an *ik-lakṣaṇa* word, it does not end with 'ik'. But since the transformation has occurred with reference to the 'ik', it may be regarded as *ik-sthānika*, for the *phak* is ultimately applied to *ligu*.

173. The point here is that since the 'tin' *vibhakti* is 'knit' all the ādeśas that take in its place are to be regarded as themselves also 'knit' by the Pāṇini's rule "sthānivad-ādeśo 'nalvidhau" (1.1.56), and therefore there should be prohibition of *guṇa* in 'acinavam' by the rule "kniti ca". Kaiyatā here comments that the *anubandha* of the *la-kāra* being called 'it' when it is elided, is not attached or associated with that which

The operation directed for the 'nit', shall take place, but not the operation that is due when 'niit' follows. Should this be definitely stated? How can one understand it if unless it is definitely stated? It can be deducted from the fact that 'yāsuṭ' can be declared as 'knit', 'yāsuṭ' alone is unable to endow all *la* suffixes with a *niit* character and yet 'yāsuṭ' has been declared as 'niit'. The necessity for that is this—all such operations as should be done to a 'niit', should be done but no such operation should be done as are due when a 'niit' suffix follows.<sup>174</sup>

has taken its place and therefore the prohibition to *sthānivadbhāva* as dictated by the phrase 'analvidhau' in the rule "sthānivad adeśo' na lavidhau" (1.1.56) will not apply. From the rule "sārvadhātukam apit" (1.2.4)— the sārvadhātuka that is not 'pit' becomes like 'knit', the *Bhāṣya* infers that which is 'pit' is not 'knit', that which is 'knit' is not like 'pit'. By adopting the principle of 'yoga-vibhāga' in the rule "sarvadhātukam apit" either by "sthānivadbhāva" or by being directly a 'knit' the prohibition of *guṇa* will apply to all *la-kāras*. Thus *laṭ* is an *apit*, being an *apit* it is a 'knit'— so also 'luṭ', and 'loṭ' and 'lṛṭ'— and the rest are directly 'knit'.

Here the *Vārttika* puts forward an answer of a provisional nature and says: the suggestion that the tense *la* being 'knit' all the ādeśas would have the same status is obviated by the fact that the suffix 'yāsuṭ' has been declared as a myth. This the *Bhāṣya* interprets as follows: the fact that 'yāsuṭ' — a *la*-suffix has been specifically mentioned by Pāṇini, indicates the fact that ādeśas occurring in the place of 'knit' suffixes would not themselves be regarded as 'knit'. If this is so, why then "nityam nītah" and "itaś ca".

There is a rule "yāsuṭ parasmaipadeśūdātto nītāś ca" (3.4.103)— in the *parasmaipada* the augment 'yāsuṭ' will come in place of *līn* and this 'yāsuṭ' will have the *udātta* accent and be treated as 'niit'. Now if this *sthānivadbhāva* maxim be held in force, the *yāsuṭ* occurring in place of 'līn' will naturally be a 'niit' and there will be no necessity for Pāṇini to declare it specially as 'niit'. From such a declaration the natural implication is that there are other ādeśas prescribed in place of the tense *la-kāra* should not be regarded as 'niit'.

There is a rule "nityam nītah" (3.4.99) and it means that the *sa* of the first person of a 'niit' tense *la* is elided.

There is another rule "itaś ca" (3.4.100) *apacāva*. It means the *i* associated with a *niit* *la-kāra* will always be elided in the *parasmaipada* —*apacat*, *apākṣit*. Now the point raised in the *Bhāṣya* is that these two *sūtras* — assume or indicate that Pāṇini admits that there is tense *la* which should be regarded as 'niit'. But it should be noted that the contention is not relevant. No one denies that there are some tense *la* which have *na* as *anubandha* and these may naturally be regarded as *niit*. But this does not indicate that the ādeśas coming in their place should be regarded as 'niit' for in that case a *laṭ* being an *apit*, is 'niit' and we should expect that the *sa* in *pacāva* should be elided by the rule "nityam nītah" and we should expect 'pacāva' instead of 'pacāvah', as we find in *laṭ*.

174. The idea is that we do not deny that *laṇi*, *luni*, etc. are themselves *niit* but we hold that no ādeśas that are to occur in place of these *niit* *lakāras*, should themselves

be regarded as *niit* and should be exposed to such restrictions on the words preceding them as are due when *niit* suffixes follow. When 'yāsuṭ' is made *niit* it induces the operations that take place when a *niit* suffix follows such as *samprasārana* etc. If *yāsuṭ* could have been regarded as *niit* on the ground that 'yāsuṭ' is an *ādeśa* in place of *lin* which is *niit* by the *sthānivadbhāva* maxim, then the declaration in the *sūtra* that 'yāsuṭ' should be regarded as *niit* (3.4.103) would have been quite unnecessary.

The main outline of the discussion in the rule "knīti ca" is as follows: 'knīti' in the *sūtra* is in the seventh case. The seventh case may have two different relevant meanings, one guided by the rule "tasmin niti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya" (1.1.66)—it means that when anything in the *sūtra* is in the seventh case, it implies that the consequential operation shall take place with reference to the vowel or consonant that immediately precedes as in the rule "iko yaṛ acī" (6.1.77)—*dadhyodanam*. There is another rule "yasya ca bhāve bhāvalakṣaṇam" (2.3.37). It means that when by the action of anything the action of any other thing is describable, then there will be seventh case with regard to the former. This is called *nimitta saptamī*. Now, if the seventh case in 'niit' is guided by the second rule then *niit* suffix will be regarded as a *nimitta* or cause for the prohibition of *guṇa* and there is no such condition that this prohibition will take effect only with reference to the immediately proximate 'ik'. If the meaning of the seventh case however be determined by the first rule (1.1.66) then the prohibition should effect only the immediately proximate vowel preceding. The first stand taken in the *Vārttika* and the *Bhāṣya* is that the seventh case in 'knīti' should be regarded as a *nimitta saptamī* according to the second rule quoted above (2.3.37), for otherwise one cannot provide for the prohibition of *guṇa* in the penultimate vowel and also satisfactorily solve the word 'roravītī'. Provisional objections are raised against this view. It is suggested that the seventh case of 'knīti' might be taken in the first meaning (1.1.66) and it may be held that the prohibition would apply to wherever there is scope whether the vowel be ultimate or penultimate. But then the meaning according to 1.1.66, definitely bars the operation with reference to the vowel that is not immediately proximate to the 'knīti' suffix and therefore the prohibition cannot apply to the penultimate. It is again suggested that if the second meaning is accepted then verbs with a following *śa* or *ca* cannot be solved. The reply given to this is that in those cases *guṇa* does not take place because the prescription of 'iyāni' and 'uvāni' is internal or *antarāṅga*. Then another attempt at justifying the *nimitta* view in the seventh case is made with reference to the words *hato*, *hathah*, *upoyate*, but this objection also is overriden.

In further explaining the rule it is said that the prohibition of *guṇa* would apply to the *ik* of a *vikarana* or a *dhātu* in immediate proximity. But the problem regarding affecting the penultimate by the prohibition of *guṇa* still remained inexplicable unless the seventh case is taken in the sense of *nimitta*. But all these objections are brushed aside for the suffix 'knu' has been made 'kṇītī' only with a view to arrest the *guṇa* of penultimate vowel. We here find that it is unnecessary to ascribe the second meaning of *nimitta saptamī* to 'knīti'. Its meaning therefore is that which is controlled by 1.1.66.

The second meaning of *nimitta saptamī* is not also necessary for the formation of the word 'roravītī', for this word may be regarded as being of Vedic usage. Apart from

Pāṇini.

## dīdhīveviṭāṁ 1.1.6.

In the case of the roots 'dīdhī' and 'vevi' and the augment 'iṭ', there will be no *guṇa* or *vṛddhi*. (The roots 'dīdhī' and 'vevi' are mostly used in the Vedas. 'Dīdhī' means 'to reflect', 'to meditate', 'to shine' and 'vevi' means 'to go', 'to permit', 'to derive', 'to love', etc. as *dīdhīte*', 'vevīte'.

Bhāṣya.

kimartham idam ucyate ? guṇa-vṛddhī mā  
bhūtām iti. 'ādīdhyanam ādīdhyaka',  
'āvevyanam āvevyakah'.  
ayam yogah śakyo' kartum. katham ?

Vārttikā.

dīdhīvevyoś chandoviṣayatvād dṛṣṭā-  
nuvidhitvāc ca chandasāś chandasy  
adīdhed adīdhayur iti ca guṇadarśanād  
apratiṣedhah.

Bhāṣya.

'dīdhī-vevyoś chandoviṣayatvāt'. dīdhī-  
vevyau chandoviṣayau. dṛṣṭānuvidhitvāc  
chandasah. dṛṣṭānuvidhiś ca chandas  
bhavati. 'adīdhed adīdhayur' iti ca guṇasya  
darśanād apratiṣedhah. anarthakah  
pratiṣedho'pratiṣedhah. "prajāpatir vai yat  
kimcana manasādīdhet", "hotrāya vṛtah  
kṛpayann adīdhet" (RV. 10.98.7), "adīdhayur  
dāśarājñē vṛtāsah" (RV. 7.33.5).

it, other solutions are also provisionally proposed with reference to some of the fundamental problems. These provisional replies are not, however, satisfactory. The conclusion then is that the prohibition of *guṇa* before a *kiṭ* suffix applies to an ultimate or a penultimate vowel, as the case may be.

Another point raised here is the question as to whether the *la-kāra* suffixes prescribed in the case of *la-kāra* should be regarded as '*niṭ*' and thereby all *guṇa* operations should be suspended whether they belong to the ultimate vowel or the penultimate. But the answer is that for the fact that '*yāsuf*' has been made a '*niṭ*' it follows that other instances of *la-kāra* should not be regarded as '*niṭ*' in the sense that when they follow there is no *guṇa-vṛddhi* with reference to the immediately proximate vowels or penultimate vowels. No specific declaration need be made for it as it is deducible from the fact that '*yāsuf*' has been made *niṭ* by Pāṇini (3.4.103).

bhaved idam yuktam udāharaṇam—  
 ‘adīdhed’ iti. idam tvayuktam — ‘adīdhayur’  
 iti. ayam jusi guṇah pratiṣedha-viṣaya āra-  
 bhyate, sa yathaiva “knīti na” ity etam  
 pratiṣedham bādhate. evam imam api bādheta.

naiṣa dosah. jusi guṇah pratiṣedhaviṣaya  
 ārabhyamāṇas tulyajātīyam pratiṣedham  
 bādhate. kaś ca tulyajātīyah pratiṣedhaḥ ?  
 yaḥ pratyayāśrayaḥ. prakṛtyāśrayaś cāyam.

athavā—yena nāprāpte tasya bādhanam  
 bhavati. na cāprāpte “knīti na” ity etasmin  
 pratiṣedhe jusi guṇa ārabhyate. asmin punah  
 prāpte cāprāpte ca.

yadi tarhy ayam yogo nārabhyate, katham  
 ‘dīdhyad’ iti ?

dīdhyad iti ca śyan-vyatayayena.

*Vārttika.* Bhāṣya.

dīdhyad iti ca śyan vatyayena bhaviṣyati.

iṭas cāpi grahaṇam śakyam akartum.

‘katham—‘akanīṣam’, ‘aranīṣam’, ‘kaṇīṭā  
 śvah’, ‘raṇīṭā śvah’, iti ?

“ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ” (Pā. 7.2.35)  
 ity atra ‘iḍ’ ity anuvartamāne punar iḍ-  
 grahaṇasya prayojanam — ‘iḍ iḍ eva yathā  
 syād, yad anyat prāpnoti tan mā bhūd’ iti.  
 kim cānyat prāpnoti ? guṇah.

yadi niyamah kriyate, ‘pipaṭhiṣater apra-  
 tyayah pipaṭhiḥ’ — dīrghatvam na prāpnoti.

naiṣa dosah, āṅgam yat kāryam tan  
 niyamyate, na caitad āṅgam.

athavā—asiddham dīrghatvam tasyā-  
 siddhatvān niyamo na bhaviṣyati.

(Bhāṣya:) Why it is this sūtra made ? So that there may not be any guṇa  
 or vṛddhi —ādīdhyanam, ādīdhyakah, āvevyanam, āvevyakah.

This *sūtra* could have been avoided. How ?

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—‘*dīdhī*’ and ‘*vevī*’ being Vedic usages and usages from there having been current in language in the Vedic usages, we have *adīdhet* and *adīdhayuh* which show that they are affected by *guṇa* and therefore the prohibition of *guṇa* does not apply.

(The *Bhāṣya* explains it as follows)—‘*dīdhī*’ and ‘*vevī*’ being found only in the *Vedas*, these (‘*dīdhī*’ and ‘*vevī*’) are Vedic incidents. The *Vedas* can use only words that are current. In the *Vedas* the current words are accepted as current and used. In ‘*adīdhet*’ and ‘*adīdhayuh*’ *guṇa* being found, it (*guṇa*) cannot be prohibited. A useless prohibition is no prohibition. Prajāpati medicated upon (*adīdhet*) whatsoever in his mind being nominated for the position of a *hotṛ*. Through kindness he reflected (*adīdhet*). Those who were nominated, reflected (*adīdhayuh*).<sup>175</sup>

The example ‘*adīdhet*’ is a proper one, but the example ‘*adīdhayuh*’ is not so. This *guṇa* in the presence of a following ‘*yus*’ is an object of prohibition and just as ‘*knīti ca*’ prohibits *guṇa*, so this *sūtra* also prohibits *guṇa* in that place. This is no fault. The *guṇa* in ‘*yus*’ is the object of prohibition and this prohibition, as it works, contradicts another prohibition of its own class. What is the prohibition of the same class ? That which depends upon the suffix. But this prohibition is with reference to the original *dhātus*.<sup>176</sup>

Or, rather, that which has a general rule is contradicted. If the rule ‘*knīti ca*’ had not exercised its prohibitive control, the rule ‘*yusi guṇah*’ would

175. The word ‘*dr̥ṣṭānuvidhitvāc ca chandasah*’ as used in the *Bhāṣya* deserves a little comment. *Dīdhī* and *vevī* have currency in ordinary language and though in the ordinary language the words that are actually seen current in usage, but which are grammatically correct and correctness of which we can assume by their use by master minds may be re-accepted in language. But these forms such as *adīdhyānam* as illustrated before, are not actually found in the *Vedas*. The Vedic forms are ‘*ādīdhet*’, ‘*ādīdhayuh*’ where *guṇa* has been commended. The prohibition of *guṇa* in case of ‘*dīdhī*’ cannot therefore be accepted. If *guṇa* did not take place, the forms might be ‘*ādīdhyānam*’, ‘*adīdhyakah*’. Such forms are not found current in the *Vedas*. We find *guṇa* in the *Vedas* and therefore the universal prohibition of *guṇa* by the present rule is not justifiable. *Ādīdhet* is the *lai* form of *dīdhī*, and ‘*ādīdhayuh*’ is formed by change ‘*jhi*’ into ‘*yus*’ by the rule “*jakṣityādayah ṣat*”(6.1.6) — The root ‘*jakṣa*’ and six other roots are regarded as *abhyasta*.

176. There is a rule “*jusi ca*” (7.3.83) which means that when the ‘*yus*’ suffix follows the *iganta* part of a root, is affected by *guṇa*, as ‘*ajuhavuh*’, ‘*avibhayuh*’. In the formation of the word ‘*adīdhayuh*’ there is *guṇa* by this rule “*jusi guṇah*”. The *sūtra* ‘*dīdhī-vevītām*’ should have opposed this *guṇa* by “*jusi ca*”, but the present *sūtra* ‘*dīdhī-vevītām*’ is dependent on the nature of the original roots ‘*dīdhī*’ and ‘*vevī*’ and is not dependent upon the suffix that followed them.

not have been introduced. Thus, there being the general prohibition by “*kniti ca*”, there is the special rule, “*jasi ca*”. But if thus, this rule was not introduced, how to solve the form ‘*dīdhyat* (*dīdhi* - *leṭ* ‘tip’)? Then by the rule “*itaś ca lopāḥ parasmaipade*” (3.4.97) the *i-kāra* in *dīdhi* is elided.

(Here the *Vārttika* intervenes)—*dīdhyat* has been formed by the irregularity of ‘*śyan*’.

(*Bhaṣya*:) ‘*Dīdhyat*’ has been formed by the irregularity of ‘*śyan*’.<sup>177</sup>

The ‘*īṭ*’ in the *sūtra* is also unnecessary. How so? ‘*akaṇiṣam*’, ‘*araṇiṣam*’, ‘*kanitā śvah*’, ‘*raṇitā śvah*.<sup>178</sup>

In the rule “*ārdhadhātukasya iḍ valādeḥ*” (7.2.35; when a suffix of the *ārdhadhātuka* class with any of the alphabets contained in the group ‘*val*’ follows, there should come the augment ‘*īṭ*’). ‘*īṭ*’ was available by continuity or *adhikāra* and there was no necessity for including the word ‘*īṭ*’ in the *sūtra* 7.2.35, had it not been for the fact that it indicates that this ‘*īṭ*’ will remain unchanged—whatever else might be prescribed in its place, should not take place. The *adhikāra* of ‘*īṭ*’ (7.2.35) may be traced from the rule “*neḍvaśi kṛti*” (7.2.8).

If a restriction is made when we have ‘*pipaṭihī*’ from ‘*pipaṭhiṣati*’ without a visible suffix, the ‘*īṭ*’ ought not to have been lengthened.<sup>179</sup>

177. *Dīdhi* - *śyan* + *tip*—the ‘*śyan*’ being ‘*īṭ*’, there is no *guṇa* by “*kniti ca*”. By the rule “*yīvaraṇayor didhi-vevyoh*” (7.4.53; when *ya* and *i* follow, the *i* of *dīdhi* and *vevī*, they are elided). The *i* of *dīdhi* is elided and thus we have *dīdhyat*.

178. The root ‘*kaṇ*’ as in *kaṇati*, means ‘to become small’, ‘to cry in distress’ or ‘to approach’. The root ‘*raṇ*’ as in *raṇati*, *rarāṇa*, means ‘to rejoice’, ‘to praise’, ‘to go’. *akaṇiṣam* = *kaṇ* + *am* (*lui*) = *a* + *kaṇ* + *sic* + *am* = *a* + *kaṇ* + *i* + *sic* + *am* = *akaṇiṣam*.

Here the *guṇa* of *i* was expected by the rule “*pugantalaghūpadhasya ca*” (7.8.86). It is suggested that the *guṇa* of this *īṭ* as expected by the rule ‘*puganta*’ etc., is suspended by the present rule. This is the reason why the *Bhaṣya* says that if this rule was not composed by Pāṇini, how could we have prohibited the *guṇa* of *īṭ* in *akaṇiṣam*? Here a provisional reply will now be suggested by the *Bhaṣya* that follows.

179. We have the verb ‘*pipaṭhiṣati*’ from *paṭh* + *saṇ* and then we add ‘*kvip*’ suffix to it. There is the rule “*ato lopāḥ*” (6.4.48; when an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows, the *a* of the preceding verb is elided). Thus we have *pipaṭhiṣa* + *kvip* = *pipaṭhiṣ* (by the rule 6.4.48) the ultimate *a* is elided. Now, we have a rule ‘*sasajuṣo ruḥ*’ (8.2.66; a *pada* ending in *sa* and the word ‘*sajuṣ*’ will have *ra* in place of their *sa*). We have another rule “*īṭ koh*” (8.3.57; it means that the *sa* following the vowels included in the group ‘*īṭ*’ or the consonants in the group *ku*, will become cerebralised). But since the rule “*īṭ koh*” is a rule later than the rule “*sasajuṣo ruḥ*” and since they are both within the *tripādī*, i.e. the last three sections of Pāṇini’s work, work, the rule, “*īṭ koh*” is to be regarded as null or *asiddha* by the rule, “*pūrvatrāsiddham*” (8.2.1) and therefore the

(Another provisional reply is suggested in the *Bhāṣya* that follows)—

This is no criticism. It is the operation regarding an *aṅga* that is restricted. But this is not an *aṅga* operation.<sup>180</sup>

(The final suggestion on the point will be attempted in the *Bhāṣya* that follows)— Or, rather, the lengthening is nullified (*asiddha*); that being nullified, there will be no restriction.<sup>181</sup>

### General review

Both the *Vārttika* and the *Bhāṣya* think that the rule “*dīdhīveviṭām*” could well have been dropped by Pāṇini. The roots ‘*dīdhī*’ and ‘*vevi*’ are found in the *Vedas* only and they are found to undergo *guṇa*. The rule was not also necessary for the prohibition of the ‘*ī*’, as the rule “*ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ*” indicates that this ‘*ī*’ should not undergo *guṇa*.

*Kambala + dā + ka*— in the case of *ākārānta dhātus* with *ka* suffix there does not occur any *guṇa* of the *ākāra*. By associating the *k-it* suffix in case of *ākārānta dhātus*, provision has been made to render the *ākāra* of the

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rule “*sasajuso ruḥ*” applies and we have *pipathir* and we have thus *pipathīḥ* with the transformation of *ra* into *visarga* (:). But the objection of the *Bhāṣya* is that if by the restriction suggested in the previous section that an ‘*ī*’ enjoined by the rule “*ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ*” (7.2.35), should remain ‘*ī*’ and should not undergo any change, with what reason could we introduce a change in this ‘*ī*’ by lengthening the ‘*ī*’ in *pipathīḥ* ?

180. The point raised here is that the rule “*ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ*” enjoins the restriction that whatever may be in other cases, this ‘*ī*’ will not be changed. But this operation or injunction words off any change or ‘*ī*’ as an *aṅga* operation. But the rule “*rvor upadhāyā dīrgha ikah*” (8.2.76; a *pada* or a *dhātu* ending in *ra* or *va* will have its vowel of the ‘*ik*’ group lengthened) does not prescribe a change of the *aṅga* type and therefore such a change of the ‘*ī*’ was not contemplated in the rule “*ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ*” which asserted in an indicatory manner that in no *aṅga* operation this ‘*ī*’ shall be changed. It should be noted in this connection that the *a* that was elided by the rule “*ato lopah*” (6.4.48) forming the word ‘*pipathīḥ*’, for the maxim is that, that which is elided in connection with ‘*kvip*’ cannot be regarded as *sthānivat*.

181. It was suggested that the rule “*ārdhatukasyed valādeḥ*” (7.2.35; implied that this ‘*ī*’ would not be changed and it was then objected: how we could lengthen the *i* by the rule “*rvor upadhāyā*” etc. (8.2.76) ? The reply is that the rule “*rvor upadhāyā*” etc. (8.2.76) is a rule in the *tripādī* and hence its operation is non-existent (*asiddha*) in the eye of the rule “*ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ*” (7.2.35). This rule “*ārdhadhātukasya*” etc. does not know that its injunction regarding the inviolability of ‘*ī*’ was transgressed by the rule “*rvor upadhāyā*” etc. in the *tripādī*.

*dhātu* into *akāra*. This shows that *guṇa* does not occur in such cases and hence the *sūtra*. Similar is the case with “*janer dāḥ*”.

- (i) *puganta-laghūpadhasya eva sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh*
- (ii) *puganta-laghūpadhasya sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayor eva.*

*Pāṇini.*      **halo'nantarāḥ samyogaḥ 1.1.7.**

Consonants unintervened by a different class of vowels are together technically called conjunctions (*samyoga*)

*Bhāṣya.*      anantarā iti. katham idam vijñāyate—  
avidyamānam antaram yeśām iti, āhosvid  
avidyamānā antaraiśām iti ?

(The word ‘*anantarāḥ*’ is now picked up for interpretation and a question is now raised as to the meaning of the word). How should we understand the meaning of the word — is it, those of which there is no intervening time or is it those of which there is nothing intervening.<sup>182</sup>

*Bhāṣya.*      kim cātah ? yadi vijñāyate — avidyamānam  
antaram yeśām iti. avagrahe samyoga-samjñā  
na prāpnoti — “*apsvityap'su*” (RV. 1.23.19)  
iti. vidyate hy atrāntaram.  
athā vijñāyate — avidyamānā antaraiśām-  
iti na doṣo bhavati.

What of that ? If it is understood as those of which there is no hole (the first meaning), in that case the term ‘*samyoga*’ or conjunction could not be applicable to the *avagraha* (for meaning see below), as in “*apsvityap'su*”. There is a hole here. If it is understood as those of which there is no intervening letter, there is no harm.<sup>183</sup>

182. The two alternative meanings suggested are as follows:

(1) In the first meaning ‘*antara*’ means a hole, i.e. moment devoid of any letter. In the first meaning ‘*anantarā*’ is formed by a *bahuvrihi* compound with *nañ* particle. ‘*anantarā*’ thus means holeless (*niśchidra*). ‘*halo'nantarāḥ*’ thus means consonants in the pronunciation of which there is no hole or lapse of time.

(2) In the second meaning, the word is ‘*antarā*’ and not ‘*antara*’. ‘*anantarā*’ means — in the middle. “*halo'nantarāḥ*” thus means those consonants that have no letter in between them.

183. ‘*Avagraha*’ means the unit of time of the length of half measure or *ardhamātrā* and ordinarily the period of time required in passing from one alphabet sound to

Bhāṣya.

yathā na doṣas tathā 'stu.

athavā punarastu—avidyamānam antaram  
yeṣām iti. nanu coktam — avagrahe sam-  
yoga-samjñā na prāpnoti— “apsvityap’su”  
iti. vidyate hy atrānaram iti. naiva doṣaḥ, na  
prayojanam.

Then let it be that in which there is no harm of rather we may also accept the first interpretation as those of which there is no hole. But it has been said that in such a case the term ‘samyoga’ should not be applicable to an *avagraha* as in ‘apsvityap’ su’, there is a hole here.<sup>184</sup>

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another alphabet sound or *varaṇa* is called half measure, *ardhamātrā*. When two consonants are pronounced one succeeding the other, there is still the delay of half measure as determining the period of succession. But there may be a delay of an additional half measure in the case of *pluta* accent as in “*guroranṭa*” or “*apsvityap’su*”.

Thus in such cases there would be one measure of time and consequently the term ‘samyoga’ would not be applicable. This interpretation is rejected.

184. A few points have to be first noted before we can understand the meaning of the above version. There is a *sūtra* “*pratyabhivāde sūdre*” (8.2.83.) — At the time of counter-greeting on the part of a teacher — the *ti* part of the name should be both *pluta* and *udātta* — ‘*ti*’ means the part of a word beginning with the last vowel — “*aco ntyādi ti*” (1.1.64). There is another rule “*samyoge guru*” (1.4.11.), i.e. when a conjunction or a *samyoga* follows the vowel-part preceding it is called *guru*. There is another rule “*guror anṛto nantyasyāpy ekaikasya prācām*” (8.2.86). In the case of counter-greeting on the part of a *guru* and not referring to a *sūdra*, the *pluta* accent should be modified by the present rule to the extent that vowels not being a *r* and being non-ultimate as well as *guru* or ending in ‘*api*’ should have the *pluta* in the successive part of the *ti*, optionally. Thus the word ‘*Devadatta*’ can be made *pluta* in the following way —

De3vadatta/ Deva3datta/ Devadatta3. But in ‘*Kṛṣṇamitra*’ where there is a *kṛ* we have only two — *Kṛṣṇa3mitra*/ *Kṛṣṇamitra3*. Now in the phrase “*apsvityap’su*” ‘*a*’ would be *guru* vowel as we would expect here *pluta* by the rule “*guroranṭa*” etc. But there is no *pluta* here, and this would ultimately lead to the view that the ‘*su*’ in ‘*apsu*’ is not a *samyoga*. But if this is so why then again accept such a view. The reply is that the *samjñā-s* are made for particular utility and for removing certain criticism. But the word “*apsvityap’su*” means ‘in the water in the water’. *Pluta* is possible only in the case of calling at a distance — *durād hūte*; and therefore there is no occasion for a *pluta* accent here, for ‘*apsvityap’su*’ is not a name called from a distance and therefore there is nothing to be afraid of that in such cases there cannot be any *pluta* and that this would lead to a miscarriage of our definition of *samyoga* as holeless.

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
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